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Preface
Who shall count the host of weaker men whose sense of truth has
been destroyed in the effort to harmonise impossibilities - whose life
has been wasted in the attempt to force the generous new wine of
science into the old bottles of Judaism? (Thomas Huxley 1894, 52)
We need to be honest to science. Through the natural and social
sciences we know in considerable detail the reality in which we live,
move and have our being (to adapt a phrase from Acts of the Apostles
17: 28). We should not sacrifice our sense of truth 'in the effort to
harmonise impossibilities', nor should we waste our time on attempts to
adapt new insights to old views of the world. Rather, we need to adapt
our view of the world to the best available insights we have.
Emphasis on the sciences does not imply that other types of human
discourse are irrelevant. Even if morality, politics, art, the love for
another person, and the love of music can be understood within a
naturalist framework informed by the natural and social sciences, they
are still real and rich human practices. This applies to religion as well:
I do not see religiously relevant gaps in the natural and human world,
where the divine could somehow interfere with natural reality. The
origins and functions of religions may be intelligible. However,
religion can be seen as an important, real, and rich human phenom-
enon. Furthermore, the whole of reality is not itself understandable
within a naturalist framework; in response, a sense of gratitude and
wonder with respect to the reality to which we belong may be
appropriate.
I do not consider an intellectual study like this one the most
important thing in the world. When we stand before the divine
throne on the day of judgement, if I may for the moment use this
image, God will not ask 'How did I do it?' Rather, the question might
be: 'What did you do with it?' With Calvin De Witt, from whom this
set of questions has been taken, I agree that issues which are within
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our responsibility, in our time especially environmental issues, are
extremely urgent. However, here I will be concerned with 'the voice
that speaks' rather than with 'what the voice speaks'. If there is no
throne in the clouds, how then should we think about God (if at all),
about the world, and about ourselves in this world?
Many believers do not take the natural and social sciences seriously
enough. Some do not pay any attention to the sciences at all. Among
those who do, various strategies for coping with the sciences may be
found in both naive and sophisticated forms. Some concentrate on
gaps in our current knowledge. This strategy reinforces others in the
impression that the advancement of science has to imply the retreat of
religion. Others do not concentrate on specific gaps, but play down
the status of scientific knowledge - a 'scientific agnosticism' which has
to make room for religion. Then there are others who adopt a
'scientific method' in theology, with an elaborate formal apparatus,
while avoiding engagement with scientific knowledge. Quite a few
traditional and New Age believers embrace science uncritically; they
run away with a mystification of quantum physics or chaos theories.
And, for the moment last but not least, science may be taken
seriously, but used only as a source of analogies and models, rather
than as a source of knowledge about the world of which humans are
a part.
I consider such responses half-hearted. They diminish the relevance
of science. This becomes especially clear when we note that the sciences
offer not only insights into the world, but also insights about ourselves.
Not only did the world evolve - an evolution which might be seen as
God's mode of creation - but we humans, with our religious beliefs
and moral codes, are the product of evolution as well. The sciences are
not only about the world out there, but also about ourselves; they
inform us about our constitution in relation to our environment
(brains, genes, culture, etc.) and about the way this constitution and
this environment became what they are through evolution. The
challenge is to accommodate religious positions not merely to contem-
porary physics, but also to insights gained through evolutionary biology
and the neurosciences, and beyond that to knowledge acquired in, for
instance, cultural anthropology and comparative studies in the histories
of religions. In this study the emphasis is on the natural sciences, but
the impact of such social sciences needs to be taken into account. The
social sciences may be less precise due to the complexity of their subject
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matter, but they complement the natural sciences in an important way,
especially when human practices and beliefs are considered.
Many non-believers take science seriously, and consider this to be
the end of all religion. The loss of interest in religion is, in my
opinion, an impoverishment of our lives. Science is not the only, and
perhaps not even the most important, factor in the declining
importance of religion in the Netherlands and other Western
countries. The rise of historical consciousness, respect for the
plurality of cultures and traditions, and indignation with the way
religious traditions have fuelled intolerance and cruelty have certainly
contributed to sceptical attitudes towards religious truth claims. The
decline of the importance of church membership for social careers
has also contributed to indifference with respect to religion.
However, even if its traditional truth claims are questioned and its
social power is gone, religion may still be important as one of the
factors that shape our way of life, our experiences, and our view of
the world. It is to such an appreciation of the possible importance of
religion that I hope to contribute.
In the first chapter of this book the central notions 'science', 'natur-
alism', and 'religion' will be explored, and various strategies and views
of the relationship between science and theology will be considered.
Chapter 2 considers some historical episodes in interactions between
science and religion and evaluates views of these episodes. Then, we
will turn towards theological responses to contemporary scientific
knowledge of the world (chapter 3) and of human nature (chapter 4). The
final chapter (5) returns to the understanding and defence of science
and of religion. In the text, numbers placed in square brackets will be
used to refer to sections of the book.
Proper sensitivity to disadvantages and prejudices related to gender as
it has arisen over the last decades has resulted in uneasiness with
respect to the use of personal pronouns when referring to humans.
Rather than alternating gender by occasion or chapter, I have decided
to use the female and the male pronouns for two slightly different
purposes: when referring to a human as the subject who studies reality
as a scientist, scholar, or theologian, I will use female pronouns,
whereas I will use male pronouns when referring to humans as objects
of study. Thus, when an anthropologist studies the beliefs of a tribe, I
will refer to 'his beliefs' and 'her studies'. This, of course, in no way
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implies that scholars are always female or that male persons are the
proper representatives of humans.
I was trained in theoretical physics at the University of Utrecht, the
Netherlands. Out of interest I studied theology and philosophy of
religion at the Universities of Amsterdam and of Groningen. My
dissertation on theological and philosophical issues related to astrophy-
sical cosmology was published as Beyond the Big Bang: Quantum Cosmologies
and God (Drees 1990). Cosmology, and certainly quantum cosmology, is
a peculiar and a-typical branch of science, more prone to philosophical
and religious speculations than most other areas of the natural sciences.
I felt challenged to reflect upon the implications of more regular
branches of the sciences, and especially those that impinge upon our
understanding of ourselves, such as evolutionary biology and the
neurosciences.
When engaged in critical discussion of other positions I sometimes feel
ungrateful, as I am mostly taking things apart without being able to put
all the pieces back together. I am grateful that there have been persons
who dare to elaborate creative proposals and to explore their possibi-
lities; I could not have embarked upon this project without such
constructive contributions. I am thinking with gratitude especially of
Robert J. Russell, my host at the Center of Theology and the Natural
Sciences, affiliated with the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley,
in the Fall of 1987, and of Philip Hefner, who hosted me at the Chicago
Center for Religion and Science, linked with the Lutheran School of
Theology at Chicago during the Winter and Spring of 1988. Among
the many others who through their constructive writings made my
work possible, I mention Ian Barbour, Ralph Burhoe, Michael Heller,
Nancey Murphy, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, and Luco van
den Brom, with all of whom I had discussions on various occasions,
and Gordon Kaufman and Gerd Theissen, whose constructive writings
I appreciate more than may be apparent from the discussion in this
book.
The first draft was written during the first half of 1993 in the Center
of Theological Inquiry in Princeton, a hospitable and stimulating
environment sustained by the leadership of Dan Hardy. I express my
gratitude to the Department of Philosophy of Princeton University,
which granted me a visiting fellowship during those seven months, and
especially to Bas van Fraassen, my friendly host. I also thank the
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Netherlands American Committee for Educational Exchange for
giving me a grant as a Senior Fulbright Scholar.
I have had the opportunity to present earlier versions of some parts
of this book in various contexts. I think with gratitude of the research
conferences organised by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for
Theology and the Natural Sciences (Gastel Gandolfo, Italy, September
1991, and Berkeley, USA, August 1993); the conference on 'Physics and
Our View of the World' organised by the Praemium Erasmianum
Foundation (Oosterbeek, NL, 1992); the Fourth and Fifth European
Conferences on Science and Theology, organised by the European
Society for the Study of Science And Theology (Rocca di Papa, Italy,
March 1992, and Freising, Germany, March 1994); lectures at the
Princeton Theological Seminary and at the Chicago Advanced
Seminar on Religion and Science (April 1993); two consultations
organised by the Center of Theological Inquiry in Princeton (June 1993
and 1994); and meetings of the research group on knowledge and
normativity of the Department of Philosophy of the Vrije Universiteit
and of the working group on science and theology initiated by the
Bezinningscentrum of the Vrije Universiteit, chaired by Professor
Maarten Maurice, a generous supporter of work on the relationship
between theology and the natural sciences. I also acknowledge the
importance of meetings on (socio)biology and theology organised by
the Evangelische Akademie in Loccum (Germany) and the Chicago
Center for Religion and Science (May, Striegnitz, and Hefner 1989,
1990), even though I did not present any material there myself. The
Prins Bernhard Fonds Prize, awarded in 1992 by the Dutch Academy
of Sciences in Haarlem, and the 1994 prize from the Legatum
Stolpianum of the University of Leiden, both for my book on
cosmology and theology, and prizes in 1994 and 1995 from the John
Templeton Foundation in its programme on 'humility theology1 were
valuable encouragements to academic work which cuts across contem-
porary disciplinary boundaries.
Peter Kirschenmann, philosopher of science at the Vrije Universiteit
in Amsterdam, has contributed enormously to the maturation of this
book through critical questions and comments. I also thank the
Department of Philosophy for accepting this thesis as a serious
contribution to an important debate, even though most faculty
members heartily disagreed with the position defended here. Ernan
McMullin,John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy, emeritus, of
the University of Notre Dame is to be thanked not only for his
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willingness to act as referent, but also for the way he challenged and
encouraged me to articulate central elements more clearly. Bas and
Tina Jongeling corrected the English of an earlier version as well as
some of my arguments. I am also grateful for the many other
individuals who responded to drafts of various chapters, or who
through discussions contributed to the development of some of the
ideas presented here. With the certainty that I am omitting some
persons, I recall responses by, ideas from, and conversations with John
H. Brooke, Calvin B. DeWitt, S. J. Doorman, Corby Finney, Owen
Gingerich, Gary Green, Niels Henrik Gregersen, Casper Hakfoort,
Dan Hardy, Philip Hefner, Rob Hensen, Piet Hut, Chris Isham, Wim
de Jong, Evert Jonker, Bernd-Olaf Küppers, Theo Kuipers, Huib
Looren de Jong, Maarten Maurice, Gees de Pater, Arthur Peacocke,
Herman Philipse, John Puddefoot, Hans Radder, Helmut Reich,
Robert J. Russell, Robert Scharlemann, Bas van Fraassen, Wentzel van
Huyssteen, Wim van der Steen, René van Woudenberg, Bas
Verschuren, Christoph Wassermann, and an anonymous referee for
Cambridge University Press.
My employer, the Bezinningscentrum of the Vrije Universiteit,
graciously allowed me a leave of absence for the seven months in
Princeton during which the first draft of this book was conceived, and
my colleagues created the atmosphere in which I could complete the
book. My closest colleagues, Bert (A. W.) Musschenga and Anton van
Harskamp, have responded to drafts of sections and exerted even more
influence through many incidental conversations. However, it is likely
that neither they nor the board of the Bezinningscentrum, nor any of
the persons mentioned, fully agrees with my position as developed
here. While they all deserve positive credit, they all must be excused
from any blame.
I^ast but not least, Zwanet graciously allowed me many leaves of
absence, both physical and mental, taking care of our children
Johannes, Annelot, and Esther, while encouraging me to complete my
work. In line with the main thrust of my argument, I believe that her
love and support is not less real for being embodied. This book is
dedicated to her.
Religion and science: strategies, definitions, and issues
i. INTRODUCTION: A VARIETY OF STRATEGIES
Mountain peaks do not flow unsupported; they do not even just rest upon
the earth. They are the earth in one of its manifest operations. (John Dewey
'934, 3)
Humans too 'are the earth in one of its manifestations'. We are part and
parcel of nature. Our mental life, consciousness, and culture, our sciences
and our religious convictions 'do not flow unsupported', nor do they
merely 'rest upon' our physical constitution. We are natural, limited,
biological beings. This has consequences for our self-understanding, our
views of human religion and science included.
We are atoms and molecules, but we are not just piles of them. We
are much more structured and shaped. Reality allows for a rough
division into levels of complexity, from quarks to atoms, and from
molecules to organisms and cultures, and our knowledge ranges
accordingly from physics and biology to the social sciences and
humanities. Religion and morality belong to the 'highest' level, that of
human persons, cultures, and traditions. However, that level does not
'flow unsupported', but is rooted in, or rather a manifestation of, the
rich possibilities of the natural world. In this study I seek to articulate
such a view of reality and attempt to think through perspectives for
religion in a world best understood in scientific terms. In chapter i I
will articulate my understanding of the main partners, that is, of
science and the naturalist view of reality which, in my opinion, is the
most adequate interpretation of the sciences [2], and of religion [3].
After these reflections on the partners and on definitions of central
terms, we come to discussions about the relationship between science
and religion [4, 5]. But first, we will consider some strategies for dealing
with religion in relation to the natural sciences.
2 Religion and science
My strategy with respect to the sciences is in contrast with various other
interpretations of the natural sciences.
(1) Some play down science in order to make room for existing beliefs.
In their opinion, science offers knowledge which may be instrumentally
useful, but this knowledge is not significant when it comes to matters of
meaning, where we have to turn to subjective experience and inter-
personal relations. Either the status of scientific insights or the extent of
the domain of science is supposed to make the sciences irrelevant for
reflections on religious life. With such thinkers I agree that religion and
science are quite different enterprises. However, humans are part of
the natural world; the sciences may well have something to say about
interpersonal relations and subjective experiences too. At various
places in this study I will attempt to make it clear that such modest,
agnostic views of science, with respect to its domain and the nature of its
claims, underestimate the scope and strength, and thus the relevance of
the natural sciences.
(2) Others do not so much play down science, but rather
embrace it while arguing that the sciences result in a 'holist' or
'organic' view of reality, which incorporates notions such as values
and feelings. In some such approaches the standard disciplinary
order of the sciences is rejected, and mental or personal phe-
nomena are taken to be more basic than physical ones, or at least
equally fundamental (e.g., process metaphysics, as inspired by
Whitehead). Reality is seen as more meaningful than the dominant,
physicalist view of the sciences seems to suggest. I will argue that
such romantic or metaphysical interpretations of science are, if not at odds
with the best available knowledge, unwarranted when they postulate
more fundamental entities or relations than one needs to account
for all our experiences.
(3) In this study I opt for an interpretation of the sciences which takes
them very seriously (though cautiously so, since current scientific
theories are not final) and as relevant to our understanding of the
natural world, humans included (against i). I accept the current
disciplinary structure of the sciences, which gives physics a prominent
place when it comes to the most basic laws and constituents of reality,
while life and consciousness are taken to be phenomena which depend
on complex organisations and are studied by 'higher-level' sciences
such as biology and psychology. The sciences say what they seem to
say; the interpretation need not always be obvious or unique, but a
radical reinterpretation and reshuffling of the sciences allows more
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liberty from accepted scientific practice than I consider warranted
(against 2).
Among those who take the sciences as relevant and as saying what they
seem to say, various positions with respect to religion can be found.
(a) Some authors give the sciences full reign in the domain of
knowledge, and conclude that science has made all religion futile. I
agree with them on the primacy of science in the realm of knowledge;
claiming science and religion as separate cognitive enterprises of equal
status is too easy. I also agree on a sober rather than a romantic
naturalist framework as the best interpretation of modern science, and
conclude that science challenges religious views. However, contrary to
polemical anti-religionists, I hold that religion continues to be an important
phenomenon in our reality. Even when religion is explained, if ever, it
will not thereby be eliminated even though it will have to change.
Furthermore, I will argue that a naturalist understanding of phe-
nomena in reality leaves some questions about the framework as a
whole open; questions which such authors dismiss too easily.
(b) This brings me closer to those who do science-and-theology in a
way which takes the natural sciences seriously. However, within this
approach I will distance myself from those who do science-and-theology as
if science offers evidence for divine design, as if there is room for
particular divine actions within the natural world, or as if we have two
enterprises of equal cognitive status which need to be integrated. In my
opinion, such a position runs the risk of demanding 'less than it could
of theologians and more than it should of scientists' (Eaves 1991, 496).
It demands more than it should of the scientists since such an approach
threatens the coherence of the sciences; this coherence I articulate in
the notion of 'naturalism' [see below, 2]. Equally important, if one
relates scientific understanding of the world to theological convictions
[chapter 3], without taking into account scientific insights about human
nature [chapter 4], one demands less than one should of theologians. I
have two reasons for this position.
(i) We should not combine a sophisticated understanding of physics
with a pre-scientific understanding of human nature, for example, by
talking about mind, subjective experience, affections, or decisions
without taking into account the way such aspects of personal life are
rooted in our constitution. In our anthropology, which is essential to
any theological position which is existentially relevant, we should take
the appropriate sciences into account. A jump from quantum physics
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to the self, or from non-linear thermodynamics and chaos theory to
human nature is inadequate since it bypasses many relevant 'inter-
mediate' disciplines such as neurophysiology, behavioural genetics, and
sociobiology [22-6, 28].
(ii) Theologians not only have to develop a view of creation and
providence which does not conflict with the evolution of species and
our knowledge of physical processes. They also have to take into
account that religious beliefs and interpretations arose in various
historical and pre-historical circumstances. That such beliefs arose in
certain circumstances does not imply that they must be wrong, but
their historical contingency in relation to human history and human
nature raises the question of why we would consider particular beliefs
of an earlier epoch as serious candidates for truth or as existentially
relevant insights, worth reformulating in our time. Translating theolo-
gical convictions into new terms by finding new models and metaphors
is, in my opinion, inadequate if questions concerning the evolved,
historical character of human religious traditions are passed by.
Whether theologians can respond adequately to these insights, is
something that depends on the criteria by which one evaluates the
results of projects like the one undertaken here. I will articulate a
minimum number of elements which I consider essential [3], and seek
to argue in this book that these can find a place in a naturalist view of
reality.
My approach is minimalist with respect to religion (Stone 1992), but
this is, in my opinion, a consequence of taking science seriously. The
challenges from the sciences to religion are such that significant changes
in our understanding of religion are called for. Religion is too
important to leave to conservatives who attempt to save faith by
keeping science at bay with the help of formal arguments, by rejecting
science, or by replacing it with a reconstruction of their own. The rise
of conservative positions, both inside and outside the Christian
churches, is 'a sign not so much of a recovery of faith as of a loss of
nerve before the onslaught of new perceptions of the world' (Peacocke
1993, via). Theologians and other thinkers about religion should not be
satisfied with less than honestly facing the challenges. The hope, and
for Gerd Theissen (1985, xi) the 'surprising experience', is 'that
precisely when we refuse to stop short at the innermost "sanctuaries" of
the tradition with our modern scientific questioning, the tradition
shows up in quite a new light'. I am less confident about this 'new light'
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than Theissen. However, whatever the outcome, intellectual honesty
compels us, in my opinion, to take science with utmost seriousness,
since it is the joint, cumulative and successful enterprise of many
individuals.
By arguing for a naturalist view of religion, for the importance of
religion, and for the persistence of limit questions despite the success of
the scientific understanding of reality, I will probably offend persons in
opposite camps: both those with a more traditional view of religion and
those who totally dismiss religion. Many adherents of these two
opposite positions share a static cognitive understanding of religion,
which is challenged here. Just as politics is too important to leave to
extremists on the left and the right to define the issues, so too are
religion and science too important to leave their fates to conservatives
and eliminators.
This book serves two purposes. One objective is to provide a survey of
various positions on, and of issues in, the relationship of religion and
science - many of which merit further attention. This survey has to be
selective and limited in view of the second goal: the articulation of my
own position, and its defence against various challenges, some of which
arise from the other positions considered. Though the book presents a
personal perspective, I hope that those who do not share my position
will none the less find the reflections on various challenges to religion in
relation to the natural sciences relevant. The following is an argument,
but it is also a map, providing an overview which may be useful
whatever the direction in which one may intend to go.
If one were to study all individual trees at length one would not notice
the forest. The analysis of the positions of individual authors may leave
much to be desired; a complete presentation of each view would have
to be much more nuanced. Besides, there are important books which
have not been considered, and British and American authors have
received much more attention than authors from the European
continent. I apologise for any biased representations. However, the aim
of this book - an argument about the field as a whole - is at odds with
a detailed analysis of individual authors or single issues and with the
attempt to be complete.
The focus is on Christianity as it is prominent in Western Europe
and in the United States of America. This is not in any way based upon
an informed judgement about the value of other traditions. Some
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limitation is necessary to acquire some depth with respect to the area
chosen. The particular limitation and approach adopted here are
contingent upon my own background and context, that of a late
twentieth-century Dutch academic, who was raised in a religiously
liberal and politically social-democratic atmosphere, who was trained
in one of the natural sciences, and whose primary professional
responsibility is intellectual rather than pastoral. Whether a similar
analysis could be made in other contexts, would have to be considered
by persons more versed in other traditions.
There may not be a neutral, objective stance; even the mixture of
empirical and analytical attitudes assumed here is the product of
tradition, namely of the intellectual traditions of modern science and of
the European Enlightenment. This tradition has moral and intellectual
merits in its ideal of an impartial view and in its intended attitude to
put any assertion as much as possible to the test, and therefore its
willingness to abandon any belief if it were to fail seriously. This
tradition is not neutral, maybe not even self-referentially consistent, as
problems of tolerance with respect to intolerant ideologies and persons
show. However, as a moral and intellectual tradition it is mine, and
that of many others both within and outside the churches in Western
Europe and North America. It is in that spirit of inquiry that I offer the
following reflections on religion in relation to the natural sciences.
2. SCIENCE AND NATURALISM
The 'Legend' was, and in some circles still is, that science discovers the
true story of the world by using the scientific method (Kitcher 1993, 3).
This view has come under attack during the last three or four decades.
Studies of actual science showed that some successes had been achieved
by violating officially acknowledged methods. Subsequent scientific
accounts and paradigms were shown to exhibit substantial discontinu-
ities, even though each story was in its time held to be almost,
approximately, or partially true. The relevance of social relations
among scientists and between scientists and the wider community to
the development of science has been brought to light. Such studies
have led to criticisms of the traditional view of science.
One possible response to the criticism of the legendary view of
science is to question and dismiss science. Another possible response is
to conclude that we should develop a better understanding of science
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in the conviction that 'Legend offered an unreal image of a worthy
enterprise' (Kitcher 1993, 5). I take the latter course. The epistemic
status of science can be defended even while the importance of the
social dimensions of scientific practices and the reality of discontinuities
in the history of various disciplines is accepted. This position can be
argued for in a general way on the basis of our successes in manip-
ulating the world and in unifying our understanding. More specific
arguments come from detailed studies, for instance of the social
dimensions in consensus formation and of continuities and discontinu-
ities during various historical transitions. P. Kitcher's The Advancement of
Science offers, in my opinion, a promising example of such a revised
view of science. He concludes:
Flawed people, working in complex social environments, moved by all kinds
of interests, have collectively achieved a vision of parts of nature that is
broadly progressive and that rests on arguments meeting standards that have
been refined and improved over centuries. Legend does not require burial but
metamorphosis. (Kitcher 1993, 390)
A few characteristics of the understanding of science that lies behind
my approach:
a. Science is taken in a realist way in the sense that it is supposed to
study a reality which is to a large extent independent of humans, and
even more independent of human attempts to find out about reality.
However, science is not restricted to phenomena which are indepen-
dent of humans. Even though large parts of the biosphere have been
modified by humans, a biologist can still study an ecosystem as a reality
which precedes her current study. A recently discovered class of
materials which exbibit superconductivity at relatively high tempera-
tures exists, as far as currently known, only in so far as these materials
have been made by humans in laboratories. However, a physicist who
studies these materials after producing them still investigates a reality
'out there', even though that reality has been constructed. Even the
study of human consciousness by physiologists and psychologists, to
take another example, is in many cases the study of other persons, and
if it is self-reflection there still is the assumption that the reflection
concerns one's own inner feelings and thoughts - a reality on which
one reflects.
b. However, such a realism does not carry us very far in debates on
scientific realism, which are, in my view, not debates about the existence
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of 'reality out there' but debates about the quality of our knowledge.
Do our terms refer to entities out there? Can we say that these entities
exist? Do our theories express relations between entities out there? Or,
less generally, which theories, or which elements in our theories, can
we take seriously as 'depicting' the way reality is, and to what extent?
What criteria should we apply when we attempt to answer such
questions? Are there mature sciences in which there is convergence to a
true account of the world? Unqualified realism, in the sense that we
take all our current theories to be the truth, or at least part of the truth
or increasingly better approximations to the final truth, seems too
strong, and thus too vulnerable to criticisms. Scientific explanations
and concepts are provisional human constructs organising the natural
world; they are not wholly independent of human intellectual capa-
cities, social interactions, and contingencies of history.
Debates about realism sometimes become heated due to conflation
of this debate about the quality of our knowledge with the debate
about the existence of reality out there referred to above (a), especially
when the dispute concerns not only the knowledge and existence of
ordinary reality but also knowledge about, and the existence of, God.
To some extent this conflation of the two debates on realism is to the
point when it comes to religious issues, since the consequence of a
certain view of our knowledge (the second debate, b) may be that one
has a low regard for the belief that religious terms refer to a particular
existent with the characteristics ascribed to God without, however,
challenging the existence of reality as such; perhaps the religious
terms are understood psychologically or sociologically [see below, 20,
22, 24]. To meet the challenge of a non-realist understanding of
religious terms, a general defence of realism in the first sense (in
contrast with idealism, [17]) is insufficient, since the challenge concerns
not so much the existence of a reality, but rather the nature of that
reality.
c. One major characteristic of the sciences is their wide scope; their
domain seems to be without obvious boundaries. In the course of
history, terrestrial physics turned out to be applicable to heavenly
phenomena as well, and chemistry can be applied to all processes in
living beings. The domain of the sciences extends from the smallest
objects to the universe at large, from extremely brief phenomena to the
stability of rocks, and from heavy objects to massless light. The same
physics and chemistry seem to apply everywhere and at all times.
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d. Correlated with the extension of science is the inner coherence of our
scientific knowledge. While I do not claim that theories in one
science, for instance biology or chemistry, can be exhaustively
reformulated in terms of another science, such as biochemistry or
physics, the coherence between different sciences has proved to be a
heuristically fruitful guide in the development of the sciences, and, if
temporarily strongly violated, has at least re-established itself as a
result of later scientific developments. Coherence has become a
criterion which makes us reject, or at least consider with the utmost
suspicion, purported knowledge which stands in splendid isolation,
even if it does not conflict with the rest of our knowledge. This
coherence is such an effective heuristic guide that I take it to be
informative about the reality with which our knowledge deals, but I
will articulate that when we come to 'naturalism'.
e. Science enlarges and changes our view of the known world.2 In science
there is more risk involved than in formal demonstrations (as in
mathematics) since the scientific theories are not in a strict sense
implied by the data. The development of scientific theories is also more
risky than induction or extrapolation, since theories may postulate
entities and concepts of a kind not found in the data; theories are more
than generalisations of facts. The debate about scientific realism (see
above, b) can also be interpreted as a debate about the way we should
consider the theories of science given the 'risk' involved in the process
by which we come to these theories: is the process to be understood as
a form of inference on which we can rely (and to what extent and for
what purposes)? Whatever we think of the realist status of scientific
theories, they offer us scientific images of the world which differ from our
The coherence need not have been heuristically fruitful at all moments in the history of
science, asj. H. Brooke pointed out to me with the help of some examples. For instance, in
the late nineteenth century there was no coherence between the best physical estimates of the
time available for terrestrial evolution (e.g., Kelvin calculated on the basis of known sources
of energy a solar lifetime of approximately 20 million years) and the time assumed in
evolutionary biology and geology. Too stringent opinions on coherence would have
hampered the development of biology. However, in this case coherence was established later,
with the discovery of nuclear fission and fusion. Coherence can also be artificial and
unfruitful, for example by making too facile claims about similarities and relations between
quantum and mental phenomena; this would be a claim to coherence which leaves out many
relevant 'intermediate' disciplines, such as the neurosciences and thus is not the kind of
coherence referred to in the text.
The expression that science enlarges our view of the known world has been taken from the
title of an essay by McMullin (1994); see also (McMullin 1992, 92), where he argues that the
scientific 'process as a wholr is the inference by which we transcend the limits of the observed,
even the instrumentally observed'.
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manifest images (Sellars 1963). This is especially relevant when we
consider religion, since religion is in general intimately related to
manifest images. This has to do with the importance of tradition for
religion, and hence that of symbols and myths from earlier times. It has
also a 'public relations' side, since most religions reach out to a wide
audience which understands and relates to manifest images more
easily. The difference between manifest and scientific images is also
conceptually important. For instance, our concept of a person (with an
inner life, emotions, responsibilities, etc.), as it is central to most
religious views, is rooted in our manifest images of the world.
f. Contemporary natural science is stable and provisional. It is stable in the
sense that many branches of science seem to be cumulative, building
upon knowledge acquired in the last few centuries. Whereas there was
a time when the existence of atoms was seriously disputed, it seems
extremely unlikely that physicists and chemists ever will abandon belief
in atoms and, for instance, in the periodic table arranging the various
elements. It seems equally unlikely that biologists will abandon evolu-
tion, both as a view of the natural history of organisms and as a theory
explaining this natural history in terms of transmission of properties (in
genes) and of differences in survival and reproduction between various
variants. However, science is also provisional, and this provisionality is
not merely that we may extend our knowledge into new domains (for
instance by creating and studying super-heavy elements), but also that
we may reach a further understanding of domains already known, and
thereby modify our views. For instance, our understanding of the
particles that make up atoms (protons, neutrons) has changed; they
now are taken to consist of quarks and gluons. And if one probes
further, one comes into a domain where the physics is very speculative,
and certainly not as stable as our belief in atoms.
Naturalism
Among those who intend to take science seriously, various views of the
world may be found, but one of these seems to me to be the most
adequate view of the world given contemporary natural science. It is
this view which I label 'naturalism'.
There are at least two ways of using the label 'naturalism'. Strawson
(1985, 38ff.) distinguishes between 'soft' or 'non-reductive' and 'hard' or
'reductive' naturalism. Upon the 'soft' understanding, naturalism refers
to what we ordinarily do and believe as humans, say about colours,
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feelings, and moral judgements. When a painting is considered
'naturalist', it is so in this 'soft' sense. The 'hard' version, according to
Strawson, attempts to view human behaviour in an 'objective',
'detached' light as events in nature. This distinction corresponds to
some extent with the distinction made above between 'manifest' and
'scientific' images. Strawson argues that these two ways of viewing the
world are compatible when each is considered relative to a certain
standpoint; however, if he has to choose, he opts for 'soft naturalism'
(Strawson 1985, 95). In contrast, I am of the opinion that in the light of
the successes of science we have to give 'hard naturalism' priority over
'soft naturalism' if there appears to be a conflict; science not only
supplements, but, in many instances on good grounds, corrects our (soft)
'natural' understanding of reality.
One could interpret this study as an attempt to understand what
happens to our self-understanding, our 'soft naturalism', when we think
through the results of the 'hard' approach. If 'hard' naturalism is to be
considered successful, it has to be able to make intelligible why we
perceive the world and ourselves the way we do, i.e. our 'soft naturalist'
view of the world. Physics not only offers a different description of a
table, say as empty space dotted by a few nuclei surrounded by fast
electrons, but also an explanation of the appearance of substantial
solidity. Some elements of our manifest images may be shown to be
illusions, but many elements of human self-understanding and manifest
images of the world can perhaps be recovered with minor reinterpreta-
tions, for instance as valid relative to a certain point of view and a
certain level of description. In this study I use the label 'naturalism' for
'hard naturalism'; 'materialism', 'physicalism', and 'physical monism'
may be construed as near synonyms.
My naturalism is a metaphysical position. It goes beyond the details
of insights offered by the various sciences as an attempt to present a
general view of the reality in which we live and of which we are a part.
However, it is a rather 'low-level' metaphysics in that it stays close to
the insights offered and concepts developed in the sciences, rather than
that it imposes certain metaphysical categories on the sciences or
requires a modification of science so that it may fit a metaphysical
position taken a priori. Thus, the view may seem to share in the
provisional character of scientific theories (see above, f). As a general
view my position is not dependent upon the fate of speculative theories,
say on superstrings. However, it is dependent upon the fate of major
scientific insights, and especially on the standard view of matter as
12 Religion and science
constituted of atoms (physics) and on the standard view of organisms as
having arisen through an evolutionary process. At various places in this
study we will consider the question of how to deal with disagreements
in science (especially in [16]), and how the presence of such disagree-
ments affects our view of the current consensus. The fact that there are
disagreements, especially disagreements with respect to traditional
metaphysical issues such as ultimate origins and the temporality of the
universe, does support the conviction that one should be modest in
building metaphysical claims upon contemporary science. On the
other hand, we cannot do better than accept the best available knowl-
edge, and thus build upon the most stable insights about the constitu-
tion of worldly entities and the processes by which they came to be
what they are.
The following is an attempt to define some central terms of my
naturalism. It is not thereby decided by definition that these definitions
of naturalism apply to our world. Rather, it is claimed that these
definitions are useful in dealing with our knowledge of the world; this
claim to adequacy is to be supported by actual cases. Later chapters
thus not only consider the implications of such an understanding of the
world, but also explore the viability of a naturalist way of looking at the
world.
My own naturalism, informed by the natural sciences, can be
articulated in six claims. The first is a consequence of our experience
with the wide scope of the natural sciences. Non-material aspects of
reality, such as music, science, and social meanings, are not studied as
such by any of the natural sciences, but they seem to be always
embodied, and therefore causally efficacious, in forms which are in the
domain of the natural sciences, whether as ink on paper, sound waves
in the air, or neural patterns in a brain. Let us call the domain of the
natural sciences - a domain which includes stars and planets, living
beings and non-living objects, stable entities and ephemeral events,
physical objects and embodied mental and cultural entities - the
natural world. The first claim is then the following:
i. The natural world is the whole of reality that we know of and
interact with; no supernatural or spiritual realm distinct from the
natural world shows up within our natural world, not even in the
mental life of humans. This claim I will call ontological naturalism
(ON).
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The 'within' natural reality has been italicised to signal an important
qualification, to which I will return, namely that answers to questions
about the natural world as a whole may perhaps require reference to
something beyond the natural world (see below, LQ).
Above we already noted the coherence of our knowledge. This coherence
might be seen as an artifact: we might have restricted ourselves to
phenomena which could be dealt with in a coherent way. However,
such an understanding of the coherence of the sciences seems to do
insufficient justice to the historical development and to the contem-
porary situation of the sciences.
In the course of the development of the sciences, the understanding
of various phenomena which once were dealt with separately, has
become integrated, or at least linked. Apparent boundaries have
dissolved and phenomena which once seemed scientifically inaccessible
are now dealt with successfully. A recent example of increasing
coherence is the rise of theories which describe complex and chaotically
behaving systems with the help of differential equations on the basis of
the same physical principles as earlier Newtonian mechanics.
The enormous variety of specialisations in contemporary science
may seem to count against this understanding of coherence. A working
scientist has no need to reflect on the coherence of all the sciences; a
biochemist need not read any astrophysical cosmology. However,
scientists do pay attention to disciplines which deal with similar
phenomena in a different context, disciplines which study processes or
systems which are believed to be involved in the object of their own
study, and disciplines which assume certain conclusions about their
research. Thus, an astrophysicist studying nuclear processes during
stellar evolution may fruitfully relate to specialists in nuclear physics
and in plasma physics (who in different ways study the underlying
processes and the same processes in other contexts) and to cosmologists,
who consider the distribution throughout the universe of the various
elements produced in stars. The disciplinary organisation, as expressed
in academic careers and professional journals, is to some extent
arbitrary and pragmatically justified. However, there is a coherence
across the variety of sciences which is not an artefact due to the way we
organise science, but which tells us something about the natural world.
If we accept this interpretation of the coherence of the sciences, the
question becomes what the coherence of the sciences tells us about the
natural world. Some seek to interpret it as an indication of some kind
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of holist or organic unity of the world. However, given the actual shape
the coherence of the sciences has taken - which resembles a hierarchy
with more fundamental sciences describing the behaviour of the
constituents of the more complex systems described by 'higher'
sciences, with physics as the most fundamental science at the basis - I
take it that the unity of the sciences arises due to the fact that different
entities are constituted from the same basic stuff, say atoms and forces.
Interactions and spatial relations between constituents are, of course,
included in this view of reality; contemporary physics treats forces,
particles, and space-time together. Thus, I accept the following two
claims:
2. Our natural world is a unity in the sense that all entities are made up
of the same constituents. This I label constitutive reductionism (CR).
3. Physics offers us the best available description of these constituents,
and thus of our natural world at its finest level of analysis. This could
be called the physics postulate (PP).
Constitutive reduction does not imply elimination, as if the entities or
processes are not real; rather the reverse; pain does not become less
real or painful when its physiological basis is unravelled [see below, 22].
However, elimination might happen with regard to concepts used in
our descriptions: an exhaustive description in terms of constituents
might make concepts which were originally employed to analyse the
phenomena at the higher level superfluous, as mere convenient devices
for something which could be reformulated without recourse to such
terms. A major philosophical question is whether all our concepts can
be reduced, translated, and thus eliminated, in this epistemological
sense - a move which would make physics the only vocabulary which
we would, in principle, need. Elimination is especially an important
threat to any attempt to salvage religion in a naturalist perspective.3
There is no such risk when one holds that God intervenes occasionally
in the natural world (at odds with my first claim, ON), since religious
language is thereby provided with a unique domain of events.
However, if one accepts the naturalism described so far, one cannot
For instance, Viggo Mortensen points out that Burhoe's attempt to revitalise religion by
integrating God into the sciences by, apparently, identifying God and natural selection, as
both refer to the power to which we owe our being and to which we have to bow our heads
and adapt, (see below, [26]) may 'lead to the abolishing of religion', since 'then religion
becomes nothing but words words that we could just as well do without' (Mortensen 1987,
'97)-
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relate religious language to a domain of its own, except for philoso-
phical limit questions about reality as a whole (see below). For further
meaningfulness of religious language some form of irreducibility is
essential. Such an irreducibility can be defended in relation to the
natural sciences.
One way to approach the issue is to consider the division of labour
in contemporary science. This is possible due to the considerable
stability and independence of 'higher sciences' relative to fundamental
physics and cosmology. Various sciences have developed their own
ways of describing and analysing the phenomena with which they are
concerned. If one accepts constitutive reductionism (CR), every biolo-
gical, mental, or social change is at the same time a change in the
physical state of the system (token-token identity). However, regula-
rities described in processes at higher levels need not correspond to
regularities at the physical level. Constitutive reductionism does not
necessarily imply conceptual reductionism, or type-type identity, even
though some programmes which seek to reformulate theories at higher
levels in terms of lower levels may be successful and fruitful. Naturalism
need not exclude the meaningfulness and non-superfluous character of
concepts which are involved in explanations in sciences other than
physics.
This is not merely a philosophical claim, added independently from
physics just to mitigate its significance. It can be argued in relation to
ideas that have arisen in modern physics: 'The ideas of symmetry
breaking, the renormalization group and decoupling suggest a picture
of the physical world that is hierarchically structured in quasiautono-
mous domains, with the ontology and dynamics of each layer
essentially quasistable and virtually immune to whatever happens in
other layers.' Physicists studying scaling, renormalization, and critical
phenomena have come to the conclusion that 'much of the macro-
scopic behaviour was quite independent of the microscopic forces'
(Schweber 1993, 36f.; similarly Anderson 1972). This view could be
labelled ontological non-reductionist, in the sense that successful
causal explanations at a certain 'level' use terms which relate to real
causal dependencies and natural kinds at that level. Protons attract
electrons. The fact that at a different level of description protons are
understood as being constituted of quarks and gluons is no reason to
deny the ontological status of protons. Nor does the role of 'protons'
in certain causal explanations imply that they are fundamental rather
than constituted of other particles.
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I do not expect that many readers will disagree with this point when
it is made with respect to protons, but it also applies to notions at
higher levels. Carnivores, green plants, and humans are carnivores,
green plants, and humans even though at the atomic level they all are
carbon, phosphorus, hydrogen, and other well-known atoms. Desires
and emotions may perhaps be fundamental concepts in a psychological
analysis, even when affective and mental phenomena are rooted in
physiological processes, which are, 'further down', identical with
physical processes. The whole is not immediately understood in terms
of its parts as they function separately, as if someone could predict the
occurrence of emotions on the basis of knowledge of the behaviour of
individual molecules. Rather, our understanding of the behaviour of a
whole organism contributes to our understanding of the parts (nerve
cells, transmitters, etc.), and that understanding of the parts as they
function in that whole contributes to our understanding of the whole,
even though it need not always be possible to understand the whole in
the terms used to describe the parts.
The acceptance of the reality of 'higher level' entities may mislead
some to forget the physical realities underlying such entities; a risk
which is especially relevant in the context of a study of the implications
of a naturalist view for religion. The conclusion of the relative
independence of various sciences is conceptual and explanatory rather
than ontological in the constitutive sense. Therefore, I prefer to abstain
from speaking of 'ontological non-reductionism', and label the next
claim conceptual and explanatory non-reductionism (CEN):
4. The description and explanation of phenomena may require
concepts which do not belong to the vocabulary of fundamental
physics, especially if such phenomena involve complex arrange-
ments of constituent particles or extensive interactions with a
specific environment.
In the natural sciences, research may be oriented in two 'opposite'
directions. Some speculative thinkers, also outside the professional
communities, are attracted to the quest for an understanding of the
most fundamental laws and constituents of reality (e.g., quantum
physics, relativity theories, grand unified theories, etc.). But most
scientists work on the understanding of phenomena and on the
discovery and construction of new phenomena, assuming that the
constituents and laws relevant to their purposes are sufficiently well
known. This second approach is not only characteristic of disciplines
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such as chemistry, material sciences, or astrophysics, but also of large
parts of physics.
This division of work among scientists is successful. Chemists can
go on with their work, even though particle physicists may lack
consensus on the most fundamental theory (quarks, superstrings,
quantum gravity, etc). Physics is not fundamental to the building of
scientific knowledge, since most modifications in fundamental physics
do not affect 'higher sciences'. While fundamental physics is funda-
mental as inquiry about the fundamental ontology of the world, it is
the most speculative of the sciences, the pinnacle rather than the
foundation of the building of scientific knowledge. Fundamental
physics shares this status with cosmology, the study of our particular
universe in relation to the possibilities relative to the fundamental laws
and constituents.
While one may consider humans as 'inventions' of the evolutionary
process, the question arises of 'whose invention' that process itself is.
The intentional language is a metaphor conveying an insight: reductio-
nistic explanations within a naturalist framework do not explain the
framework itself, as a thumbnail sketch of the sciences may illustrate.
Concerning the properties of genes a biologist may refer to the
biochemist in the next office. When asked 'when and where did the 92
elements arise?' the chemist can refer to the astrophysicist. The
astrophysicist might answer that question in terms of nuclear processes
in stars and in the early universe, referring for further explanations to
the nuclear physicist and the cosmologist. This chain of referring to
'the person in the next office' ends, if successful at all, with the
cosmologist and the elementary particle physicist, the one concen-
trating on the ultimate historical questions and the other on the most
basic structural aspects of reality. Physicists and cosmologists cannot
refer to a 'person in the next office'. Due to this particular situation
they sometimes engage in philosophical and theological speculation
with much less embarrassment than scientists from other disciplines,
though not necessarily with greater competence.
5. Fundamental physics and cosmology form a boundary of the natural
sciences, where speculative questions with respect to a naturalist
view of our world come most explicitly to the forefront. The
The image of referring questions has been (aken from Misner (1977, 97); see also Weinberg
(1992, 242). It may be the case (hat historical (rosmological) and structural (fundamental
physical) questions converge on one desk, that of the quantum cosmologist (Isham 1993, jaf.).
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questions which arise at the speculative boundary I will call limit-
questions (LQ).
The questions which are left at the metaphorical 'last desk' are
questions about the world as a whole, its existence and structure. Such
limit-questions are persistent, even though the development of science
may change the shape of the actual ultimate questions considered at
any time. Naturalism does not imply the dismissal of such limit-
questions as meaningless, nor does it imply one particular answer to
such limit-questions. Religious views of reality which do not assume
that a transcendent realm shows up within the natural world, but which
understand the natural world as a whole as a creation which is dependent
upon a transcendent creator - a view which might perhaps be
articulated with the help of a distinction between primary and
secondary causality, or between temporal processes in the world and
timeless dependence of the world (including its temporal extension) on
God - are consistent with the naturalism articulated here [13.3, 31].
So far the account of the natural sciences and naturalism has been very
general. When we come to humans and their cultural creations, such as
moral systems and religions, we may consider various levels of analysis.
Physics is fundamental, but not very informative in this case. However,
with respect to living organisms we have a powerful pattern of
explanation which is not primarily in terms of constituents and laws
(physics), but in terms of interactions between organisms and their
environments, namely evolutionary biology. An informed contem-
porary naturalism has to accept this part of science, since it is very
successful in dealing with a wide variety of phenomena. Its explanatory
schemes are primarily functional: within the constraints due to natural
history, traits which contribute to the functioning of an organism (or,
more precisely, to the propagation of that trait in a given environment)
are likely to become more abundant than other traits which are
functionally neutral or disadvantageous.
The emphasis on biology may seem arbitrary: why would biology
deserve a more prominent place in this discussion than, for instance,
chemistry? However, in physics and in chemistry phenomena are
primarily classified in terms of what they do and in terms of their
micro-structure, whereas in biology phenomena are primarily classified
in terms of their purpose or function (as explicated by Mackor (1994,
542), who develops arguments from Millikan (1984, 1989)). Hence,
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there is a fundamental difference between physics and chemistry on the
one hand and biology (and, beyond biology, psychology and the social
sciences) on the other. In biology there is a greater variety of types of
explanations (Mackor 1994, 55if.), since one may explain in functional
terms what happens, in causal terms how it happens, and in evolu-
tionary terms why the organism is structured so that this behaviour can
happen (an 'ultimate' functional explanation in terms of reproductive
success).
That traits arose via biological evolution does not imply that every
trait must have been optimal in its original context; contingencies of
natural history may have determined to a large extent which traits
developed. Traits are likely to function well in circumstances similar to
those in which they arose, and likely to function less adequately when
the circumstances and the interests of the organism differ significantly
from those which occurred in the relevant segment of its evolutionary
past. Capacities may also be employed for new purposes; this is called
'plasticity'. Consider, for example, humans: our fingers did not evolve
to play the piano. Consciously or unconsciously, traits which had
evolved because they conferred certain advantages on their possessors
have been deployed for novel tasks; perhaps the ability to read animal
tracks endowed us with brain structures which we now deploy for
reading texts.
An evolutionary view does not imply a particular position in debates
on the role of the environment versus the role of the constitution of an
organism, such as the debate on whether intelligence is due to nature
(genes) or to nurture (education); it is probably due to a complex
interplay of both.
Whether evolutionary biology is sufficient for the understanding of
humans, their individual and social life and their cultural creations,
such as morality and religions, is to be considered in a later chapter. I
will argue that culture is not independent from biology, but that an
evolutionary treatment of morality, religion, and other cultural phe-
nomena which does not take into account the contribution of culture to
human life (and human evolution) is insufficient [24, 25]. Here I want
to underline the importance of evolutionary biology:
6. Evolutionary biology offers the best available explanations for the
emergence of various traits in organisms and ecosystems; such
explanations focus on the contribution these traits have made to the
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inclusive fitness of organisms in which they were present. Thus, the
major pattern of evolutionary explanation is functional. This claim
could be labelled the evolutionary explanations postulate (EEP).
The evolutionary perspective has consequences for epistemology. We
are able to acquire knowledge since we are endowed with sense organs,
certain mental capacities, and a body of implicit knowledge, much of
which is developed and acquired in early childhood with the acquisi-
tion of language. This background knowledge forms the core of our
manifest image of reality, as distinct from scientific images (see above,
e). This background to our capacity to acquire further knowledge of
natural reality is, upon an evolutionary view, itself a product of natural
reality, and thus a capacity which can be studied in the light of
evolutionary biology. Our epistemic capacities arose because they were
advantageous to our hominid ancestors (and further back in time to
earlier organisms); it is unlikely that traits would have evolved which
would have been costly but ineffective in the actual circumstances our
ancestors encountered. Thus, evolution has endowed us with capacities
and limitations. Our knowledge arises in particular contexts and is tied
to particular interests, though it may subsequently be sustained and
modified if and when the horizons of the 'world' in which we live
expand and our interests change.
Our knowledge of the world is always conditional upon our
capacities, contexts, and interests, and therefore never final or absolute.
Hence, naturalism is not to be identified with scientific realism without
further qualifications. Naturalism informed by the natural sciences
does take mental processes to be secondary relative to physical
processes (PP), and thus is a form of realism if realism is contrasted with
idealism (see at the beginning of this chapter, a). However, as argued
for example by Giere (1988, 8), with respect to a more epistemological
variant of naturalism, naturalism does not imply a scientific realism
which claims that our scientific theories are accurate representations of
reality (see above, b); we may have adopted our theories because of
certain non-representational virtues they have, such as enhancing
human functioning in certain environments (EEP). However, I believe
that non-representational virtues of certain theories and insights, if
these virtues are maintained and extended while new experiences are
incorporated, support a moderate realist attitude towards our insights;
it is hard to have wrong beliefs which none the less support right
behaviour, and even harder to persistently modify wrong beliefs on the
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basis of new experiences with the world into other wrong beliefs, which
are again successful (as I argue against the philosopher Plantinga; see
below and [18]).
This concludes the presentation of the overall view of science and
reality. In the remainder of this section I will consider two further
issues, namely differences between ontological naturalism as described
above and methodological and epistemological naturalism, and the
impossibility of a justification of naturalism which would satisfy all non-
naturalists.
Ontological, methodological, and epistemological naturalism
Some define naturalism primarily in terms of scientific method; Danto
(1967, 448) defines it as 'a species of philosophical monism according to
which whatever exists or happens is natural in the sense of being
susceptible to explanation through methods which, although paradig-
matically exemplified in the natural sciences, are continuous from
domain to domain of objects and events. Hence, naturalism is
polemically defined as repudiating the view that there exists or could
exist any entities or events which lie, in principle, beyond the scope of
scientific explanation.' Such a naturalism is 'ontologically neutral in
that it does not prescribe what specific kinds of entities there must be in
the universe or how many distinct kinds of events we must suppose to
take place ... it is a methodological rather than an ontological monism
... a monism leaving them [philosophers] free to be dualists, idealists,
materialists, atheists, or nonatheists, as the case may be' (Danto 1967,
448).
With respect to ontology, my definition of naturalism is more
restrictive than Danto's. In another sense my naturalism is less
restrictive than his naturalism, because of conceptual and explanatory
non-reductionism (CEN); upon my definitions, there may well be
phenomena which are intractable in terms of the natural sciences, even
though we can still locate (and thus to some extent understand) such
phenomena within our naturalist framework. On my version of
naturalism, one may take Danto's reference to scientific method as
heuristically useful advice: one seeks to explain phenomena preferably
in terms which refer to the most basic sciences which might be relevant.
The more successful such a strategy is, the more the ontological unity
of reality (CR) becomes explicit.
My definition of naturalism is also less restrictive, compared to
I
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Danto's, with respect to questions which cannot be answered with the
help of scientific methods, such as the question of why there is
something rather than nothing. On a definition which emphasises
methods, questions which cannot be answered by these methods may,
in consequence, be dismissed as meaningless. If one defines naturalism
in ontological terms, such questions may need to be formulated in
accordance with our knowledge of reality (and some such questions
may then turn out to be inappropriately formulated), but there is no
ground to dismiss such questions a priori.
The philosopher Alvin Plantinga has recently argued against at-
tempts to understand the world exclusively in terms of natural causes,
an approach which he calls 'methodological naturalism' (Plantinga
1991). He has also articulated in epistemology a view of warrant, which
he considers a version of 'epistemological naturalism' (Plantinga 1993,
46). This is taken to be in contrast with epistemological deontologism,
the view that acquiring knowledge is to be understood as fulfilling
epistemic duties. His epistemological naturalism relates acquiring
knowledge to the proper function(ing) of our epistemic apparatus (sense
organs, brain, etc.), and proper function relates to the way something
was intended or designed. Since he thinks about our capacities in terms
of 'intention' or 'design', he is in a position to argue that 'naturalism in
epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in
metaphysics', and that 'metaphysical naturalism when combined with
contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of
human life is an irrational stance' (1993, 46 and ix). I will return to
these challenges to my approach [18]. I accept most of Plantinga's
reflections on epistemology, but I will argue that his argument against
an ontological naturalist understanding of our cognitive capacities rests
upon a problematic use of possible states of affairs and is wrong with
respect to evolutionary biology.
A naturalist view of naturalism
A naturalist approach treats humans as part of the natural world. But
humans are also subjects in the world, who describe the world, make
judgements about it, and act upon it. 'Naturalism' is one particular
human description of the world. A naturalist description of the world
(including ourselves) aspires to objectivity, to a view from nowhere (Nagel
1986), while naturalism denies us access to such a view; we cannot
escape being somewhere, and thus being shaped by a particular
historical and cultural context. Therefore, an irksome philosophical
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question is whether naturalism as a general view of the world is able to
deal with itself as a view that arose in a particular context.
One of the difficulties one might see in applying naturalism to itself
is that of giving an independent, non-circular definition of'naturalism'.
I do not consider this to be a fatal problem. Any definition of
naturalism introduces other terms in need of definition, and thereby
leads on to still further terms - including notions such as atom,
evolution, fossil, and clock. Thus, the meaning of'naturalism' is part of
an extremely large web of meanings (cf Quine and Ullian 1978). This
semantic web is not closed within itself; some terms are tied to
phenomena and experiences. Thus, there is no reason to suspect that
definitions of naturalism are viciously circular.
Another difficulty might be the possibility of a naturalist explanation
of adherence to naturalism. Is naturalism able to explain the fact that
some people hold a naturalist view? If a certain conception leads to
inconsistencies when applied to itself, it would be ruled out, just like the
male barber who shaves all men who do not shave themselves, or the
man from Crete who says that all men from Crete always lie. However,
a naturalist account of the emergence of persons who hold such a view
of the world (and, at the same time, an explanation of the fact that
there are persons with other views) does not seem to be inconsistent,
since the self-reference considered here is of a much more limited
character than the self-reference in the statements about the man from
Crete and the barber. Here we consider a certain pattern of explana-
tion, a naturalist one, which is called to explain certain phenomena,
namely that some persons hold a naturalist view and that other persons
have other views.
A more serious philosophical problem arising as a consequence of
self-reference is the justification of naturalism. Can one offer
independently from a naturalist view - a justification for holding a
naturalist view? Some justification can be found if one is able to
develop a naturalist view which is comprehensive, coherent, and
fruitful (or satisfying other such criteria which themselves might
perhaps be justified by their past successes), and without an equally
satisfactory alternative. However, such arguments assume criteria such
as coherence or success. If all such criteria are rejected, or applied in a
fundamentally different way, any attempt to justify naturalism comes to
a halt. A completely independent justification of naturalism is impos-
sible, since naturalism attempts to deal with everything.
The aim of this study is to develop a naturalist view of reality,
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including the phenomenon of religion, and to argue that it is superior
to other ways of considering religion in relation to the natural sciences.
To the extent that this programme is successful, it offers some support
for naturalism (see also [27, 28, 30]).
3. RELIGION
If one defines religion as 'belief in God', one may be asked what is
meant by 'God' and what is meant by 'belief in'. The question 'What
do you believe?' (as a question about the content or object of belief)
may be distinguished from the question 'What is it to believe?' It is the
latter question which will be considered here. Is it primarily a belief
that something is true (e.g., that God exists)? Or is it belief in a person,
as a conviction about a person's trustworthiness and good intentions?
What other kinds of 'belief are there, apart from 'belief in the non-
religious sense of thinking that something is the case, even though one
is not completely sure?
In order to avoid premature exclusion of relevant aspects, I opt for a
broad understanding of religions in their variety by presenting various
concepts of religious faith. The term 'religion' covers a wide variety of
beliefs, attitudes and the like, but has also some discriminatory power
in that it allows one to say of certain individuals that they are non-
believers, even though differences among believers are very significant
and interesting [3.2]. We will also come to consider how views of the
nature of faith correlate with views of the agenda for a dialogue
between religion and the sciences [5]. In this section, I will also
formulate some of the main elements of religious views which I
consider important [3.3]. A major aim of the later parts of this book
will be to show that these elements can be accounted for in a
satisfactory way in a naturalist view informed by the sciences.
Before coming to the understanding of religion, I will discuss a
general issue which is important to the present study, namely the
distinction between the point of view of a believer and the point of view
of a modern scholar (including historians, anthropologists, psycholo-
gists, etc.; here we reach clearly beyond the natural sciences), who may
or may not be a believer. A study like this one has a hybrid character in
that it seeks to accept a 'detached' scholarly approach but nonetheless
also seeks to argue for a particular stance towards religious beliefs [3.1].
Another general issue is the relation between individual believers
and communities, but I will not consider this point here separately. For
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the present purposes I assume that focusing on individuals is a way of
focusing on communities in their effects and their constituents. The
term 'faith' primarily refers to individuals; the term 'religion', and even
more its plural 'religions', refers more often to communities and their
traditions as they have been passed on from generation to generation.
The terms are also used with a slightly different contrast, when
'religion' is used as the most encompassing term, covering religious
behaviour, attitudes, sentiments, institutions, myths, and more system-
atically articulated sets of convictions, whereas 'faith' more explicitly
indicates personal commitments like trust and assent. 'Theology' is
used specifically for systematically articulated sets of religious convic-
tions and the structure of such convictions.
3. i. The believer and the scholar
The way a believer qua believer approaches his religion is in a
fundamental way different from the way a scholar as scholar studies
religion; this distinction is similar to the one which arises in the context
of sciences such as psychology and anthropology between the scientist
and the people studied. Daniel Dennett (1991, 66-98) speaks of
'heterophenomenology' as the attempt to describe neutrally in the
other's own terms the way the other understands the world. In normal
relationships one expects a conversation partner to respond to one's
beliefs by expressing recognition, or disbelief, in some way which
reveals his/her own attitude, but in the heterophenomenological phase
of research, a scientist should seek to record as neutrally and faithfully
as possible, nodding at all utterances without affirming or challenging.
'That deviation from normal interpersonal relations is the price that
must be paid for the neutrality a science of consciousness demands'
(Dennett 1991, 83). Approaches can be distinguished in many ways;
these may differ in details, but such differences do not undermine the
usefulness of emphasising that there are two families of approaches.
One way in which the difference arises with respect to the natural
sciences is the distinction between 'the manifest image' of reality, as it
appears to us, and 'the scientific image', as it is constructed or inferred
(see above [a, e]).
A scholar studying religion seeks a neutral way of describing
the beliefs, suspending her judgement on their truth or accuracy
(even when convinced of the sincerity of the speaker). For example,
the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973, 90) defines a religion as
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'(r) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general
order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of f actuality
that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic'. And the anthropol-
ogist J. van Baal defines 'religion or the religious as: all explicit and
implicit notions and ideas, accepted as true, which relate to a reality which cannot be
verified empirically' (Van Baal and Van Beek, 1985, 3). Even though Van
Baal speaks of truth and of a relation with a reality which transcends
the empirically verifiable, the issue for these anthropologists in their
professional work is not the truth of the ideas, but rather the fact that
these ideas are accepted by certain individuals in certain circumstances as
true (Van Baal) or factual (Geertz).
This distinction between two approaches does not necessarily imply
a conflict between the conclusions of a scientist and the convictions of a
believer; the one separates judgement and description as far as possible,
whereas the other, the believer, makes a positive judgement. Whether
there is a conflict depends on the convictions of the believer and of the
scientist. The ontological naturalism presented above seems to imply a
conflict of this kind. However, even then the conclusion that there is
such a conflict, and the precise understanding of the character of the
challenge, still depends on the understanding of religion (see below).
There is a related but slightly different conflict between two approaches
in the study of religion. A methodological naturalist approach assumes
'that religion could be understood without benefit of clergy - that is,
without the magisterial guidance of religious authorities - and, more
radically, without "conversion" or confessional and/or metaphysical
commitments about its causes different from the assumptions one might
use to understand and explain other realms of culture' (Preus 1987, x).
A religionist approach, such as advocated for instance by Mircea
Eliade, assumes that the study of religion is sui generis, involving, for
instance, a 'transconscious' element, archetypes, or a relation with 'the
sacred' which may be illustrated by examples but cannot be defined,
analysed, or explained without losing its character as sacred.5
In the dialogue about religion and the natural sciences, some have
argued for a religionist approach towards religion. In such a way one
might understand the approach of T. F. Torrance who, under the
inspiration of the theologian Karl Barth, has argued that theology has
A recent discussion of 'religionist' approaches can he found in Platvoet (1994).
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to adopt a method appropriate to its object, i.e. God. A quite different
example of religionism in the dialogue about religion and the natural
sciences can be found in approaches which, with the help of science,
seek to point out certain phenomena which are sui generis. For instance,
in The Encyclopedia of Religion edited by Mircea Eliade, one finds an entry
under neuroepistemology defending a separate kind of experience of
the Absolute (D'Aquili 1987; see [20.4]).
In line with my earlier remarks about the coherence of the sciences, I
opt for a non-religionist approach in the study of religions. In so far as
possible, they should be approached in the same way as other human
phenomena. Thus, one should attempt to understand their origins in
the context of the rise of human cultures, and their actual functioning
in the context of psychological and social mechanisms. If this approach
is successful in accounting for the phenomena (including the subjective
experiences of individuals and their religious interpretations of the
phenomena), it is thereby intellectually justified. If the approach were
to fail because one would be unable to account for all details of
religious beliefs, practices, and myths of a community, or because one
would be unable to specify the actual historical path along which the
beliefs of that community were shaped, this might well be acceptable
within a naturalist approach. An incomplete understanding is also
accepted for other phenomena, both in evolutionary biology and in the
understanding of cultures; specifying possible explanatory histories
which are compatible with the best available evidence may be the best
that can be achieved. However, if one were to fail to find any possible
history of the phenomena consistent with the rest of our knowledge,
then one would have reason to doubt the naturalist approach as such.
Let us return from the competition between two approaches in the
study of religion to the relations between the perspective of a believer
and that of a (non-religionist) scholar. The individual believer may be
influenced by the scientific study of these phenomena, which may, for
example, modify the way the beliefs are held (e.g., not literally but in
some other way) or which may modify the content of his beliefs and the
vocabulary used to express them. It is such a modification of beliefs
that I seek when I suggest that some elements can be maintained in a
naturalist approach, though not all. The dependence the other way
round is obvious: the scientific study has to do justice to the
phenomena, and the phenomena include beliefs and experiences
people have. The scientist need not agree with the beliefs, but she
needs to explain both the objective and the subjective aspects of the
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experiences; the advocate of a Copernican view had not only to
explain the celestial movements, but also why everybody experiences
the earth as stable and sees the sun rise.
Believers may seem more naively credulous than scientists, in that they
take their beliefs to be true in some way or another. However, this is not
necessarily the easier side. Believers who take their beliefs seriously have
to resolve (or live with) problems such as contradictions, whereas, for
instance, an anthropologist studying the beliefs of a certain tribe may just
record inconsistent beliefs, since she does not take the beliefs as claims
about the world but as the beliefs of the tribe she studies. Furthermore,
the evaluation itself is not so much an evaluation of beliefs with respect to
their truth, but rather an analysis which asks about their antecedents and
their psychological and social functions and consequences.
In this light, my study - and many other studies on the relationship
between science and religion, except most historical studies - has a
hybrid character. On the one hand, I seek to adopt a scientific stance
towards all aspects of reality, including a critical analysis of religious
beliefs in all their varieties. On the other hand, I go beyond the
neutrality of the historian or social scientist studying certain interesting
phenomena, or that of the analytical philosopher analysing the con-
cepts used. Most authors on religion in relation to science, including
myself, do so from the stance of a believer, in that they seek to answer
the question of which intentional stance to take towards religious
beliefs. The suspension of judgement, and especially of affirmative
judgements, is not maintained, even when in many places a third-
person view of religious beliefs is taken.
3.2. Concepts of faith
Not only may different believers have different beliefs, but they may
differ in their notion of what 'having a belief is. W. L. Sessions (1994)
distinguishes six models of religious faith; many individual believers
and religious traditions combine elements from different models.
(i) Belief may be understood as faith in a person. Faith in this sense
requires a personal relation with characteristics such as love and
trust, as well as, perhaps, 'negative' characteristics such as fear and awe.6
Propositional belief is, upon this view of faith, secondary, but cannot be
Sessions does not discuss 'negative' characteristics such as fear and awe, which mark distance
rather than closeness within personal relationships, but I do not see why they should be
excluded, even if positive characteristics such as trust are necessary to the model.
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absent, since any kind of faith of a subject S in a person A implies
propositions about A and about A's relationship to S, such as claims
that A exists and has a personal character, that A is related to S in
faith, and that S's trust in A is not misplaced (Sessions 1994, s6f.).
(2) Belief may also be understood as a firm belief that such-and-such (ƒ))
is the case, especially when 'S has inadequate evidence for p, and S's
belief that p is nonevidentially based' (Sessions 1994, 50). Understood
thus, faith is an attitude towards propositions. Sessions explicitly
distinguishes this model from a more epistemic notion of 'belief that',
as advocated by the philosopher of religion Richard Swinburne,
according to which religious and non-religious forms of 'belief that' are
all in some sense beliefs which should be held in proportion to the
available evidence (see [19]). In my view, even if one accepts that 'belief
that p' is not based upon overwhelming evidence (or inference to the
best explanation, etc.), and thus is not to be argued Tor on the basis of
evidence, it still can be confronted with evidence which suggests that p
is not the case.
Neo-orthodox Protestant theologians such as Barth, Brunner, and
Ebeling have severely criticised the understanding of faith as 'belief
that' on theological grounds (Sessions 1994, 151); this kind of criticism is
also present in accounts of the history of science and theology by
Dillenberger and Buckley (see [n]).
(3) Faith may also refer to a person's attitude towards the world', an
attitude which constitutes the person who has the belief and at the
same time the world as seen by that person. Saying that the world is
created is, upon this concept of faith, an expression of a certain way of
looking at the world and having a certain attitude towards the world,
even though it also implies some claims (such as that the world is not
identical with God). Seen thus, beliefs are self-involving (Evans 1963;
Kelsey 1985). Such an attitude is total, fundamental, and significance
engendering, and therefore a kind of faith (Sessions 1994, 69).
(4) Sessions considers also a non-relation 'confidence model' of faith
as an attitude which qualifies a person without essential reference to anything
else. It may be a kind of self-confidence accompanied by serenity,
tranquillity, calm, and peace. It may also be faith as realising one's
deeper self, or realising pure awareness, without an object of which one
is aware. Such an understanding of faith may be more appropriate to
Asian traditions than to Western theistic traditions, even though
elements such as self-realisation are not absent from other models of
faith.
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(5) Devotion, with features such as volition and commitment, can be
devotion to a way of life. On this model of faith 'a devotee treats the way
of life to which she is committed not as a mere means to something
better, but as an end in itself, something worth pursuing for its own
sake even if it does not lead to something else. A way of life requires no
goal or end or result beyond itself (Sessions 1994, 104). Devotion to a
person can be understood as devotion to a person exemplifying a way
of life.
(6) Rather than faith as feeling or volition, the central feature of faith
may also be the hope for some important future good G, which the believer
'greatly desires and confidently awaits, anticipates, and expects, despite
G's improbability' (Sessions 1994, 114). The latter clause, about the
improbability of the realisation of G for S, distinguishes such faith from
a warranted expectation that G will come about, a conviction which
one would not consider as a variety of religious faith.
Among the differences between these six models are differences in the
kind of object of faith, which may be a person, a proposition, an
attitude towards the world, a way of life, and a future good; the
confidence model has no object at all (Sessions 1994, 131). The six
models differ in the role of propositional beliefs and in the kind of
beliefs that may be entertained. Debates about propositional beliefs
about the world seem to be the main area of engagement of theology
with the natural sciences. However, most models also relate to our
understanding of human nature, for instance of relations, attitudes,
volitions. This too is an issue where there can be engagement with the
sciences. This is not immediately obvious if one thinks of physics or
cosmology as the typical sciences to be considered, but it becomes a
major area once one widens the range of sciences to include a
biological view of human origins (including the origins of human
desires, attitudes, and ways of life) and a genetic and neuroscientific
perspective on human constitutions (including, for instance, human
dispositions towards certain attitudes, desires, and ways of life). The
claim that this is a major area of discussion is reflected in this study by
the fact that chapter 3, on the implications of scientific knowledge of
the world, is followed by chapter 4 on the implications of knowledge of
human nature.
Given the insight that the debate is not restricted to one about the
understanding of the world, I find the way the theologian George
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Lindbeck has structured views of doctrine (in three rather than six
types) helpful in explicating various areas of discussion on relations
between science and religions (see also below, [5]). One view is labelled
by Lindbeck a propositional-cognitivist view. Upon this view, religion, and
especially its systematic articulation in theology, is an attempt to grasp
the true, ultimate nature of reality. Another view, called experientia.1-
expressivist, 'interprets doctrines as noninformative and nondiscursive
symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations' (Lind-
beck 1984, 16). This emphasises elements of attitude, especially as
related to the impact of the world on humans and the human response
to the world as something given. The third view considered by
Lindbeck, the cultural-linguistic one, understands religions as traditions
by which people live, which shape their lives, both individually and
communally. This relates to the active side of various models of
Sessions, especially to the way a human subject structures the world
(the third, attitude, model) and the way of life to which humans devote
their lives (the fifth model).
The propositional-cognitivist view of religion correlates with an
understanding of the dialogue with the natural sciences as a dialogue
about scientific knowledge of the world (and thus often correlates with
a major interest in fundamental sciences such as physics and cos-
mology). The experiential-expressivist view of religion does not have
much interest in the details of scientific knowledge, nor in questions of
origin and history; upon such a view of religion the main issues of
discussion in the interaction with the natural sciences can be in the
study of the human constitution (and hence the neurosciences) and in
the way this constitution allows humans to experience the world,
themselves, and, perhaps, God. The cultural-linguistic view of religion
pays much more attention to historical dimensions, since religions as
traditions which shape the way people live have a historical dimension.
Thus, for such an understanding of religion an evolutionary view of
human nature and culture can be much more relevant.
Whereas a propositional-cognitivist understanding of religion directs
the discussion towards ontological issues (about time, the openness of
natural processes, etc.), the other kinds of understanding religion also
bring in axiological issues: how do affective aspects of experience relate
to the subject of the experiences and the object experienced? And,
thinking of religions as ways of life in relation to an evolutionary
understanding of human reality, what are the goods which people have
come to desire? Can these desires be understood evolutionary? How
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much freedom do humans have with respect to their historically
conditioned desires? Understanding the origins of certain human
values may explain why they are valued, even if it leaves open the
question of why they should (or should not) be valued.
h everybody religious?
Some aspects of these models of faith are almost universal: everybody
has some prepositional beliefs and attitudes towards the world, desires
some future good, and lives in some way. However, the various models
have been qualified by Sessions in important ways. For instance,
desiring some future good is not sufficient for that model of religious
faith; Sessions has added the condition that the believer confidently
awaits and expects that future good despite its improbability if one
does not hold the belief. There is a certain attitude which goes with the
desire. Essential to these models of faith is the combination of different
elements. In that sense, the six models of Sessions (or the three
approaches of Lindbeck) cover a significant variety of positions, but not
every relationship, attitude, or belief counts as religious.
I add a different argument to the effect that not everybody is
religious. This argument relates back to the conceptual and explana-
tory non-reductionism articulated above (CEN, [2]). With respect to
religious language as an articulation of important aspects of human
existence, some would argue that it can be eliminated and replaced by
a non-religious vocabulary, which does without notions such as mystery
and without some articulation of the distance between what is and
what is believed should be (see below, [3.3], ia and ib). Someone who
believes that all religious language can be exhaustively replaced by
non-religious language, would not be religious even with respect to the
broad concept of religion presented here.
Even if the concept of religion presented here is not all-
encompassing it has to be admitted that it is very broad. Hence, many
interesting differences will be seen to arise between authors who can be
considered religious in different ways (just as a distinction between
science and non-science leaves open that many interesting disagree-
ments take place within the broad ambiance of science).
3.3. Essential elements (in my opinion)
Consensus formation, which works quite well in the natural sciences,
seems almost totally absent with respect to religious views. Thus, any
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proposal as to which are the most important characteristic elements of
religions is disputable and relative to the person who makes the
proposal (and, often, to a larger community with which he or she
identifies). Whereas the preceding subsection sought to sketch a variety
of religious positions without defending one particular position on the
map, this section will indicate what I consider to be the most relevant
elements of a religious view. I will not add qualifications such as 'in my
view' to all the sentences, but do so here for this whole subsection at
once. As I said before, a major aim of the later parts of this book will
be to explore whether and to what extent these elements can be
articulated in a satisfactory way within a naturalist view informed by
the sciences.
/. Two kinds of human experiences
A concept of God as a transcendent and/or immanent reality may be
the central symbol of religion, but I do not see how it can be the point
of departure of a non-religionist approach to religion. For such an
approach, we have to start from human experiences, desires, needs, or
reflections. I propose to understand religion as a human response to
two kinds of experiences, namely experiences with aspects of reality
(a) which we will not accept or (b) which we do not understand or
control, but to which we feel positively related.
(a) If religion is seen as a response to aspects of reality which we will not
accept, it might be called a prophetic religion, since it relates to the
experience of a discontinuity between values and facts, axiology and
cosmology. To articulate this dimension of religion, there should be a
dualist element in religious language, articulating a contrast between
what is and what should be. Such a dualism can be expressed in
religious terms as the difference between earth and heaven, between
the city of man and the city of God, between the present and the
paradise, between the present and the Kingdom of God, between
nature and grace, and in many other ways. Thus, Gerd Theissen (1985,
4) wrote:
Every faith contradicts reality in some way. That is inevitable, if faith is to be
an unconditional 'Yes' to life. Think of all the horrors that could contradict
this 'Yes'! Think of all the oppressive experiences against which it has to be
affirmed: all the probabilities and certainties, including the certainty of one's
own death!
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Seen in this light, religion is not a reflection of positive experiences, of a
sense of divine presence, but rather a critical response, a protest against
experiences of injustice or human disorder.
(b) Religion is also a response to encounters with aspects of reality
which we may not understand or control, but to which we feel positively related
or for which we feel grateful. This dimension of religion I call mystical,
since it has to do with a sense of being related to, or belonging to,
something which surpasses us and our understanding. This is a
dimension of religion which many authors on the relationship
between science and religion seem to identify with when they
emphasise elements which correspond to an, affectively speaking,
positive view of reality, such as order, creativity, purposiveness,
coherence, beauty, or mystery. In my approach, the persistence of
limit questions (LQ) will be explored as a possible ground for a
'mystical' sense of belonging and an attitude of wonder and grate-
fulness [31], whereas the 'prophetic' duality will be approached
through the evolutionary understanding of particular religions with
their regulative ideals [26, 32].
2. A view of reality and a way of life
If a response is to be considered religious, it has to be related to a view
of life and a way of life.
A religious view relates existentially significant human problems
(such as sin, death, injustice, and an uncertain future for our
descendants and for other living beings; see ia) and existentially rich
human experiences (of love, joy, personal understanding, recovery
and transformation; ib) to a view of reality as a whole, of 'ultimate
reality', 'a general order of existence' (as in the definition by Geertz,
Barbour (1990, 47f.) offers another angle on mystical and prophetical elements in religion
when he, following Ninian Smart, distinguishes between mystical union and numinous
encounter (where the sense of distance and contrast is prominent). For a study of biblical
theology which focuses especially on divine presence and absence, see Terrien (1978). The
issue could perhaps also be argued in the context of the history of religions. John Hick (1989),
following Karl Jaspers, distinguishes between the tribal religions which preceded the axial
(transition) period around the middle of the last millennium BCF. and the post-axial religions.
The earlier religions located the individual within the social and cosmic order (and thus are
typical examples of religions which stress continuity between cosmological and axiological
aspects), whereas the later one's emphasised transformation, salvation, or redemption (and
thus, in one way or another, a distinction between the actual social and cosmic order and the
destiny of the individual). Platvoet (1993) offers a more elaborate analysis of the history of
religions; according to him, the most recently emerged religions (e.g., New Age) have some of
the characteristics of earlier types of religions.
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above). The experiences do not stand alone, in isolation from
convictions about reality as a whole.
The religious responses amount to a stance towards reality, which
shapes and guides the interactions of the believer with his environment
in the light of the believer's view of his relation to reality as a whole. As
a way of life it covers his responsibility for the relevant environment
and his way of coping with events in that environment - the second
and third view discerned by Lindbeck. (By the way, in the contem-
porary situation, in my opinion, the relevant environment cannot but
include humans of all ethnic and religious backgrounds as well as all
other living beings on earth in their ecological relations.)
3. Resources
A religious view is not merely an intellectual position, comparable to a
scientific theory which aims at a univocal description and explanation
of certain phenomena. Rather, it is an existential response which has
elements of all three views described by Lindbeck: propositional beliefs
(e.g., about the 'general order of existence', see above), attitudes which
structure the world and qualify the subject's relation to himself and
others, and a way of life, including regulative ideals distinct from the
actual situation in which one finds oneself.
This complex response is nourished by and expressed in various
symbols, narratives, and practices, such as singing, breaking bread,
burning a candle, meditating and praying, reading poetry, and so on.
Thus, religious believers draw on the resources (narratives, command-
ments, rituals, etc.) of particular communities and traditions. Critical
consideration of those resources is intellectually and morally necessary,
since symbols, images, and rituals may be powerful and evocative, but
they need not be wise in our situation; they developed in other
circumstances (see [2], EEP).
4- Coherence
There is another intellectually desirable but problematic character-
istic of religion, and that is coherence. The two kinds of experiences
considered above (ia, ib) are quite different; one might say that they
point in opposite directions. A mystical view correlates with some
sense of continuity between the understanding of the world and the
understanding of the central religious symbol God, whereas the
prophetic view emphasises discontinuity. I find the combination of
continuity and discontinuity between the understanding of the world
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and the understanding of God, or, in other terms, between what is and
what should be, or between facts and values, to be a major character-
istic of interesting religious views. Views that lean towards the side of
continuity seem insufficient with respect to the existential response to
evil, whereas those that lean towards the side of discontinuity are in
danger of being too much tied to dualist views of the world, as
expressed, for example, as a dualism of heaven and earth, or a
distinction between God as creator and as the loving father of Jesus
Christ. An important issue is whether an adequate religious view (also
adequate with respect to our scientific knowledge) is able to combine
mystical and prophetical elements in a consistent and fruitful way.
4. CONTEMPORARYCONTEXTS FOR RELIGION S RELATION TO
SCIENCE
So far we have considered science, naturalism, and religion more or
less separately. In this section and the next one, we will begin with an
exploration of discussions on their relationship. We will begin with one
specific voice among those who give priority to ethical issues, that of the
Brazilian theologian Rubem Alves, as he spoke at a conference of the
World Council of Churches (WCC) on 'Faith, Science, and the Future'
in 1979.
When we become concerned about making room for God in the physical
universe or when biology becomes the model for our speech about God, have
we not departed from the voice of the oppressed? Have we abandoned our
tradition? (Alves 1980, 375^)
Participants from Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and
the Pacific Islands supported Alves's position when they urged 'scien-
tists to leave their ivory tower and wealthy temples and join this
humble Man in his service to the suffering people of our world' (in
Abrecht 1980, ijif.). These people from the Third World emphasised
the need for action in response to the social and ethical impact of
science, especially the role of science in the global imbalance of power.
Ethical issues were central for Western delegates as well, but in a
different way. Seven of the ten sections dealt with social responsibility
in relation to genetics, pollution, energy, industrial and urban environ-
ments, economy, technology and political power, and the social role of
Christian churches. This conference stood in the tradition of social
ecumenical engagement as it has developed from the conference on
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'Life and Work' at Stockholm in 1925 into the work of the section
'Church and Society' of the World Council of Churches. The other
major tradition within the WCC, 'Faith and Order', dealing with the
understanding of faith, liturgy, and church order, played no major role
in the conference. Despite the shared interest in ethical aspects, Alves
dismissed the Western discussions as politically inadequate: 'as we have
been speaking about the future of mankind we have indeed been
speaking about the future of the rich, since the whole was not
questioned' (Alves 1980, 374).
Emphasis on the Western ethical agenda is also explicit in a book with the
title The New Faith-Science Debate (Mangum 1989). In the Foreword, Paul
Abrecht - a long-time ecumenical leader who had also been involved in
the conference referred to above - writes on a shift in the interaction of
science and theology around the middle of the twentieth century, with
the discovery of nuclear energy and its use in nuclear weapons.
In the earlier confrontation the fundamental issue was the clash between
Christian belief and scientific knowledge, especially between the scientific
understanding of the world and Christian views on creation. In that debate
the churches were generally on the defensive . . .
The contemporary encounter between faith and science is quite different
from the earlier one ... Today, as a result [of the rapid progress of modern
science], science and science-based technology are on the defensive, and
religious faith, speaking in the name of troubled and anxious humanity, has
begun to ask questions about the consequences of the scientific world view.
(Abrecht 1989, viii)
The claim that the earlier discussion on 'the clash between belief and
knowledge', and thus the challenge to the credibility of belief, has been
replaced by a new one on the consequences of technology, seems to me
incorrect. It would be wonderful if religious traditions could offer some
guidance in dealing with the choices we have to make. However, to
present oneself as an advocate of a 'troubled humanity' facing the
consequences of science and technology does not resolve the doubts
one may have about one's intellectual credentials, even if the churches'
moral credentials were unproblematic. Those who seek guidance from
faith may intend well, but they still have to account for their claim to
authority. What is the nature and credibility of religious traditions in
connection with our 'scientific world view'? It is not clear that
Christianity would become more credible intellectually by exploiting
concern and anxiety about moral issues. One might even question the
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morality of trying to resolve one's own problem, that of the credibility
of religious beliefs, by exploiting concerns about the problematic
consequences of science.
Even though 'the new science-faith debate' does not replace other
intellectual debates, in fact not even in the book with that title, it is
important to see that there are such differences in topics to be
discussed. I focus in this study on intellectual issues, but I do not intend
to play down the urgency of reflection on, and of appropriate responses
to, ethical and social issues.
Within the Western part of the world the specific context is relevant to
the concerns addressed in intellectual reflections on the relationship of
religion and science. Many American contributions are clearly related
to the strong presence of creationism. When the astronomer Howard
Van Till from Calvin College argues in his The Fourth Day that science
and religion deal with different questions, and hence that their answers
are not of the same kind, so that there cannot be a genuine conflict, his
readers are primarily Christians whom he wants to steer away from a
creationistic view of science and the Bible. This is not a minor issue in
the general population. According to a Gallup Poll of November 1991,
47% of the Americans interviewed opted for the view that 'God
created man pretty much in his present form at one time within the last
10,000 years', whereas 40% opted for a view which accommodated
religion to science, 'Man has developed over millions of years from less
advanced forms of life, but God guided this process, including man's
creation', and only 9% opted for the naturalist alternative 'Man has
developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life. God
had no part in this process.' Among those with at least college
education the figures were 25% for the creationistic view; 54% for the
religious accommodation, and 16.5% for the naturalist position.
US News and World Report (23 December 1991), 59; among those with incomes above 150 ooo
the distribution is 29%-5O%-i7%), similar to the distribution among those with at least
college education. In a poll in 1982 on the same three alternatives, the figures for the general
population were about the same: 44% recent creation, 38% evolution guided by God, and
9% evolution in which God played no part (New York Times 29 August 1982, 22; also quoted in
Numbers (1986), 391 and 415 note i). And, even before the revival of creationism, in 1963,
almost 30% of white church-members polled in northern California were against evolution
(Bainbridge and Stark 1980, 20). A recent Dutch survey had no question on evolution (which
is itself an indication of the minor relevance of the issue compared to issues which were
included, such as church participation, and the role of churches in society). The following two
items may give an indication of the situation concerning issues relating to creationism in
the Netherlands. Eleven per cent supported a litcralist interpretation of the Bible; 47%
considered the Bible inspired but not to be taken literally, and 43% regarded the Bible as an
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Even when they do not deal directly with creationism, American
books and journals on theology and science can be read as apologetics
of science in a culture in which the status and acceptance of the
natural sciences is less prominent than in Western Europe. American
books (e.g., Barbour 1990, Rolston 1987), tend to be critical of
scientism, naturalism, reductionism, and secular humanism as views
which might inhibit the acceptance of science. British authors such
as Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, or Dutch authors do not
primarily view scientism, naturalism, and reductionism as challenges
to the acceptance of science, but as challenges to religion. As
concerns the Dutch scene, this applies not only to my own work, but
also to that of others who hold a more orthodox religious position,
such as Van den Beukel (emphasising religious experience) and Van
den Brom (proposing models for conceptualising divine omnipresence
and divine action). Regional differences are not to be overempha-
sised, as Americans and Europeans discuss the same issues with each
other, but Europeans seem to be less involved in an apologetics of
science, and more in an apologetics of religion, against those who are
tempted to dismiss all religion.
5. CLASSIFICATION OF A R E A S OF DISCUSSION IN
SCIENCE-AND-RELIGION
Three challenges to religion
A single synthesis of religious convictions and pre-scientific insights is
often assumed to have characterised the late Middle Ages. It is dubious
whether such a medieval synthesis actually existed; conflicts between
faith and philosophy occurred, no system was complete and compre-
hensive, and people disagreed: 'The learned Latin culture of the I3th
century was no more unitary than ours' (Mark D. Jordan). However,
as a construction of later times the mythical medieval synthesis offers a
ancient book with human legends, fables, histories, and moral codes. However, to a question
about the historical existence of Adam and Eve, 37% answered in the affirmative (Becker and
Vink 1994, i42f).
Daecke (1987, 33) points to another difference between German authors and English and
American authors on the relationship between science and religion: the latter aim more often
at some kind of integration, whereas German authors more often take the position that the
two enterprises are distinct and mutually irrelevant.
Mark I). Jordan develops his case for tension and diversity by considering Roger Bacon,
Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventure in 'Ky whom all things urn made': Chnstalogt and Cosmology in
the Jhrtemlh Ontury, presented at the conference 'Our Knowledge of God, Christ, and
Nature' at the University of Notre Dame, April 1993.
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nice contrast to our situation. A major example of a systematic
synthesis is the work of Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century). A literary
expression of an integration of theology, ethics, politics, and geocentric
astronomy is Dante's Commedia about hell, purgatory, and paradise
(early fourteenth century). In discerning the order of things, the higher
creatures trace God's footsteps, as Beatrice tells the poet in the first
canto of Paradise. In such medieval syntheses, ideas from Greek
philosophers (Plato, Aristotle), from Scripture, and from earlier theolo-
gians came together. Medieval views had a static character and a
hierarchical structure, and they were geocentric. The order, under-
stood in terms of Aristotle's doctrine of 'natural place', was also
normative, as is still reflected in some uses of the words 'natural' and
'counter-natural'. None of the medieval syntheses is tenable any longer.
(a) New knowledge separates us from the medieval synthesis. The
geocentrism of medieval astronomy has been abandoned. Static views
have been replaced by an evolutionary one with time scales far
exceeding any scholarly chronology based on the Bible or on knowl-
edge about the ruling dynasties in Egypt and Mesopotamia, such as the
date given by Archbishop James Ussher (1581-1656) for the moment of
creation, namely the beginning of the night preceding 23 October 4004
BC, a date which became incorporated in the margins of the author-
itative King James version of the Bible. Not only have we become
aware of a long pre-human history of the earth, but evolutionary
biology and the neurosciences have given humanity a new position
among other living beings. Some people have attempted to adapt
theology to contemporary changes in our view of the world, for
instance by seeing God's creative activity in the evolutionary process.
Ascribing the problems for theology to 'an outmoded world picture'
(Wildiers 1982, 235) is, however, incomplete and inadequate. It is not
only the knowledge of nature that has changed.
(b) Ideas about the nature of knowledge and about methods for
acquiring knowledge have changed, as is exemplified by the role of
experiments and of mathematical idealisation. With the rise of
modern science the conception of science changed. The changes at
this level during the seventeenth century 'were those that most clearly,
in retrospect, mark this century as the age of the scientific revolution'
(McMullin 1990, 28). The ideal of purely deductive or inductive
Ussher's date is too often only mentioned to ridicule religion. However, it deserves to be
understood against a much wider discussion of knowledge in that period, as is done, for
instance, by Rudwick (1986, 296) and North (1977).
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knowledge was gradually replaced by the ideal of hypothetico-
deductive (or retroductive) reasoning. The eighteenth-century philoso-
pher Immanuel Kant made the creative role of the subject more
explicit. According to him, the world as it is in itself is inaccessible;
the accessible, knowable world is the world as we describe it in terms
of our categories. Subsequent developments have shown that Kant's
categories and forms of perception, such as Euclidean space, were not
necessary. But the insight still stands that knowledge is shaped by our
categories, and not only by the reality it purports to be about. The
shift to the subject of knowledge was followed by an increased
emphasis on the role of language and context, by a decline in the
belief in secure foundations of knowledge, and by disputes over the
demarcation between science and other human activities. Theology
has responded to the increased emphasis on the role of the human
subject, for instance by focusing on the personal (e.g., Martin Buber's
distinction between 'I-thou' and 'I-it' relations).
(c) A third change regards our appreciation of the world. The medieval
synthesis took the world to be God's good creation. Today some
consider the world existentially meaningless, neutral or ambivalent,
whereas other thinkers, both secular and religious ones, still find our
reality meaningful. The emergence of mixed feelings about the world
can be illustrated by the poem John Donne wrote in 1611 during a
time of turmoil in Europe, with the oft quoted line, 'And new
philosophy calls all in doubt'. It is dubious whether the poem's
original intention was a lamentation over the loss of the medieval
world view, but this passage has often been used to refer to this loss. '2
Over a century later, the changing appreciation of the world is
exemplified by the cultural impact of the earthquake that destroyed
Lisbon in 1755. The French philosopher Voltaire gave his Poème sur le
désastre de Lisbonne (1756) the subtitle 'Or an examination of the axiom
"All is well" '. This theme returns in Voltaire's novel Candide ou
l'optimisme (1759). There the philosopher Pangloss defends the view
that this is the best of all possible worlds. The more Pangloss, who
stands for Leibniz, argues his case, the less convincing it becomes.
Another illustration of changes in the appreciation of the world, again
Stephen Toulmin (1990, 65(1".) is one of the advocates of the view that the poem is about the
decline of the cosmopolis, the sense of cosmic and social order. Toulmin's reading can,
however, be disputed. Manley (1963, 44) claims that 'the passage is usually taken out of
context to illustrate the impact of scientific rationalism on the Medieval world picture'.
Donne's poem can be seen as a methodical religious meditation, similar to the Jesuit exercises
(Martz 1947).
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a century later, can be taken from Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov.
One of the brothers, Ivan, wants to return to God his ticket of entry into
the world. The suffering in this world is not justified by heavenly
meaning. 'And if the sufferings of children go to swell the sum of
sufferings which was necessary to pay for truth, then I protest that the
truth is not worth such a price.' ' "
Changes in the appreciation of the world have affected theology as
well. This is most explicit in those theologians who have moved from
an understanding of God in metaphysical terms, say God as the
Ground of Being, to an understanding of God as being on the side of
the victims or of the poor (e.g., Alves, see [4]). The 'Death of God'
discussion of the 19605 reflects the stronger emphasis on human
autonomy in creating knowledge (b), but it also fits in with a strong
sense of the reality of horror and injustice in the world (c).
Three views of religion
Not only are there different challenges to religion due to the rise of the
natural sciences and other developments (such as changes in the
understanding of history and in appreciation of other cultures). Our
understanding of religion has also diversified. Each particular way that
religion is understood gives a certain shape to its interaction with the
natural sciences. George Lindbeck has attempted to clarify the nature
of ecumenical (dis)agreements by distinguishing between three views of
religious doctrine (see above, [3.2]). I will adapt his categories here for
my purposes as describing core elements which are combined in
various ways in actual religions and theologies.
1. Cognitive claims are central to some views of religion. Religion, and
especially its systematic articulation in theology, is an attempt to grasp
the true, ultimate nature of reality. Lindbeck (1984, 16) has it that such
a propositional-cognitivist view 'was the approach of traditional ortho-
doxies (as well as many heterodoxies), but it also has certain affinities to
the outlook on religion adopted by much modern Anglo-American
analytical philosophy with its preoccupation with the cognitive or
informative meaningfulness of religious utterances'.
2. Religious experiences, or religious interpretations of experience,
are at the heart of religion according to other views, especially in
liberal positions influenced by Schleiermacher. Lindbeck calls this an
'experiential-expressivist' view of religion; 'it interprets doctrines as
Quoted from the Constance Garnett translation, revised by R. E. Matlaw (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1976), pp. asjf.
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noninformative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes,
or existential orientations' (1984, 16).
3. Religions can also be seen as traditions by which people live, which
shape their lives, both individually and communally. This aligns well
with anthropological and sociological approaches. Lindbeck speaks of a
'cultural-linguistic' view of religion. Religions resemble languages and
forms of life; they are 'idioms for the construction of reality and the
living of life'(1984, 18).
A ^  x 3 classification1'1
Given these two ways of structuring the arena of debate, in terms of
three challenges to religion and in terms of three views of religion, a
total of nine areas of debate may be distinguished. Ideally, each
theological or philosophical proposal would cover all these areas; the
On differences with other current classifications. Ian Barbour (1988, 1990: 3 30) uses four
major categories: i. Conflict (scientific materialism; biblical literalism); a. Independence
(contrasting methods; differing languages); 3. Dialogue (boundary questions; methodological
parallels); 4. Integration (doctrinal reformulation; systematic synthesis). The categories
'conflict', 'independence', 'dialogue', and 'integration' express strategies for handling tensions:
choosing either one position or the other (conflict), separating the contending claims as
different and independent, adapting one's views to some extent (dialogue) or accommodating
both claims in an interwoven whole (integration). The four categories do not pay attention to
the question as to which kind of religion is supposed to be in conflict with, independent from,
or to be integrated with, which kind of science. However, the conclusion that there is a
'conflict' between science and religion (or that they are independent, or that they can be
integrated), can be drawn for quite different reasons. For instance, Barbour is in a position to
dismiss 'scientific materialism' by lumping it together with 'biblical literalism' under the
heading conflict. The suggestion is that both are mistaken in relying on an all-too-
straightforward realism with respect to texts and theories. This is an attractive rhetorical
move, but not adequate since it neglects the fact that the challenges are different. 'Biblical
literalism' ('creationism') collides with new knowledge and with modern ideas about the
nature of knowledge, whereas 'materialism' tries to accommodate maximally to these new
insights. 'Scientific materialism' is much more of an intellectual challenge than biblical
literalism. Biblical literalism moves from experiences, in this case the words of a text, directly
to convictions. The path from experience to theories is much more elaborate in science. This
distance between convictions and experience carnes over from science to 'scientific
materialism', which is therefore at least in this respect much more sophisticated than
'biblical literalism'. Clustering by strategical stance also tumps together various views of
independence. This too is unsatisfactory, as underlying views of religion may be very different.
For instance, some pleas for independence are based upon the distinction between primary
and secondary causation, maintaining a metaphysical understanding of religion as dealing
with the Primary Cause of everything. But independence might also be the strategy adopted
when religion is understood as dealing with moral and emotional issues in human existence.
It is not illuminating to treat such different ways of separating science and religion together.
The scheme not only lumps together arguments and positions which are different in
fundamental respects, but also separates views which are similar in important respects. A
materialist view of religion, here listed under 'conflict', may be close to a metaphysical
'integration', since both expand the realms of religion and science to encompass the whole of
reality.
44 Religion and science
scheme can be seen as a way to delineate the target area. However,
in practice, most authors focus on one area, a single column, or a single
row, or at least have a characteristic emphasis there. For instance, the
theologian Philip Hefner writes in intense dialogue with an anthro-
pological understanding of religion, and thus most of his writings
primarily deal with the areas of discussion in the third column.
However, this does not keep him from making cognitive claims.
Rather,' myth provides a picture of the way things really are" (Hefner 1993,
202). Such a shift of column signals an important (and problematic)
element in his approach, as we will have to consider when we come to
theologies which take the evolved character of human religions into
account [26].
Strategies discerned by Barbour (1988, 1990; see note 14) can be
recovered in some of these areas, especially in the one which focuses on
Viggo Mortensen (1987, 1988) uses two major categories to describe the field, restriction
and expansion. One might defend the coexistence of science and religion by arguing that
they deal with different, restricted aspects of reality. Or one might consider their relation by
arguing that each deals, in principle, with the whole of reality. The attractive feature of this
distinction between restriction and expansion is that it focuses immediately on the underlying
views of science and of religion However, the two categories do not pay attention to the way
the challenges to religion deriving from science are perceived.
Another scheme, which conceives of eight (4 x 2) possible relationships between science
and theology, has been developed by Arthur Peacocke (1981, xiiiff.; see also 1993, 20) and
Robert J. Russell (1985, 49f ) Russell distinguishes four 'dimensions' in Peacocke's proposal,
namely approaches, languages, attitudes, and objects. Along each of these four dimensions,
science and theology may be considered as similar (and thus fairly close to each other,
positively related) or dissimilar. I appreciate the four dimensions, which I understand as
referring to epistemological, semantical, axiological, and ontological issues. My list of three
challenges is somewhat similar, except that I explicitly add the issue of the content of scientific
knowledge. I also refer to epistemological and axiological issues; I treat issues of semantics
and ontology when they come up in the reflection on knowledge and views of knowledge,
rather than listing them separately in advance Whether reflections in these lour areas of
discussion lead to a 'positive and reconciling' or a 'negative and non-interacting' relationship
(Peacocke 1993, 20) is to be seen; I would not make the result an element in the classification
itself, and I doubt that a single scale from negative to positive is adequate here. A
disadvantage of this scheme is that it emphasises the cognitive aspects of religion. In my
opinion this leaves important areas of discussion out of sight. The natural sciences have
consequences for theology, understood as cognitive affirmations, but also for experience and
tradition, which are central notions in other views of theology. Therefore, I propose a more
elaborate scheme of nine areas of discussion.
I owe this metaphor to A. Peacocke. At (he Fifth European Conference on Science and
Theology (March 1994) he, R. J Russell, N. H Gregersen, H. Reich, C. Wassermann, and
various others gave helpful responses to an earlier version of this scheme. Russell suggested
calling it a typology rather than a classification, since the latter might suggest that the various
categories are mutually exclusive. However, I prefer to speak of a classification, since
'typology' carries other undesirable connotations (symbolic representation), whereas classifica-
tion may be, as intended here, 'a useful schema for stating some of the problems and disputes'
(R. Abelson in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, cd. P Kdwards (New York: Macmillan,
'967), 3'4)
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cognitive elements in religion (ia). I prefer to distinguish these strategies
as follows: i. conflicts over specific issues; ii. separation of domains and
claims; iii. partial adaptation, for instance by developing models which
borrow from the sciences to explicate religious notions; and iv. the
development of an integrated view, and the debates over various
integrated systems, or world views.
Other classifications (see note 14) give most prominence to the way
cognitive claims in religion (theology) and in science are related. This is
only the first column, and often only one area (ia), in the scheme
proposed here. And especially with respect to this area I intend to
make it clear that debates do not stand in isolation, but require
consideration of other views of religion (other columns) and other views
of the challenges (other horizontal rows).
Table i. A classification for areas of discussion concerning the relationship of
religion and science
Challenge
a. New knowledge
b. New views of
knowledge
c. Appreciation of
the world
i. Cognitive
ia. Content:
i. Conflicts
ii. Separation
iii. Partial
adaptation
iv. Integration
ib. Philosophy of
science and
opportunities for
theology.
ic. A new covenant
between humans
and the Universe?
Character of religion
2. Experience
2a. Opportunities
for experiential
religion?
Religious
experience and the
brain.
ab. Philosophical
defences of religious
experiences as data.
2C. Ambivalence of
the world and
implications for the
concept of God.
3. Tradition
33. Religious
traditions as
products of
evolution.
ßb. Criticism and
development of
religions as
'language games'.
3c. A basis for
hope? Or religions
as local traditions
without universal
claim?
I will now give examples of discussions on relations between science
and religion in the various areas, with reference to parts of this book
where such positions are considered at greater length.
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ia. Cognitive claims in religion and new knowledge about the world
i. Various conflicts have arisen over the truth of the Bible: the world
either came into being a few millennia ago or it has existed for billions
of years; there has either been a world-wide flood or there has not;
species are either fixed or they are not; the Sun either stood still at
Gibeon (Joshua 10: 12) or it did not, etcetera. We will come across
creationist controversies on various occasions during this study, but we
will also consider other alleged examples of a straightforward conflict,
especially the condemnation of Galileo [7] and the conflicts sur-
rounding Darwin's theory [8]. It will be argued that in these cases, as
well as in the 'creationist' controversies of the last decades, the conflicts
were also conflicts among believers about the understanding of religion
and conflicts among scientists about the interpretation of science [9].
Hence, whereas the popular picture might be that science and religion
have collided over facts, further analysis shows that other issues are
involved, such as the flexibility of religious expressions (and hence the
possibility of partial adaptation (see below, iii)), the understanding of
religion (moving to other columns in the scheme) and the under-
standing of science, which involves discussions about the nature of
knowledge (the next row in the scheme).
ii. Separation as a strategy may be a consequence of new knowledge,
say biological explanations for the apparent design of organisms and
organs. However, if the strategy is separation, the discussion is not so
much about details of new knowledge, but rather about the nature and
scope of scientific understanding (the next row). An example of such a
position is the distinction between primary and secondary causes (see
especially [13.3, 31]).
iii. Examples of a partial adaptation of religious views to new
knowledge are attempts to find a model for divine action in the context
of quantum physics, chaotic processes or via top-down causation [13].
iv. Among attempts to develop an integrated world view have been
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's evolutionary theology, and process
theology drawing on the metaphysical notions of Alfred N. Whitehead
and Charles Hartshorne [30]. One might also think of views which
dismiss religion as a cognitive mistake which is intelligible on the basis of
our psychological constitution and our evolutionary past [Chapter 4].
ib. Cognitive claims in religion and the nature of knowledge
The idea that theology should adopt the methodology of the
sciences, or that recent insights in epistemology and semantics
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provide a fruitful perspective for religion has been defended by
various philosophers of religion. As one of them claims, and more
seem to believe, 'Methodology, not subject matter, has kept theology
trailing behind in the age of science' (Murphy 1990, 127). According
to Nancey Murphy, relevant parts of theology could be structured as
a Lakatosian research programme, including features such as a hard
core, auxiliary hypotheses, and novel data. Hence, the cognitive
claims of theology deserve as much credibility as the cognitive claims
of science. We will come back to her position and to other attempts
to assimilate science and theology along such methodological lines
[17.2]. A weaker assimilation in methodological and epistemological
respects has been defended by Ian Barbour, when he listed simila-
rities and dissimilarities between science and religious belief (Barbour
1974, 69; 1990, 65-92; see also Peacocke 1984, 41-4). Thus, some
argue that every theological model or metaphor drawing on the
sciences has an 'is' and an 'is-not' component. I will argue that this
qualification is important but insufficient [17.3].
ic. Cognitive claims about the meaning of the universe
In their popular book on self-organisation, Order out of Chaos, Ilya
Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers wrote of a 'new covenant' between
man and nature [14]. The physicist Freeman Dyson saw in the
fundamental characteristics of the universe an indication of purpose, as
if the universe in some sense knew that we were going to arrive on the
scene; 'the universe is an unexpectedly hospitable place' (Dyson 1979,
251; see [31] on the anthropic principles). In writing thus, they opposed
other scientists who had come to the opposite conclusion. The biologist
Jacques Monod, for instance, described everything as the result of pure
chance: there is no objective foundation for meaning or purpose. And
near the end of his popular book, The First Three Minutes the cosmologist
Steven Weinberg wrote: 'The more the universe seems comprehen-
sible, the more it also seems pointless' (1977, 155). This debate is not so
much about the possibility or plausibility of any concept of a transcen-
dent God, or even an active God, but rather about the way we
understand the universe, our place in it, and its future.
2a. Religious interpretations of experience and changing knowledge
Some see new opportunities for an experiential religion. These include
'religious empiricists' who seek continuity with the Christian tradition
as well as authors who represent 'New Age' ideas [30]. Among the
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sciences, quantum physics and ecology attract most interest among
those who seek to develop religion with an experiential emphasis. Such
approaches typically aim at integration, either partial or complete.
Research on the differences between the functioning of the left and
right hemispheres of the human cortex has led some to claim that ordinary
perception and analysis may be located in the left hemisphere whereas the
capacity for experiences of the Absolute is located in the right hemisphere
(e.g., D'Aquili, Ashbrook). In this way, a separation of scientific knowing
and religious knowing can help their integration within a larger frame-
work, which is itself linked with the neurosciences. In the end it is an
attempt at integration to understand 'intense religious and spiritual
experience in a more scientific form' (D'Aquili and Newberg 1993, 178).
However, the same neurosciences have led some to another conclusion:
religious experience is not a special kind of experience, but rather an
interpretation given to certain experiences. Explaining religious experi-
ences almost amounts to explaining them away [20, 22].
2b. Religious experience and the nature of knowledge
We will consider some philosophers of religion, especially Richard
Swinburne and William P. Alston, who argue for the legitimacy of
religious experiences as data for theology [19]. Another proponent of
the same viewpoint is Nancey Murphy, who appeals to communal
discernment as novel data for theology ([17.2], cf. also area ib).
2c. An experiential view of religion and the appreciation of the world
Some American 'religious naturalists' [30], such as Bernard Loomer
and William Dean, want to avoid reference to anything inaccessible.
There is no relief from the ambiguities of life and death in some realm
beyond space and time. Thus, in order to maintain their self-imposed
restriction to the experiential realm they prefer to accept ambiguity in
God rather than a resolution of evil through a notion of ultimacy
beyond history.16
$a. Mew knowledge and religion as a tradition
On the naturalist view that will be presented here, religious traditions
are products of evolution. As evolved traditions, they have been closely
intertwined with the evolution of morality, and more widely with the
evolution of humanity. This view of religion and morality will be
Another discussion of this kind is (Stone 1992) with a preface, critical on this issue, by
Gilkey.
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presented below, drawing on Richard Alexander's Biology of Moral
Systems and Ralph Burhoe's view of the role of religion in the evolution
of the human species [24].
3b. Religion as a tradition and new views of knowledge
Drawing on the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, some defend that
religious traditions should be seen as 'language games' or, drawing on
Michael Polanyi, as implicit, personal, background knowledge. This
seems to grant such traditions a kind of immunity: How could one
consider such a framework or background without leaving it, and
thereby claiming a detached point of view which does not exist? I will
argue against this immunity that the observation that understanding is
always relative to a framework does not exclude further analysis [27].
$c. Traditions and appreciation of the world
The few theologians who take the evolutionary, functional view of
religion (as a position in area 33) very seriously, seek to move beyond a
functional view of religious traditions as adaptations which have
structured societies. They make claims which transcend any local
context, and thereby move from function to truth. The theologian
Philip Hefner writes that the locus of the God-question has become
'the trustworthiness of the processes of evolution upon which man
depends'. Thus, he asks 'whether there is ultimately a resonance between man
and his world or a dissonance - whether man is fundamentally at home in his world
or out of phase with it' (Hefner 1970, 10 and nf.). And the theologian
Gerd Theissen seeks to defend that reality is, ultimately, tolerant and
graceful. We will return to these authors [26]. I agree with them that
religious traditions are to be seen in an evolutionary perspective.
However, their shift from functional adaptations in local contexts to
ontological claims of universal scope does not seem successful. It is
more promising, in my opinion, to accept religious traditions within an
integrated, naturalist understanding of reality as rich, functional
adaptations to certain historical contexts in combination with a
religious appreciation of naturalism, since reality and its intelligibility
do not explain themselves [32].
6. ISSUES FOR FURTHERCONSIDERATION AND PREVIEW
In the introduction I contrasted my own position with two other
approaches, namely the approach of those who play down science and
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that of those who overestimate science in a romantic or metaphysical
interpretation [i].
With respect to those who play down science, I need to argue about
the domain and the status of science. Reflections on our 'inner life',
including religious experiences, on human consciousness, and on the
evolutionary origins of religion and morality, support the conviction
that no phenomena in the world fall outside the domain of the natural
sciences [chapter 4]. With respect to the status of scientific knowledge, I
will offer arguments against attempts to dismiss or evade the implica-
tions of science with the help of philosophical moves, for instance with
an appeal to 'post-modern' pluralism (e.g., Allen, see [18]), or via the
argument that science needs a foundation in some form of super-
naturalism (e.g., Trigg, Plantinga; see also [18]). The reflections on
'scientific realism' [17] and on a naturalist view of science [27] also
serve to make it clear why I hold that one should not underestimate the
significance of the sciences. This needs to be supplemented by an
analysis of the possibility of similar arguments for the status of theology;
I will conclude that such a transfer of arguments from scientific to
theological realism does not work [17.2],
Against those who overestimate the sciences or include them in a
richer metaphysical view of reality, I need to make it clear that
recent advances in the sciences do not offer new perspectives for a
sense of cosmic meaning [14] and that the provisional character of
our knowledge undermines more elaborate metaphysical interpreta-
tions [16]. I will also have to argue that this provisional character
and the incompleteness of scientific explanations does not count
against the naturalist view; even if all phenomena in the world
cannot be explained, they can none the less be understood as
phenomena in a naturalistically understood world [chapter 4]. In this
context, the status of accounts which are not straightforwardly
explanatory but present us with an explanation of how things may
have happened is to be clarified ([24]; see also, on thought
experiments, [15, 18]). The most important competing metaphysical
interpretations of the sciences are organic or holistic; they are
advocated by process theologians and other 'religious empiricists'. I
consider such quite different interpretations to be possible but
implausible because of their implications for the disciplinary struc-
turing of the sciences [30].
Against those who believe that science has made all religion futile I
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will have to argue that religion can be meaningful even if one accepts
the explanatory power of physics, evolutionary schemes and the
neurosciences [20, 22, 25]. The history of relations between religion
and science is not to be seen as one of conflicts between advancing
science and retreating religion, but rather may be seen as a history in
which the understanding of both religion and science have changed
[chapter 2].
Some relate science to theology in an attempt to reformulate
theological notions; in the terms of the classification offered above [5;
first column], they emphasise the cognitive side of religion. I will argue
that attempts to find room for divine action in the natural world are
problematic [13], and that the use of science in theological models may
be heuristically useful but does not lend credibility to the theological
notions [15]. I also will argue that the cognitive claims of theology
cannot be defended along the same lines as contemporary defences of
scientific realism [17].
Understanding theology primarily in terms of experience and of
tradition (second and third columns of the scheme) does not provide
safe havens for theology, as I will argue in chapter 4. We will consider
what it implies that a believer's point of view can be located within a
naturalist view [22]. I also will argue why an argument for a sui generis
character of religion such as provided by D'Aquili fails [20.4]. Thus,
the chapter concerned will contribute to a defence of the viability of a
non-religionist approach towards religion, including religious experi-
ences and religious traditions.
The order of the three views of religion used in the classificatory
scheme (cognitive, experiential, and cultural) corresponds to a large
extent with the order of the chapters (3, 4-A, 4-8). In the final
chapters I come to options which I consider most promising, namely
the possibility to think about God in terms of transcendence with
respect to the natural world [31] - an approach which is in line with
my reflections on limit questions (LQ) - and an understanding of
religion as a human phenomenon in which concepts of God have
arisen in the course of our evolutionary and (pre-)historical past [26] ;
I also discuss critically why I do not accept a 'religious naturalism'
which offers a view of reality which appears to be more hospitable
for religion [30]. Instead, I articulate how I believe that an
evolutionary view of religion and the relativising of particular
religious views that ensues from a strong sense of transcendence may
be held together [32].
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Preview
Chapter 2 considers interpretations of the history of the interactions
between science and religion. This will show the complexity and
context-dependence of these discussions. History has been cast too
often in a single mould, whether one of persistent conflict or one of
basic harmony between science and religion. I will take issue with some
of these stereotypes, especially with the prime myths of conflict, viz. the
condemnation of Galileo and the responses to Darwin, and with the
apologetic arguments which depart from the claim that Christianity
formed the matrix in which science could arise. In line with contem-
porary historians of science we will note that the issue is not just how
science and religion related to each other, but also how conceptions of
religion and of science were shaped through their interaction. Not only
the relation between science and religion, but also the understanding of
religion and of science has been shifting over time.
Chapter 3 is for the most part an argument against religious views of
reality which emphasise the cognitive and rational character of religion
in relation to the natural sciences. In this part we are to a greater or
lesser degree comparing like with like, i.e. views of theology and of
science as cognitive projects, as attempts to understand reality. The
first few sections focus on the way the content of science is used to
articulate religious views which emphasise some form of ontological
transcendence, often joined with belief in activity of that transcendent
reality within our empirical reality. In the later sections of this chapter I
will challenge the view that science and religion are similar in their
general character. I will argue that defences of scientific realism do not
carry over to theology, and that cognitive claims in theology have
problems in dealing with the provisional character of science, problems
which are not solved by moving away from fundamental physics to
sciences focusing on 'higher levels' of reality. With these objections to a
theological realism modelled after scientific realism and to predomi-
nantly cognitivist and rationalist views of the relations between science
and religion, the way is cleared for a naturalist view of religion.
In chapter 4 we will pay more attention to differences between religion
and science. Here the balance shifts to my articulation and defence of a
functional and immanent-ontological, evolutionary view of religion,
whereas the preceding chapters were mainly arguments against posi-
tions of others. Chapter 4 begins with an exposition of the failure of
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arguments from experience to a transcendent reality. In some sections I
seek to understand religious experience and human identity naturalisti-
cally, especially in relation to our brains. We then turn towards
religions as traditions which arose in a long evolutionary process and
which contributed to that process. The last section [26] of this part
considers theological proposals which aim at developing a 'biohisto-
rical' (Kaufman) or 'biocultural' (Burhoe, Hefner) view of human
nature and human religion. Without agreeing with such proposals in
all details, I argue that they make interesting attempts at a theological
appropriation of a naturalist view of religion.
In the final chapter, I defend the significance of the natural sciences
without elevating them to a position which would make science itself a
phenomenon beyond the naturalist framework. Religion is affected by
the naturalist view in two ways: through the naturalist understanding of
reality, which challenges religious explanations of or assumptions about
reality, and in the understanding of religion that it offers. After
reconsidering a naturalist understanding of science and of religion, we
will come to some further reflections on naturalism. I will argue that
questions concerning the whole of reality do not provide answers or
evidence, contrary to some who have claimed otherwise on the basis of
the so-called anthropic coincidences. The question of existence, of why
there is something rather than nothing, is shown to be intractable; the
status of questions concerning the order of the universe is less clear. I
shall also consider the possibility of a radically different description of
our universe, such as the one offered by process philosophers and
theologians who use the conceptual framework of A. N. Whitehead.
Such a restructuring of our conceptual framework cannot be excluded;
a naturalist view cannot be dogmatically protected. However, currently
there seems to be no compelling reason to abandon the materialistic
naturalism opted for above, nor do I consider any of the alternatives
convincing. Thus, I consider religions as particular traditions that have
arisen in our past, but I also consider religion as a response to reflection
on the openness highlighted by limit questions about naturalism.
2Histories of relationships between science and religion
The history of the interactions between science and religion has been
described stereotypically as a warfare between two contending powers:
The history of Science is not a mere record of isolated discoveries; it is a
narrative of the conflict of two contending powers, the expansive force of the
human intellect on one side, and the compression arising from traditionary
faith and human interests on the other. (Draper 1875, vi)
In the following sections I will argue that this is an inadequate view of
the relationship between science and religion, especially since it
portrays the history of this relationship as one in which the relative
importance of both sides is at stake. More balanced studies reveal that
confrontations were not only about the relative importance of two
given enterprises, but also about the natures of science and of religion.
Another mould in which the history has been cast is that of a fruitful
interaction between Christianity and science. The claim has been
made that Christianity has been essential to the rise of modern science.
This too is a stereotype which is still operative today. By considering
episodes in the history of the interactions between science and religion
I intend to show the inadequacy of such stereotypes. Each episode is
different, both with respect to the social context and with respect to the
understanding of the nature of science and of religion. Thus, this part
is meant to contribute to the overall argument of the book's sensitivity
to the diversity of, and changes in, conceptions of religion and of
science, and to take into account insights from contemporary historians
of science who have studied interactions between science and religion.
We will begin with interpretations of two well-known conflicts, the
Galileo affair [7] and the theological responses to Darwin [8]. The
conclusion will be that these conflicts were as much conflicts within
science and within religion as between them. Portraying the history of
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the relationship of science and religion as one of conflict along a single
line of division is neither correct nor helpful [9].
We will then take up the argument that Christianity was the matrix
in which science arose. As a general claim, this is as inadequate as the
claim that conflicts have always developed along the same lines [10].
Some authors criticise both the conflict-interpretation and the co-
operation-interpretation for the incorrect understanding of religion
assumed in them, which gives insufficient attention to the differences
between science and Christian faith. Viewing the entire history in
terms of a loss of faith makes this correct insight into another
inadequate stereotype, itself fuelled by apologetic interests [n]. The
history of the interaction is one in which the meanings of 'science' and
of 'religion' are diverse and shifting. There is a wide variety of activities
going under the headings of 'science' and 'religion'. The issue treated
in this study is not just the relation between two existing entities, each
in itself understood very well, but also ways of thinking about these two
clusters of human concerns. In the final section, we will consider what
lessons can be learned from recent historical studies [12].
7. THE GALILEO AFFAIR AS THE FOUNDING MYTH OF CONFLICT
Stephen Hawking, a cosmologist, recalls an audience with Pope John
Paul II at the close of a study week in 1981 organised by the Vatican
Observatory. The pope told the scientists
that we should not inquire into the big bang itself because that was the
moment of Creation and therefore the work of God. I was glad then that he
did not know the subject of the talk I had just given at the conference - the
possibility that space-time was finite but had no boundary, which means that
it had no beginning, no moment of Creation. I had no desire to share the fate
of Galileo. (Hawking 1988, 116)
Actually, the pope did not object to research into the Big Bang. He
made a philosophical point: whatever theories scientists come up with,
they will always leave open metaphysical questions about the beginning
and existence of reality, since one can always raise further questions
(John Paul II 1982, xxviii). Hawking apparently fails to appreciate this
central element in die papal statement.
It is remarkable that Hawking invokes 'Galileo's fate'. It would, of
course, be in no way in the power nor in the interest of John Paul II to
force Hawking to revoke views and to put him under house arrest in
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Hawking's own villa. The opposite was actually the case: in 1985
Hawking became a member of the Pontifical Academy of Science
(Marini-Bettôlo 1986, 233). How Hawking reconciled accepting this
membership with his expressed fear and felt need to keep silent about
his scientific work is not clear to me; perhaps the reference to the papal
statement was merely to enliven his book.
By referring to Galileo, Hawking appeals to the most well known
example of a conflict between science and religion. To assess the
adequacy of this view, we will have to consider what the intellectual issues
were, what actually happened, and who the contending parties were. '
Problems of the Copemican view
Though the heliocentric view developed by Nicholas Copernicus (1543)
is fairly obvious from our perspective, we should avoid the bias coming
with hindsight if we want to understand the Galileo affair. There were
various reasons for resistance against a heliocentric view. Apparently,
the heliocentric view contradicted sense experience. Nobody feels the
rotation of the Earth, even though its speed at the equator is over 1,600
kilometres an hour. We still see the Sun rising and setting. Other
epistemological issues were the justification of the use of instruments such
as the telescope, the role of tradition, especially the Bible, in scientific
research, and the relation between physics and astronomy. There were
also religious objections, as the Copernican view seemed at odds with
certain Biblical passages.
There were various astronomical objections as well. Terrestrial objects
were irregular, solid and changing, whereas celestial ones appeared to be
spherical, luminous and unchanging. Besides, as Galileo came to realise
in i6io,2 on the Copernican view Venus would have to show the full
range of phases, from full to dark. And if the Sun rather than the Earth
was the centre of the system of the fixed stars, the apparent position of
stars should show annual variation (parallax), which was not observed.
Apart from the astronomical objections, the Copernican model did not
fit the physics of the time, especially the understanding of motion.
The following list of problems with Copernicanism follows Finocchiaro (1989, yf., and I7f.).
Quotations from documents of the Galileo affair have heen taken from the translation by
Finocrhiaro (1989) unless noted otherwise. The order of questions has been inspired by
Pedersen (1983 and 1991)-
Galileo's friend Gastelli wrote to Galileo about the phases which Venus would have to show
in the late summer of t6io (Gingerieh 1982, 136; 1986, i [6); whether Galileo was aware of this
before Castelli's letter, is unknown to me.
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Galileo's research on motion addressed the physical objections; they
were definitively resolved through Newton's work at the end of the
same century. Galileo's observations with the telescope dealt with most
of the astronomical objections. Heavenly bodies such as the Moon
turned out to be far from perfect and the phases of Venus were
observed. These discoveries, together with the discovery of four moons
circling Jupiter, were published in The Starry Messenger (1610) and The
Sunspot Letters (1613). The absence of observed stellar parallax remained
a valid objection (though this could be interpreted as an indication of
huge interstellar distances), until instances of stellar parallax were
established observationally in 1838.
Epistemological problems such as the conflict with sense experience
and the nature of knowledge were a continuing source of debate.
While, for instance, the observed phases of Venus falsified the Ptole-
maic system, it did not follow that they proved the heliocentric system.
Tycho Brahe's system, which had the Sun circling the Earth and all the
(other) planets circling the Sun, would do equally well. Without
referring to this specific system, Cardinal Bellarmine made the episte-
mological point in his letter written in 1615 to a Carmelite priest,
Foscarini, who had defended the compatibility of the Copernican view
with Scripture:
I say that if there were a true demonstration that the sun is at the center of the
world and the earth in the third heaven, and that the sun does not circle the
earth but the earth circles the sun, then one would have to proceed with great
care in explaining the Scriptures that appear contrary, and say rather that we
do not understand them than that what is demonstrated is false. But I will not
believe that there is such a demonstration, until it is shown to me. Nor is it the
same to demonstrate that by supposing the sun to be at the center and the
earth in heaven one can save the appearances, and to demonstrate that in
truth the sun is at the center and the earth in heaven; for I believe the first
demonstration may be available, but I have very great doubts about the
second. (Bellarmine, in Finocchiaro (1989, 68))
What happened?
On 24 February 1616 the Holy Office headed by Cardinal Bellarmine
condemned two theses regarding the position of the Sun and the
movement of the Earth. A few days later, on 5 March, the Congrega-
tion of the Index issued a decree which prohibited various books by
Protestants, and suspended Copernicus' book and a commentary on
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Job 'until corrected'. Foscarini's defence of the compatibility of the
heliocentric view and the Bible was completely prohibited and con-
demned. There is no reference to Galileo in this decree.
It was decided by the pope on 25 February 1616, that Galileo would
be invited in private by Cardinal Bellarmine to 'warn him to abandon
these opinions', and if Galileo would refuse to obey, he would receive a
formal injunction in the presence of witnesses. The next day Galileo
was received by Bellarmine. It is not completely clear what happened
on this occasion. There is a document, lacking proper signatures,
reporting that Bellarmine warned Galileo that the heliocentric view
was erroneous, and that - without any suggestion that Galileo had
refused to obey - immediately thereafter in the presence of witnesses
the Commissary General of the Inquisition, a Dominican, ordered
Galileo 'not to hold, teach, or defend in any way whatever, either
orally or in writing' the heliocentric view. However, the official report
by Bellarmine states that Galileo 'had acquiesced when warned' and
did not refer to the more specific instruction which the document says
Galileo had received from the head of the Inquisition.
A few months later, Galileo was granted an audience with the pope,
who affirmed that Galileo was highly respected. As there were rumours
circulating about him, Galileo requested and received a certificate
from Bellarmine. This explicitly denies that Galileo has been con-
demned. 'On the contrary, he has only been notified of the declaration
made by the Holy Father and published by the Sacred Congregation
of the Index' (Finocchiaro 1989, 153; Baldini and Coyne 1984). In 1620
the corrections of Copernicus' book were published. The book went
through unchanged, except that the heliocentric view was not asserted
but treated hypothetically (Finocchiaro 1989, 200-2).
In 1623 Cardinal Maffeo Barberini, a patron of the arts and the
sciences, was elected Pope Urban VIII. He had once written a poem to
honour Galileo's work. Galileo was received by him in six private
audiences in 1624; the impression is that a discussion of the heliocentric
view was considered acceptable if it were treated as a hypothesis.
Probably against Galileo's claim that he could prove the truth of the
See for the interpretation of the document, for instance, the discussion between Drake (1965)
and De Santillana (1965). It might be that the document was made in advance in case Galileo
refused to obey, while no such further injunction, was served, and that therefote the
document was left unsigned; it has also been speculated that the Commissary General served
the injunction though this was not according to the papal decision and Bellarmine's
intentions, and hence that Bellarmine did not report it since officially it had not happened.
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heliocentric view on the basis of his theory of the tides, the pope argued
that one could never prove the heliocentric view to be true. It would
always be within God's infinite power to create the world in such a way
that the phenomena which were taken to prove the Copernican view,
were brought about by other means.
Galileo began to work on the book that became The Dialogue
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems - Ptolemaic and Copernican. The
pope's argument is brought forward at the end by the defender of the
geostatic view. The book was finished in April 1630, but not printed
until February 1632. Obtaining a licence to print took time, partly due
to external circumstances such as an outbreak of the plague, which
inhibited travel, and partly due to hesitations on the side of the officials.
Despite the imprimatur and the changes which had been made at the
request of the licensers, the book was taken out of circulation in Rome.
In September 1632 the Holy Office (Inquisition) summoned Galileo to
Rome. In February 1633 Galileo arrived in Rome, where he stayed at
the Embassy of Tuscany (Florence). On 12 April Galileo was interro-
gated, and subsequently detained in the apartment of the chief
prosecutor. At the end of April it seemed as if the case would be settled
extrajudicially, with Galileo admitting vanity in presenting the helio-
centric view too strongly. Galileo was allowed to return to the
Embassy. Shortly thereafter, Galileo presented his defence along the
lines of the expected extrajudicial settlement.
The pope received a very critical report of the proceedings; the
report did not match with the moderating attempt (documented in
letters) to settle extrajudicially. At a meeting of the Inquisition on
16 June, presided over by Pope Urban VIII, it was decided that Galileo
was to be interrogated 'under threat of torture'. This was the legal term
for formal interrogation, and should, according to contemporary
scholarship, not be understood as if Galileo was really threatened with
torture. On 22 June Galileo abjured, with only seven of the ten
cardinals present actually signing the sentence. Galileo was put under
house arrest, first at the residence of a friend, the archbishop of Siena,
and subsequendy, until his death in 1642, in his own villa near
Florence.
Who had a conflict about what?
i. Traditionally, the Galileo affair is seen as a conflict between science
and theology over the heliocentric view of the universe. As such, it is
seen as a conflict about scientific facts and theories.
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2. Recalling Bellarmine's letter to Foscarini (quoted above), Finoc-
chiaro holds that the 'key epistemological issue in the Galileo Affair was
the provability of the earth's motion, that is, whether the earth's motion
was something capable of being proved true, not whether it had (already)
been proved true' (ig86a, 200). This emphasis leads to various issues for
research, such as the way in which Galileo spoke of proofs, the pope's
argument based on divine omnipotence, and the patterns of reasoning
involved (Finocchiaro 1980). Seen thus, the conflict has to do with the
aims of science. It still is a conflict about intellectual authority, but such
an approach gives more credit to the ecclesiastical authorities. They may
have been factually wrong about the movement of the earth but
philosophically sound in resisting the premature adoption of a new view.
3. The Galileo affair, and especially the events of the first episode
(1616), can be seen as a conflict about hermeneutical principles and
authority in exegesis (Pedersen 1983, 1991). Heliocentric views had
been espoused before, even by the high-ranking Cardinal Nicholas of
Cusa (1401-64). However, the Catholic Church had defined its position
more strictly in response to the Protestant Reformation. The Council
of Trent had decided in its Fourth Session, on 8 April 1546, that no
one should interpret the Holy Scriptures contrary to the sense that the
Holy Mother Church has held and holds, or contrary to the consensus
of the Fathers, the recognized theologians of the early church (e.g.,
Blackwell 1991, nf, 183). Galileo's letter to Castelli (1613) and his
subsequent letter to Grand Duchess Christina in 1615 dealt at length
with the hermeneutical issue.
Galileo argues that where science is certain, one has to adapt one's
interpretation of Scripture. If science offers merely 'plausible opinion
and probable conjecture' in place of sure and demonstrated knowledge,
one should give priority to Scripture and the view of the Fathers, and
shape one's scientific view accordingly. While he argues that science
might correct our interpretation of Scripture in physical matters,
Galileo also argues for mutual neutrality of Scripture and science.
Galileo quotes a cardinal to the effect that Scripture does not intend to
teach us how the heavens go, but how to go to heaven. The Bible is
only relevant in matters 'which concern our salvation and the establish-
ment of our faith'.4
4. The affair can also be seen as the outcome of internal conflicts within
Quotes from Galileo's Letter to Grand Duchess Christina (Drake 1957, 197, i88f.). McMullin
(1967, 33; 1981, 18 25) sees a tension between relevance and neutrality; Finocchiaro (1986,
261-8) defends the coherence of Galileo's letter.
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the scientific community and within the Catholic Church. The first opposition to
Galileo came from colleagues at the university, philosophers steeped in
the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition such as Lodovice délie Colombe. In
his treatise Against the Earth's motion (1610 or 1611), Colombe introduced
religious objections in the confrontation over the nature of science.
Galileo's letter to Grand Duchess Christina is especially critical of such
philosophers. What started as an internal conflict within the academy
was transferred to the domain of the church. The emphasis on alliances
and struggles over power, including those within the Catholic Church
between Dominicans and Jesuits, is central to the account given by
Giorgio de Santillana (1955), who pointed out analogies with the use of
power and repression by communist regimes of his time.
5. Piedro Redondi has argued that the condemnation of Galileo for
his defence of a heliocentric view was a cover for a quite different
charge, one of heresy with respect to the Eucharist. Redondi has
discovered a complaint against Galileo in the files of the Holy Office,
filed in 1624 or 1625. The charge in the document was that Galileo's
view of matter was at odds with the proper understanding of the
Eucharist. The Council of Trent had affirmed that in the Eucharist,
the bread and wine are no longer bread and wine in substance, even
though they are so in external appearance. An atomistic view of matter
which tied secondary qualities, appearance, to primary qualities,
substance, was a challenge to this Catholic doctrine. Redondi interprets
the condemnation of Galileo in 1633 for Copernicanism as an attempt
by Pope Urban VIII to cover up the far more dangerous accusation of
heresy with respect to the Eucharist. On this interpretation, Urban
remained a friend of Galileo, though appearing to have changed his
attitude. However, Redondi is then challenged to explain why Urban
had to remain apparently hostile towards Galileo in private correspon-
dence in later years. Though original and drawing upon a wider
perspective of that period, Redondi's reconstruction does not seem to
be tenable.5
6. Personal animosities and the characters of the persons involved may
well have aggravated the affair. Galileo was involved in various
disputes. Psychology might also explain to some extent the position of
Pope Urban in 1632 and 1633. At the end of Galileo's Dialogue the
argument from divine omnipotence is presented by Simplicio. Urban
seems to have felt that he was thereby ridiculed. Wider issues, such as
See detailed criticisms by Westfall (1989: 84-103; this essay also in History of Science 26 (1988):
399 415) and by Mayaud (1992); further references in Finocchiaro (1989, 351, note 16).
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his status as a patron of the arts and sciences may also have been
involved.
7. The political situation may have influenced the course of events as
well. The second phase of the affair took place during the Thirty Years
War in Europe. Spain, Germany, and Austria, ruled by the Catholic
Habsburgs, fought against a Protestant alliance headed by the Swedish
king Gustavus Adolphus. Both Catholic France and the papacy allied
to some extent with the Swedes against the Habsburgs. Pope Urban
was accused by some Spanish cardinals of helping the Protestant cause.
It may have been that Urban needed to be strong on doctrinal
challenges in order to diminish internal Catholic tensions. The tension
between the various Catholic nationalities might explain why some of
the cardinals present did not sign the condemnation of Galileo
(Redondi 1987, 2601).
The Galileo affair is not a conflict between 'the church' and 'science'.
Clergymen, Catholic institutions, and academics can be found on both
sides. The conflict had various intellectual dimensions, which had to do
with facts as well as with issues of method and authority in science and
in theology. Social and psychological aspects were also relevant, and
were partly connected with the epistemological issues, as the church
was drawn into a conflict amongst scientists and philosophers.
Looking back upon the Galileo affair
Part of the myth of the Galileo affair is that the Catholic Church is
assumed to have held the same position for a long time. In the autumn
of 1992 newspapers reported on a speech made by Pope John Paul II as
if the Catholic Church had now rehabilitated Galileo and finally
acknowledged the heliocentric view. This is mistaken with respect to
the intervening ages and with respect to the speech of John Paul II.7 In
1734 the Holy Office allowed the erection of a mausoleum to Galileo in
the church in Florence where he had been buried. In 1741 permission
was given to print the first edition of Galileo's complete works,
including the Dialogue. In 1757 the general condemnation of books
favouring the heliocentric view was taken off the Index. In 1822 it was
As pointed out in Westfall (1989, 58-83). The issue of patronage is considered in detail in
Biagioli (1993). In a Postscript to the third edition of his book, Langford also points out that
contacts between Galileo and various 'subversive' persons may have contributed to Urban's
anger towards Galileo (I^angford 1966 (1992, 203!!".)).
The following data have been taken from (Jacqueline 1987; Finocchiaro 1989, 307; Poupard
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allowed to present the Copernican system as a thesis, a fact, and not
only as an hypothesis (Brandmüller et al. 1992, Poupard 1992, 375). In
the late nineteenth century, but in continuity with earlier activities, the
Astronomical Observatory of the Vatican was founded so 'that
everyone might see that the Church and its Pastors are not opposed to
true and solid science, whether human or divine, but that they
embrace it, encourage it, and promote it with the fullest possible
dedication' (Pope Leo XIII, Motu Proprio, Ut Mysticam (1891), quoted in
Maffeo 1991, 34). This observatory participates fully in up-to-date
scientific research.
A solemn meeting of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences took place
on 31 October 1992. Ambassadors and members of the Curie were
present. The pope spoke positively about Galileo, affirming his episte-
mological and his hermeneutical insights. However, the papal address
was not a rehabilitation of Galileo. It lacked the formal setting of a
legal rehabilitation. Besides, the address can also be heard as a
justification of Galileo's judges; they had made mistakes, but these were
intelligible in the context of their times. In recent, more or less official,
Catholic writings on the Galileo affair (Poupard 1987; John Paul II
1979, 1992) there is a genuine longing for truth about the historical
facts. But there is also the expectation that a better understanding of
the affair will support the thesis that science and religion are compa-
tible. However, this latter claim is beyond historical research, and in
danger of distorting it (Finocchiaro ig86a, 191). Historical research can
falsify the view of the Galileo affair as an instance of plain incompat-
ibility of scientific truth and theological truth. It was a conflict between
different persons within the scientific community and within the
Catholic Church, with different views of science, of theology, and of
the role of authority in these enterprises.
8. POST-DARWINIAN CONFLICTS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA
The Galileo affair has become the prime myth of conflict between
science and the Catholic Church. Controversies over evolution in the
late nineteenth century have become the archetype of conflicts between
science and Protestantism in the United Kingdom and the USA. In A
History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, Andrew D.
White wrote that 'Darwin's Origin of Species had come into the
theological world like a plough into an ant-hill. Everywhere those thus
rudely awakened from their old comfort and repose had swarmed forth
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angry and confused' (White 1896, 70). A review of Charles Darwin's
Origin of Species by Samuel Wilberforce, Bishop of Oxford, is White's
prime example of the theological response to evolution.
Nor did the bishop's efforts end here: at the meeting of the British Association
for the Advancement of Science he again disported himself in the tide of
popular applause. Referring to the ideas of Darwin, who was absent on
account of illness, he congratulated himself in a public speech that he was not
descended from a monkey. The reply came from Huxley, who said in
substance: 'If I had to choose, I would prefer to be a descendant of a humble
monkey rather than of a man who employs his knowledge and eloquence in
misrepresenting those who are wearing out their lives in the search for truth.'
This shot reverberated through England, and indeed through other
countries. (White 1896, vol. i, 7of.)
We will begin with a brief presentation of the confrontation between
Wilberforce and Thomas Huxley. I also will come back to the polemic
characteristics of White's book. In both cases, the social context, the
professionalisation of science in Britain and in the USA was important.
In the last part of this section I will present and criticise the claim that
orthodox Calvinists rather than religious liberals were in the best
position to incorporate Darwin's theory into their views, partly because
Darwin's theory had its roots in their views.
The debate between Huxley and Wilberforce
The confrontation took place during the annual meeting of the British
Association for the Advancement of Science, 27 June to 4 July i86o.8
Since its publication at the end of 1859, Darwin's Origin of Species had
been reviewed positively, for instance by Huxley in The Times, and
negatively, for instance by Richard Owen, leading anatomist of the
Natural History Department of the British Museum, who had, many
years before, collaborated with Darwin on some of the specimens from
his voyage on the Beagle. In a discussion at a meeting of the section for
botany and zoology of the British Association, on Thursday, 28 June,
Owen had asserted an 'impassable gulf between humans and apes, as
human brains contained posterior lobes which apes lacked. Huxley
'denied altogether that the difference between the brain of the gorilla
and man was so great as represented by Prof. Owen' (The Athenaeum
7 July 1860, 26).
Two days later, on Saturday 30 June, there was another meeting of
The Athenaeum 1706 of 7 July 1860, 18 27, and 1707 of 14 July, pp. 64 6; reconstruction in
Jensen (1988); see also Jensen (1991).
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the section for botany and zoology. Between 400 and 700 people were
present: scientists, theologians, students, 'and women' Jensen 1988,
165). The meeting was not set up as a debate between Wilberforce and
Huxley. Huxley had intended to visit relatives that day; in his diary
were the departure times for the train Jensen 1988, 173). John William
Draper from New York - who many years later published a History of
the Conflict Between Religion and Science — lectured for well over an hour
'On the intellectual development of Europe, considered with reference
to the views of Mr. Darwin and others, that the progression of
organisms is determined by law'.9 Whether the British Darwinians
present appreciated this broad sweep of evolutionary thinking, rather
than a more limited and technical argument, may be doubted.
During the discussion Bishop Wilberforce was called upon to give his
view. He spoke for about half an hour. Wilberforce argued that
Darwin's theory was an hypothesis which 'when tried by the principles
of inductive science, broke down' (The Athenaeum 14 July 1860, 65).
According to some accounts, he asked Huxley a question about his
descendence from the apes. This may have been related to the
discussion in the same section two days earlier; the question and
Huxley's answer are not mentioned in the report in The Athenaeum.
Huxley rose to defend Darwin's theory as the best explanation of the
facts, without asserting that all details were correct or confirmed. He
replied to Wilberforce's rhetorical question, according to a letter two
months later, as follows:
If then, said I, the question is put to me 'would I rather have a miserable
ape for a grandfather or a man highly endowed by nature and possessed of
great means and influence, and yet who employs those faculties and that
influence for the mere purpose of introducing ridicule into a grave scientific
discussion' - I unhesitatingly affirm my preference for the ape.'
After Huxley a few anti-Darwinians spoke, and two more supporters of
Darwin, including the botanist Joseph D. Hooker. Letters from both
sides claim victory among those whom each considers most competent
to judge. Press reports gave mixed impressions (Jensen 1988, 172).
Wilberforce's question should be understood in the context of the
playfulness of English debate, and of a crowded room after a fairly dull
lecture. Though this may be said to Wilberforce's credit, questioning
evolutionists as heirs of apes, tadpoles, or mushrooms had already been
The Athenaeum 14 July 1860, 64f; see also Fleming (1950, 67 73).
I-etter of T. H. Huxley to Dr Dyster, 9 September 1860, Huxley Papers, vol. 15, fols. iiyt.
Jensen 1988, 168; De Beer 1964, i66f.; Nature 172 (14 November 1953): 920).
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dealt with by Huxley in an essay, and was perhaps not a very
appropriate joke for the occasion.
The professionalisation of science in Britain
White's History of the Warfare described the exchange between Wilber-
force and Huxley as a confrontation between science and theology.
However, the exchange was not only a confrontation of ideas; the
social and professional context, and thereby the understanding of the
nature of science, is important for a proper understanding of this
exchange.
Wilberforce, vice-president of the British Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science, represented the scientific establishment as much
as he represented the church. Huxley, twenty years his junior, was a
career scientist (Jensen 1988, 175). If the opponents are seen in this way,
the exchange reflects a general change in British science. 'During the
first half of the nineteenth century the major characteristics of British
science were amateurism, aristocratic patronage, minuscule govern-
ment support, limited employment opportunities, and peripheral inclu-
sion within the clerically dominated universities and secondary schools'
(Turner 1978, 360). Although the utility of science for industry and
agriculture received some attention, many 'scientists considered the
moral and metaphysical imperatives of natural theology as a proper
and integral part of their vocation' (Turner 1978, 360). Around the
middle of the century science developed into a profession which sets its
own terms for evaluating results and selecting prospective scientists.
Rather than seeking aristocratic and clerical patronage, the support of
the public was sought by arguing for the relevance of science for the
welfare of the nation and hence for the inclusion of science in curricula.
The change can be illustrated by the observation that forty-one
Anglican clergymen presided over sections of the British Association for
the Advancement of Science between 1831 and 1865, while only three
held such chairs between 1866 and 1900 (Turner 1978, 367).
(Jensen 1988, 176!".; 1991, 82). Lucas (1979, 327) argues that Wilberforce did not ask about
Huxley's descent, but rather spoke in the first person of his own descent, or in the third
person of our common descent. On Lucas' reading, he may have challenged Huxley with
respect to the place where in a series of progenitors he would locate the shift from one species
to another one.
Developments in other countries have been different. For instance, it has been argued that
science became a profession in France with the French Revolution (Crosland 1975, 140);
members of the French Academy of Sciences before the Revolution had a professional
attitude, for example, disciplinary self-correction, but did not yet form an occupational group
(Hahn 1975, 135).
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The shift from the gentleman-naturalist to the professional scientist
led to conflicts with leaders of organised religion who wanted to
maintain their influence on educational institutions. And attempts at
reconciling science and religion by religiously minded scientists, both
clergy and lay, came under attack due to the naturalist and critical bent
of the new scientific generation. The botanist Joseph Hooker, a friend
of Thomas Huxley and Charles Darwin, wrote in 1860 that the worst
'scientifical-geological-theologians ... are like asses between bundles of
hay, distorting their consciences to meet the double call on their public
profession' (L. Huxley 1918, 520).
The decreasing role of clergy in science was not only sought by
scientists. It also reflected developments in the churches. There was an
increasing emphasis on devotional and theological issues rather than on
participation in general culture. This is explicit in the various revivalist
movements during the nineteenth century, the Oxford movement, the
Salvation Army, and in Catholic circles the revival in Ireland and the
attention given to the miracle of Lourdes.
It was not only the social position of scientists that changed, but also
their ideology. Whereas they had been 'tracing the presence of the
Creator in creation', the ideology of professional scientists of the
second half of the century became 'the glorification and strengthening
of the nation and its wealth', i.e. the service of the common weal
(Turner 1978, 375).
White's Warfare and Cornell University
In England a dominant church was giving way to an independent
professionalised science. The American context was different, as there
was not a single dominant denomination. But Andrew D. White's
History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896) also has a
context which explains some of the polemic characteristics of this book.
White was the first president of Cornell University. This institute,
the first non-denominational private university, was created in 1865 by
the State of New York with the help of funds from Ezra Cornell and
from White. The classical disciplines and the industrial sciences were
taught, though during his Senior year in college White had regarded
the latter 'with contempt - with wonder that human beings possessed
of immortal souls should waste their time in work with blow pipes and
test tubes' (Altschuler 1979, 61).
Though not denominational, Cornell was set up as a Christian
university, with compulsory attendance at chapel (Altschuler 1979,
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68, 81). And, even though White claimed that denominational back-
grounds were irrelevant, he took great care to create a denomination-
ally balanced faculty (Altschuler 1979, 81). Though Christian, the focus
was not to serve religion, but to serve the nation by educating its future
leaders. White himself served the country in various diplomatic
positions; he was close to running for vice-president in 1900 (Altschuler
1979, 258). As first president of the American Historical Association, he
told his audience in 1884 that the historian must use historical facts to
drive home a particular lesson (Altschuler 1979, 155). In his History of the
Warfare of Science with Theology a lesson is driven home chapter after
chapter: theological resistance was futile as science always turned out
victorious.
Frustrations about the ecclesiastical opposition he met, both in
Cornell and elsewhere, may well have influenced the articulation of'the
warfare between science and theology'. White responded strongly to all
charges of atheism and infidelity (Altschuler 1979, 95). Earlier in his
career, White was not appointed to a position in Yale since the members
of the board were not sure enough about his personal religious convic-
tions (Altschuler 1979, 36). And by the standards of the board, which
consisted almost entirely of orthodox Congregationalists, they were
probably right. Despite his mother's wishes, Andrew White had refused
confirmation in the Episcopal (Anglican) Church because he resisted the
minister's view that unbaptised children and members of other churches
(including his own grandmother) are eternally punished (Altschuler
1979, 25). White took religion seriously, but quarrelled with dogmatic
theology and sectarianism. 'Religion, as seen in the recognition of "a
Power in the Universe, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness",
and in the love of God and of our neighbour, will steadily grow stronger
and stronger' (White 1896, vol. i, xii). Such a religion was in harmony
with science and could only benefit from science. As White saw it,
I 1
conflicts were between science and dogmatic theology.
Both in Britain and in America, conflicts about religion and science
were part of the struggle for the establishment of science as an
independent profession. However, there was also the content of
Darwin's theory, which had to be dealt with intellectually.
Ijndbcrg and Numbers (19863, 339) consider White's focus in his History of the Warfart of
Science with Theolo/y m ('.hwtendom (1896) on dogmatic theology rather than religion 'more of an
afterthought' as he had spoken in 1869 of 'religion'. However, the evidence given by
Altschuler on White's younger years seems to warrant the claim that his appreciation for
religion and his resistance against denominationalism and theology, were fairly constant over
his life, and already well in place in 1869.
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Some British responses to Darwin's theory
Wilberforce was not the only voice from the Anglican clergy at the
meeting. The next day Frederick Temple, who became Archbishop of
Canterbury in 1896, delivered a sermon on 'the present relations of
science to religion' which claimed that God's finger was to be discerned
in the laws of nature; Temple recognised a deep identity of 'tone,
character, and spirit' between the Book of God and the Book of
Nature, God's words and God's works.15 The list of positive responses
from clergy, theologians, and Christian leaders to Darwin's theory can
easily be extended. Friendly relations despite disagreements also under-
mine the adequacy of the 'warfare metaphor'. As the historian Moore
(1979, 100) wrote, 'Henceforth interpretations of the post-Darwinian
controversies must be non-violent and humane.'
Not only were others open-minded, but Wilberforce himself was not
as narrow-minded as legend has taken him to be. In his presentation at
the meeting of the British Association, he seems to have emphasized
scientific and philosophical problems, as he did in his forty page review
of Darwin's book:
and if Mr. Darwin can with the same correctness of reasoning [as Newton]
demonstrate to us our fungular descent, we shall dismiss our pride, and avow,
with the characteristic humility of philosophy, our unsuspected cousinship
with the mushrooms . . . only we shall ask leave to scrutinise carefully every
step of the argument which has such an ending, and demur if at any point of it
we are invited to substitute unlimited hypothesis for patient observation, or
the spasmodic fluttering flight of fancy for the severe conclusions to which
logical accuracy of reasoning has led the way.
And, after an extensive discussion of various facts and arguments from
The Origin of Species, skilfully focusing on its weaker points and grander
extrapolations, Wilberforce continues:
Our readers will not have failed to notice that we have objected to the views
with which we have been dealing solely on scientific grounds. We have done
The spectrum of responses varies by country; for theological responses in German-speaking
countries, see Hübner (1966), for Catholic reactions in general see Paul (1974, 1979); for a
comparative study of the reception of Darwinism, not focused on religion, see Click (1974).
Some differences between responses in England and the United States correlate with
differences in theological and philosophical background; in the United States a liberal
theology in the tradition of Schleiermacher collided with orthodoxy, whereas English
theology had been shaped by a natural theology which was much more threatened by an
alternative explanation of biological adaptedness (R. Hensen, private communication).
F. Temple, The Present Relations of Science to Religion: A Sermon Preached on Aft Sum/in, July i, 1860,
before the University of Oxford, during the Meeting of the British Association (Oxford: J. H. & Jas.
Parker, 1860) (Brooke 1991, 41, 274; Moore 1979, 89).
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so from our fixed conviction that it is thus that the truth or falsehood of such
arguments should be tried. We have no sympathy with those who object to
any facts or alleged facts in nature, or to any inference logically deduced from
them, because they believe them to contradict what it appears to them is
taught by Revelation ... There may be to man difficulty in reconciling all the
utterances of the two voices. But what of that? He has learned already that
here he knows only in part ... This is as truly the spirit of Christianity as it is
that of philosophy.'II,
Opposition to Darwin's theory was not restricted to theologians. It
came also from scientists such as the anatomist Sir Richard Owen, and
the physicists George Stokes, William Thomson (Lord Kelvin), and
James Clerk Maxwell. Owen was not opposed to the general idea of
evolution, but he was more interested in the order of nature, the
pattern of organic diversity, than in the way it had come into being.
Homologies, for instance between the wings of birds, the forelegs of
tigers and the arms of humans were there, as 'all animals within each
major group were variations on a single theme, modifications of a
single Ideal Type' (Rudwick 1972, 210). Similarities were not traced to
common ancestry but to a common Archetype. The fossil sequence
through time shows the gradual embodiment of the pre-existent Ideas.
This was a scientific explanation as well as a world view for Owen, as
we may glean from a lecture in 1849, On the Nature of Limbs.
I have used therefore the word 'Nature' in the sense of the German
'Bedeutung', as signifying that essential character of a part which belongs to it
in its relation to a predetermined pattern, answering to the 'idea' of the
Archetypal World in the Platonic cosmogony, which archetype or primal
pattern is the basis supporting all the modifications of such part for specific
powers and actions in all animals possessing it. (af)
To what natural or secondary causes the orderly succession and progression of
such organic phenomena may have been committed, we are as yet ignorant.
But if, without derogation to the Divine Power, we may conceive the existence
of such ministers and personify them by the term 'Nature', we learn from the
past history of our globe, that she has advanced with slow and stately steps,
guided by the archetypal light amidst the wreck of worlds, from the first
embodiment of the Vertebrate idea, under its old Ichtyic vestment [that is, as
fish], until it became arranged in the glorious garb of Human form. (86)
Owen's Platonism was not 'a naive creationism' but an explanation
'with intellectual credentials quite as high as Darwin's, and with
The Quarterly Revuui 108 July 1860): 225-64, 231 and 256f.; The landm Quarterly Renew
(American edition) 108 (July 1860): 118^38, 121, 134.
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considerably more credibility to the mind of the time' (Rudwick 1972,
207). Belief in 'design' had at least two faces: the emphasis on functional
adaptations which has been typical of William Paley's Natural Theology
of 1802, and a more idealistic tradition represented by Owen, which
emphasised not so much efficiency of adaptation as coherence of an
overall plan (Bowler 1977). Owen's approach was not a traditional
Platonism with a perfect reality of Ideas of which we perceive mere
shadows; 'the vertebrate archetype represented the opposite: the
simplest and least perfected conception of a vertebrate' (Rupke 1993,
243). Despite the apparent Platonism, there was a major sense of
potentiality, of organic evolution by means of secondary causes.
Owen's position was conducive to scientific work, for instance in
comparative anatomy. The scientific debate between Darwinians and a
man like Owen was intertwined with debates about the aims of science,
about metaphysical issues, and about their role in science, as well as
with rhetorical moves which sought to build supportive alliances.
Against what he considered to be metaphysical intrusions into
science, Huxley coined the term 'agnosticism'. In philosophy it meant
that we cannot claim knowledge beyond the limitations of reason,
while in science it implied that nothing was to be regarded as true
unless based upon reason and experience. It was this agnosticism,
'philosophy, not science, that blocked the path to God in one direction,
while suggesting the way forward in philosophy in another' (Gilley and
Loades 1981, 301). There was also a moral dimension to Huxley's
agnosticism. A detached spectator of the evolutionary process may well
be filled with the Amor Intellectualis Dei, and see the world as the creation
of a good God. However, 'the vision of illimitable sufferings . . . mars
the prospect for us poor mortals' (Huxley 1894^ 74). Though rejecting
metaphysics and theology, Huxley appreciated the Bible, especially the
social and religious criticisms by the prophets. In seeking election to the
London School Board he pleaded for the inclusion of Bible reading in
the curriculum, but without having it controlled by theology, by the
churches (Huxley 18943, 396-9, 4Oif).
Calvinist roots of Darwinism?
White held that Darwinian evolution was in conflict with Christian
theology. As we have seen, responses of clergy and of Christian lay
scientists were more varied than that. Besides, not all opposition was
fuelled by Christian theology. An even stronger claim, about a positive
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correlation, has been made by James Moore in his study of the post-
Darwinian controversies.
By considering the views of twenty-eight Christian controversialists in Great
Britain and America, it is argued that Darwin's theory of evolution could be
accepted in substance only by those whose theology was distinctly orthodox;
that this was so because the theory itself presupposed a cosmology and
causality which, owing to orthodox doctrines of creation and providence,
could be made consonant a priori with orthodox theistic beliefs; and that,
conversely, other theories of evolution were embraced by those whose
theology was notably liberal. (Moore 1979, ix)
Christians who rejected Darwin's theory based themselves 'on philoso-
phical premises to which the name "Christian" cannot distinctively
apply' (Moore 1979, 214). Belief in the fixity of species was a remnant
from the static world of antiquity.
Liberal Christians seemed to accept Darwinian evolution, but they
did not really do so. According to Moore, religious liberals incorpo-
rated non-Darwinian views of evolution; they 'could only discern God's
purposes in nature if they were ascribed primarily to causes other than
natural selection' (Moore 1979, 250).
Orthodox Christian Darwinians 'could see God's purposes being
realised through natural selection' and could thus account for divine
omnipotence and beneficence without conflicting with Darwinism
(Moore 1979, 250). As they saw it, Darwin's theory removed some
objections to understanding nature as designed, as the product of
God's providence. If one assumed special creation of all species, it was
hard to understand the numerous phenomena which seemed without
purpose, such as rudimentary organs. However, in an evolutionary
perspective, these organs are understandable since they have been
useful in the past (Moore 1979, 273). A major issue for orthodox
Christian Darwinians was the nature of variation, which Darwin saw as
random, but was taken by the botanist Asa Gray and the minister and
geologist George F. Wright to be guided by God.
The existence of Christian Darwinians of fairly orthodox, and mostly
Calvinist, adherence is beyond doubt. However, Moore claims more
than the existence of persons who reconciled their faith and a
Darwinian view of evolution. Moore argues (i) that these orthodox
Christian Darwinians were the only ones able to accept Darwinism and
retain their Christian faith, and (ii) that this was due to the affinity
between their understanding of creation and of providence and the
assumptions about causality underlying Darwinism, and (iii) that the
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affinity was not accidental, but a historical necessity, as their Christian
convictions were relevant to the development of Darwinism.
In defence of the genetic claim (iii), Moore refers to the influence on
Darwin of the English tradition of natural theology, especially the
works of the Reverend William Paley. In addition, Darwin gained
ideas from the Reverend Malthus about population sizes and selection,
which undermined optimistic, liberal views of evolution. For support of
both (ii) and (iii), Moore appeals to the argument that the Christian
understanding of the world as created had encouraged experimental
science; a thesis which will be criticised below [10]. As for (i), liberal
Christian evolutionists made the mistake of moving away from a
Christian understanding of creation and from the perspective of
natural science by adopting a non-Darwinian view of evolution, either
investing nature with an innate tendency towards progress or blurring
the distinction between God and nature. Darwin's ' "liberalism" was
incidental to the development of his theory. The orthodoxy of
Darwinism was that, not of its author, but of the theology of nature
which his theory presupposed' (Moore 1979, 345).
Moore treats with respect, and some pastoral concern, those who
abandoned orthodox faith and became atheists (e.g., Moore 1979,
i i4f.). However, in the study discussed here, Moore takes it that liberals
betrayed Christianity. Basically, there are two parties: liberalism and
orthodoxy; a middle ground is not taken into consideration. Nor does
he pay attention to changes in the understanding of religion and in
ideas about the nature of science. In this respect, this book by Moore
still stood in the tradition of conflict-historiography. ' The difference
with authors such as A. D. White is that Moore does not describe the
episode as a conflict between religion and science, but as one between
atheistic Darwinians and orthodox theistic Darwinians on the one
hand, and Christian anti-Darwinians and liberal non-Darwinian evolu-
tionists on the other. The former have been right, the latter have been
wrong.
Though the existence of 'Darwin's Forgotten Defenders' (Living-
stone 1987), such as Asa Gray and G. F. Wright, rightly challenges the
idea that there is an irreconcilable conflict between Christian faith and
evolutionary theory, the uncovering of this history does not achieve the
wider apologetic purposes which it seems to have for authors such as
His more recent biography of Darwin, co-authored with A. Desmond (1991), is quite different
in this respect, as is his account of personal factors such as the death of a beloved daughter in
the development of Darwin's religious views (Moore 1989).
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Moore and Livingstone. Nor does the criticism of particular liberal
responses as scientifically inadequate show the inadequacy of any
liberal response. However, problems similar to the liberal nineteenth-
century optimistic belief in progress also arise for theologies which
apply the evolutionary and historical perspective not only to the world,
but also to religion (see [26]).
9. CONFLICT-VIEWS
We have considered two historical episodes which have been used as
prime examples for the thesis that there has been a persistent conflict
between science and religion. As may be clear by now, it is inadequate
to treat these episodes as exemplifying a single conflict, with clear and
stable demarcation lines.
(i) In each episode, religious affinities can be found in persons considered to be
on opposite sides. And openness to new scientific insights is not always the
privilege of one party; neither Bellarmine nor Wilberforce were
scientific nitwits or conservatives at all costs.
(ii) Facts are only one component of the conflicts. The Jesuits of the
Collegio Romano in Rome had confirmed Galileo's observations with
the telescope in 1611. And though there were issues of fact involved in
the confrontation at the British Association for the Advancement of
Science meeting in 1860, such as the differences between skulls of
humans and of apes, the tenser part of each conflict went beyond the
facts.
(iii) Theories, such as Darwin's explanation of the origin of biological
species and Galileo's heliocentric view were a significant part of the
disputes. In each case, alternative views which were able to account for
the observed facts were available. Tycho's system (which had all the
other planets circling the sun, but the sun and the moon circling the
earth) was consistent with Galileo's observations (though at odds with
later physical theories of motion). Part of the debate was about the
choice of theories.
The choice of theories is, of course, partly to be decided on the
basis of facts, observations. However, there are also other criteria
involved, such as judgements of the relative simplicity of the theories.
The coherence with other knowledge is another issue. The debates
over evolution also involved a dispute about the length of time
available. The physicist Kelvin, who was 'on the same side' as
Richard Owen and Samuel Wilberforce, argued on the basis of what
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was known about energy that there had not been enough time for
the process as described by Darwin's theory. This opposition was
finally refuted when nuclear fusion was discovered as the source of
the Sun's energy. In the choice of theories, and of questions about
which theories were formulated, metaphysical commitments were
also involved. Owen resisted Darwin's theory on the basis of an
underlying 'Platonic' assumption of species as variations on certain
ideal types.
(iv) The hypothetical character of theories has been an issue as well. In his
letter to Foscarini Cardinal Bellarmine emphasised that even if the
heliocentric view could account for all observations, this would not
prove its truth. In a somewhat similar vein, George F. Wright
emphasised the role of induction in Darwinism and in Christianity.
Whereas Bellarmine requested certainty, and thus kept unwelcome
views at bay, Wright was happy to live with the uncertainty of
induction.
The status of theories has also been an important element in the
controversies over the teaching of evolution in American public schools
in the 19805. On various occasions 'scientific creationists' have stressed
the hypothetical nature of evolutionary theory. Thus, one of the issues
has been the question 'What constitutes science?' Is 'scientific crea-
tionism' pseudo-science (Kitcher 1982), or is it (incorrect) science
(Laudan 1982, 1983)? Or is it religion, as the philosopher Ruse argued
as a witness in a trial in Arkansas (Ruse 1982, 19823)? There was also a
pragmatic side to Ruse's defence of this view of'creationism': the other
views would not have worked equally well in the legal context as did
the view of 'creationism' as religion disguised as science; American law
prohibits the promotion of religion through public schools, but not the
teaching of bad science (but see Quinn (1984)).
(v) Conflict views are dependent upon a clear-cut distinction
between a limited number of options, A recurring assumption in
arguments in favour of 'scientific creationism' has been that one has
to choose between two options, either evolution or the flood-geology
of the creationists (e.g., Gish 1982). If one accepts the dichotomy,
everything that counts against current evolutionary theory is evidence
in favour of the alternative. This either-or pattern is a rhetorical
strategy which is seriously misguided. In the cross-examination at the
trial in Arkansas (1981), the geneticist Francis Ayala replied to such
G. F. Wright, Recent books bearing upon the relation of science to religion: No. I - The
nature and degree of scientific proof. Biblialheca Sacra 32 (July 1875): 537-55.
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an argument by one of the lawyers acting on behalf of the
creationists, Mr. Williams, as follows: 'Surely you realize that not
being Mr. Williams in no way entails being Mr. Ayala' (quoted in
Gilkey 1985, 141).
(vi) Apart from the choice of theories, the conflicts also deal with
criteria for choosing a religious view. In the Galileo case, the discussion was
whether the Bible tells us only 'how to go to heaven' (salvation) or
whether the Bible also bears upon our view of 'how the heavens go'
(cosmology). And in the controversies over evolution, the orthodox
Christian Darwinians considered by Moore are very much preoccupied
with God's sovereignty and all-determining, providential role. Huxley's
agnosticism could not allow for these beliefs, nor for his own dualism of
ethical and cosmic nature. He none the less held on to such a dualism:
'the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic
process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it' (Huxley
1893, 34; i8g4c, 83). Andrew White's definition of religion as the
recognition of a power in the universe which makes for righteousness is
again another view, perhaps more akin to the evolutionary optimism of
Herbert Spencer and others (Moore 1985, 8of.), and it thus results in a
different agenda for dealing with scientific insights. And in the trial in
Arkansas over the teaching of scientific creationism, theologians could
be found as witnesses on both sides. Langdon Gilkey, an expert witness,
discussed differences between science and religion, but he also argued
that the view defended by the creationists was one view of creation
which existed alongside many other religious views (Gilkey 1985, 99^,
io?f., 119).
(vii) Conflicts were also shaped by the social situation of science.
Patronage was an important factor in the Galileo affair (Westfall
1989). The conflicts over evolution took place when science was
establishing itself as an independent profession. The revival of
creationism in the United States of America and the emphasis on
the scientific character of creationism can be traced back to the Cold
War. In 1957 the Soviet Union was the first to launch an unmanned
satellite, the Sputnik; in 1961 the Russians were the first to embark
on manned spaceflight. Worried that the USA was lagging behind,
the National Science Foundation sponsored development of better
curricula and textbooks. Evolutionary theory was given a more
prominent place in biology education. Organisations of creationists
are in part responses to the new textbooks; the first major project of
the Creation Research Society was the development of an alternative
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high-school biology textbook.19 As public education became the
context of the debate, there was a strong incentive to present
creationism as a scientific alternative to evolutionary biology, rather
than as a religious position.
The conclusion must be that even some of the best-known conflicts of
the past do not exemplify a single stereotype, 'conflict'. Continuing our
consideration of historiographies, we will consider a less antagonistic
view. Did science arise in the West due to its Christian heritage, and in
particular due to the Reformation?
IO. CHRISTIANITY AS THE MATRIX IN WHICH SCIENCE AROSE
The sciences would not have advanced to their present state if Linnaeus,
Hartsoeker, Euler, Jenner, Wollaston, Olbers, Blumenbach, Robert Brown,
Berzelius, Encke, Mitscherlich, Agassiz, etc., had not been born. Happily their
fathers, who were clergymen, were not committed to celibacy ... The number
of people who can raise their families in the path of morality, simplicity, and
hard work, along with the desire to be useful to others and the wish to occupy
themselves with intellectual matters in a disinterested fashion is never very
great. One is sorry to see that number decreased by a vow of celibacy imposed
on those very men who have more education and character than the average.
I am speaking here of the Catholic clergy. (De Candolle, 1885, 333f; transi.
Cohen iggoa)
Alphonse de Candolle was one of the first to use quantitative methods
in studying the development of science. Using the election to member-
ship of academic societies such as the Royal Society of London and
the Académie Française of Paris as an indicator of scientific eminence,
he argued that, among foreign members, Protestants were proportion-
ally overrepresented. De Candolle suggests that this might be a
consequence of the greater role of authority in Catholicism, which
thereby discourages curiosity, and of the celibacy imposed on Catholic
clergy.
De Candolle's emphasis on celibacy seems questionable. As most
Catholic clergy have no children, they are left with more time to teach,
J. N. Moore, H. S. Slusher, cds., Biology: A Starch for Order m Complexity (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1970). 'This book was approved by many state textbook committees, but was
declared unconstitutional by Indiana Supreme Court in 1977' (Mclver 1988, 176). Connec-
tions between the launch of the Sputnik, the biology curriculum project, and the revival of
creationism are discussed in Nclkin (1977; larson (1989, 4, 86, gif); Eve and Harrold (1991,
a8f.); Numbers (1992, 240); the creationist Henry Morris stresses also the 'propaganda' for
evolution around the centennial of Darwin's Qngrn of Spears (Morris 1984, 75, igof, I94f).
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to control education, and hence to pass on intellectual culture.
Leaving aside this particular explanation, we will focus on the contribu-
tion of Christianity, and of Protestantism in particular, to the rise of
modern science. We will come back to the claim that Protestantism
provided the cultural values which were important to the development
of science, but we will begin with the claim that it was the Christian
understanding of creation which stimulated experimental science.
Christianity versus Greek philosophy
The mathematician and philosopher Alfred N. Whitehead (1925, 18)
traced the rise of science in Europe to:
the medieval insistence on the rationality of God, conceived as with the
personal energy of Jehovah and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher.
Other cultures with a highly developed sense of learning did not
develop science to any significant extent. If God was a despot, why look
for regularities? And if God was seen as rational, understanding is
expected to come through thinking (as in mathematics) rather than
through observation. M. B. Foster is another philosopher who argued
that Greek rationalism had negative consequences for science. If God is
neither a demiurge nor merely rational, but personal and creative, as
Christianity holds, then there is a particular contingency in nature,
which is 'only knowable by sensuous experience' (Foster 1934, 464). To
allow for empirical science, Greek, rationalist philosophy of nature had
to be changed, and this came about through modification of the
doctrine of God.
Foster assumes that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
theologies and philosophies of nature (Foster 1936, n), and that there
is a unique philosophy of nature which made modern science possible
(Foster 1935, 43gf.). These assumptions simplify the argument at the
expense of adequacy. He bypasses the more empirically based
contributions of Archimedes and Greek astronomy, resulting in
Ptolemy's detailed system. He thus relies more on Aristotle's Logic
than on the actual practice of Greek science (Foster 1934, 454).
Relying on global pictures and on propaganda in defending the role
of Christianity as the mother of modern science promotes the
A similar point about celibacy is made by Richard Dawkins in his The Selfish Gau, when
discussing the transmission of mêmes (ideas) in analogy with the transmission of genes. To be
fair, it should be noted that De Candolle did not restrict himself to celibacy; he also
considered explanatory factors such as socio-economic structure, immigration, educational
system, scientific societies, etc.
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treatment of 'science', 'Christianity', and 'Greek philosophy' as mono-
lithic entities. If one acknowledges greater diversity, the rise of
science might be traced to various philosophies of nature, each
partially adequate and partially inadequate, and each at some
moment creating certain opportunities for progress. This would also
allow for a more complete understanding of the intermediate states,
the development of science and theology in Arabic and medieval
European culture.
Another 'monolithic', and thereby too simplistic, analysis of the rise
of modern science is to be found in the work of Stanley Jaki. According
to him, either the world is cyclical and meaningless, a 'treadmill', or
time is linear and nature lawful, a created order. As for most authors in
these debates, the role of belief in creation is not merely of historical
interest. To the belief in creation, 'science owes its very birth and life.
Its future and mankind's future rest with the same faith' (Jaki 1974, viii).
This scheme is black-and-white. It is 'a choice between two ultimate
alternatives: faith in the Creator and in creation once-and-for-all, or
surrender to the treadmill of eternal cycles' (Jaki 1974, 357). To uphold
this view, he claims that there is a single and unique biblical view (Jaki
1974, 139). In addition, all successes in the development of science are
ascribed to this biblical tradition. An explanation is needed of how
Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed 'could be written in the Muslim
milieu and yet evince a mentality far superior to it. This is all the more
remarkable as Maimonides showed no condescendence toward Muslim
and Greek scholars' (Jaki 1974, 213). However, as befits Jaki's position,
the superior contribution of Maimonides is due to 'the overriding role
that was played in Maimonides' thinking by the concept of the Creator
and of the creatio ex nihilo, as contained in the Bible' (Jaki 1974, 2I4).22
Reformed superiority
Other discussions of intellectual history have more accurately acknowl-
edged the diversity of traditions, both biblical and otherwise. In his
Religious Origins of Modem Science Eugene M. Klaaren pays serious
attention to spiritualist views of creation, as found among enthusiasts of
the radical reformation, in Renaissance Platonism, and among those
A criticism of the reliance on 'subjective, propagandist and programmatic sources' can be
found in Hall (1963, 15), against Merlon's sociological link of the rise of science and
Puritanism (see below).
In my view, cnaho ex mhilo is not biblical, but a philosophical conviction which arose in the
second century in the interaction between Christianity and Greek philosophy (May 1978;
Drees 1990, 264 7).
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interested in the alleged writings of Hermes Trismegistus.23 A major
representative of this view wasjohan Baptist van Helmont, a disciple of
Paracelsus. His works received attention from Boyle and others in
England in the middle of the seventeenth century. Van Helmont opens
a major work, Oriatrike, with a prayer to God, 'All', of All, Father of
Lights (Klaaren 1977, 58f.; 'Father of Lights' can be found in the New
Testament, James i: 17). As the Spirit is an all-inclusive and all-
pervading reality, Van Helmont's ' "mysticism" called for penetration
into, rather than flight from, the world' (Klaaren 1977, 61). He and
others preferred spiritualist, organic motifs, rather than legal or
mechanistic ones. Van Helmont's views were heavily criticised in
Boyle's Skeptical Chymist (1661). For Van Helmont, chemistry was more
than knowledge; in his Oriatrike (LX: 66) he wrote:
Finally, and finally, Chymistry, as for its perfection doth prepare an universal
Solver, whereby all things do return into their first Being, and do afford their
native endowments, the original blemishes of Bodies are cleansed, and that
their inhumane cruelty being forsaken, there is opportunity for them to obtain
great and undeclarable restoration and purification.
As Klaaren, from whose work this quote has been taken, summarises it,
Van Helmont sees chemistry as an attempt 'to realize God's own work
of restoration and new creation, for purification and perfection are
one' (Klaaren 1977, 80). This spiritualism was conducive to the
emergence of modern science as it supported interest in particular
observations and distanced itself from Aristotelian natural philosophy.
However, according to Klaaren, voluntarism had a definite advantage
over spiritualism, as it was less holistic and therefore more capable of
making discriminating judgements. It differentiated between the
various works of God, and hence between the Book of Nature and the
Book of Scripture. This differentiation was institutionalised in the
Royal Society of London and became characteristic of modernity.
The contribution of spiritualism is also acknowledged in recent
studies by Nebelsick and Kaiser. However, these theologians, too,
argue for the greater importance of the Reformed view, the emphasis
on God as transcendent lawgiver (and therefore provider of order,
though a contingent order) rather than as spirit. Esoteric and plato-
nising ideas 'fail to maintain the biblical understanding of God as
The hermetic tradition in relation to the rise of science has been discussed at length by
Frances Yates, for instance in her book on Giordano Bruno (Yates 1964). For a critical review
of later research on the importance of the hermetic sources, non-hermetic occultist traditions,
and in different ways the label 'hermetic', see Copenhaver (1990).
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transcendent over and separate from nature', and had 'to be set aside
before the world could become the world of nature and science could
become the study of nature proper' (Nebelsick 1992, 65^). Even if one
finds it difficult to identify with spiritualist and Platonist approaches,
one needs to recognise their importance to the rise of science. The
importance of the voluntarism of the Calvinist tradition and its
precursors in nominalist thought should not be overemphasised.
Kaiser credits the spiritualist tradition, especially in Van Helmont
and Leibniz, with 'its ability to generate powerful organizing principles
like gas, matter and force' (energy) and to give them empirical meaning
in quantifiable form (Kaiser 1991, 161). Besides, through persons like
Comenius and Samuel Hartlib, it contributed significantly 'to the
formation of social and moral values of the emerging scientific commu-
nity' (Kaiser 1991, 161). However, the central contribution of Chris-
tianity was the belief 'that God had created all things in accordance
with laws of his own devising, laws which made the world comprehen-
sible to humans and gave the world a degree of unity and relative
autonomy, and that God had sent his Son and poured out his Spirit to
initiate a worldwide ministry of healing and restoration' (Kaiser 1991,
300). This creationist tradition 'was to last for sixteen hundred years
and gave birth to modern Western science and technology before it
degenerated into pure naturalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries' (Kaiser 1991, 6). The word 'degenerated' is telling for
Kaiser's own stake in the discussion, as he could equally well have
written that it 'gave birth to' pure naturalism just as before it 'gave
birth' to natural science.
The Puritan attitude and the rise of science
In contrast with the emphasis on ideas, it has been argued that it is:
to the religious ethos, not the theology, that we must turn if we are to
understand the integration of science and religion in seventeenth century
England. (Merton 1938, 461; ioa)24
The major origin of social views of the role of religion with respect to
modern culture is considered to be Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism (1930, which goes back to earlier German essays;
Marshall 1982). With respect to the rise of the sciences this theme was
References to Merton's Science, Technology and Society use the page-numbers of the 1938 edition
and of the reprint, separated by a colon. Similar ideas, argued differently, were put forward
by Stimson (1935) and Jones (1936); extracts and a survey of subsequent discussions in Cohen
(iggoa).
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developed by Robert Merton. One-third of his major study deals with
the role of Protestantism in the rise of science; about as much space is
devoted to economic and military influences, while the initial chapters
focus on shifts in interests, ranging from painting and poetry to
medicine, science, and politics, and on shifts in the relative proportions
of work done in various sciences.
The argument that Puritanism created the ethos which supported
the rise of modern science has become known as 'the Merton Thesis'.
The Puritan complex of values consisted 'of a scarcely disguised
utilitarianism; of intramundane interests; methodical, unremitting
action; thoroughgoing empiricism; of the right and even the duty of
libre examen [free inquiry]; of anti-traditionalism — all this was con-
genial to the same values in science' (Merton 1938, 495; 136; similarly
I936. 29).
Merton remains within a sociological framework when he allows
that 'it may well be argued that ascetic Protestantism itself is a product
of more pervasive cultural changes' (Merton 1938, 495; 136). He does
not take the content of scientific theories to be determined by social
factors. Rather, the point is that social changes made science a
recognised and accepted enterprise, and that there were social aspects
in the choice of topics dealt with.
The discussion on the relation between Puritanism and the develop-
ment of science has not come to a conclusion, more than fifty years
after Merton's initial article and dissertation. This may be due to some
extent to personal stakes with respect to apparent implications for the
status of religion in the twentieth century. The fact that no conclusion
has been reached may also be a consequence of factors more intrinsic
to the thesis.
(i) A source of confusion has been the use of categories such as
'Puritan'. Puritanism does not refer to a well-defined institutional
entity. It refers to a reform movement which arose in the late sixteenth
century. The seventeenth century in England saw changing fortunes of
kings, queens, and parliaments. 'Puritan' was not a stable concept, nor
were people who lived through the various changes consistent in the
way that they presented their religious affiliations. This produces
problems when one assesses the role of Puritans with respect to science.
For instance, 'John Wilkins was brought up as a Puritan, married
Cromwell's sister, and during the Commonwealth served as Warden of
Wadham College. But after the Restoration, he joined the established
church, was formally ordained, and became bishop of Chester. Was
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the mature Wilkins a Puritan because of his upbringing and early
career? Merton would say yes, his critics no' (Cohen iggoa, 6af.; see
Shapiro 1969, 5-11).
(ii) The political and cultural changes occurring within the seven-
teenth century have also made the debate very complex. Charles
Webster (1975) argued that science in the 16405 and 16505 was
motivated by millennialist expectations. After the restoration of the
monarchy and of the established church in 1660 little sympathy was felt
for puritanist priorities and achievements. But 'it may turn out that in
the scale of values of a future age the utopianism and humanitarianism
of puritan science may come to be held in high esteem' (Webster 1975,
520). Again, a personal agenda shines through, this time an agenda in
social ethics 'in the most recent crisis in science and technology'
(Webster 1975, 517).
Whereas Webster emphasises discontinuity in English political
history, others stress continuity. Boyle and others 'did not cease to be
reformers, but couched their reforming sentiments in vague terms of
improving man's health and estate through science' (Jacob and Jacob
1980, 253). These 'conservative reformers' carried science forward after
the revolutionary period. They retreated from millennialism and
interest in occult sciences to a view of nature as consisting of atoms
guided by God's providence.
(iii) The various ways of viewing religion, ranging from doctrine to
social attitude, have not contributed to the clarity of discussion
either. Merton sees religion as an embodiment of dominant cultural
values; this is to some extent independent of particular theological
claims. The incentive to be useful could be derived, and actually was
derived, from understanding good works as a sign of grace in a
predestinarian theology, but also from treating good works as a
means towards grace; 'there is substantial uniformity in the social
implications of the various Protestant dogmas' (Merton 1938, 422;
63). Other historians and theologians have been less sensitive to the
sociological perspective of the history of ideas, understanding religion
'more narrowly, as a body of explicit espousals of intentions in
doctrinal form' (Abraham 1983, 373; see also Cohen 1990, 314, 339
and note 21).
(iv) There are two phenomena to be explained: (a) the shift of values
that moved scientists to the top of the intellectual hierarchy and made
science a recognised public concern, and (b) the greater propensity of
Puritans to be engaged in science (Ben-David 1985, 2O9f.). Chapter six
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of Merton's book, 'Puritanism, Pietism and Science: Testing an
Hypothesis', dealt with the second phenomenon. This counting of
participants has been the subject of most criticism; as argued above (i),
the meanings of the various labels change over time. However, the
more viable part of the thesis has to do with the rise of science as a
culturally acceptable practice, rather than with scientific theories and
explanations themselves.
(v) One might counter the claim that ascetic Protestantism was
specifically conducive to the emergence of modern science by pointing
out the limitations of the focus on seventeenth-century England, for
instance by presenting the contributions of Catholics elsewhere in
Europe (e.g., Ashworth 1986) or by attacking the way numbers of
participants from various backgrounds are established and the ways in
which labels are attributed. Even if Protestants were overrepresented
among early scientists, an apologetic use of the thesis is misguided,
even if understood in the more general sense that Protestantism
supported the values that made science a highly respected enterprise.
Once science had acquired social recognition, the mechanism which
had brought about this recognition became something of the past. To
some extent external influences have given way to internal systems of
evaluation. Besides, an account of the early phase of this process of
institutionalisation is incomplete if it deals only with the appeal to the
affinity of science with religion; distancing science from religion was
another part of the rhetorical expression of the same agenda (Gieryn
1988,
Continuity and discontinuity
It is true that the results of our dominion over nature have been unhealthy in
many cases; the powerful river of modern science and technology has often
caused disastrous inundations. But by comparison the contemplative, almost
medieval vision that is offered as an alternative would be a stagnant pool.
Thus wrote the historian of science Hooykaas (1972, 74) in his book on
the importance of Protestantism to the rise of modern science.
Discontinuity between medieval and modern science is an important
element in this argument.
Even if there were discontinuities in methodology and in metaphy-
sics, we should not judge the medievals on the wrong grounds. 'Their
aim was not to anticipate future worldviews' (Lindberg 1992, 363).
Their contributions were conducive to the subsequent development of
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science. They 'created an intellectual tradition. They worked through
Greek and Islamic materials. They created the institutional setting of
schools and universities. And they created a critical climate in which
Aristotelian doctrine was regularly and carefully scrutinized, and which
in its fate depended on its explanatory power rather than on any
authoritative status it might possess' (Lindberg 1992, 366). With this last
observation, IJndberg deviates from the popular view that medieval
science and philosophy were strongly dependent upon authority.
Developments at different disciplinary levels were not all concurrent.
Focus on global change biases historical judgement towards disconti-
nuity, towards treating historical change as a shift from one monolithic
outlook to another. More detailed analysis, however, uncovers the
manifold connections between medieval and modern science. This
undermines the claim that there was a discontinuity, in which the rise
of modern science was correlated with the Protestant Reformation.
The notion of a 'Scientific Revolution' for a radical transformation
in which philosophical insights were of major importance is itself a
product of the polemic against the positivist emphasis on observation,
and is thus to be understood in the context of the development of
philosophy and history of science in the twentieth century. Recent
detailed studies have challenged the global claims in many ways. The
notion of a 'Scientific Revolution' may still be the dominant inter-
pretation, and it serves 'heuristic functions, even if it no longer
commands universal assent' (Lindberg 1990, 20). The emergence of
modern science was a complex phenomenon. Social attitudes and
metaphysical positions generated by religious views were certainly
effective in that process/5 'To single out any specific religious view
seems unwarranted as it neglects the wide variety of religious,
philosophical and scientific views that interacted with each other. It
would also suggest a kind of necessity which is hard to sustain in
historical affairs.
Various studies on the importance of Christianity to the rise of
modern science have an apologetic interest, an interest in supporting
Christianity today (e.g., Foster, Hooykaas, Jaki, Kaiser, Nebelsick).
However, as apologetics for Christianity in our time, such arguments
exaggerate differences between Christian views and Greek views that
For broad and balanced studies, sec Brooke (1991, 52 ti6), the essays in IJndberg and
Westman (n»i)<>) .ind Lindberg and Numbers (1986, 49 237), and H. F. Cohen's study of
historiographies of the Scientific Revolution (1994), which I came across only after completing
the book.
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failed to give rise to science, while they belittle differences between the
religious views of the early modern period and contemporary perspec-
tives on the world (Grüner 1975, 79).
Whereas in this section we have considered the contribution of
Christianity to the rise of modern science, there is also a contribution
of modern science to the development of theology. In the manifold
interactions of the seventeenth century, we see the rise of 'a veritable
secular theology such as never existed before or after' (Funkenstein
1986, ix). This theology was secular in a double sense, carried out by
laymen for laymen, and oriented towards the world, ad seculum. This
shift in theology will be considered in the next chapter.
II . NON-APOLOGETICAL APOLOGETICS
Nobody doubted the existence of the Deity until the Boyle lecturers had
undertaken to prove it. (Remark from the deist and freethinker Anthony
Collins, eighteenth century.)26
Michael Buckley begins his narrative in At the Origins of Modem Atheism
with the Catholics Leonard Lessius and Marin Mersenne in the early
seventeenth century. They both argued against atheism on the basis of
'a wide-ranging knowledge of natural philosophy' without assigning a
position to 'Christology or religious experience' (Buckley 1987, 65).
Such a style of philosophical apologetics continued through Descartes
and Newton. It was assimilated into theology by Nicolas Malebranche
and Samuel Clarke. And in the eighteenth century it resulted in the
self-conscious atheism of Denis Diderot and Baron Paul Henri d'Hol-
bach. Remarkable, according to Buckley, is that which is absent from
such Christian apologies:
Religious experience of whatever dimension or character counts for nothing,
neither the interior claims of an absolute, nor the disclosures of 'limit
experiences', nor the movements and attractions towards the transcendent.
Or, if one looks not for the witness of subjectivity but for the historical or
external witness within human tradition, one will look in vain for the history
of holiness as a perpetual manifestation of mystery, the testimony of the
mystics, the depths of human religious practice over thousands of years, and
L. Stephen, History of English Thought at the Eighltmth Century, vol. i (London: Smith, Elder &
Co., i88ia, 80); see also under 'Deism' in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. P. Edwards
(New York: Marmillan, 1967), 331. Van Fraassen (1980, 229) refers to the eighteenth-century
witticism that 'Everybody believed in the existence of God until the Boyle-lectures proved it.'
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- even more remarkably for a Christian culture - anything of the reality and
meaning of Jesus of Nazareth. (Buckley 1988, 94)
Without becoming atheists themselves, natural philosophers (scientists)
such as Newton and Boyle shifted the terms of the debate. 'The origin
of atheism in the intellectual culture of the West lies thus with the self-
alienation of religion itself (Buckley 1987, 363). 'Inference cannot
substitute for experience, and the most compelling witness to a personal
God must itself be personal' (Buckley 1988, 99).
John Dillenberger makes a similar case in his Protestant Thought and
Natural Science (1960). Apologetics in the eighteenth century appealed to
evidence from miracles and prophecies and to the wisdom of God as
discernable in nature, as it had been done before. However, the role of
such arguments from miracles and prophecy had become rather
different from the way that they functioned in earlier centuries. Then,
miracles and fulfilled prophecies were confirmation for a belief held
independently, whereas in the eighteenth century belief had become
dependent upon miracles and fulfilled prophecies. 'Confirmation for
the revelation of God in Christ was of the same order as that in the
natural sciences. The Messiah had Himself become an object of
ordinary knowledge and demonstration' (Dillenberger 1960, 146).
A similar shift occurred in relation to the appreciation of God's
wisdom in creation, the so-called 'argument from design'. One of its
proponents was John Ray. His book was entitled The Wisdom of God
Manifested in the Works of Creation, in Two Parts, viz. The Heavenly Bodies,
Elements, Meteors, Fossils, Vegetables, Animals, (Beasts, Birds, Fishes, and
Insects) more particularly in the Body of the Earth, its Figure, Motion, and
Consistency; and in the admirable Structure of the Bodies of Man and other
Animals; as also in their Generation, etc. With Answers to some Objections. Listing
topics in the title was a common practice. Here it gives an impression
of the scope of this book. Examples of divine wisdom are abundant
throughout nature. One example, quoted from the eleventh edition
('743. 2390=
The great Wisdom of the divine Creator appears, in that there is Pleasure
annex'd to those Actions that are necessary for the Support and Preservation
of the Individuum, and the Continuation and Propagation of the Species; and
not only so, but Pain to the Neglect or Forbearance of them. For the Support
of the Person, it hath annex'd pleasure to eating and drinking, which else, out
of Laziness or Multiplicity of Business, a Man would be apt to neglect, or
sometimes forget; indeed to be oblig'd to chew and swallow meat daily for two
Hours Space, and to find no Relish or Pleasure in it, would be one of the most
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burdensom and ungrateful Tasks of a Man's whole life; but because this
Action is absolutely necessary, for abundant Security Nature hath inserted in
us a painful Sense of Hunger, to put us in mind of it; and to reward our
Performance hath adjoin'd pleasure to it; and as for the continuation of Kind,
I need not tell you that the Enjoyment which attend those Actions are the
highest Gratifications of Sense.
These writers claimed to follow the tradition of the early Church, but
'they had inverted the original apologetic'. Christology was separated
from the domain of nature. 'Reflection on this period raises the
question whether a conscious apologetic is not usually a boomerang'
(Dillenberger 1960, 153), as the distinctive grounds of religion are lost
from sight.
Moving beyond history to an assessment of the situation of his time,
Dillenberger sees new opportunities in the theology of the twentieth
century, especially in the contributions of Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and
Rudolf Bultmann; 'they restored the Christian drama of redemption to
central importance' (Dillenberger 1960, 263); through existentialism the
dimension of depth was recovered (265). The naïveté' which we are to
overcome is reductionism, both in biology and in analytical philosophy
(Dillenberger 1960, 279 and 282n.).
Dillenberger and Buckley present a different view of theology than we
encountered in the preceding sections. However, to the extent that
Buckley and Dillenberger emphasise a single issue throughout the
history of theology and science, their position resembles views discussed
in earlier sections. A difference is that arguments about conflicts or
affinities between Christian religion and science [7-10] are mostly
based on a cognitive view of religion in line with the understanding of
the natural sciences, whereas their argument focuses more on differ-
ences, assuming rather an experiential view of religion.
In emphasising 'religious experience', either as 'the witness of
subjectivity' or as 'the historical or external witness within human
tradition' (as Buckley does in the text quoted), the debate is quite
different from most discussions on the relationship between science and
religion, but this emphasis does not imply that there are no issues to be
considered. When one builds upon particulars in human experiences
and in human history, the area of debate shifts from debates about the
world 'out there' (see chapter 3) to debates about our understanding of
human nature, human experiences and human traditions, and thus to
'reductionism in biology' (see chapter 4).
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12. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM HISTORY
Contemporary historians of science have objected to the emphasis on
unity. In presentations which argue for a persistent conflict [7-9],
affinity [10], or betrayed distinctiveness [n]:
it is almost always assumed that there are lessons to be learned from history.
The object of this study is not to deny that assumption but to show that the
lessons are far from simple . . . The real lesson turns out to be the complexity.
(Brooke 1991, 4f.)
Contemporary historians of science are more neutral than their
predecessors; a historian of science who used the warfare-style of
Draper or White would not receive much recognition from her
academic peers today. Current historians are not only, in general,
more accurate with respect to their sources, they have also come to the
conclusion that there is an enormous richness, diversity, and complexity
in the interactions between science and religion in various episodes.
Even a single individual may entertain different views in different
periods of his life or in front of different audiences. Streamlining the
historical account of science in its relation to religion is a temptation
which should be avoided. Counter-examples to any stereotype can
always be found.
Historians have shifted the agenda from an analysis of the interac-
tion between science and theology to an analysis of the way religion
and science developed and changed in the course of the processes. The
historian cannot define in a strict way 'science' and 'religion' before
embarking upon her research. Otherwise, she would be unable to
understand authors such as Newton who did not live by that distinc-
tion. It is of special interest to understand shifts in the meanings of the
terms 'science' and 'religion', and hence of the boundaries between
what was considered science and what was considered religion. Taking
science and religion as clearly defined entities involves the danger of
neglecting the variety of activities covered by these terms and of
isolating both from their common cultural and social context (Rudwick
'981, 243; Brooke 1991, ;ƒ.).
As an example of shifting meanings, one might even consider the
evolution of creationism, as there have been 'substantial changes in
creationist thought during the twentieth century' (Numbers 1992, xiv).
In the late nineteenth century the issue was God's creative role and the
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understanding of the world as designed, whereas contemporary crea-
tionism takes a strong stance on the literal meaning of the first chapters
of Genesis. As the concepts 'science' and 'religion' are subject to
change, 'we must not ask "Who was the aggressor?" but "How were
Christianity and science affected by their encounter?" ' (Lindberg and
Numbers ig86a, 354).
Not only do meanings change over time, but they are also diverse
and used eclectically at any moment, since the style and strategy
pursued by an individual often reflect the rhetorical situation in relation
to the audience and the aims of the moment.
Methodologically historians opt for an intrinsic, local understanding of
the various episodes, in relation to the social and intellectual setting of
the participants. An encompassing view of the history of science (and
thus of science's relation to religion) seems to be lacking; 'there is a
danger that the important revisions of recent years will simply be
slotted into conventional large-scale narratives that drain the analysis
of any real edge ... As a result, a construct founded on the primacy of
method, genius and heroic discovery continues (albeit awkwardly) to
organize a body of specialist literature devoted to criticizing the
coherence of such concepts' (Secord 1993, 388).27 Attempts at thinking
through relationships between science and religion can go awry in
similar ways, either by overemphasising methodological issues or by
focusing narrowly on a few heroic individuals, for instance on the faith
of a major scientist.
With respect to the contemporary situation, strategies may be
pursued which are similar to those of the historians, and similar
conclusions can be reached. Positions of various contemporary authors
can be understood better when attention is given to the understanding
of religion and of science involved and to the audiences to which
certain ideas are addressed (see, for instance, [4, 5, 23]). I intend to
operate in a similar way as the historians of science considered here, in
following a contextual and non-religionist approach (see [3.1]). In doing
so, I seek to avoid simple conflict-interpretations [7, 8, 9] as well as
apologetic attempts which seek to claim support from the history of
C. Hakfoort discusses 'the missing syntheses in the historiography of science' in a similar way,
and argues that historians of science might attempt to write synthetic surveys on 'the historical
background to the present uncertainty about what science is' (Hakfoort 1991, 214!°.). This
resembles the situation with religion and science, where the argument is as argued in the
text not so much one about the relationships between religion and science as one about the
nature and status of science and of religion.
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science or from current science for traditional beliefs or which claim
room aside from science [10, n]. Rather, I identify with the assesment
by James Secord of the direction in which a new 'big picture' of the
history of science might develop: 'Essentialist stories of science as the
central actor in a drama of triumph or disaster, will be replaced by a
focus on questions, debates and contests for authority' (Secord 1993,
389). As a philosophical interpretation I intend to build upon the work
of such historians of science and of science's relations to religion, not so
much in detail (since I seek to articulate a general view rather than
make very specific claims about particular episodes) as in general style
and spirit.
The work of the historians derives its strength from a self-chosen
limitation; they attempt to understand each episode in relation to its
own context. In doing so, they avoid the issue of the intellectual
credibility of religion in our time. Though a thorough historical tour is
fascinating, studies of particular historical cases cannot be transposed
to our time, especially since each episode is embedded in its own wider
context. This study aims at an exploration of the avenues that are open
to us in an intellectually honest way, given the resources of our time.
Hence, we have to move on from historical studies to reflections on
contemporary science. The historical explorations may alert us,
however, to the diversity of views of religion, of agendas in relating
religion to science, and of meanings of religion; a diversity which is
very probably not smaller now than at any time in the past.
3Theology and knowledge of the world
Religion is about reality, that is about creation and about God. Science
informs us about reality. If the central concerns of each enterprise are
seen thus, how do science and religion interact? We will consider in
chapter 3 two areas of interaction, namely in relation to the discoveries of
science, the insights about the world, and to the discovery of science, the rise
of science to a major, if not the major, position in our attempts to find
out about the world. In the terms of the earlier 3 x 3-classification [5],
we are dealing with the first column (a cognitive understanding of
religion), and especially with areas ia (new knowledge, the discoveries
of science) and ib (new conceptions of knowledge, the discovery of
science).
We will begin with theological responses to the discoveries of science. A
major issue is the impact of these discoveries on our understanding of
the world as a tightly knit web of processes described by laws. What
possibilities are there for an understanding of divine activity within the
processes of the world? I will argue that a quest for gaps in natural
processes is unsuccessful, given the coherence of scientific insights, but
that the denial of such gaps within natural processes does not foreclose
all options for a view of divine action, since divine action may also be
conceived as a unique creative-sustaining (not causal-temporal) action
with respect to everything [13]. We will also consider alternative
conceptions of the divine which do not involve anything that resembles
divine activity in the world. Rather, they emphasise a cosmic sense of
meaning or mystery [14].
After considering these examples of religious views in relation to our
understanding of the world, we will come to the general theme of using
scientific insights for theological purposes. First, I will argue that the
use of science in theological models may be heuristically fruitful as well
as helpful for communicative purposes, but that it does not contribute
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much to the credibility of the theological ideas thus developed [15].
With respect to the hierarchy of levels, theology may seem to be
remote from areas such as fundamental physics and cosmology where
consensus on the theories and their interpretations seems lacking.
However, I will argue that the provisional character of scientific
theories which are relatively remote from human interests challenge an
argumentative use of science [16].
In the last sections of this part we will turn towards the discovery of
science. We will begin with a survey of contemporary defences of
scientific realism. This is done for two purposes. Firstly, as an end in
itself, in order to counter attempts to cope with science by playing
down its importance. Secondly, in relation to debates on theological
realism. For some authors writing on the relationships between science
and religion attempt to transfer arguments from the philosophy of
science to the philosophy of religion; I will argue that such moves are
unsuccessful [17].
In the concluding section I will come to arguments which seek to
find room for theology or metaphysics via science by arguing that
science rests upon a metaphysical or theological basis (Trigg), or to find
room for religion despite the results of science, since science is a
cultural practice (Allen), or claim that epistemological naturalism is
best understood in the context of metaphysical supernaturalism (Plan-
tinga) [18].
13. DIVINE ACTION'
Though themes relating the doctrine of creation to questions of origins
often come to mind most readily in discussions of science and religion,
a more central theme from a theological perspective is God's action in the
world (e.g., Russell et al. 1993, 1995). Views of divine action are involved
in views of divine providence, prayer, miracles, the understanding of
the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, and human freedom and
responsibility, to mention just a few issues. Views of divine action in the
world have been challenged for various reasons. A major reason has to
do with the reality of evil: If God acts in the world, and especially if
God acts in response to the needs of individuals, why is there so much
evil and suffering in the world? Here I will focus on the other major
After having developed the arguments in this chapter I came across a dissertation by Steven
D. Grain (1993), which deals with the same issues at greater length, and which considers
William Pollard as well as Polkinghorne and Peacocke.
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kind of problem, namely the challenge which arises when one seeks to
combine belief in particular divine actions with scientific insights about
the lawful behaviour of natural processes. In this section we will briefly
consider the idea that an occasional, scientifically unobserved miracle
would not be a problem. Then we will discuss more extensively two
proposals for understanding divine action in relation to the natural
world, focusing on the unpredictability of complex processes, and on
the way the behaviour of particular constituents in a system is shaped
by the state of the system as a whole (top—down causation). Both
proposals turn out to be problematic. Then, I will consider an under-
standing of divine action which avoids any conflict with and depen-
dence on the natural sciences by emphasising the distinction between
divine action (as atemporal creation of the whole) and temporal
processes in the world.
An odd miracle and integrity
The philosopher William Alston has written that
the odd miracle would not seem to violate anything of importance for science.
It would be quite a coincidence if a miracle should be among the minute
proportion of cases of X that are examined for scientific purposes. (Alston
I99I, 244)
It may well be that God has interfered just when and where we did not
look. Arguments to that effect are formally strong, just as the ingenious
Omphalos argument reconciling evidence for a long evolutionary past
with a recent creation: God may have created the world some six to
ten thousand years ago with all the traces of a longer past, including
Adam and Eve with navels (suggesting a mother, though there was
none), trees with rings, the fossils which are mistakenly thought to be
remnants of earlier organisms, and the light which appears to come
from distant stars, and keeps the astronomers busy [see 15].2
There are all kinds of gaps in our knowledge; we have not checked
conservation of energy everywhere and we do extrapolate from
evidence found now to past events. However, to exploit such limitations
in order to avoid unwanted conclusions is to depart from regular
scientific practice. By undermining scientific reasoning, this argument
for the possibility of occasional miracles does undermine something 'of
importance to science', even though it does not conflict with any
The argument was articulated a few years before Darwin's Origin of Species (1859) by Philip
Henry Gosse in his Omphalos: An Attempt to Untie the Geological Knot (1857).
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observations. The argument undermines the integrity of science, both
that of its methods and that of its results. Integrity has various
meanings, including overtones of a moral character. Here it is used in
the way it might be used in a legal context: one may have stayed within
the formal boundaries of the law, while violating the underlying spirit,
the larger web of beliefs, intentions and procedures of which it is a part
(e.g., Schüssler Fiorenza 1991, i38f.). Thus, in the following I will not
explore theological approaches which use such gaps in our knowledge,
but consider approaches which seek to respect and interpret the
understanding of reality delivered by the natural sciences.
13. r. Divine action in unpredictable processes
Theories regarding chaotic behaviour introduce an openness into our
description of the natural world which was missing in classical
Newtonian physics so far. This openness would be a kind of local
contingency which might allow for human or divine free will and
human or divine agency.3 This view has been eloquently defended by
the Anglican priest and theoretical physicist John Polkinghorne, even
though in the end he takes a more pronounced distance from the
ordinary interpretation of science, when he argues for an under-
standing of the laws of physics as a 'downward' 'approximation to a
more subtle (and supple) whole' (Polkinghorne 1993, 439). In this way
he takes exception to the disciplinary order of the sciences; the laws
of physics are to be distinguished from the laws of nature. In
principle, more fundamental reinterpretations of the sciences such as
this one and the further developed one proposed by process philoso-
phers are possible, but I consider them unlikely; I will come back to
this below [30].
Here the focus is on discussions which relate to the laws of physics.
We will first consider Polkinghorne's interpretation of chaotic systems,
before arguing on the basis of a more general view of scientific
explanations against such a view of divine action.
The 'choice' of path actually followed corresponds, not to the result of some
physically causal act (in the sense of an energy input) but rather to a 'selection'
from options (in the sense of an information input) ... God is not pictured as
an interfering agent among other agencies. (That would correspond to energy
R. J. Russell (1988) introduced the concept of local contingency, in contrast to global and
nomological contingency, with further differentiations.
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input.) Instead, form is given to the possibility that he influences his creation
in a non-energetic way. (Polkinghorne 1991, 45)
The laws of nature allow for openness, gaps which might allow for
divine and human action. Central to this argument is that there can be
information input without energy input, thus without interfering with
physical laws regarding energy. In Science and Providence Polkinghorne
uses the example of a bead at the top of an inverted U-shaped wire. In
this case, he argues, there would be no energy barrier between different
options, i.e. moving the bead to the left or to the right. God could act
without input of energy (Polkinghorne 1989, 32).
Polkinghorne proposes a model for divine influence on physical
processes which does not violate the conservation of energy. However,
this approach has at least two drawbacks. It puts divine information
input in competition with energy input from the environment, espe-
cially if one takes into account the amplificatory powers of natural
systems. Polkinghorne also moves from unpredictability to openness in
a way which pays insufficient attention to the scientific theories
available. We will deal with these two aspects in turn.
A bead at the top of an inverted U-shaped wire would in due course
end on either the left or the right side, as molecules from the
surrounding air will have pushed it in one direction or the other.
Once one such collision has taken place, one could not without some
expenditure of energy make the bead fall the other way. Thus, a
God who would like to provide information without energy would
have to act quickly, before energetic influences such as those arising
from the environment have moved the system out of the state of
unstable equilibrium. In this sense, there is a competition between
divine input of non-energetic information and the input of energy.
This is a general feature of such a model, which seeks a picture for
divine action in a physically effective but non-energetic way. Polk-
inghorne distinguished between energy input and information input,
with the latter determining the 'selection' of one of various possible
options, but this distinction is not sufficient to avoid competition.
Once one allows the system in its environment some time, the
'selection' will be made by the environment. This is a consequence
of the way natural systems may amplify the consequences of tiny
differences in energy.
We are often not aware of tiny differences in energy input. Take,
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for instance, two different mental acts corresponding to a choice
between two options. We experience them as different in information
content, not (qua mental acts) as physically different in energy or
labour involved. However, the apparent fact that we have information
differences without energy differences may well be an illusion, due to
the enormous amplificatory powers of the central nervous system
(Dennett 1984, Jjf.) and the fact that we do not monitor the
physiological processes in our brains. Theories of chaos and self-
organisation show that the amplificatory powers of physical systems
with respect to small initial differences are much more impressive
than previously thought. One should avoid confusing zero and close-
to-zero in this context; it is essential to Polkinghorne's position that
the difference in energy input is zero rather than almost zero, whereas
a naturalist description may understand the process as regulated by
low-energy events which act as switches modulating processes which
expend larger, observable amounts of energy. On a naturalist view,
information and energy go together. The alternative, of information-
differences without energy-differences, may respect conservation of
energy, but it makes God and physical causes compete for temporal
priority.
If there were such a competition, and if God were to act first
whenever God decided to influence natural processes, the outcome of
the act would seem to be the consequence of a natural process, which
we would, mistakenly, believe to have happened. In presenting us with
an illusion, this position has some similarity to the idea that God might
have created the world with the appearances of a long geological and
evolutionary past, an illusory past which we study (a kind of 'Om-
phalos' argument to which we will return [15]); the difference is that
here we are mistaken in our understanding of minute effects of the
thermal background rather than of effects on a grand scale.
In a slightly different way, the same problem holds for Polkinghorne's
interpretation of unpredictability as a sign of ontological openness:
if apparently open behaviour is associated with underlying apparently
deterministic equations, which is to be taken to have greater ontological
seriousness - the behaviour or the equations? (Polkinghorne 1991, 45)
This preference for the phenomena (unpredictability) rather than the
current explanation (deterministic chaos) is problematic, given Polking-
horne's defence of critical realism elsewhere. Defences of critical
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realism conclude from the explanatory power of a theory to its
ontology. In this sense, in critical realism 'epistemology models
ontology', a slogan Polkinghorne wears on a T-shirt, and which he
explains as 'acquired knowledge is a guide to the way things are'
(Polkinghorne 1993, 440). Polkinghorne seems to assume that the
acquired knowledge which is to be followed is that certain processes are
unpredictable; this he sees as an indication of ontological openness.
However, the acquired knowledge is much richer than the observation
of limited predictability. It includes the theory which explains the
processes, including our inability to predict their course; this theory is
formulated in non-linear, deterministic equations. In this sense, a
comparison with the analysis of quantum uncertainty is mistaken, as
there the theory allows, at least according to some major interpreta-
tions, the conclusion that there is genuine indeterminacy. The scientific
study of self-organising, complex, and chaotic systems has not revealed
new gaps, which might be filled by some external actor. Rather,
complex systems exhibit behaviour as if they were guided by an
external organising principle or an intentional self, but the theories
show that such behaviour is explainable without invoking any such
actor - whether a self, a life-force, or a divine Informer. As such, chaos
theory is the extension of the bottom-up programme to complex
systems rather than suggesting the existence of some 'top' from which
'intentional causation' as 'information' proceeds downwards, as Polk-
inghorne claims.
Polkinghorne acknowledges that the use of openness as the causal
joint between God and the world looks like a 'God-of-the-gaps', even
though God is not competing as 'an alternative source of energetic
causation'. However, Polkinghorne argues that there is a fundamental
difference between these gaps and earlier gaps, which 'were epistemic,
and thus extrinsic to nature, mere patches of current scientific
ignorance' (Polkinghorne 1993, 446). I agree that there is a funda-
mental difference, but it works in the other direction. In the case of
epistemic gaps that reflect our ignorance, one might maintain an
agnostic stance with respect to the possibility of a scientific explana-
tion. However, with respect to the processes described by chaos
theories there is no reason for such an open attitude, since we have
an underlying theory. To claim the existence of gaps is not merely to
remain agnostic where we do not know, but to go against acquired
knowledge, the unpredictability of systems which are described by
deterministic equations. At this level, we are not confronted with any
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indications of 'gaps' in the processes, unlike the situation at the
quantum level and, perhaps, the cosmological level.
My objections to Polkinghorne's argument are based upon more
general reflections on gaps and scientific explanations. There are at
least two conceptions of explanation, an epistemic one, which considers
phenomena explained when they are located in a wider theoretical
framework (e.g., Kitcher 1981), and an ontic one, which considers
phenomena explained when underlying causes or mechanisms are
discerned (e.g., Boyd 1985). Such ontic and epistemic approaches 'are
not mutually exclusive, but, rather, complementary' (Salmon 1990, x).
Chaotic processes have been explained, in both senses. They fit into
a wider theoretical framework, parts of which have been around for
centuries (differential equations) whereas other elements, for example,
fractals, were developed at about the same time as chaos theory was
being developed. Chaos theory has not diminished the unity of
explanatory accounts, but increased it, as more phenomena are now
treated within the framework of mathematical physics. And a causal
account of chaotic processes of limited predictability is available. Even
though we could not have predicted a specific storm two weeks in
advance, since we were unable to observe the then prevailing condi-
tions in sufficient detail (what is colloquially called 'the butterfly effect'),
we can think of a possible causal mechanism which generated that
storm. We cannot predict the numbers that will come up when we
throw a pair of dice, nor are we able to predict which way the bead will
fall along an inverted U-shaped wire. But in either case, we can explain
how it may have come about the way it actually came about (due to
minute influences from the air, the surface, etc.). Predictability is no
condition for explainability.
We are not limited to two options, as if a phenomenon is either
predictable, or is unexplainable due to some genuine 'gap' in nature.
In between are phenomena which are in principle explainable but are
currently unexplainable because we do not yet have the correct theory
- as was the situation with the discovery of 'high temperature' super-
conductivity in ceramic materials. Even without an explanation we
assume the phenomenon to be explainable in terms of physics,
probably current physics, but otherwise with a modification of current
physics. There may also be phenomena which are explainable but will
never be predictable - as is the case with chaotic processes. As the
events will never be fully predictable, one can never exclude a
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particular divine action hidden in the unpredictability. However, as I
see it, if there is no indication of, or need for, such an assumption of
openness and divine action, the assumption is not justified.
Quantum uncertainty may be different. Here we have good grounds
to exclude ordinary (local) 'hidden variables', and thus to rule out an
explanation of the limited predictability as a consequence of unob-
served but real local physical processes. Therefore, quantum physics
may be a more appropriate level for envisaging divine action than any
process at a higher level of reality. Its 'gaps' are not asserted despite the
presence of a competing explanation, viz., deterministic laws and causal
mechanisms underlying chaotic processes, but are reflected in the
fundamental structure of the theory (which describes reality in terms of
a superposition of various states).5 I am none the less sceptical about
the use of quantum physics in an attempt to locate divine action. One
reason is that quantum indeterminacy might be resolved either via a
modification of quantum physics or via some future reinterpretation.
Another reason is that quantum indeterminacy does not require a
metaphysical supplement to physical causes, even though it may
perhaps allow such a move. There is no need to adhere to a
metaphysical principle of sufficient reason, even though a methodolo-
gical principle of sufficient reason is a good heuristic notion within any
naturalist approach.
Unpredictability is very relevant beyond the strictly scientific context,
especially in the context of ethics. If we can have only a limited view of
the consequences of our actions, this may affect the way in which we
assess our responsibilities. But unpredictability does not offer or under-
gird a specific view of divine action in individual events or a view of a
causal joint between God and the world. Unpredictability is metaphy-
sically uninteresting, or at most a necessary but insufficient condition
for metaphysical openness.
13.2. Top-down causation as a model for divine action
An alternative to an interventionist view of God's action within
unpredictable processes has been presented by Arthur Peacocke in his
As argued by R. J. Russell in a contribution which will be published in (Russell, Murphy, and
Peacocke 1995).
As in the contributions by G. K R. Ellis, N. Murphy, and T. F. Tracy in Russell, Murphy,
and Peacocke (1995).
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Theology for a Scimtiftc Age. It relies on thé notion of top—down causation,
a notion originally introduced by D. Campbell (1974). I will briefly
present this idea and its application in the context of theology, before
coming to some critical comments.
Examples of top -down causation
There are physical and chemical systems in which there is co-
ordinated behaviour of myriads of individual molecules. Chemical
clocks (mixtures which rhythmically change colour) and Benard cells
(stable convection cells in a fluid between two plates) are examples of
this. The system exhibits a global pattern, as long as certain
conditions are maintained at the spatial boundaries. Individual
molecules behave according to this global pattern, rather than in the
manifold possible ways described in the statistics of an ideal gas. As
Peacocke formulates it,
the changes at the micro-level, that of the constituent units, are what they are
because of their incorporation into the system as a whole, which is exerting
specific constraints on its units, making them behave otherwise than they
would do in isolation. (Peacocke 1993, 53f.)
Bernd-Olaf Küppers has on various occasions presented theories
regarding self-organising systems as theories regarding 'boundary
conditions' (e.g., Küppers 1990). There are spatial boundary condi-
tions, such as the temperatures at the bottom and the top of the fluid in
which Benard convection cells occur. More relevant to our under-
standing of reality are DNA-molecules which shape the development of
each organism and may be seen as some sort of initial conditions.
Boundary conditions are, of course, a traditional feature in physical
descriptions, corresponding to the freedom of the experimenter to
choose a certain experimental set-up. However, in the case of the DNA
of organisms, we are not dealing with such almost totally contingent
boundary conditions. The boundary conditions which are initial to one
stage are the outcome of the preceding step, and beyond that they are
the product of a long sequence of generations that gave rise to complex
organisms.
Another example of top-down causation, sometimes mentioned, is
the relation between mental phenomena and brain states. According to
Peacocke, top-down causation provides a middle ground between an
unacceptable Cartesian dualism of two entities and a physicalist
reductionism of mental states to brain states. There is a danger of a
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circularity here: one may invoke top—down causation to understand
the relation between mind and brain and invoke our understanding of
brain states and mental phenomena in order to present top-down
causation. The risk of circularity, and of relying on unclear ideas
about the relation between mind and brain, should be a major reason
for caution in appealing to this example in theological contexts. I also
have the impression that a reductionistic approach, if it includes
environment-organism interaction and the difference between a first-
person and a third-person account, has a stronger case than is
granted by authors who appeal to top-down causation in order to
understand the mind-brain relationship (see below, [21]).
A more general concern about the idea of top—down causation is
whether it deserves the label 'causation'. There certainly is a place for
top-down analysis, but that is an epistemological rather than an
ontological notion. For instance, the neuroscientist Roger Sperry who
advocates the notion of top-down causation mentions, as an example,
'how a wheel rolling downhill carries its atoms and molecules through
a course in time and space to a fate determined by the overall system
properties of the wheel as a whole and regardless of the inclination of
the individual atoms and molecules' (Sperry 1980, 201, quoted in Arbib
and Hesse 1986, 66). Arbib and Hesse agree that to consider the
positions and motions of all individual atoms and molecules is not the
most expedient way of analysing the course of the wheel. However, as
they point out, the wheel makes the movements it makes because the
atoms and molecules behave in certain ways; the whole is not acting
independently, 'regardless' (Sperry) of the constituent particles and
their interactions; the example does not make it clear that a level has
emerged from which causal action proceeds downwards.
The example of the Benard cells is a clear instance where the
conditions at the boundary, in combination with the properties of the
components and their interactions, determine the behaviour of billions
of individual molecules; the internal properties are emphasised in
arguments about ^^organization; the boundaries are emphasised in
arguments about to/>-down causation, as in this section. However, here
one could replace the term 'top-down' causation by 'environment-
system' interaction. That environment, which determines the tempera-
ture at the boundary plates, is a physical system, just as the system in
which the Benard cells occur. All influences can be traced as local
phenomena within the space—time framework. For instance, changing
the boundary conditions does not have an immediate impact on the
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behaviour of molecules at some distance from the boundary; it takes
the system some time to settle into a new co-ordinated state. In such
cases, there is a sense in which a whole (state at the boundary-plates;
DNA) serves as the boundary for the system, while the next stage of the
whole, for instance the DNA of the next generation, is shaped by the
development of the system (the organism) in its environment. However,
there is no sense in which the system-as-a-whole has a specific,
'emergent' causal influence. All causal influences can be traced locally
as physical influences within the system or between the system and its
immediate environment. Boundaries are local phenomena, rather than
global states of the system-as-a-whole.
Top-down causation as model for the God-world interaction
Peacocke emphasises the inadequacy of all human models and meta-
phors as models or metaphors regarding God (e.g., Peacocke 1993,
14, 167). This, however, does not keep him from an attempt to picture
God's relationship with the world with the help of the model of top-
down causation. The state of world-as-a-whole 'can be a "top-down"
causative factor in, or constraint upon, what goes on at the myriad
levels that comprise it' (Peacocke 1993, 158). On this view, divine action
could make a difference without violating in any way the regularities
and laws of physics.
My suggestion is that a combination of the notion of top-down causation
from the integrated, unitive mind/brain state to human bodily action ... with
the recognition of the unity of the human mind/brain/body event . . . together
provide a fruitful clue or model for illuminating how we might think of God's
interaction with the world. ... In this model, God would be regarded as
exerting continuously top-down causative influences on the world-as-a-whole
in a way analogous to that whereby we in our thinking can exert effects on our
bodies in a 'top-down' manner. (Peacocke 1993, 161)
This is not merely a general influence on the world: 'initiating divine
action on the state of the world-as-a-whole can itself have a causative
effect upon individual events and entities within that world', without
ever being observed as a divine 'intervention' (Peacocke 1993, 163).
Peacocke acknowledges the problem that, in all cases with which we
are familiar, transfer of information requires transfer of energy.
However, divine action now has been located at the interface between
the world-as-a-whole and God, rather than within the natural order.
'This seems to me to be the ultimate level of the "causal joint"
conundrum, for it involves the very nature of the divine being in
IO4 Theology and knowledge of the world
relation to that of matter/energy and seems to me to be the right place
to locate the problem, rather than at some lower levels in the created
order at which divine "intervention" would then have to be postulated,
with all of its difficulties' (Peacocke 1993, 164).
The issue of energy and information has already been considered
above [13.1]. Here I will consider the application of the notion of top-
down causation to the world-as-a-whole. In taking top-down causation
as the point of departure for describing the relation between God and
particular events in the world, there is a significant extrapolation from
particular environments to the encompassing notion of 'the world-as-a-
whole'. God is introduced as the one who sets the boundary conditions
for the world-as-a-whole, at the global level. This seems to me to be
problematic if not unwarranted with respect to the science at hand. In
the examples which led to the notion of top-down causation, there is
always an important role for the physical environment. One could say
that in the example of the Benard cells it is the environment which acts
as the 'top' which sets the temperature at the plates, and thereby the
state of the system. And in the DNA example, it is the preceding history
which has resulted in the DNA that serves as a boundary condition for
the organism that is to develop. When we start talking about 'the
world-as-a-whole', the whole notion of a context, of an environment,
becomes a metaphor. In science, we always deal with a context which is
itself also captured in terms of the same laws of physics.
With Peacocke I agree that the 'world-as-a-whole' may be a more
appropriate location for 'the causal nexus' than any place within the
world of natural processes. However, viewed as a model for under-
standing the causal nexus between the divine and the world, divine
action on the world-as-a-whole still interferes with any assumed
completeness of a naturalist account. An alternative which avoids such
interference is provided by a reflection upon the naturalist account
itself, especially on the themes of the existence, order, and intelligibility
of the world; rather than seeking an understanding of divine action in
or on the world, we might interpret the world itself as God's action.
'3-3- Non-temporal views of divine action
In the preceding sections we considered attempts to understand divine
action in the context of our knowledge of natural processes or in
analogy with natural processes. However, one might also abstain from
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such an analogy - the Creator is to be thought of as unique and so
different from any creature that God's mode of action would not be
like the actions of created entities. Divine action should not be
conceived of as an additional causal factor among others. One major
way to conceive of such a difference, is to think of divine action as
something which is not action in time, as all natural activity is. Rather,
God is thought of as the non-temporal ground of all that is.
In the Christian tradition an early advocate of such a view was
Augustine of Hippo, one of the early theologians, who in his Confessiones
argued that we should not ask what God was doing before God created
the world, since the concept of 'before' does not apply; time was
created with material reality, and is not something which is indepen-
dently applicable. Temporal reality is as a natural and temporal reality
the creation of God.
One of the differences between 'temporalists' and 'atemporalists' is
in the understanding of God, with emphasis on God's interaction and
personal characteristics or on God's transcendence. With respect to
divine action, the atemporalist view has been developed with the help
of the distinction between primary and secondary causality. Secondary
causality is creaturely activity, whereas primary causality is the divine
creative act which underlies the whole of natural reality (including
natural processes with their secondary causality). This view of divine
action in terms of primary causality should not be conflated with a
deistic view, which has it that God acted once, in the beginning, with
the world continuing on its own. Rather, everything is at all times held
to be dependent on the primary cause; without it, nothing would exist.6
There is an enormous variety of philosophical and theological
literature on this approach to divine action, for instance its compat-
ibility with human freedom as freedom within creation. By empha-
sising the distinction between divine and natural causality - and
thereby avoiding an analysis of divine and human roles as if they are
two players competing in a zero-sum game, where one loses when
the other gains - one might seek to salvage genuine human freedom
and responsibility without detracting from divine freedom and power
(e.g., Burrell 1993, 62). I will not enter into such philosophical
See for overviews Thomas (1983) and the introduction by R. J. Russell (1993) in Quantum
Cosmolagu and the laws oj Mature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. McMullin (ig88) offers a
lucid account of the historical background of, and differences between, temporalist and
atemporalist construals of God's relationship to nature as understood via the natural sciences.
See also references in notes 4 and 5 of chapter r(.
io6 Theology and knowledge of the world
discussions here, but rather focus for a moment on the relation to
the natural sciences.
Upon such a view, whatever the natural sciences come up with as
the best description of the world, can be accepted as the description of
created reality. There is no need to opt for indeterminism or top-down
causality to maintain a locus for divine action. This is the advantage of
this position, but this aloofness may also be seen as a disadvantage: the
irrelevance of our knowledge of the world threatens to make our ideas
about 'primary causality' abstract and superfluous, unless belief in
primary causality as God's creative activity is rooted in something else.
However, if those roots are to be found in particulars of human history
or of human experience, where God would have been revealed or
disclosed to us, the problem of particular divine action in the created
order returns with full force, even though perhaps not so much in
relation to the natural sciences as in relation to history and human
experience (see, for instance, Buckley's position [n]). When talking
about divine action within history, one seems to allow with respect to
historical processes something which one would not allow for natural
processes, namely the incompleteness of an account in terms of
creaturely (natural, including cultural) processes. Hence, the interaction
with the natural sciences is not so much direct - in arguments which
seek to pin down how God might act within natural processes - but
indirect, namely via the question to what extent anthropology (history,
experience) may be considered independent from natural processes. I
will return to this understanding of God in terms of primary causality
which sustains the world at all times in the final sections [31, 32], after
explorations into the anthropological domain [chapter 4] and in
combination with some reflections on limit questions about reality,
since such limit questions may be seen as incentives to an atemporalist
understanding of God.
14. COSMIC MEANING AND MYSTERY
Above, we concentrated on divine action. However, some have enter-
tained in reflections on science conceptions of the divine which do not
so much conceive of God in terms of action, but in terms such as
'meaning' or 'mystery'. After a brief discussion of 'meaning' we will
consider some aspects of relations between science, religion, and
mystery.
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Cosmic meaning
Order out of Chaos by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers had as its
original title in French La Nouvelle Alliance: Métamorphose de la Science.
There is a new alliance between man and nature, due to changes in
science. As they see it, the classical (Newtonian) physical sciences
treated human experiences as illusions, for instance the experience of
the passing of time. Changes in science have, in their opinion, paved
the way for a new view of the meaningful place of humanity in natural
reality. Unlike God's covenant with Moses made on Mount Sinai, this
one is not with a God who transcends reality. This covenant is rooted
in physical reality itself. Humanity is no longer a stranger in a strange,
mechanistic world. Rather, within the universe there is a tendency
towards higher complexity and order.
The distance between us and the medieval synthesis can be attrib-
uted to changes in the content of our knowledge, changes in our ideas
regarding the nature of knowledge, and changes in our appreciation of
the world (see above, [5]). Prigogine and Stengers argue that changes
in the content of our knowledge have reopened the way for a new
synthesis with a positive appreciation of the world.
When Nobel prize-winner Prigogine and his co-author Stengers
proclaimed a 'new covenant', they responded to Nobel prize-winner
Jacques Monod whose influential book Chance and Necessity ended with
the following sobering (or liberating?) thought:
The ancient covenant is in pieces; man at last knows that he is alone in the
universe's unfeeling immensity, out of which he emerged only by chance. His
destiny is nowhere spelled out, nor is his duty. The kingdom above or the
darkness below: it is for him to choose. (Monod 1971, 180)
The kingdom above is the kingdom of knowledge, 'within man, where
progressively freed both from material constraints and from the
deceitful servitudes of animism, he could at last live authentically'
(Monod 1971, 180). The 'darkness below' is the variety of animisms,
including Utopian ideologies such as historical materialism. The ethics
of knowledge is based on an ethical choice, an axiom which humans
impose on themselves. It 'thereby differs radically from animist ethics,
which all claim to be based upon the "knowledge" of immanent laws,
religious or "natural", which are supposed to assert themselves over
man' (Monod 1971, I76f). Animisms fail to discriminate properly
between judgements of value and those of knowledge. Meaning is not
found in the process described by science, but in the human choice for
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objectivity. Objectivity as the ethical axiom cannot itself be based upon
some scientific objective basis. It is this ethical axiom which bars
science from becoming a basis for further values.
The issue seems to be whether knowledge and values or meaning
may be integrated into a single intellectual scheme, or, even stronger,
whether a scheme based upon science can provide a basis for ethics.
Prigogine and Stengers have a metaphysical agenda, when they offer a
description which at the same time purports to be a prescription. Just
as with the models of divine action, it is disputable whether in the quest
for meaning and values such approaches do not reach beyond the
actual achievements of science with its focus on local, relative contexts,
parts of the world. We will come back to an evolutionary explanation
of morality below [chapter 4-6]. Such an explanation does not offer a
firm foundation for specific values, but rather links the values that arise
to the contexts in which they arise. We do not, via science, seem to
reach beyond the diverse reality in which we live. Should we not rather
pay attention to the limitations of science, instead of over-valuing its
results? It is to such an approach that we will turn in the rest of this
section.
Mystery: a common awareness of not-knowing?
For the scientist who has lived by his faith in the power of reason, the story
ends like a bad dream. He has scaled the mountains of ignorance; he is about
to conquer the highest peak; as he pulls himself over the final rock, he is
greeted by a band of theologians who have been sitting there for centuries.
(Jastrow 1980, 125)
The essence of modern cosmology is, according to Robert Jastrow, that
the universe 'began at a certain moment of time, and under circum-
stances that seem to make it impossible - not just now, but ever - to
find out what force or forces brought the world into being at that
moment' (1980, 12). Is an awareness of not-knowing, of mystery,
common ground for theologians and scientists? We will consider
arguments from science to mystery, but first we will take a look at the
theological side.
Roots of negative theology and of critique of religion
In his The Elusive Presence Samuel Terrien traces the role of hiddenness
through the whole Bible. One example is the story of Jacob wrestling
with a stranger during the night; the stranger cannot be seen in the
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light of the day nor is his name revealed (Genesis 32). 'Thick darkness'
characterises the place of God, both at Mount Sinai and in the temple
in Jerusalem (Exodus 20: 21, i Kings 8: 12, 2 Chronicles 6: i). The Ten
Commandments prohibit the carving of images. According to Isaiah (8:
17, 45: 15), God hides himself. Job is challenged to tell where he was
when God laid the foundations of the earth. Job places his hand in
front of his mouth and is silent (Job 38-40). Job does not so much
acknowledge moral guilt as hubris. In Jesus God's presence is not
obvious. Is this not the carpenter? Do we not know his parents,
brothers, and sisters? (e.g., Mark 6: 3). And he is not even able to save
himself from the cross (Mark 15: 29-32)! But then the centurion
recognises this man as the Son of God (Mark 15: 39). Through
humiliation comes exaltation (Philippians 2: 5-11).
The life of Jewish and Christian communities is not structured
around a holy place, a temple where God would be present. Central to
Jewish and Christian life are holy times of remembrance and expecta-
tion. The Sabbath recalls the Creation and the Exodus and is a
foretaste of fulfilment. The synagogue is a place of memory and hope,
recalling God's great deeds in the past for the sake of the future. The
hiddenness and absence can be seen mystically, in relation to God's
holiness, but also in relation to prophetic engagement: this world is not
as God intends the world to be.
Later European negative theology and criticism of religion draws
also upon Greek philosophy. Xenophanes (area 470 BCE) criticised
anthropomorphic views of the gods; if they could, horses and oxen
would make themselves gods in the form of horses and oxen.
According to Plato's Apologia, Socrates persistently asked critical ques-
tions, but these questions do not yet lead to an affirmation, to negative
theology. With Plato, we find a further step in that direction, when he
considers the archè, the origin of everything. The Sun gives light and
thereby allows growth (existence) and vision (knowledge). Similarly,
existence and knowledge owe their possibility to the idea of the Good
(Politeia 508 d/e). As the condition for the possibility of existence and of
knowledge, this idea of the Good is itself beyond existence and knowl-
edge. Philo of Alexandria, a Jewish thinker around the beginning of
our era, identifies such metaphysical notions with the biblical God.
With him, emphasis shifts from the history of Israel to philosophical
reflection.
H. Die Is, Die Fragmente tier VorsokratUter, vol. l. Berlin: Weidmannschr Buchhandlung, 1906',
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Negative theology receives its most influential articulation at the
close of the fifth century by an author referred to as (pseudo-)Dionysius
the Areopagite (Hochstaffl 1976, 82-155). Pseudo-Dionysius coined the
term apophatic theology, negative theology. We do not move upward by
extrapolation from the image via the imageless to the divine but by
negation, by relinquishing form. Negation has a mystagogic function in
a hierarchical framework. The masses need symbols, images. However,
with respect to the divine, negations are true whereas affirmations are
inadequate.8 Through negation of all positions the road winds towards
a position beyond all negations.
With the loss of a hierarchical understanding of the world such a
mystagogic method lost its context. It was no longer clear that the
negation at one level propelled one upward to a higher level. What are
the possibilities for the emphasis on an unknowable, on mystery in
relation to contemporary science? We will take a look at two proposals,
focusing on the provisional character of scientific theories and on the
hiddenness of quantum reality.
Provisionality and hiddenness
In his Cosmic Understanding (1986) Milton K. Munitz gives a philosophical
analysis of scientific cosmology. The universe as it is known, as an
intelligible unit, results from the application of a conceptual scheme.
The point is epistemological: One cannot escape being bound to
concepts if one wants to achieve intelligibility. One transcends the
conceptual limitations of a theory by entering another conceptual
scheme, which has its own boundaries. Each understanding of the
universe is a mask which is held in front of the real, but in itself
unknowable, universe (Harrison 1985).
Munitz defends more than a view of knowledge; he suggests 'a
dimension of reality "beyond" any account of the known universe (or
any of its contents), of which we can have a mode of awareness that is
not hemmed in by the constraints and ever-present horizons of
cosmological knowledge' (Munitz 1986, 229). This reality would not be
conceptually bounded, and thus could never be captured adequately in
language.
We shall be driven, consequently, and at the end, to silence, although the
'talk' on the way, if at all helpful, will have had its value in making the silence
De Coelesti hiérarchie 2,3 in J. P. Mignc, Patrolagia cursus comjilftui, smesgmeca 3, 141 A.
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a pregnant one, and indeed the occasion for having an overridingly important
type of human experience. (Munitz 1986,
Munitz attempts to point to something which is at the heart of reality,
but transcends all our knowledge.
A similar position has been argued by the physicist Bernard
d'Espagnat in the context of quantum physics. As he sees it, 'present-
day physics calls for a clear-cut distinction between two notions both
designated in the past by the word "reality" ': independent reality
which is distant, 'veiled', and empirical reality, the totality of phe-
nomena. As he sees it, 'in our time science itself has provided us with
pressing reasons for accepting the (philosophical) duality of Being and
of phenomena' (D'Espagnat 1989, 7). These reasons are supposed to
come from quantum physics, since quantum physics is not merely a
theory about the nature of reality, but also about the possibilities of
acquiring knowledge of reality.
Various comments can be made about these arguments for mystery in
the context of science. To summarise them in advance: Firstly, even if
we do not know certain things, there are other things which we know
not to be the case. Secondly, the specific claims about cosmology and
quantum physics are disputable. And thirdly, would such an unknown
or veiled reality be religiously significant?
(i) In looking for mystery, the emphasis is on what we do not know.
However, in reflecting upon the religious implications of science we
should not neglect what we know not to be the case. Ideas previously
held to be true have been shown to be incorrect, at least very probably
incorrect. As an example, one might think of the age of the universe. It
has not been settled whether the universe had a beginning a finite time
ago, had an infinite past, or is not adequately captured in either of
these expressions. On the basis of Munitz's account one would expect
that this will never be settled. However, even then one might say with
confidence that the age of the universe is not restricted to a few
thousand years - and, thus, does not fit a count of years based on the
genealogies in the Bible. Science as knowledge about what is not the
case (e.g., no young universe, no universal flood) challenges religious
views in as far as they rely upon, or have been expressed, in terms of
the knowledge of an earlier age. Even if one holds that science does not
provide a grand view of reality, scientific research forces one to
reconsider ideas.
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(2.a) A more specific objection to Munitz's argument concerns his
expectation that theories will continue to be replaced. It would be a
fair situation if the world were arranged in such a way that no
generation could claim to possess the final truth, or even be nearer to
it, than any earlier generation: 'For both of us the slope is the same,
and reaches as far ahead and as far behind' (Fowles 1980, 22). And,
when we take the lessons from history to heart, it also seems wise to
adopt a humble attitude with respect to the completeness of our
current knowledge. None the less, some scientists are more pretentious
about our knowledge. Nobel prize-winner Steven Weinberg entitles his
book Dreams of a Final Theory (Weinberg 1992), and Steven Hawking
predicted in his inaugural lecture in 1980 that we might have the
fundamental theory by the end of the twentieth century.
In what sense could our scientific knowledge become complete? This
topic deserves a more elaborate treatment than can be given here (e.g.,
Barrow 1991, Drees 1990, 89-94). It seems reasonable to expect that
within the next few decades, centuries, or millennia physicists will come
up with a theory which integrates all known particles and interactions
in a single mathematical scheme. This would not imply that all
phenomena could be derived from these fundamental equations. The
mathematics could be too complicated to handle. Besides, the theory
may allow various solutions, without deciding between them. As an
analogy, one might think of a theory about traffic based upon
considerations of safety and efficiency. On such a theory, the situation
where everybody drives on the left-hand side of the road would be as
good as that where everybody drives on the right, but a choice has to
be made. An encompassing theory would also not imply that there
could be no other theory that would do justice to the phenomena. Nor
would the theory explain why reality behaves in accordance with the
theory. If one accepts such restrictions, a fundamental and complete
theory of physics is imaginable. There would be no reason to expect
that such a theory would be replaced by another, as there would be no
intrinsic reasons to assume that science could do a better job at
describing and explaining the phenomena. However, even then Mu-
nitz's position could be defended, since uniqueness would not be
settled; one would not be able to exclude an alternative theory, using a
different conceptual framework.
(2.b)Just as the persistent provisionality of theories may be disputed
and qualified, d'Espagnat's claim about the duality of Being and
phenomena in quantum physics is by no means trivial. Quantum
Cosmic meaning and mystery 113
physics might be replaced by some other theory, based upon a different
conceptual framework even though the new theory would need to
reproduce the successes of quantum physics. This is not a mere
theoretical possibility, as quantum physics and general relativity, the
theory about gravity, space, and time are incompatible without funda-
mental changes in at least one of them. And even if one does not
appeal to future theories, quantum physics can be (and actually is)
interpreted differently, without the duality of Being and phenomena
considered by d'Espagnat (see also note 13).
(3) Is mystery an appropriate term in relation to the provisional
character of our knowledge? Scientists do not stop in front of an ill-
understood phenomenon in respectful contemplation, but consider
such a phenomenon as a problem to tackle. For instance, Jastrow said
that it would be impossible to know what happened before the Big
Bang, and hence that cosmologists have to acknowledge their defeat
after scaling the highest peak. In this form the claim is already outdated
by the development of quantum cosmologies. There is no accepted
theory, but explorations show that new theories might result in radical
changes in the concept of time. As a consequence, the question of
whether there was a 'before' might be no longer adequate (e.g., Isham
1988, 1991, 1993; Drees 1990, 41-75; 1993). Current answers resemble
in this respect the answer given by Augustine when asked what God
was doing before God created the world. According to Augustine, time
is created with the created order (creatio cum tempore], whereas the
question assumes creation in time, and thus is ill posed (Confessiones,
Book n). Similar ideas can be found a few centuries earlier in Philo of
Alexandria's On the Account of the World's Creation by Moses (section 26).
The Aristotelian understanding of time as the measure of movement
implies that in a state without material creation, or without movement
of material creation, there would be no time. Contemporary research
in cosmology, resulting perhaps in another understanding of time,
shows that cosmologists are not outdone by reaching the limit of the
Big Bang theory. It may be a problem rather than a mystery.
Theologians are hesitant to make too much out of apparendy
mysterious aspects of reality as described by the sciences. The catch-
word is 'God-of-the-gaps'. Gaps in scientific accounts have often been
seen as possible loci of special divine intervention. This resulted in
religious retreats when science filled such gaps. Could there be gaps
which do not disappear? I do not see any such gaps within the scientific
account. However, limit-questions about the scientific approach to
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reality may allow for a more acceptable 'God-of-the gaps'. Two
fundamental candidates worth considering might be the existence of
the world and human subjectivity.
Persistent mysteries of existence and subjectivity?
Though the natural sciences reach out to the chemical composition of
stars and to the emergence of time, two issues might be considered as
candidates for escaping the omnicompetence of the natural sciences:
the mystery of the existence of the world and the mystery of subjectivity
(Durant 1990, 167-70).
Even if there were a complete theory of all fundamental interactions,
such a theory would not by itself explain why there is a reality which
behaves accordingly. This is a modern version of a traditional philoso-
phical question: Why is there something rather than nothing? Answers
which are given within the terms of the natural sciences, for instance
referring to a quantum fluctuation in a vacuum, always assume certain
givens, say laws of nature and a reality which behaves accordingly.
Hence, the mystery of existence seems scientifically unassailable. Even
if one agrees that science is unable to provide an answer, theology may
not be able to do much better. As the physicist Charles Misner (1977,
96) wrote
Saying that God created the universe does not explain either God or the
Universe, but it keeps our consciousness alive to the mysteries of awesome
majesty that we might otherwise ignore, and that deserve our respect.
Whether subjectivity will escape the omnicompetence of the natural
sciences seems more disputable. There is, of course, a difference
between the experience from within and a description from the
outside. While I experience love, hate, or boredom, the scan shows
electrical and chemical processes. Can scientific insights and philoso-
phical analysis explicate how the experience from within has come into
existence and how a 'self functions in relation to its environment and
its constitution? We will return to subjectivity in chapter 4; other
potential limit-questions are considered in chapter 5.
Even if one envisages a mystery beyond science, one may wonder
what its significance for religion can be. Constructive use of the
limitations of science is risky. Only in the context of a broader view of
reality which would itself be above uncertainties, as the Neoplatonic
theologians still held, does it seem possible to ascend through the
critical questioning of science on a mystagogic way. As such a
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framework beyond dispute seems unavailable to us, science does not
contribute to a negative theology which results in an affirmation of
God. But awareness of the limitations of scientific theories may help
to keep alive a sense of wonder, of the non-triviality of reality.
15. USING SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES IN THEOLOGY (l):
MODALITIES OF MODELS
There are differences not only in the concept of ultimacy (an active
God, meaning, mystery) considered in relation to the sciences, but also
with respect to what is considered achievable. Can strong claims be
made about the relationship of science and religion, for instance that
science proves or disproves a certain religious view, or at least that it
contributes to its (im)plausibility? Or should we speak of science as
providing models for religious thought? We will first consider the
farther-reaching claims (proof), before turning to three ways in which
the notion of model is used in these discussions.
Proof and argument
Knock-down proofs are few and far between. Arguments which are not
logically compelling, but make a claim to plausibility, are much more
abundant. There is even a book by an Anglican bishop of Birmingham,
Hugh Montefiore, with the tide The Probability of God (1985). One area
for such arguments for religion on the basis of science is cosmology, for
instance in relation to the origin and the order of the universe. The
initial singularity as envisaged in the Big Bang model of the universe
could be claimed as evidence of a creator; the anthropic coincidences
have been read as evidence of design.
A closer consideration of cosmology shows that such claims reach
beyond the framework of the scientific theories at hand. In historical or
archaeological research it is assumed that in certain respects past
human behaviour resembles current human behaviour; our ancestors
also needed food. The Big Bang theory is comparable to historical
analysis in relying on assumptions about the validity in the past of the
laws of physics as we know them today. Since current physics works
well in interpreting observations from stars and galaxies far away in
space and in time, we have sufficient warrant to rely on those laws in
reconstructing the history of the universe. This results in the Big Bang
model of the universe. However, there is less reason to believe that our
physics (and with it the model) is adequate for the earliest stages of the
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model, during the first fraction of the first second of the model. On the
contrary, there are good grounds to believe that current physics is
inadequate when we calculate backwards to a fraction of a second from
the apparent 't=o'. In this way we see that the Big Bang theory is not
about the origin of the universe, but about its subsequent evolution.
This limitation of the theory is not too relevant in relation to current
observations on the background radiation and the abundances of the
elements, but it seriously affects the use of the theory in the context of
an argument about an absolute beginning. The Big Bang model is not
final. Some speculations about future theories imply that the notion of
time loses its meaning for those 'earliest' stages. Other proposals
envisage a much larger or perhaps even infinite universe like a boiling
liquid; our Big Bang universe would be one expanding bubble. The
absoluteness of the beginning would be an artifact, a consequence of
the fact that we look at a bubble from the inside. Such speculations are
different with respect to the understanding of the beginning of the
universe and of the nature of time. The provisional character of
scientific theories, especially with respect to such issues as an absolute
beginning, should be respected in arguments based on science.
Similar problems arise when the order of the universe is considered.
Some see the fact that the universe has the right conditions for the
emergence of life as supporting a belief in design, in purpose (the so
called 'anthropic principles'). However, here too arguments reach way
beyond the scientific evidence. Even if there are characteristics of the
universe which make it seem 'fine-tuned' for life, there might be a
future theory which explains these features. It might also be that the
features are only typical of our neighbourhood, the currently obser-
vable part of the universe. The observation that we happen to be in a
corner of the wider universe where the conditions are right would not
be too amazing; we could not have been elsewhere reflecting on those
properties (see on anthropic interpretations also [31]).
Issues of design, necessity, or randomness may be philosophically
interesting. However, science does not offer a basis for a clear
argument. Theories may change, and they do allow for different
interpretations. Thus, one cannot claim proofs, whether for or against
design or with respect to other metaphysical or religious convictions.
Probabilities are also hard to assess, since one would be assessing
probabilities on future developments of scientific theories. And to have
a clear view of such future theories would be to have these theories
already - prediction of scientific theories, or more generally prediction
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of new ideas, is quite different from predicting the weather. The
provisional character of theories, together with the underdetermination
of theories by current data, prohibits any strong metaphysical claims.
We therefore will turn to more modest claims which do not attempt to
ascribe numerical probabilities to competing theses, but rather speak of
models in different ways (e.g., Hesse 1967, Barbour 1974); in the next
section, we will come to the question of how to deal with areas of
science where there is marked disagreement.
Models in a logical approach
In formal logic, one can consider a collection of symbols, axioms and
rules, without ascribing any meaning to them. However, one can also
interpret the symbols and rules in a model. A certain abstract set of
terms ('point', 'line') and of axioms ('through two "points" there is one
and only one "line" ') may be represented by geometrical figures in a
plane. The model is an interpretation of the original axioms and
symbols. Models are 'possible worlds' with respect to these axioms.
Models serve as a test for consistency. If there is a consistent model
which interprets the axioms, they are consistent. If there is no model,
the axioms are inconsistent. Though this rule is simple, its application
need not be, for how would one know that a model itself is consistent?
Such models have also a semantic function - a model offers a context in
which the symbols acquire an interpretation, a meaning. There may be
more than one model for a given axiomatic system, and each of those
models could be richer in different ways than the system it models.
Thus, interpretation through a model offers a possible meaning, not
'the meaning' of the terms involved.
In theology, some proposals can be characterised as models, under-
stood as interpretations of a given system of axioms. Thus, a model can
be invoked to show the consistency of various assumptions. An example is
the Omphalos-argument in relation to evolution. The issue is whether
one can maintain that God created the Earth a few thousand years
ago, even though the evidence from paleontology and geology seems to
teach us otherwise. A consistent articulation of this possibility, a
'model' for the theological conviction together with the scientific
evidence such as geological strata and their fossils, was given by Philip
H. Gosse in his book Omphalos (navel) in 1857, two years before the
publication of Darwin's Origin of Species. A few thousand years ago God
may have created all the evidence of a longer past, including Adam's
navel (suggesting a mother), the fossils in the geological strata, and the
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light which we (upon this view mistakenly) assume to come from distant
stars. Hence, there is no formal inconsistency between accepting the
discoveries about fossils and geological strata and believing in a fairly
recent creation. However, the consistency achieved in this model has a
price; God becomes a deceiver, and sciences such as geology and
astronomy are not so much studies of events in a distant past or at
distant places, but studies of the extent to which we have been fooled.
A more recent example of an argument for consistency by envisa-
ging possible worlds, is Alvin Plantinga's treatment of natural evil in
combination with God's omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness.
Rather than explaining why God would allow for such evil, Plantinga
restricts his aim to a defence of the consistency of certain beliefs
about God and the presence of evil. The consistency of the fact of
moral evil with God's omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness is
argued on the basis of the freedom to make wrong choices. Plantinga
then turns to natural evil, disasters such as earthquakes and floods.
Such evil is shown to be compatible with his beliefs about God by
finding a 'model'. Plantinga finds one by assuming that natural evil
might be due to one or more non-human agents, say Satan and his
cohort. This reduces the issue of natural evil to one of moral evil,
which he had already solved (Plantinga 1974, s8f.; similarly Plantinga
1985, 42ff.).
Plantinga does not assert that earthquakes are actually caused by
Satan, but rather that it is logically possible to understand apparently
natural evil as evil caused by free persons. By finding a possible world
with evil and an omnipotent and morally good God, Plantinga claims
to have offered a philosophically (though not thereby pastorally or
emotionally) adequate defence of the consistency of the theistic posi-
tion. As in formal logic, the problem of consistency returns at the level
of the model, the consistency of the proposed understanding of free
will, possible worlds, Satan, and so on.
To get a clearer view of differences in the purposes of such
arguments, it may be helpful to contrast Plantinga's defence with the
free-process theodicy as John Polkinghorne has defended it. God allows
the world to be itself, in an exploration of its potentialities through
chance and necessity. 'God no more expressly wills the growth of a
cancer than he expressly wills the act of a murderer, but he allows both
to happen' (Polkinghorne 1989, 67). Whereas Plantinga deliberately
restricts himself to an argument which proves the consistency of his
beliefs with natural evil, a 'possible world', Polkinghorne attempts to
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offer more: an imperfect but none the less real understanding of die
actual world.
The Omphalos view of creation and the Satan free-will defence of
natural evil are both examples of a rather formal approach. The
concern is with possibility, understood as logical consistency, rather
than with plausibility. A disadvantage of the use of such models in
philosophy, unlike the use of models in science, is in the role of the
background assumptions. In a thought experiment in the physical
sciences, one can describe the imaginary situation and the empirical
consequences that would result if the situation occurred. One treats
these consequences then as informative, in the sense that they could be
the outcome of actual experiments. Such thought experiments carry
with them a major ceteris paribus clause: it is assumed that other aspects
of reality are unchanged. A clear example is provided by a dispute
between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr about quantum physics.
Einstein had conceived of a way of determining both the time and the
position of an event, in violation of the Heisenberg uncertainty relation.
Bohr subsequendy showed that the thought-experiment did not actu-
ally yield the alleged result, since not all effects had been taken into
account; Einstein's own theory of general relativity should have been
included in the considerations.
Wilkes (1988: 1-48) has compared thought experiments as they occur
in the natural sciences and in philosophical arguments. Her conclusion,
with which I concur, is that much of the burden of proof lies in the
ceteris paribus conditions. It is there that thought experiments in the
natural sciences perform well, whereas thought experiments in a
philosophical context perform poorly. In science the consequences of a
theory are developed against a well-defined background (and as far as
it is left unspecified, it is assumed that the background is our world in
all respects relevant to the thought-experiment). 'Put in another way,
the "possible world" is our world, the world described by our sciences,
except for one distinguishing difference' (Wilkes 1988, 8). If the back-
ground is left unspecific or incomprehensible, the conclusions from a
thought experiment are left inconclusive. We might, in a thought
experiment, think of the logical possibility that gold does not have
atomic number 79, that water is not H2O, that whales are fish, or that
iron bars can float on water, but such a world would not be in relevant
respects similar to our world. Such possible worlds may be fine in
literary fantasy, but they do not thereby establish the possibility of the
imagined state of affairs. 'It is of course true that if things had been
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radically different, then so would be our concepts' (Wilkes 1988, 47),
but a flight of the imagination does not thereby provide a better
understanding of our world or our concepts.9
Models in logic not only serve to show consistency, but also offer
possible meanings of the terms involved. For instance, Luco van den
Brom (1982, 1984, 1993) has proposed to understand divine omnipre-
sence and transcendence by envisaging physical reality as embedded in
a reality which has at least two dimensions more than the dimensions
of natural reality. (With only one additional dimension God's space
would be divided by physical reality; a line divides a plane and a plane
divides a three dimensional space.) Such an approach may be especially
helpful in understanding a possible meaning of philosophical terms
used in theology, such as contingency and necessity, transcendence and
immanence, or time and eternity. Such models may draw upon the
natural sciences and the philosophy of the natural sciences; Van den
Brom considers disputes about relational and other views of time. But
the usefulness of the exercise is more dependent upon the ingenuity of
the model than upon the natural sciences. The issue is not so much
whether the model is an adequate model of reality as whether it offers
a consistent proposal for understanding the concepts involved.
In these examples of formal approaches, consistency was important.
In the natural sciences the issue is not so much consistency (as most
models and theories are known to be inconsistent in some respects), but
rather whether the model approximately depicts reality or, less realisti-
cally understood, whether the model is heuristically fruitful. It is to such
ways of understanding models that we will now turn.
Models as approximately depicting reality
Perhaps we cannot attain certainty, but we may none the less aim at a
plausible view of reality, for instance when we depict a gas as a box of
billiard-balls, or when we think of God as acting in reality in a way
analogous to top-down causation in physical systems [13.2]. Can the
natural sciences contribute to models for understanding theological
ideas, such as divine action? The aim would be to develop a model that
is plausible though not perfect. For instance, with respect to divine
action the authors considered above do not claim that chaos theory is
Similar to this hesitation about thought experiments in philosophy is the warning by Dennett
against intuition pwnps (Dennett 1984, 12); they may be useful pedagogical devices, but they can
also be misleading due to inadequate simplifications and analogies.
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the final theory science will come up with, nor do they think that it is
the basis for a perfectly adequate model of the way God acts. Rather,
they claim that it is a good model for conceiving of divine action, a
good approximation to the way divine action in the world actually is.
The looseness of terms like 'approximation' has a natural appeal to
working scientists, as their models also have a positive and a negative
analogy.
The classic example of a theoretical model is a gas modelled as a
collection of billiard-balls. By identifying notions such as mass, velocity,
and kinetic energy for billiard-balls and molecules and by correlating
certain phenomena such as temperature with microscopic properties
such as mean kinetic energy, the Law of Boyle and Gay-Lussac about
the relation between pressure, volume, and temperature can be
derived. We thus have a model of a gas which explains features such as
pressure (by analogy with collisions between the balls and the walls). In
considering the analogy we are selective. We hold that the size of
molecules is incorrectly represented, and we do not pay attention to
aspects such as colour or the non-zero volume of the balls. Thus, there
is a positive analogy (the elements taken seriously, such as velocity), a
negative analogy (actual size), and a neutral area (colour, non-zero
size). It is this latter area which allows for the development of the
theory (Hesse 1963, 1967). For instance, if one starts taking the non-zero
size into account, one might come up with a slight modification of the
Law of Boyle and Gay-Lussac, a modification which can be corrobo-
rated in experiments.
The negative part of analogies and models is explicitly appreciated
by some theologians. It would be idolatry to take any model as
adequately representing God or God's relation to the world; the
negative analogy reminds us of the qualification that in certain
respects God is not as depicted in any model (e.g., McFague 1982, 13;
see [17.3]).
Models as communicatively and heuristicalty fruitful
There is at least one more way of thinking about theological models
drawing on science. Rather than seeing them as attempts to present
underlying mechanisms and offer explanations, their heuristic and
communicative function can be emphasised (e.g., Hesse 1981, 287).
For instance, the notion of 'complementarity' as it has arisen in relation
A single author might, of course, do both; for example, Russell (19883).
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to quantum physics has been claimed in various ways for theology.
There are two ways to read such proposals. One way is that
complementarity as it occurs in physics tells us something about reality
which is relevant for theology, for instance about the relation between
observers and the reality observed. A claim might be that the structure
of reality as described in theology is analogous to the structure of
reality as described by physics. Another way of reading proposals about
complementarity is less controversial: the analogy is not so much a
claim about reality, as it is used as a heuristic tool which may help to
produce new insights."
The two ways of using models work out very differently with respect
to the justification of claims. In the case of a theoretical model such as
the gas-billiard-balls model, new insights, such as the modifications of
the Law of Boyle and Gay-Lussac, can be justified on the basis of the
model (though, of course, there is still a need for empirical corrobora-
tion). In the case of a model or analogy which serves a heuristic
function, the model does not contribute plausibility (and hence does
not justify), as the model is not supposed to reflect the underlying
structure. When physics is supposed to show something relevant to
theology, one is apparently moving within the first realm of discussion
(theoretical models as approximately matching reality); when a
theology has to stand on its own, theologians may adopt models for
heuristic and communicative purposes.
The difference between a justificatory and a communicative use of
models corresponds to the distinction between natural theology and
theology of nature. Natural theology has two distinctive connotations in
the tradition of European theology. It is associated with the English
tradition of arguments from design; the intricacies of the natural
world would lead one to conclude to its creator. Natural theology is
theology based on experience and reason, without appeal to revela-
tion, Scripture, or similar source of authority. I will follow this usage.
The term has acquired a somewhat different connotation in German
theology, where it was used for theology which based itself on social
and historical realities and fictions such as nation and race. Theology of
nature is used for theologically based reflection on the natural world It
The issue is here the heuristic and communicative use of models and metaphors from the
sciences in theology; this is to be distinguished from the use of scientific models in the natural
sciences, where McMullin (1984, 30 5) has argued that heuristic fertility is a reason for
confidence in the entities involved in the model; see for the discussion on realism and
theological realism [17].
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has become 'politically correct' in theological circles to present oneself
as doing theology of nature rather than natural theology. Thus, belief
in divine action is not itself taken to follow from scientific knowledge,
though divine action may be described in a model drawn from the
natural sciences. The style of 'natural theology' is more explicitly
present when scientists or philosophers are finding meaning or
mystery through their scientific knowledge [14]. John Polkinghorne
also presents himself as reviving natural theology, which he sees 'as
the completion of the task, instinctive to the scientist, of seeking the
deepest possible explanation of what is going on, the most compre-
hensive available account of the one world of experience' (Polkin-
ghorne 1990, 87). Whereas he sometimes argues from science to
claims about God, for instance when considering the intelligibility of
the universe or the anthropic coincidences [31], Polkinghorne's treat-
ment of divine action [13.1] and of natural evil (above) is more in the
tradition of theology of nature.
In this section, we have considered expectations one might have about
the use of theological models which are partially derived from science.
Formal models were found unsatisfactory. Models may serve a heuristic
function within theology, and they might perhaps also be used to justify
theological claims. However, this is dependent upon the way one
handles the provisional character of scientific theories, a topic to which
we will return in the next chapter.
l6. USING SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES IN THEOLOGY (2): LEVELS AND
LACK OF CONSENSUS
Scientific knowledge is diverse in status and character. Some theories
are part of a widely shared consensus; others are strongly disputed. I
accept atomistic views of ordinary matter and evolutionary views of
living organisms as part of the consensus. In this section, we will
concentrate on areas of science where there is no such consensus. This
is not merely relevant to opinions on the status of scientific insights,
since areas where there are various competing theories have often
attracted thinkers interested in metaphysical or religious speculations,
and such thinkers have often operated eclectically. Before turning to
general remarks, we will first consider one area where disagreements
are persistent, namely cosmology.
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Limitations of the consensus in cosmology
The Big Bang theory is a successful scientific theory about the
development of the universe over, approximately, the last fifteen billion
years. It can with good reason be accepted as the current scientific
consensus, though there is some debate. Part of the theory is a sudden
beginning of the universe, a 'Big Bang'. However, this initial moment is
not part of the consensus. Somewhere in the first fraction of a second
we end up in a fog which makes it impossible to look farther back; the
accepted theories of matter and of space and time become unreliable
or break down. We thus cannot reliably reach back to the apparent
beginning. There is no consensus on the very early stages of the
universe, the history of the universe during the first fraction of a
second. There may have been a phase preceding the (apparent)
beginning. It might also be that the fog covers a reality which is quite
different from anything we have imagined so far.
Cautious writers about science and theology have explicitly ab-
stained from attaching theological significance to the apparent begin-
ning of the universe. They have restricted themselves to the scientific
consensus, claiming that the Big Bang theory shows us the dynamic
nature of the universe, the essential role of time. As Barbour (1989, 143)
expresses it, 'astrophysics adds its testimony to that of evolutionary
biology and other fields of science . . . It is a dynamic world with a long
story of change and development.' This conclusion rests upon a
methodological decision, namely that:
we should consider only the broadest and most well-established features of the
world disclosed by science, not its narrower or more speculative theories.
(Barbour 1989, 143; similarly 1990, 6of.)
Such authors intentionally restrict themselves to the more general,
apparently safer, features of the model. Thus, it seems as if they do not
need to pay attention to speculations in quantum cosmology and
quantum gravity, such as those of Hawking, which would affect only
our ideas about the very early universe.
A problem is that this view only considers one type of future
development of cosmology, namely an answer to the question of
whether there is an extension of the universe further back in time (or
not). However, quantum cosmology would not necessarily be restricted
to the choice between a finite past with an absolute beginning and an
extension further back in time. Rather, an integration of quantum and
space-time theories may lead to a revision of our understanding of
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space, time, and matter, and therefore affect the entire interpretation
of the Big Bang theory, including the part about which there is
consensus, and thus including the dynamic nature of the universe,
which Barbour took to be a safe part of the consensus. The coexistence
of a plurality of serious research programmes which all accept the Big
Bang theory in its 'consensus' domain, shows that the Big Bang theory
is open to a variety of future developments or interpretations,
suggesting different ontologies (e.g., the approaches by Linde, Hawking
and Penrose discussed in Drees 1990, 62-9; iggia). Restricting oneself
to the consensus may be a good strategy when one considers specific
predictions and explanations, for instance when the Big Bang model is
used to discuss the abundances of different elements or the evolution of
galaxies. But relying on the consensus is a problematic strategy when
one argues for metaphysical claims about the most fundamental
structure of reality or about its ultimate origins, since ontologies may
change abruptly, even when successful theories develop continuously.
Strategies with respect to scientific disagreements
In general, there seem to be four possibilities with respect to the way
that theologians might deal with disagreements within science.
(i) Cheap dismissal: As long as the scientists do not reach a consensus,
anything goes. Theologians need not pay attention to science, since the
scientists themselves are not certain of their claims. Thus, theologians
are free to hold whatever position they like. Such an approach neglects
the partial consensus among scientists, especially on the alternatives
that have been ruled out. Even if we do not know the answers, we do
know that certain answers are wrong. Hence, to dismiss science
completely because of a lack of consensus is not warranted.
(ii) Cautiously wait and see what will become the consensus; theologians
need not consider theories which are still controversial. I agree that
there is no need for theologians to be consistent with all speculative
scientific theories. However, the scientific consensus is not that clear
and safe either. In active areas of research there are always competing
research programmes. Waiting for a final consensus may take quite
long, if not forever. 'If our strategy is to wait for agreement, I fear we
will be limited to historical studies. Moreover, agreement is seldom
univocal: when will it really been reached? what about reversals after a
theory was considered settled?' (Russell ig88a, 370).
(iii) Eclecticism: one takes whatever fits best. This attitude is present in
the religious use of more speculative and disputed scientific statements,
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such as those of David Bohm, John Wheeler, or Rupert Sheldrake.
Taking one's pick from science in such a manner may be a contribution
to the development of an intelligible and coherent view. However, it
makes no contribution to the credibility of the position under con-
sideration, except by showing that it is a possible position given the
current state of science, at most as likely as the specific scientific theory
that has been chosen. If the selection is made in an arbitrary and
dubious manner, an eclectic strategy will backfire upon the credibility
of the position constructed. Scientists are also critical when they spot
eclecticism with respect to whole disciplines, for instance when Pope
John Paul II emphasises cosmology but ignores biology (Eaves 1990;
John Paul II 1988) or when the theologian Pannenberg prefers to
consider life in the context of non-linear thermodynamics and human
behaviour in terms of anthropologies shaped by the humanities, while
passing over behavioural genetics (Eaves 1989, aoßf; Pannenberg
1989, 260-3).
(iv) Reverse eclecticism: taking the worst possible case. If one is able to
show how what initially seem to be for theology the most problematic
results of science can be incorporated into a certain religious-metaphy-
sical scheme, one can claim real progress. Taking science 'where it
hurts most' (Eaves 1989, 203) offers the greatest challenge, but is also
capable of producing the greatest profit with respect to credibility. In
this spirit, I have argued that one should not appeal to unpredictability
when one seeks to articulate a possible locus for divine action, since
such unpredictability might well be the consequence of deterministic
laws or of purely random processes [13]. Similarly, I prefer to analyse
in chapter 4 the consequences of naturalist approaches to human
experience and human traditions rather than playing down these
sciences.
In my view, in as far as there is a clear consensus among competent
scientists (and on who is competent to judge the issues under considera-
tion), theologians or others who seek to interpret or use scientific
insights should rely on the experts. However, no consensus is without
its limitations; there are always domains in space and time where, and
conditions under which, the theory has not been tested; there are
disagreements which fuel further research; and there is a variety of
interpretations of the current consensus. Thus, in building upon
scientific insights, even if part of the current consensus, one should note
their provisional character, and ways in which they may have to be
modified or reinterpreted as a consequence of further research. As for
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disagreements, one may be eclectic when the sole purpose is to develop
one's ideas. However, if one intends to test a position, it is most fruitful
to respond to insights which challenge the position most strongly.
Disputes about quantum cosmology and the very early universe may
seem far removed from most questions theologians are interested in,
which concern human beings who are situated squarely within the
epoch which is well described by Big Bang cosmology. However,
changes in quantum gravity may have implications for our under-
standing of time and space at all times and at all places. This has to do
with the coherence among the variety of disciplines, an issue to which
we will turn now.
Levels and reductions
Chemistry can be done without paying attention to the quark structure
of atomic nuclei. More generally, there seems to be a hierarchy of
levels of complexity in reality and a hierarchy of scientific disciplines.
A strict ontological or disciplinary hierarchy is an inadequate view of
the sciences. One cannot locate plasma physics and solid state physics
with respect to each other as 'higher' or 'lower', though both are
secondary with respect to quantum theories of matter. There are
'horizontal' links, for instance when nuclear physics is applied in the
astrophysics of stars, as well as 'vertical' ones, say between physics and
chemistry. Besides, structural sciences such as physics and biochemistry,
and historical sciences such as cosmology and evolutionary biology do
not neatly fit into a single ordering. In addition, one might ask what
kind of entities or disciplines are to be ranked highest. Should it be the
most encompassing entities, and thus disciplines such as ecology and
cosmology? Or should one rather place at the top tightly knit complex
systems which exhibit the richest known behaviour, i.e. humans? A
further objection to hierarchies is that some disciplines do not belong
to a single level; 'the most important fields are often those that do not
have a clear place on the scale' but rather serve to integrate different
levels (Juengst 1988, 77). Genetics in biology serves to integrate ecology
and ethology as higher levels with histology and molecular biology at
lower levels.
A strict hierarchy seems too simple. A network might appear to be a
Bechtel and Abrahams«! (1991, 257); similarly Peacocke (1993, 217; 1994)- A. F. Sanders (1988,
232f; 1992, 48), following C. Sanders and H. van Rappard (1985), speaks of various ways of
cognitive structuring.
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more suitable image. However, presenting the sciences as a network
does less justice to the intuition that some sciences are more basic than
others. Therefore, I will continue to use in this section the image of
higher and lower levels.
One might ask how one could fit theology into such a hierarchical view
of disciplines. One proposal is to go up the hierarchy:
We can, I would urge, go further. I refer to that most complex and all-
embracing of the levels in the hierarchies of 'systems', namely the complex of
nature-man-and-God. (Peacocke 1986, 30)
According to Peacocke (1994) one should not attempt to locate God
somewhere in such a hierarchy of being, as if God were one emergent
entity among others. God is understood to be related to everything. At
the top end of the scale one can place the relations between God and
the world, and especially with human beings. This would lead one to
expect that these relations require special concepts and methods,
beyond those of the lower levels. An alternative view would not
conceive of theology so much as a discipline related to the highest level,
as a discipline which integrates across all levels, in analogy with the role
of genetics in biology. I consider such proposals not very informative,
for two reasons. One first has to argue that theology is a discipline of a
similar kind to the natural sciences, and is related in a suitable way to
the other scientific disciplines; just locating some potential cognitive
enterprise, whether theology or astrology, somewhere in the network of
disciplines does not contribute to greater intelligibility or credibility.
Furthermore, once one seeks to relate theology to the other disciplines,
one encounters a problem (to be considered in the next chapter) which
also inhibits the transfer of defences of scientific realism to theological
realism: whereas in scientific realism the existence of an underlying
reality is undisputed, and the issue is the adequacy of our knowledge
about that reality, in theology the existence of a corresponding realm
remains disputed. Locating theology among the sciences, whether
structured hierarchically or as a web, is not helpful in articulating a
response to a naturalist view of reality, including religion and morality.
If there are various sciences pertaining to different levels of complexity,
one might ask how these different sciences are related. The naturalist
view [2] has it that ontologically higher levels of complexity consist of
the constituents of lower levels. For instance, molecules are made of
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atoms; humans are made up of molecules. However, this does not
imply that reductionism in a methodological sense must be an effective
strategy for scientific research: it may well be that the study of higher-
level phenomena is best pursued by using concepts which are appro-
priate at that level (see [22]). Thus, 'reductionism is not a guideline for
research programs, but an attitude towards nature itself (Weinberg
1992, 52). As an attitude towards nature, and a concomitant 'belief in
the connectedness of scientific knowledge' (Weinberg 1992, 49), it
excludes claims of total independence of one cognitive enterprise from
the others; astrology cannot be autonomous.
Reductionism is a challenge to any theology which seeks to restrict
itself to the use of insights about 'higher levels' while avoiding
problematic aspects of lower levels, either the uncertainty about
fundamental theories or the actual insights of our current theories.
Reductionism may however, also be seen as an opportunity for
theology - where one cannot refer to 'the man in the next office', the
physicist in company with the cosmologist (for the ultimate historical
issues) may well say 'God knows' (Misner 1977, 97; see [2]). This
groping for an ultimate explanation makes popular books on physics
and cosmology so attractive to religiously and philosophically minded
readers (e.g., Davies 1983, 1992; Hawking 1988). However, it is
precisely here that a major challenge to theology lies: the 'God' of the
cosmologists and the physicists seems to be a principle of order, a First
Cause, or whatever, rather than a God interested in human concerns,
providing guidance to our lives.
In order to arrive at a concept of God which is more relevant to
humans, some thinkers seek to understand cosmology in a more
hospitable way, for instance by understanding the life-allowing features
of our universe as a consequence of intentional design. Others retreat
from these discussions about science, falling back on experience and
tradition. Again other authors, such as Arthur Peacocke and Ian
Barbour accept a form of ontological reductionism (there are no
separate entities involved in life), but object to epistemological reduc-
tionism, the claim that higher-level phenomena can be fully explained
in terms of lower levels, and ultimately in terms of physics. However,
even then one needs to pay attention to the relations between the
various levels; they are not totally autonomous. Higher levels of reality
are constrained by lower levels, even if perhaps not fully determined by
them. A biological description of reality may not be reducible to one in
physical terms, but it cannot contradict the physical laws involved. For
130 Theology and knowledge of the world
example, if energy is conserved, this should hold both in physics and in
biology. Changes in our understanding at lower levels of the hierarchy
of the sciences have consequences for higher levels in so far as the
higher levels use the same concepts and laws.
17. SCIENTIFIC R E A L I S M AND DEFENCES OF THEOLOGICAL REALISM
Theology is supposed to explore reality, both God and creation.
Hence, judgements on whether the object of theology is real seem to
depend upon views of human knowledge of reality, as discussed under
the rubric of 'scientific realism'. 'Realism' has many meanings, in part
dependent on what is perceived to be the opposite of realism. Some
take the opposite of realism (without making a distinction between
realism and scientific realism) to be idealism or solipsism, the denial of
a reality 'out there'. For example, Roger Trigg sees a battle 'between
realists who believe that there is a world to be investigated which exists
independently of human belief and language, and anti-realists' (Trigg
1993, 6). I consider this a misleading view of discussions on scientific
realism, as if the central issue is the existence of reality. Most non-realists
do not deny the existence of a reality independent of our beliefs and
language. The central issue in debates about scientific realism is not the
existence of reality, but to what extent our ideas about reality represent
what reality out there is like (semantic), to what extent our methods are
adequate for finding out which entities there are (ontological), or on
what grounds we base our belief in our ideas about reality (epistemolo-
gical). Thus, the discussion about scientific realism in this chapter is not
so much on the existence of a reality 'out there' as it is about the nature
and quality of our investigations, and thus of our scientific knowledge, and thus about
whether to ascribe existence to certain theoretical entities.
The debate about scientific realism, as a debate about the results of
science, is not in itself a debate about naturalism, in the ontological
sense in which it is defined above [2], or about its implications for
theology. Both scientific realists and scientific and- or non-realists
might deny or affirm the existence of particular realities out there, such
as a divine being, the Absolute, values, or whatever. Indirecdy,
however, the understanding of scientific realism may be relevant to the
understanding of theology, and thereby of importance to the reflections
on the implications of naturalism. The presence of a naturalistic view
of reality (including religion) would carry much less weight if scientific
claims are not interpreted realistically or if the cognitive status of
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theological claims can be argued for as similar to the status of scientific
statements. This approach will be considered critically below, when we
come to philosophical arguments for similarity qua status [17.2] and to
motives for realism in theology [17.3]. Before coming to arguments
about views of knowledge in theology, we will consider some aspects of
contemporary debates on scientific realism [17.1].
77. /. Scientific realism
Realism seems to be the common-sense view of science. Scientists are
not making up a story, but they are finding out about the real world.
The far side of the moon was the same before and after human
astronauts first saw it, and, whether we like it or not, tectonic plates are
causing earthquakes and mountain formation by their slow motions. If
the results of science were fiction rather than fact, why would taxpayers
spend money on it? Santa Glaus, God, the ego, the United Nations and
paper money may perhaps be human constructions, and some of them
are none the less very real, but how could anybody in his right mind
doubt realism with respect to the natural sciences? Scientists do not
construct quarks, do they?
They do, if judged by the title Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History
of Particle Physics (Pickering 1984). Even if one does not follow Pickering
in all respects, he seems to be obviously right in two ways: (a) the
concept 'quark' - the word and the theories in which it functions - is
not found, but made by scientists, in this case by picking up a
meaningless word from a novel; (b) 'high-tech science is highly artificial.
We do not simply go out and look at unadulterated nature. The events
we detect are so highly contrived and constrained as to be "man-
made" ' (Nickles 1992, 101). Artificial need not mean fictitious; the
recent ceramic materials which exhibit superconductivity at higher
temperatures than previously known are not less real than iron or
water, even though they, perhaps, never existed before in the Solar
System or maybe even in the observable universe. Though man-made,
their existence tells us about a possibility of material reality.
We will begin with some challenges to realist views of scientific
theories, before turning to contemporary defences of scientific realism.
It will be shown that such defences move beyond a narrow focus on
theories. Furthermore, contemporary defences of scientific realism are
rather modest in their metaphysical claims. In the next section [17.2], I
will argue that this modesty impedes the transfer of arguments for
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scientific realism to the defence of theological realism. Hence, even if
theologians, or philosophers of religion, are right in arguing that
scientific realism can be defended, they are mistaken when they assume
that this is helpful for a defence of theological realism. I will also argue
that it may be attractive for theology if its claims are not understood in
a strongly realist way [17.3].
Challenges to a realist view of scientific theories
Do our best theories correspond to what the world is like? And if so,
how do we evaluate which theories do and which do not? This is
problematic, and even more so if 'correspondence' is construed as
'depicting' in a one-to-one relation, for how could we ever know that
our theories are adequate? We can compare a painted portrait or a
photograph with the original, and thus assess whether it is adequate,
but we cannot compare our theories with naked reality, only with
reality as it is caught in human theories (or in human common-sense
language).
In experiments we seem to test theories against the real world.
However, a sceptic might continue the debate by pointing out that in
experiments reality presents itself in a restricted way. High-tech science
relies on instruments. To interpret the results of the experiments we
have to take into account what the instruments do, and hence we have
to rely on theories about these instruments. Data are theory laden; we
seem to be caught in circularity, as we rely on theories in order to test
theories. Against this circularity due to the theory-ladenness of data a
realist might argue that none the less experiments do inform us about
reality, or at least, more modestly, may inform us about the inadequacy
of our theories. In many cases, the theories used in an experiment are
different from, and better established than, the theory tested in the
experiment. In using a microscope one relies on optics while studying
bacteria.
The problem of the theory-laden character of data is more serious
when the theory to be tested is also used in understanding the
measuring device. A clear example of such an unavoidable circularity
is the detection of neutrinos produced by the Sun (Shapere 1982).
Neutrinos are extremely elusive particles: zillions pass through the
entire Earth every second. In detecting some neutrinos produced by
nuclear fusion in the Sun we observe the interior of the Sun rather
than the outer layers from whence we receive light. To avoid unwanted
influences from other particles, neutrino-observations have been set up
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in tunnels, deep inside mountains, a very unusual location for astro-
nomical observations. Huge tanks of specially prepared fluids are there
to catch some of the neutrinos produced by the Sun. Now comes the
same-theory-ladenness: we cannot avoid using the same theory of weak
interactions in the theory of the source for calculating the expected
production of neutrinos in the Sun; in the theory of the receptor for
calculating from the observed phenomena how many neutrinos are
believed to have passed through the detector; and in the theory of the
transmission between the Sun and the detector. However, this does not
diminish the value of these experiments. They were informative: fewer
neutrinos were detected than expected. There was something wrong,
either with the theory or with other assumptions such as those about
the temperature in the interior of the Sun. If differences with
alternative theories had been cancelled by the fact that the theory to be
tested was involved in the interpretation of the data, the experiment
would have been uninformative. However, the différences showed up
in a more pronounced way. The theory-ladenness of data is not
necessarily fatal for testing scientific theories.
Another challenge to a realist view of theories is the observation that
theories are underdetermined by the available data. We face the possibility
of a plurality of theories which are all empirically adequate but
different in their view of the world. One can imagine theories which
are different but not (or not yet) distinguishable. One might, for
instance, add to an equation a term with effects so minute as to escape
all feasible observations. Seen thus, any theory seems to have an infinite
number of close neighbours -• though these neighbours may be
mathematically far less simple, because the additional terms spoil the
mathematical symmetries of the original theory.
A different kind of underdetermination can be found in theories of
motion, where we have different formulations which are not only
equivalent with respect to current observations, but also theoretically
equivalent. Newton assumed an absolute reference frame for rest and
motion. However, in calculations only relative motions are relevant.
Hence, one can envisage a whole set of equivalent theories which differ
only in the absolute frame of reference they assume. Leaving aside
Einstein's corrections to Newton's theory, a realist might assume that
precisely one of this set of theories is the correct one, even though we
cannot know which one. We do not know which frame of reference is
absolute; our knowledge is limited. Van Fraassen has argued for a
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more radical agnosticism; accepting the empirical adequacy of these
equivalent theories does not depend on holding any of these theories to
be true. This is what we do when we reject the notion of an absolute
frame of reference (Van Fraassen 1976; 1980, 44-7). Arguments for
significant underdetermination draw mostly on mechanics and
quantum physics, but quantum and classical mechanics are exceptional
in allowing for theoretically equivalent theories.13 In these few cases,
'no decision can be made in this case as to what the theory, on a realist
reading, commits us to' (McMullin 1984, n). But that should not keep
us from a moderate realist understanding of other theories, such as
evolutionary biology or plate tectonics.
Another challenge to realism with respect to our scientific theories has
come from the awareness of discontinuities in the history of science.
Changes in theories are often refinements, but occasionally they have
been 'revolutions', more radical changes in the ontology, i.e. in our
ideas about the entities constituting the world. Larry Laudan has
presented a list of theories which were 'once successful and well
confirmed, but which contained central terms that (we now believe)
were nonreferring' (Laudan 1984, 121; see also Laudan 1981). This is
the basis for the 'inductive argument against induction', the suggestion
that 'since we have failed so often we are likely to be failing right now'
(Levin 1984, 134).
Quantum physta has figured prominently in discussions on realism, independently from
reflections on 'underdetermination'. Quantum physics has features which are strange if
considered from the classical (pre-quantum) perspective. Measurements seem to be not so
much observations as interactions, shaping the determinate outcome out of the indeterminate
state preceding measurement. A few authors have suggested that the indeterminate character
continues until the level of consciousness is reached thus making reality to some extent
dependent on the mind. Another feature of quantum physics is the presence of aspects which
do not seem to lend themselves to treatment as localisable properties. Besides, there is a
plurality of interpretations of this highly successful type of physical theories. The strangeness
of the world as described by quantum physics, including non-locality and the superposition of
different states, is not thereby anti-realist, even though it is quite unlike common-sense views.
On the contrary, the fact that we have developed such a theory suggests that reality has
forced upon us views that would not have occurred to us without external pressure. However,
an empiricist can reply that what has been forced upon us are certain phenomena; whether
one should commit oneself to the strange ontology of the theory or keep an agnostic attitude
with respect to it is not thereby decided. Even within a single type of interpretation such as
the modal interpretation, one may find authors inspired by a realist view (Dieks 1989) and by
an empiricist view (Van Fraassen 1991) Whatever the outcome of debates about the
interpretation of quantum physics, the case for scientific realism would still be open. A
determinate character of unobserved reality is not necessarily part of realism. Perhaps reality
is foggy to some extent, and perhaps the physical interactions involved in observation provide
determinateness.
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One response open to a realist is to deny the link between realism
and steady progress. A realist need not hold that we only refine beliefs
without ever abandoning any beliefs. He can especially grant, without
much reason for concern, radical changes in sciences which were, by
criteria we would currently apply, not well developed. Furthermore,
the observation that many theories of the past have been discarded is
not enough for the anti-realist argument from history. 'What the anti-
Realist needs to establish is that the history of unobservable posits has
been thoroughly erratic; for example, T' jettisons most of the ontology
of T; T" jettisons most ofthat of T' and does not retain what T' saved
from T; and so on' (DeVitt 1984, 147). Furthermore, Kitcher has also
argued that in many instances the reason why the theory failed and was
abandoned concerned other elements of the theory than those that
contributed to its success, which were retained (Kitcher 1993, 143; see,
for a similar argument also Psillos 1994). One may also grant disconti-
nuities with respect to theories but deny that this challenges our sense
of the advancement of science. Thus, Philip Kitcher argues that
scientific practices, which consist of more than theories, can be
considered progressive in some respects even when theories that were
once believed to be true, subsequently failed (Kitcher 1993, 140-9,
272—90). Thus, one can perhaps reject the apparent lesson from the
history of science that since we failed so often, we are likely to be be
always equally wrong.
This has been a brief tour of some challenges to scientific realism. One
conclusion, beyond the dispute about scientific realism as such, is that
none of these challenges imply such a limited status for the sciences
that other human practices which purport to yield cognitive claims,
such as astrology or folk-medicine, can claim equal status without
offering serious credentials.
Underdetermination, theory-ladenness, and our history of failures as
well as successes show the need for caution. We should avoid over-
statement, especially when considering the implied ontology of our
current theories; it may well be that some future theory will prolong
the empirical successes of our current theory (and add some more)
while jettisoning some of the main elements of the apparent ontology
of the theory. But the challenges do not refute the possibility of a
modestly realist attitude towards scientific theories. That theories and
observations are intertwined, as in the example of neutrino astronomy,
does not imply that we can make up theories the way we want;
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experimental results, even if not acquired independently of a specific
theory, can challenge that theory.
Defences of modest scientific realism
It seems easier to object to specific attacks on and defences of
realism than to offer a positive case for realism or anti-realism. Let
me continue this brief tour with the two kinds of arguments in
favour of scientific realism that seem to have most support amongst
contemporary philosophers of science. They both take off from, and
stay close to the instrumental success of science in our interaction
with the world (technical manipulation, prediction, control, explora-
tion). The modesty of scientific realism is a feature which will be
important when we come to consider the relevance of scientific
realism for theology.
That these major defences of realism argue from instrumental
success to realism is not too amazing. How else could one defend
realism in a non-circular way? Pointing to the success of science in
understanding or depicting reality or in referring to it, would assume
what defenders of realism are seeking to defend.
(1) One argument in favour of realism has been made by shifting
from theories to the practice of science. As long as electrons were
only theoretical entities introduced in theories, one could remain
agnostic about their existence. However, for current experimentalists,
electrons are not theoretical entities. They manipulate electrons; they
use them as tools to achieve something else. 'Experimental physics
provides the strongest evidence for scientific realism. Entities that in
principle cannot be observed are regularly manipulated to produce
new phenomena and to investigate other aspects of nature. They are
tools, instruments not for thinking but for doing' (Hacking 1982
(1984, 154); similarly Giere 1988, i25f.). This is a realism which is not
about theories and truth but about entities used as tools, on the
basis of their causal powers. In such a realism reference is more
important than representation or correspondence (Radder 1984, 91;
i989> 3°9)-
(2) The other argument takes realism as 'the only acceptable
explanation for the current instrumental reliability of scientific metho-
dology in mature sciences' (Boyd 1983, 88). The datum here is the
instrumental success of the methodology that generates these theories.
'Scientific realism .. . is a quite limited claim that purports to explain
why certain ways of proceeding in science have worked out as well as
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they (contingently) have' (McMullin 1984, 30). A realist and an
empiricist would agree that empirical adequacy, 'saving the phe-
nomena', is an important criterion in evaluating scientific theories.
However, in the selection of theories other criteria, aside of empirical
adequacy, may be important. Such other, complementary, virtues may
be coherence, consonance with other parts of science, or perhaps even
with broader world-views, fertility and unifying power, and uniqueness,
the absence of credible theoretical alternatives (McMullin 1994, 103); as
vices one might think of various forms of ad harness or artificiality. It is
a contingent fact of history that such complementary virtues support
success in the quest for empirically adequate theories. The effectiveness
of such strategies is intelligible upon a realist attitude, since a realist
would expect our theories to match the coherence of reality and would
expect a positive contribution to fertility from avoiding ad harness; if
theories would not bring us in touch with reality beyond what is
observed, there would be no reason to honour virtues and shun vices.
Hence, these 'complementary virtues make sense only in a realistic
perspective' (McMullin 1994, 104). Such a defence is not beyond
dispute. For instance, one might also attribute the fruitfulness of
various complementary virtues to the economy of thought they
support.14
It may be noted that both defences deal with more than just theories;
the first emphasises empirical practice, while the second concentrates
on scientific methodology. Avoiding overstatement, and objecting to
overstatements which ease refutations of realism, is one of the strategies
explicitly espoused by contemporary defenders of realism (e.g.,
McMullin 1994).'5 If one accepts the successful character of science as
an argument for realism, there is the further issue of how far such
I owe this argument in the present context to Hans Radder (private communication).
Another example of someone avoiding overstatement is Rom Harre (1986), who seeks to
articulate a modest form of realism rather than 'truth realism' which he considers dependent
upon an 'over-demanding principle of bi-valence' (Harre 1986, sSf; similarly 65fT).
Incidentally, Harre, who misspells Van Fraassen's name consistently, also misrepresents him
when he criticises him for a neo-Berkeleyan ontology which would deny existence to the back
of the moon until observed (1986, 56f.}. Van Fraassen does not endorse such an ontology, but
pleads for the legitimacy of an agnostic attitude. Besides, Van Fraassen distinguishes between
entities that are in principle observable and those that are not; the far side of the moon being
clearly something that is in principle observable just as are the moons of Jupiter - 'as
astronauts will no doubt be able to see them as well from close up', while 'the purported
observation of micro-particles in a cloud chamber seems to me a clearly different case' (Van
Fraassen 1980, i6f). The meaning of 'observable' as 'observable to us' is not a restriction on
existence (contrary to what Harre seems to take Van Fraassen to say). The restriction is 'too
anthropocentric for that', but it has 'to do with the proper epistemic attitude to science' (Van
Fraassen 1980, 19).
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realism extends: when should one take which theories seriously with
respect to the entities they assume and the properties and relations they
ascribe to these entities? Avoiding overstatement also implies a cautious
attitude in this respect. Once the debate about realism has moved away
from the overstatement of metaphysical realism and the understate-
ment which denies the existence of unobservable entities, the debate
about realism continues in a more refined form over the criteria to be
used in theory evaluation.16
From modest to metaphysical realism?
On both sides in debates about realism and anti-realism, authors
defend their own view against their reconstruction of the opponent's
view. If one links scientific realism with the attempt to give a
metaphysical answer to all 'Why?' questions, 'achieving a world-
picture, something that purports to be the "One True Story of the
World"' (Van Fraassen 1994, 116), it becomes quite vulnerable. If one
takes anti-realism in the very radical sense of viewing knowledge as
nothing but a summary of observations, or nothing but a mental or
social construct, it too can be refuted easily.
It is remarkable how, in contemporary debates among philosophers
of science, realists and empiricists to a large extent have come to take a
similar stance with respect to the extremes. At the 'low end', they all
agree on the presence of regularities in empirical reality and on the
instrumental success of science. Both arguments in defence of realism
considered above were geared to the instrumental success of science,
either manipulation in experimentation (Hacking, Giere, Radder) or
predictive reliability (Boyd, McMullin). The claims of most scientific
realists are moderate. Even though theories may change, the instru-
mental success of theories and related practices justifies committing
ourselves provisionally to the existence of the entities described in these
theories or assumed to be used in these practices. A strong claim, a
metaphysical realism that assumes that science offers access to the one
true, unchangeable view is avoided by the defenders of realism as
much as it is objected to by empiricists rejecting realism.
For example, both Ernan McMullin, a defender of scientific
realism, and Bas van Fraassen, an empiricist, agree on the inappropri-
ateness of metaphysical extensions of scientific conclusions. McMullin
Or one might say that the debate on realism and anti-realism is abandoned, as some
advocates of a metaphysically minimal 'non-realism' propose (e.g., Fine 1984; Rouse 1987*
127 65; Radder 1989, 304 .^); a more interesting and relevant debate then takes its place.
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rejects the link between scientific realism and metaphysical realism;
scientific realism 'is not immediately undermined by the rejection of
metaphysical realism' (McMullin 1984, 25). Current theories need not
be true or approximately true, and theoretical explanations are open-
ended, allowing for metaphorical extensions (McMullin 1984, 36).
Explanatory success allows us, 'in favorable cases, to make a truth
claim of a limited sort for the theory' (McMullin 1987, 52; emphasis
added). And Van Fraassen resists answers that pretend too much; 'the
restraint to acceptance delivers us from metaphysics' (Van Fraassen
1980, 69). Van Fraassen is interested in knowledge about the world,
but concerned about claiming too much. He identifies the following
question as one that he and realists might have in common: 'How
could the world possibly be the way physical theory says it is?' (Van
Fraassen 1984, 171). '7
This is not the place to sort out all genuine disagreements among
philosophers of science on realism and criteria for the evaluation of
theories. However, many seem to agree to a large extent that actual
science is of limited value for metaphysics. We now turn to the defence
of theological realism in discussions about theology in the context of
scientific knowledge, where prima facie one might expect a stronger
interest in metaphysical claims.
77.2. Transfer from philosophy of science to philosophy of theology?
In the less metaphysical and more empiricist tradition of English-speaking
philosophy, however, there has been a tendency to analyze religious belief by
borrowing models from contemporary philosophy of science (usually a decade
or so behind). (Arbib and Hesse 1986, 19)
In the preceding section we considered disputes about scientific
realism. As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, a major
assumption was not disputed, since it is shared by realists and most
anti-realists, namely the existence of a reality 'out there', to some
Similarly in his book on the interpretation of quantum mechanics (Van Fraassen 1991, 4 and
9), and in a quote from René Descartes' Principes (iv. 204) on its front page, of which the
second half reads 'il suffit d'expliquer comment elles (les choses) peuvent être'. In private
conversation Van Fraassen told me that he encountered the question posed in the text in a
lecture in Pittsburgh by a Jesuit philosopher of science. This could be Joseph T. Clark, who
argued that the philosopher attempts to explain 'how things can consistently be as they are
observably known to be by science; the speculative theologian seeks to explain how things can
consistently be as some God is reliably reported to say that they actually are' (Clark 1966,
S"?)-
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extent independent of the mind of the knower (even though the
existence of many phenomena, such as social facts and ceramic super-
conductors is dependent upon human activities). Thus, debates about
scientific realism were seen as debates about our knowledge, our access
to reality.
When we turn to theological realism, such an assumption can no
longer be taken for granted. One might define theological realists as
those who hold that theological claims are about an external reality
and that their claims are in some sense adequate with respect to that
reality. If we assume that theological claims are about a Being who
transcends the natural realm and is active within natural processes,
such a theological realism is at odds with naturalism as defined in this
study ([2]).
We can now distinguish between two kinds of theological anti-realists:
those who challenge existence and those who challenge access.
(1) Some may object to the existence of a divine being or a divine
reality, or at least see no reasons to accept any claims about divine
existence. Some of them may hold, for instance, that we have naturalist
accounts which should replace the theological view of reality. Thus,
they may be scientific realists who deny a similar cognitive status to
theology because the reality to which it purports to refer is non-
existent, or at least substantially different from the way it is claimed to
be; where a claim seems to be about a transcendent reality, it might be
taken to refer to intrapsychic and cultural processes.
Within the context of science, there may also be disagreements over
the adequacy of ascribing existence to particular entities. However, the
existence of a reality behind the phenomena is not disputed in the
reflections considered here. One might say that in the case of a
naturalist account of religion too, some reality behind the phenomena
is not disputed, but only the character of that reality, whether it is
natural or supernatural. However, this challenge is of such major
importance to theology that I treat it as distinct from the second
challenge.
(2) Others may deny the adequacy of cognitive claims in theology,
not because they deny a corresponding reality but because they
consider our cognitive capabilities for knowledge inadequate. One
might also defend this kind of anti-realism for theological reasons, say
due to the ineffable nature of God.
Scientific and theological realism 14.1
In this section, I will first focus on attempts to transfer defences
of scientific realism to theological realism. Then I will consider
another example of the transfer of an approach in the philosophy
of science to the philosophy of theology, namely Nancey Murphy's
defence of the usefulness of a Lakatosian view of theological
research programmes.
In arguing for realism in theology by analogy with realist views of
the sciences one needs to consider whether the nature and quality
of theological 'theories' or 'experiments' is such that they justify on
their own grounds a similar move as Hacking and Radder make for
scientific experimentation and manipulation and McMullin and
Boyd make for scientific theorising. Can a similar success be
claimed, and can it be made the basis for an argument for realism
along similar lines?
There are obvious differences in success between the sciences and
theology, if success is judged at a fairly common-sense level. Success
may become manifest in a consensus about beliefs and practices, but
theology does not exhibit the amount of convergence and consensus
found in the natural sciences. Success may also show up as fertility,
when current findings are an effective basis for further work (one of
McMullin's complementary virtues). However, we seem to lack in
theology a cumulative argument preserving previous results or prac-
tices, or some other indication of such fertility. Another measure of
success appealed to in defence of scientific realism was found in
experimental practices, our ability to manipulate entities and to
produce new phenomena on the basis of current knowledge. However,
a similar manipulative or constructive virtue seems to be absent from
theology. Whenever control over reality on the basis of a specific
theology is claimed, for instance in the ability to heal illnesses, most
outsiders tend to become very critical, considering it quite plausible
that psychological mechanisms are involved. Incidentally, many Chris-
tian theologians are also critical of claims about direct effects of
religious practices; God's grace is not thought of as if it were under
human control.
Thus, with respect to measures of success which could be appealed
to in defence of theological realism, there is a fundamental difference.
As Ernan McMullin wrote with respect to science:
There is something here to be explained, namely the success of scientific models
142 Theology and knowledge of the world
not only in prediction but in handling anomalies, in suggesting imaginative
extensions, and the like. This is a contingent fact about the history of science
since Galileo's day, and especially in the structural sciences since around 1800.
Whereas for theology,
there is no corresponding argument, alas. (McMullin 1985, 43)
Given the differences in success, we cannot defend theological realism
in the same way that scientific realism is defended. Hence, we cannot
co-opt the prestige of science for theology in this way.
One might object to this negative view of the success record of
theology. Polkinghorne considers differences between science and
theology, for instance, with respect to the ability to achieve some
consensus or to manipulate reality, to be a matter of degree rather than
of principle. 'I believe the answer to lie in the recognition that science is
easy and theology hard, because of the greatly differing degrees of
control and power to interrogate that each exercises over the object of
its inquiry ... The successes of science are purchased by the modesty of
its ambition' (Polkinghorne 1991, 8f.).
I side with McMullin in judging that the different success records of
theology and science reflect genuine differences between these enter-
prises; differences which are significant for the debates on theological
and scientific realism. In the remainder of this section we will come
across additional philosophical and theological reasons for emphasizing
the differences. This is not to deny that it may be fruitful to analyse
theologies in schemes borrowed from philosophers of science, or for
that matter, philosophers of language, by reconstructing theological
developments in terms of research programmes, paradigms, or what-
ever. Such a reconstruction may be heuristically fruitful, but it does not
support a realist understanding of the theological claims thus recon-
structed. The strength of defences of critical realism with respect to
science and to theology is in the
insistence that the objects of science lie beyond the range of literal description
just as the objects of religious belief do ... But it would be unwise to push the
parallels any further, or suggest that what enables the realism of science to be
self-critical and progressive may somehow be transferred to the domain of
religious belief. (McMullin 1985, 47)
Problems similar to those considered with respect to the transfer of
defences of realism arise when other discussions are transferred from
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the philosophy of science to the philosophy of theology.18 If claims
about methodological parallels between science and theology are not
merely claims about parallels, but are assumed to allow cross-traffic,
then those elements that guarantee reference of claims, or rationality of
inferences, or whatever aspect is considered central to the comparison,
need to be established on the theological side as well.
For instance, Nancey Murphy (1990) has argued that one might
reconstruct good theological research in the form of research pro-
grammes as described for the natural sciences by Imre Lakatos. Thus
she presents theological approaches in terms of a hard core, auxiliary
hypotheses, and a positive heuristic. Such a reconstruction may clarify
the structure of the programme, but is in itself not enough to justify
pursuing a theological programme in the way one is rationally justified
in pursuing a progressive scientific research programme. Thus, she
rightly sees the need to argue that both theoretical progress and novel
facts can be found in theology. Theologically relevant novel facts are
specially found, according to her, in communal discernment on
religious, theological and ethical issues, a discernment guided by the
Holy Spirit. While I appreciate her reconstruction of the development
of theological ideas in terms of research programmes, I doubt whether
this view of novel facts in theology works. The evaluation of communal
discernment, or, for that matter, of other varieties of religious experi-
ence, is far more problematic than the evaluation of novel facts in
astronomy or geophysics. Are such experiences to be understood as
psychological and social phenomena, or are they data about God? If
they are understood as data about God, one might compare them to
data in the sciences, such as data which are relevant to belief in tectonic
plates. However, such a comparison fails. Apart from differences in
precision and in fertility, which may be played down as differences of
degree rather than of kind, there is the fundamental difference that the
tectonic plates are within the realm of the natural, fitting into the wider
18
 Arbib and Hesse (1986, igf.) and Van Huyssteen (1989) describe some earlier examples of
defences of religion following changes in the philosophy of science. Barbour (1974) defends
the rationality of religion on the basis of insights about the role of models and paradigms in
science; Banner (1990) uses Kuhn's understanding of scientific revolutions in combination
with ideas about 'inference to the best explanation'; Murphy (1990), treated as an example in
the text, bases her account on Likaios' view of research programmes with hard cores kept
intact by commitment and justified by theoretical and empirical progress; Clayton (1989)
adds Habermas' view of the social sciences to Lakatos' view of the natural sciences, seeking a
mediation between formalist and historicist views; Sanders (1988) reconstructs Polanyi's
epistemology, and Van Huyssteen (1993) argues for a holist post-foundationalist epistemology
in theology.
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pattern of the physical sciences, whereas God is taken to be of a
different order. The possibility of understanding communal discern-
ment and religious experience in naturalist terms, which will be
considered in chapter 4, does not undermine their novelty, but it does
undermine their relevance to the theological programme they are
supposed to support. In terms of the two varieties of theological anti-
realism distinguished above, the issue is that the justification of
theological claims has to overcome both the ineffability of God (2) and
the difference between ordinary and divine reality (i), whereas a similar
justification in the sciences is restricted to the ineffability of reality 'as
such', and thus only to problems related to an assessment of the match
between theories and reality, rather than between theories and two
realms of reality.
So far, I have argued that defences of positions in the philosophy of
science cannot be transferred to defences of similar positions in the
philosophy of theology. Another issue is that philosophical literature
which models theology on science with respect to method, rationality,
or realism, is in danger of missing a major part of what science is
about. Debates about rationality, realism, and epistemology risk
becoming a separate, almost autonomous kind of literature, neglecting
substantive insights about the world and their implications for theology.
A strong concentration on the epistemological side of the debate
involves the fallacy of assuming that science is defined by its method.19
Yet, science is neither defined by its method alone nor by its content
alone. Nor is theology challenged only in its epistemology; the content
of its claims is problematic as well (and this includes eschatological
expectations, claims about the human soul and life beyond death,
divine action, and divine existence). This is, in other terms, the wider
import of the challenge to 'existence' claims, a challenge which is not in
a comparable way present in disputes in philosophy of science where
we deal only with arguments about our access to (and thus our claims
about) particular existents.
Theological realism
A narrow focus on analogies between the philosophy of science and the
philosophy of theology is not only in danger of misconstruing science.
It is also in danger of misconstruing theology. It is to this concern that
That this is indeed a fallacy is corroborated by the historical studies in Schuster and Yeo
(1986), a reference I owe to John H. Brooke.
Scientific and theological realism 145
we will now turn. I will consider why some theologians or philosophers
defend realism in science and in theology, and I will argue that these
motives do not require such a defence of theological realism.
Motives for theological realism
A natural theology which defends the truth of faith, or its plausibility, on
the basis of features of the universe such as its intelligibility and order,
assumes that scientific knowledge is knowledge about the world. The
argument could not take off if the order or intelligibility were imposed
by us. The conclusion natural theology aims at is of a similar realist
kind: God is an objective, supernatural reality. Our knowledge may be
imperfect, but the intention is to be realist in theology and in science.
Not all who opt for scientific and theological realism do so because
they intend to argue from science to theology, as in natural theology.
Others seek to bring together scientific insights and theological convic-
tions in a wider scheme of things, for instance a theology of nature which
integrates knowledge about reality (assuming scientific realism) with
ideas about God (assuming some form of theological realism, but not
necessarily indebted to a defence along the same lines as scientific
realism). We considered the use of the sciences in such an integration
above [15, 16]. Such an integration may be deemed desirable because
it would enhance the credibility of theology. If scientific knowledge and
theological claims could be brought together in a single scheme, the
suggestion that they are inconsistent would have been dispelled. A
mediating, integrative approach can also be seen as an attempt to
communicate religious views to humans who see their world in terms
provided by the sciences (e.g., Hesse 1981, 287).
Even if the knowledge content of science and that of theology are not
brought into relation with each other, there still is a theological interest
in scientific realism. If science were not knowledge of reality, how much
more would we have to fear that this is the case in theology, where the
symbolic nature of language is much more persistent and the interaction
with the reality hoped for is far less tangible.20 For instance, Peacocke
(1993, 19) has it that if one would accept a social constructivist view of
science, one would have to 'adopt a fortiori a similar view of the cognitive
claims of theology'. However, defending scientific realism for this
The inference a mourn ad mgus, or in Rabbinic writings qal wahamer, ( ' i f . . . , how much more
. . . ' ) has been formalised by H. G. Hubbeling (1987, 222 4). It does not seem to be logically
compelling without substantial assumptions about the minor and the major compared, w..
science and theology.
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reason seems to me to be misguided. One cannot avoid the problematic
defence of theological realism by turning towards the easier, but for the
purpose at hand irrelevant, defence of scientific realism. Whichever
view on the complex character of science with its success and its
persistent openness to development and change is to prevail, theological
realism would still have to be justified on its own terms.
A positive theological motive to defend theological realism has to do
with a major function of the symbol of God, that of providing trust and
hope. If God were not real, our hope would be in vain. Though this is
convincing, it does not follow that 'If God were not real, belief in God
would not fulfil this function.' More important in our context, the
statement does not require theological realism to be analogous to
scientific realism. God might be totally different from the way God is
believed to be, and beliefs about God might be untestable, while none
the less the hope expressed in the beliefs might not be vain. This
motive is at odds with eliminative anti-realism; one cannot maintain
the functions of hope and trust provided by the symbol while
eliminating any reality with which it might be linked. However, it does
not conflict with a modest assessment of our epistemic capacities, as,
for instance, in an agnostic empiricism as advocated by Van Fraassen.
Nor does it conflict with a major human role in constructing our
theories and practices.
Part of the drive for a theological variant of scientific realism is
abhorrence of the alternative. If theology were not about a reality, the
reality of God, would it not be a mere instrument, a tale which may
serve social and psychological functions but which has no basis in
reality? Is God going the way of Santa Claus and the Easter bunny: a
nice story for kids, but not for grown-ups?
There may be various responses to this abhorrence of the alternative.
Firstly, the alternative need not be seen in such dark terms. Some non-
realists or anti-realists in theology, for example D. Z. Phillips, paint
their approach in more positive terms, as the attempt to preserve
genuine faith in the form of an attitude of existential trust rather than
of assent to certain cognitive claims. Thus, one might rebut that realists
distort faith by modelling it too closely after science. A theological
realism which affirms truth and meaning out there 'is politically
conservative, and pictures the universe as being rather like an English
boarding school. You should accommodate yourself or fit yourself into
a pre-established order of things' (Cupitt 1990, 56).
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Secondly, other theologians do not so much present themselves in
opposition to realism, but rather seek to enter a dialogue with science
along different lines, in concentrating on experience and on tradition.
We will come back to such approaches in later chapters.
And thirdly, one might stick to theological realism without seeking to
defend theological realism along the same lines as scientific realism.
That seems to be the position taken by Ernan McMullin. As he sees it,
the issue in the area of theology and science is to develop broader
world views. Such world views do not exhibit the convergence and
success which would warrant a defence of theological realism along the
same lines as the defence of scientific realism. Such a position accepts
the integrity of science without burdening science with the task of
providing support for theology; the theological debate is at the level of
world views rather than directly at the level of science. This distinction
between the debate within science and the debate about world views is
central to McMullin's resistance against Plantinga's proposal for a
theistic science (McMullin 1991; 1993, 304; on Plantinga, see [18]).
World views are a proper area of disagreement; science, by weeding
out errors in a persistent testing process, is a distinct area of consensus
building. World views are tied to the place where one stands, here and
now, in a cultural context with certain values and interests.
Some authors grant a particular world view or metaphysical scheme
priority in shaping their science (or their interpretation of science) and
their theology. Some prefer the philosophical conceptual framework of
Hegel or Heidegger, and in the context of discussions on the relations
between science and religion, the conceptual framework of Alfred
North Whitehead has gained some followers. Some of the more
prominent authors, such as Harbour, Birch, and Cobb, have not so
much assumed and imposed this scheme as argued for it, developing
their insights in extensive dialogue with the natural sciences and with
religious traditions. If one wants to give priority to some metaphysical
scheme, one has to face at least two problems, that of choice and that
of justification: Which metaphysical scheme and why? The need to
justify a choice is felt more strongly with respect to theological or
metaphysical positions than with respect to science. In philosophy,
discussions are persistent. It is almost a tautology to say that unresolved
issues are metaphysical; issues that allow for resolution tend to be
classified as scientific.
Whatever conclusion one comes to with respect to scientific realism,
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the instrumental success of science is a major phenomenon of our time.
It may not be sufficient to extend the credibility of scientific insights to
the answers to philosophical questions about the existence and struc-
ture of the universe, but it does force us to take science very seriously,
even though its answers are provisional, and consensus is sometimes
lacking and, on other occasions, of limited value [16]. I appreciate the
engagement of theological realists with scientific insights, but I do not
believe that attempts to formulate theological views in continuity with
scientific insights will succeed. This is not merely a negative conclusion.
If there were too much continuity and similarity between science and
theology, we would have a theology which could not provide us with a
sense of contrast, whether a contrast that could be understood
evolutionarily or one that has to be undergirded by an understanding
of God as transcending natural reality.
Is-not is not enough contrast
Amongst those who defend a modest (often called 'critical') realism in
science and in theology, many have stressed that an important
qualification has to be added to all their theological models, metaphors,
theories and arguments. There is to any model a positive analogy, the
way the model is like the item modelled, as well as a negative analogy,
the way the model is not like the item modelled. Quite a few refer to
Sally McFague's theological justification of such an is/is-not distinction
in Metaphorical Theology. She suggests 'that one of the distinctive
characteristics of Protestant thought is its insistence on the "and it is
not". It is the iconoclastic tendency in Protestantism, what Paul Tillich
calls "the Protestant Principle", the fear of idolatry, the concern lest
the finite ever be imagined to be capable over the infinite.'21 The 'is-
not' which is whispered with each metaphor saves us from worshipping
an idol, which would happen if we mistook our images for God.
Thus, in the emphasis on the 'is not' of our models and metaphors,
including theological models which draw on science, there is a positive
analogy, namely one between our cognitive limitations in science and
in theology. This makes it 'perfectly respectable to use models of a God
who "cannot be named" ' (Soskice 1988, 182). Both in physics and in
theology we do not know what the underlying reality is in itself; in both
cases our models and language are limited. For instance, Peacocke
(1985, 22; similarly 1984, 46) argues that:
(McFague 1982, 13); see also 1341"., where she refers to Ricoeur for the distinction.
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referring successfully to an entity, say an electron, can be achieved by
affirming that one is referring to that which causes (say) this cloud chamber
track to take such and such a path. And this can be achieved without knowing
what electrons are 'in themselves'. Given the parallel between the use of
models and metaphors in scientific and theological language, it seems to me to
be equally legitimate to affirm that God can be 'that which causes this
particular experience now (or in the past) in me (or others)'.
In my opinion, the claim that there is a similarity in limitations of our
language in science and in theology, should itself be accompanied by a
major 'and it is not'. The is-not character of theoretical models, the
underdetermination of theories by data, or the difficulty of referring to
theoretical entities such as 'electrons' is quite different from the
inaccessibility of the Holy. The 'is not' of our models in science is
purely a reflection of our limited knowledge of particular processes,
whereas the 'is-not' in theology also reflects the sense that God is an
existent (if so) of a totally different kind. We again encounter the
difference pointed out when we embarked upon reflections about
theological realism [17.2], the difference between concerns about the
adequacy of our knowledge, which applies to scientific and to theolo-
gical cognitive claims, and concerns about the existence of a corre-
sponding reality, which arise especially with respect to theological
claims.
For a 'mystical' theology, which reflects a desire for unity, for a
divine presence in continuity with our lives and our knowledge,
awareness of the limitations of our models may do sufficient justice to
its understanding of the otherness of the divine. However, the 'is not' is
insufficient as an expression of the distinction between our models of
the divine and the divine reality itself for a 'prophetic' theology, which
is characterised by a sense of difference and contrast, of divine absence
rather than presence, of contrast between what is and what should
have been. On a 'prophetic' understanding of theology, there is a sense
of 'and it is not' for which there is no analogy in science. In a prophetic
theology, people also seek to articulate a sense of contrast between God
and the world, between how humans behave and how God intended
them to behave (e.g. Isaiah 55: 8), or, more naturalistically, between
ideas about 'what ought to be' and 'what is', as such ideas have evolved
within reality. An 'is not' meant as a form of modesty about our
language and knowledge is not enough to articulate such a sense of
contrast.
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l8. FROM THE DISCOVERY OF SCIENCE TO THEOLOGY?
There are the discoveries of science and there is the discovery of
science, of a complex of approaches which is successful in coping with
and finding out about various aspects of the world. Some authors argue
that this discovery is itself relevant for theology or metaphysics. We will
consider two examples of arguments to this effect. Roger Trigg has
defended the claim that science depends on metaphysics; otherwise,
science would be nothing more than one cultural practice among
others, and thus one would end up in nihilism. And Alvin Plantinga has
defended epistemological naturalism, but argued that such an episte-
mological naturalism is best explained in the context of an ontological
supernaturalism, and at odds with ontological naturalism. Plantinga
has also defended the claim that methodological naturalism is unac-
ceptable for Christians, and that science as pursued in that way should
be replaced by something else, a 'theistic science'. Even though this
latter plea for a non-naturalist science is not an argument from the
discovery of science to theology or metaphysics, I will none the less
consider both arguments of Plantinga in this chapter.
Either metaphysics, or science is just one practice among others.
The philosopher Roger Trigg believes that: 'Science has to depend on
metaphysics if it is not itself to be discredited' (1993, 225). Without
metaphysics, science might be nothing but a social practice, the
conceptual scheme of a particular period and group in human history.
Without foundation in and orientation on metaphysics, science lacks
grounds, standards, and direction.
The idea, however, that there is no target for our beliefs, no purpose for our
scientific investigation, no genuine object on which faith, whether scientific or
whatever, can be fixed, suggests that all our reasoning is going to be
unconstrained. There will be no difference between good or bad reasoning,
justified or unjustified belief, or pseudo-science and the genuine article. (Trigg
'993. 225)
Trigg considers the spectre of relativism a threat to science as well as to
religion. However, other philosophers and theologians have welcomed
such a pluralism as providing room for religion in granting it leave
from science.
A massive intellectual revolution is taking place that is perhaps as great as that
which marked off the modern world from the Middle Ages. The foundations
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of the modern world are collapsing, and we are entering a postmodern world.
(Diogenes Allen 1989, 2)
In the post-modern world we are now entering, Diogenes Allen
maintains, we can have 'the full wealth of conviction' (subtitle of Allen
1989). Post-modernism has made us aware that all forms of reflection are
located within particular traditions; objective knowledge, free of an
historical and cultural context, does not exist. If everything is bound up
in traditions, the Christian tradition (or any other particular tradition)
can claim a cognitive status on an equal footing with other world views,
including secular ones such as the natural sciences and historical
criticism, another major force in the modern period which has con-
tributed to the declining credibility of the truth of historical religions.
It seems to me to be a mistake to treat science and critical historical
scholarship as traditions on an equal footing with others. In principle, a
basic tenet of historical criticism is 'that any belief or conclusion may
be challenged, and so the boundaries of the conversation may have to
be expanded', as the New Testament scholar John Collins (1993, 747)
argued. Scholars and scientists do not always live up to such an ideal,
but the ideal none the less implies that such scholarship is not
intrinsically tied to a particular tradition. In principle all particular
beliefs are open to reconsideration. In historical criticism and in the
natural sciences, one should be willing to abandon any conclusion if
new empirical evidence becomes available - a methodological attitude
of openness - but one lives with the results achieved so far.
The post-modernist seems to adhere to a different principle of
openness: the principle that traditions are wholes, which all deserve
equal status as wholes. Conclusions reached in the context of one
tradition, or framework or whatever, may not be challenged because of
insights in another tradition. Thus, according to such a quite different
methodological attitude, boundaries between various discourses are
closed, and beliefs are shielded from interaction.
'Post-modern' is a term with many connotations. Here it will be used to refer to the position
taken by Diogenes Allen, who is quoted in the text: whereas the 'modern' period emphasised
the priority of Western science, we have now become aware of the unavoidable role of
cultural contexts with their presuppositions; different cultural traditions deserve equal
respect; the cognitive conclusions from historical and scientific studies within the Western
modern tradition are merely one view amongst others. A different 'post-modernism' (e.g.,
Hensen 1990, 53ff.), namely as a critical attitude with respect to universal claims which do no
justice to particulars, and especially to those who are powerless and speechless, those who
suffer, those who are different, etcetera, is not disputed here. Such an engagement need not
distance itself from reason and from science, but questions forms of moral discourse which
lack sensitivity to diversity among individuals and within and among cultures.
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Insights originate in particular traditions. However, acknowledging
the unavoidable role of a particular tradition does not justify that
tradition. A positive case for the status of science can be made by
observing that we do not have to justify science as a whole as a single
tradition, but can rather understand science as the unfinished accumu-
lation of many piecemeal changes and developments in theories,
criteria, and the like. Insights about the unavoidable role of a particular
historical context are carried too far when applied sweepingly. This has
been expressed well by Linell E. Cady, criticising theologians such as
Diogenes Allen, to whom she refers here:
Even without saying anything more in support of substantive specificities,
theologians can enjoy the borrowed status that comes from rubbing
methodological shoulders with science. As one theologian has put it, 'In a
postmodern world Christianity is intellectually relevant.' This strikes me as a
bit too convenient. A blanket endorsement of intellectual relevance too easily
allows a general reprieve of nonscientific inquiry to substitute for piecemeal
defenses. (Cady 1991, 88f.)
I agree with Cady and Trigg that science deserves to be taken seriously.
A facile pluralism is to be avoided. However, unlike Trigg, I do not
accept the dichotomy: either an easy pluralism which diminishes the
significance of science or a strong metaphysical basis. Rather, whether
any particular 'metaphysical' assumptions are needed is to be explored
in a more piecemeal fashion, through reflections on science and
scientific insights about the world. In the final chapter of this study I
will argue that science can be understood and accepted as a human
practice guided by certain regulative ideals; such a naturalist view of
science does not need a great deal of metaphysics [27]. I will also argue
that our understanding of reality raises some questions, questions
which are not themselves answered by science and thus may be
considered as pointing beyond science to metaphysical issues, without,
however, pointing to one particular metaphysical view [31]. I would
like to leave this issue here for the moment. However, there is another
claim about science which would point to something beyond science,
namely Plantinga's claim that scientific epistemological naturalism
requires ontological supernaturalism.
Plantinga-i: epistemological naturalism requires a supematuralist ontology
Plantinga argues in his Warrant and Proper Function that 'a belief is
warranted if it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly
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(subject to no malfunctioning) in a cognitive environment congenial for
those faculties, according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth'
(Plantinga 1993, viiif.). He considers this a naturalist position, with
naturalism taken in an epistemological (and definitely not an ontolo-
gical) sense, since 'the only kind of normativiry it invokes figures in such
sciences as biology and psychology' (Plantinga 1993, 194). I consider his
proposal on warrants for belief well-argued in his book. But in the last
two chapters of his book (Plantinga 1993; references in this section are
to this book) he argues that this epistemological naturalism requires
metaphysical supernaturalism rather than naturalism. I distinguish
three arguments, namely (a) ontological naturalism cannot give a
satisfactory definition of the notion of 'proper function'; (b) it is unable
to explain the occurrence of proper functioning faculties; and (c)
'metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolu-
tionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an
irrational stance' (ix).
(a) Plantinga argues that there is no satisfactory naturalist analysis of
the notion 'proper function'. He points to weaknesses of some con-
temporary proposals, especially by invoking (often somewhat artificial)
counter-examples. For example, the claim that an organ functions
properly cannot be logically equivalent with the claim that this is the
way it functions most frequently; even if most older carpenters have
lost a finger or a thumb, the lucky few with all ten digits would not be
dysfunctional, and the fact that most baby turtles do not reach maturity
does not make those that do dysfunctional (aoof.). The contribution to
reproduction is not a good criterion either; if in a certain culture
broken legs are necessary to attract a mate, broken legs would
contribute to reproductive success, but one would not ordinarily say
that these broken legs function properly (204). Another potential
definition overlooks systems which function properly only when the
organism of which it is part is disrupted, such as a scab-forming
mechanism (207).
If I grant for the sake of the argument that there is currently no
completely satisfactory definition of proper function - though I think
that an evolutionary understanding of proper function as advocated
by Ruth G. Millikan (1984, 1993) is able to deal with the alleged
counter-examples and objections Plantinga's conclusion to the
falsehood of naturalism does not follow. The absence of a satisfactory
general naturalist definition of proper functioning is not evidence
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that there can be no such a definition. The definition may have
eluded us so far. However, it is more likely that the request for a
strict definition is too demanding. Biology is more piecemeal than
physics, with fewer interesting general laws and the like; definitions
which are interesting and have no exceptions are rare. However, the
lack of a strict definition and the impossibility of assigning or
denying proper functioning in all borderline cases and contrived
examples need not inhibit the adequate use of the notion. Rather,
some vagueness is typical of most (or perhaps of all) our notions.
The main issue is not whether there is a satisfactory general
definition of proper function - general in the sense of holding in all
conceptually possible worlds - but whether all actual instances can be
understood in a naturalist way.
(b) Plantinga also argues that an evolutionary view is unable to explain
the occurrence of proper functioning satisfactorily (in contrast to
analysing or defining the notion), whereas a theistic view has no such
problem: 'From a theistic perspective there is no problem in applying
these notions to natural organisms, for (from that perspective) natural
organisms have indeed been designed' (197). On the evolutionary view,
you either cannot properly employ the notion of proper function, or
you are challenged to give 'a satisfactory naturalistic explanation or
analysis of the notion of proper function' (198).
The theistic position is not as satisfactory as Plantinga claims. While
the evolutionist can explain rudimentary organs, inefficient design (by
technical standards) and undesirable limitations to cognitive and other
capacities as indications of a history of tinkering with available designs,
Plantinga appeals to the unavoidability of trade-offs (sSff.). Such an
explanation works well if there is a trade-off between two desirable
features of a design. However, the appeal to 'trade-offs' does not
answer cases where the apparent designer could have done better
without, to the best of our knowledge, losing out elsewhere. In many
cases, we are stuck with certain undesirable features which could have
been remedied if the organism had been designed, but which, on an
evolutionary view, could not yet disappear without a trace, and may
even be unlikely ever to disappear except when the species and its
descendants become extinct.
Mulikan (1989 (1993, 17 19)) discusses similar objections to her notion of 'proper functions';
according to her, such conceptual analysis is 'the misconceived child of a mistaken view of the
nature of language and thought' (Millikan 1989 (1993, 15)).
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Plantinga argues that there could be functions of natural organs or
organisms which are beyond evolutionary explanation.
More generally, from a theistic perspective it could be true that many
subsystems of our cognitive and affective systems have functions, and function
properly, not because their functioning in that way promotes survival, but
because it serves other ends: the possibility of a certain sort of knowledge, or
of morality, or loyalty, or love, or a grasp of beauty, or something else. It is
therefore obviously possible that such a system have a function that confers no
survival-enhancing propensity at all. Indeed, it could be that its functioning
properly should put its owners at something of a disadvantage with respect to
survival. Since this state is clearly possible, it is possible that a thing have a
function (and function properly) even if that way of functioning confers no sep
[survival-enhancing propensity] upon its owner. This proposal therefore fails
as a naturalistic analysis of proper function, and fails resoundingly. (209)
Given the possibility of a theistic perspective, there could be properly
functioning systems which do not confer evolutionary advantage.
However, evolution would only fail as a naturalist explanation of
epistemic proper functioning in our world if there were actual cases
where we have features which cannot be understood within an
evolutionary perspective. Plantinga points to the ability to do higher
mathematics and appreciation of beauty in art and nature. Below
[24, 25] we will come to an evolutionary understanding of morality and
religion; it seems that such 'higher' forms of behaviour can be under-
stood in an evolutionary perspective, even if they do not always
contribute to survival, as long as culture and the plasticity of human
brains are taken into account. The ability to do advanced mathematics
can be understood evolutionarily as the use of cognitive capacities
which evolved for other purposes (plasticity), just as the ability to read
evolved and spread in a relatively short span of time, probably without
a corresponding change in the structure of the brain. Evolutionary
theory may be wrong and there could be phenomena which are
inexplicable, but that possibility does not count against an evolutionary
view. The presence of capacities which in their current form do not
contribute to survival, is not a sufficient argument.
The power of evolutionary explanations should not be underesti-
mated; a more realistic analogue for the society where broken legs
would confer an advantage in attracting a mate (see above, a) is the
peacock's tail, which is probably much longer than is optimal for flying
and walking. Male peacocks who are able to grow a long tail, and
furthermore are able to do well despite the burden of such a long tail,
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may be attractive mates - and once tail-length has become a criterion
for attractiveness, they become even more attractive since their sons
are likely to have long tails as well, and thus to be attractive too.
The mere possibility that inexplicable features logically could have
existed does not count against the possibility of a naturalist under-
standing of our world. The issue is to some extent empirical: are there
any features which are evolutionarily unintelligible? Candidates, such
as social behaviour from which non-relatives benefit, or examples of
unpractical display such as the peacock's tail, may be explicable within
an evolutionary scheme (see below, [24]).
(c) Plantinga also argues that a naturalist, evolutionary view is irra-
tional. An evolutionist would have to see as the ultimate purpose of our
cognitive faculties 'something like survival (of individual, species, gene,
or genotype); but then it seems initially unlikely that among their
functions - ultimate, proximate, or otherwise - would be the produc-
tion of true beliefs' (218).
On an evolutionary view, there is no need to oppose these two ways
of proper functioning. One can well understand why legs (or hands,
wings, or fins) are good for locomotion in the relevant environment
and why they contribute to survival; there is no need to oppose these.
Similarly, the ability to acquire true beliefs about our environment
('there is an apple in that tree') is as intelligible as having the ability to
climb and get hold of the apple.
There is, of course, a further disagreement about the extent to which
our beliefs are true, especially in the representational sense, or effective
in a more pragmatic sense. Plantinga claims that an evolutionist
should, on his view of our cognitive faculties, be sceptical with respect
to the truth of our beliefs. If our cognitive faculties arose to promote
survival, they could do so in various ways - by endowing us with the
possibility of having beliefs which are true (or approximately true and
only so in circumstances relevant to survival) or by endowing us with
false beliefs which none the less generate adequate behaviour. We
could do the right things on the basis of wrong beliefs. Plantinga gives
the example of running away from a tiger. Paul could do so because he
desires to pet that big pussy-cat, and he thinks that running away is the
best way to get that nice pussy-cat to be petted by him. Or he could
confuse running away from, and running towards, a tiger. Or he could
have formed the resolution to run a mile at top speed whenever
presented with the illusion of a tiger. Or he may believe that the
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appearance of the tiger is the starting signal of a race he wants to win.
And so on (225^). Since our beliefs need not be true to be survival-
enhancing, Plantinga argues that on a naturalist view the reliability of
our beliefs might be less than 50 per cent. Since we take our beliefs to
be reliable, this counts against the naturalist view. On a theistic view
there is no such problem. In that case, we should ascribe a high
reliability to our cognitive faculties, since upon that view we are
created in God's image, and thus may have cognitive faculties which
correspond imperfectly to God's epistemic faculties.
The thought-experiment which establishes the low probability has a
clause which I consider to be of major importance (as clauses about the
background are in general decisive when the relevance of any thought
experiment is assessed; see [15] and Wilkes (1988, ch.i)): '(Of course we
must postulate other changes in Paul's ways of reasoning, including
how he changes belief in response to experience, to maintain coher-
ence)' (225). This clause reveals the strange character of Plantinga's
thought experiment. He has to assume that Paul modifies his beliefs in
response to his experiences in a way which does not improve the
quality of his beliefs, not even in the long run. Rather, Paul modifies
false beliefs about the environment into other equally false beliefs
which are coherent and which generate appropriate behaviour given
the true state of affairs in the environment. Plantinga seems to exclude
piecemeal improvement, both of our belief-forming mechanisms and of
our beliefs, in continuous interaction with the environment. We would
rather expect that since our environment is causally involved in the
formation of our beliefs and concepts, we may expect these concepts to
match that environment. It is reported that the Innuit developed words
for different kinds of snow, whereas one would not expect an adequate
language about snow near the equator (except for words for snow on
high mountains).
Plantinga argues that the case against evolution is even stronger for
those areas of knowledge which are (and have been) irrelevant to
survival and reproduction, such as the more theoretical parts of
science (Plantinga 1993, 2321). This is also unwarranted. The point is
that structures and faculties previously selected for other purposes
may be applied to new ones. For example, reading is (evolutionarily
speaking) a fairly recent invention, and therefore not likely to have
become hardwired in the structure of the brain. However, most
humans are able to learn to read, using structures which were
adaptive for some other purpose, perhaps reading animal tracks. This
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plasticity (and capacity for learning) is more pronounced when
humans are young.
Plantinga claims: 'Naturalistic epistemology conjoined with naturalistic
metaphysics leads via evolution to scepticism or to violation of canons
of rationality; conjoined with theism it does not' (237). In this section I
have argued that this is mistaken with respect to the implications of
evolutionary theory and that it requires too strict canons of rationality,
in definitions and in the demands of dealing with logically possible but
fictitious counter-examples. There could be such counter-examples;
evolution could be a false belief about the world. However, one has to
come up with actual counter-examples to show that it is a false belief. I
have also argued that the theistic position is not as simple and safe as
Plantinga suggests, especially when one considers examples of imper-
fect apparent design.
Plantinga-s: Methodological naturalism is wrong; we need theistic science
In the preceding section, we considered epistemological naturalism.
Plantinga argued that metaphysical naturalism is unable to offer an
analysis of, and explanation for proper functioning epistemic faculties.
However, he also holds that our belief-forming mechanisms have led us
seriously astray in science: we need a quite different kind of science
than that which is most commonly practised. We need to abandon
'methodological naturalism'. The two terms need to be distinguished.
Whereas 'epistemological naturalism' refers to canons of rationality,
namely that the same normativity that is accepted in biology and
psychology is to be invoked when we consider other epistemic projects
(Plantinga 1993, 194), 'methodological naturalism' refers to approaches
to the world that seek to understand processes exclusively in terms of
natural causes without drawing on information from the Bible (Plan-
tinga 1991). Thus, 'methodological naturalism' is close to metaphysical
or ontological naturalism, which he considers to be the adversary of
theism, whereas epistemological naturalism is a different issue, actually
- according to him - resulting in a defeater of ontological naturalism.
Plantinga writes that the difference between the kind of science
which he proposes, which he calls 'Augustinian science' or 'theistic
science', and contemporary modern science is more pronounced in
human and social sciences than in the natural sciences, but he has also
taken a very critical stance with respect to evolutionary biology. We
will discuss evolution in some sections in chapter 4, but here I will
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comment briefly on this other discussion Plantinga is involved in (with,
apparently, for him the same purpose as in the arguments developed
on the basis of epistemic naturalism, namely in order to refute
ontological naturalisms informed by evolutionary biology).
The biological realm provides examples of adaptations more wonderful
than the intricate design of watches. The complex coherence of
organisms suggested design to William Paley (Natural Theology, 1802).
Richard Dawkins agrees, in his The Blind Watchmaker, that biological
complexity is impressive. He thus considers theism to have been
appealing until there was a naturalist explanation: 'although atheism
might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Darwin made it
possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist' (Dawkins 1986, 6).
To Alvin Plantinga, Dawkins' claim confirms that secular science is
part of the battleground in the struggle 'between the Christian commu-
nity and the forces of unbelief (Plantinga 1991, 30), or, referring to
Augustine, between the City of God and the City of Man (Plantinga
19933). Christians need to develop their own science, resisting the
methodological atheism assumed by secular scientists.
'Unnatural Science', 'Creation Science,' 'Theistic Science' - call it what you
will: what we need when we want to know how to think about the origin and
development of contemporary life is what is most plausible from a Christian
point of view. What we need is a scientific account of life that isn't restricted
by that methodological naturalism. (Plantinga 1991, 29)
Plantinga accepts as plausible that the age of the Earth might be
billions of years, but he objects to the common ancestry of all life, to
the Darwinian explanation of evolution, and to naturalist theories of
the origin of life. Just like Dawkins, Plantinga also assumes a similarity
with respect to the issues addressed by science and by theology: special
creation and evolution are competing and conflicting claims, and the
Bible offers knowledge relevant to theories of biological history (see also
fe, 23]).
The atheist Dawkins and the Christian philosopher Plantinga are
allies in presenting us with a choice between two conflicting options.
Their common adversaries are those who try to have both secular
science and genuine religion. The attempt to have both has been
developed in various ways, both orthodox and liberal, both through
separation and through integration and modification. In response to
Plantinga, Ernan McMullin argued that evolution reflects our best
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available understanding of the way living organisms came into being
in God's creation, which is the whole natural world (McMullin 1991,
77, see also [31]; for an extensive critique of Plantinga's position see
also McMullin 1993), while the astronomer Howard van Till argued
for 'categorical complementarity' of the issues pursued by science
and those pursued by religion (Van Till 1991, 39-42; see also Van
TU1 1986).
Even if one considers Plantinga's objections to the modern evolu-
tionary explanation of the origin of species and to the empirical
evidence in favour of it to be completely mistaken, as I do (see [24]),
this does not do away with his general thesis about the presence of
religious elements in science. This thesis resembles our earlier observa-
tion about the role of metaphysical issues in the controversies sur-
rounding Darwin's theory of evolution (above, [8]). Speaking of
'Bauplans', 'Ur forms', and 'typology' (Plantinga iggia, 104) is similar
to Owen's invocation of archetypes. It expresses a metaphysical
perspective which does not fit Darwin's theory. Similarly, one might
point out that metaphysical disagreements about time, contingency,
and necessity underlie the variety of research programmes in contem-
porary cosmology (Drees 1990, 62-7; iggia, 384-7). However, even if
one accepts the presence of such metaphysical elements in scientific
research programmes, Plantinga's plea for theistic science is still
unsatisfactory for at least two reasons.
Plantinga's plea for theistic science conflates religious and metaphy-
sical convictions. The view of special creation corresponding to arche-
types is Neoplatonic, not necessarily Christian. There is genuine
diversity among Christians with respect to such metaphysical issues.
Portraying the interaction as a struggle between two contending parties
ignores the diversity among Christians, locating all those who have
another opinion on the metaphysical issues in the camp of the enemy,
rather than treating them as fellow Christians. Explicitly addressing
metaphysical issues would have had the disadvantage (for Plantinga's
case) to grant more room to other elements than Scripture, and thus to
introduce more plurality into the debate, which he presents as a
struggle between two parties.
Another objection concerns the level at which one considers the
competition, if any, between religious views and secular science.
Though not espousing a completely literalist reading of Scripture,
Plantinga confronts Scripture with elements of Darwinian evolutionary
theory. In taking the Bible as basic, he still has to explicate how to
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interpret Scripture. Furthermore, such an approach is in danger of ad
Aomess with respect to criticisms of scientific theories, criticising a few
steps rather than dealing with the theory as a whole. It would be more
adequate to discuss the theory as a whole, focusing for instance on the
exhaustiveness of evolutionary explanations, the notion of explanation
involved, and its compatibility with an understanding of the evolu-
tionary world as God's creation. 'Secular science versus theistic science'
seems the wrong level of discussion, as the discussions are about world
views in which scientific insights are embedded. Disagreements about
world views may be reflected in disagreements in science, and about
the scope and aims of science. However, this is not a direct contribution
from religion to science, but an indirect one, via the dispute about
world views.
Theology and knowledge of human nature
In the preceding chapters we considered ideas on issues such as divine
action in the world, ways of using science in theology, and realism in
science and in theology. Someone who is uncomfortable with my
conclusions may argue for a different outcome on one or more of these
issues. Another option, however, is to argue that the discussion was
misconceived since the character of religion was wrongly construed.
One way to question the relevance of knowledge of the world to
religion could be to emphasise the distinction between God and the
world, and argue that therefore God's mode of creative action is not to
be understood along lines similar to our understanding of natural
processes in the world. Such a distinction may be articulated as one
between temporal processes and an a-temporal divine creative and
sustaining act [13.3]. If the difference between God and the natural
world is strongly emphasised, it seems less relevant to consider implica-
tions of the natural sciences for theology. However, such an advantage
is also a liability: due to the strong claim that divine and natural action
are different, it may become totally unclear how to think of God's
relation to the world, or, if the imagination is fertile enough to propose
some models, any model may appear to be totally irrelevant, at best a
mere option which might be attached to one's view of the world and
one's way of life [31.3]. In order to avoid irrelevance, a 'transcendenta-
lising' move, where God is understood as the atemporal ground of
being or in some other abstract way which avoids direct confrontation
with the natural sciences, is often supplemented with belief that we
have come to intimate this divine reality, either through particular
experiences of ourselves or via a tradition which relates us back to
predecessors considered authoritative.
Another way to distance ourselves from the discussion with the
natural sciences is to opt for a non-cognitive view of religion. In earlier
sections [3.2, 5] I adopted distinctions made by G. Lindbeck in
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distinguishing three different emphases in the understanding of reli-
gion, namely on cognitive, propositional claims, on experience and
expression, and on religion as a guiding, culture-shaping tradition. The
last two views of religion surfaced also in the analysis of historiographies
when we discussed authors such as John Dillenberger and Michael
Buckley who argued that theology has surrendered itself too much to a
certain kind of interaction with the natural sciences, and thereby has
become alienated from its genuine basis [n]. Thus, one might attempt
to stay aloof from discussions on the theological implications of
scientific knowledge about the world with the claim that - on the view
of religion one holds - cognitive claims are irrelevant.
Such strategies do not deliver religion from engagement with the
sciences. When the emphasis is on experience and tradition, either in
an attempt to supplement an abstract philosophical theology or as the
primary basis of theology, the encounter with the natural sciences is not
primarily to be found in physics, but rather in those areas of the
natural sciences that most directly influence ideas about human nature,
such as the neurosciences and evolutionary biology. The neurosciences
relate most intimately to our understanding of experience, conscious-
ness, etc., whereas an evolutionary perspective relates more directly to
religions as traditions which shape human lives. There will first be
some sections on human experience (chapter 4-A), thereafter some
sections on evolution and religion (chapter 4-6); each group of sections
begins with a more specific introduction of its own.
A. EXPERIENCES NATURALISTICALLY
REINTERPRETED
Whenever theology touches science, it gets burned. In the
sixteenth century astronomy, in the seventeenth microbiology, in
the eighteenth geology and paleontology, in the nineteenth
Darwin's biology all grotesquely extended the world-frame and
sent churchmen scurrying for cover in ever smaller, more
shadowy nooks, little gloomy ambiguous caves in the psyche,
where even now neurology is cruelly harrying them, gouging
them out of the multifolded brain like wood lice from under the
lumber püe. (Updike 1986, 32)
A 'Rediscovery of Inner Experience', to paraphrase the tide of a book
by Bregman (1982), appears to be widespread in Western cultures.
Advocates of inner experience deal with dreams, often with references
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to C. G.Jung, with day-dreaming and fantasy, mystical experience and
peak experiences (A. Maslow), with madness (R. D. Laing), with
sexuality (e.g., the female orgasm as 'a genuine way of restoring to
ourselves a more primordial harmony with the cosmos', Bregman 1982,
102), and with dying as the ultimate experience of one's life (e.g.,
Elisabeth Kübler-Ross). The 'psychological religiousness' has devel-
oped mostly outside the churches though to some extent it has been
integrated with the pastoral and theological work of the churches. The
limits of this market are not yet in sight:
Inner experiences could also be promoted by airlines; the mystical potential of
above-the-clouds flight is real enough, and might be publicized as a way to get
the most out of flying. By stressing the extraordinariness of flight, passengers
would have the chance to transcend their usual preoccupations and
participate in a new awareness of nature's immensity. Airlines could offer
brief training classes for passengers. (Bregman 1982, 137)
Christianity too has been called to return from doctrine, metaphysics,
and biblicism to experience. 'Inference cannot substitute for experi-
ence, and the most compelling witness to a personal God must itself be
personal' (Buckley 1988, 99; see also [11]). Granting priority to
experience is not new in Christianity; one might think of pietism and
revivals during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Friedrich
Schleiermacher's emphasis on the feeling of absolute dependence in
the early nineteenth century, and the interest in William James' Varieties
of Religious Experience (1902) and Rudolf Otto's The Holy (1917).
The turn towards experience may seem to relate positively to
science, which from its beginning has been marked by a move from
authority and metaphysics to empirical adequacy. However, whereas a
theology which builds cognitive claims upon science is in danger of
asking more from science than it is able to deliver [chapter 3], I will
argue that approaches emphasising experience run the risk of taking
less from science than it might have to offer. There are links between
feelings of love and hormones, and some explain ethical behaviour as
indirect reciprocal altruism [24] and voices of the gods as communica-
tion between the right and the left hemisphere of the brain [20.3].
When we come to experience, there is less reason to emphasise grand
cosmological themes about the origin and explanation of everything.
There is the temptation to take extraordinary claims as attractive for
religion. However, the nature of science is more clearly exhibited in a
critical attitude towards the extraordinary than in an easy acceptance
Experience as evidence 165
of such claims. In my opinion, one should seek a 'reverse eclecticism'
[16] when one attempts to understand the prospects for religion in our
time. If we face the most challenging, most naturalist understanding of
human nature, the results may be limited, but they will carry more
intellectual weight. One has to consider the way the natural sciences,
and the cognitive sciences building upon them, cover human behaviour
and human experiences in naturalist terms. Can one say, with the vivid
image of Updike quoted above, that believers have been 'scurrying for
cover in ever smaller, more shadowy nooks, little gloomy ambiguous
caves in the psyche, where even now neurology is cruelly harrying
them, gouging them out of the multifolded brain like wood lice from
under the lumber pile'?
In this section, 4-A, I seek to explore the possibility of a naturalist
understanding of religious experiences and our mental life. The aim is
not to discuss in detail current knowledge to be found in the neuros-
ciences and psychology, but to understand how religion and its relation
to the sciences may be approached in this kind of discussion. This part
concludes with a more general reflection on relations between various
descriptions, and thus on reduction and elimination. We will have to
note that science accounts for our experiences differently than we would do
otherwise. This aspect of science is often labelled reductionism, though it
might perhaps be perceived better as a shift in understanding, and could
even be labelled a form of holism - as it seeks to fit the understanding of
all phenomena into a single scheme. Central to the position here is the
fourth element in my initial definition of naturalism, that is its conceptual
and explanatory non-reductionism (GEN), namely that 'the description and
explanation of phenomena may require concepts which do not belong to
the vocabulary of fundamental physics, especially if such phenomena
involve complex arrangements of constituent particles or extensive
interactions with a specific environment'.
19. EXPERIENCE AS EVIDENCE OF GOD?
Do we perceive God? What is the evidential force of religious
experience? Some have argued for a positive answer to such questions
on the basis of similarities between religious experience and experience
of worldly objects. We will consider two arguments to this effect. The
philosopher of religion Richard Swinburne has argued that the
credulity with which we accept experiences of natural objects should
also be applied to religious experiences. Another philosopher, William
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Alston, has argued that believers are justified in taking religious
experiences as experiences of God, despite the inherent circularity,
since we accept a similar circularity with respect to ordinary sense
perception and other belief-forming practices. I will argue that neither
approach is satisfactory.
Before coming to the arguments, let me indicate very briefly some of
'the varieties of religious experience', to quote William James's tide. Six
broad categories may be used (Davis 1989, 32-65). Sometimes events
are interpreted as religiously significant, and the interpretation is based on
an existing religious framework, rather than due to any unusual
features of the experience. There are quasi-sensory experiences, such as
visions and dreams, voices, or the sensation of being touched. Flashes
of insight, moments of inspiration, sudden convictions, and perhaps
even mystical visions may be called revelatory. Perhaps most common
are regenerative experiences, such as finding oneself with new hope and
strength, experiences of comfort, healing, forgiveness, and joy, espe-
cially if obtained in a religious context, such as during prayer. More
dramatic are numinous experiences, experiences of the divine with its
terrifying glory and unapproachable holiness, accompanied by en-
hanced creature consciousness (Otto 1917). In mystical experiences one
apprehends an ultimate reality, with a sense of freedom from limita-
tions of space, time, and the individual ego.
This is quite a mixed collection. The existence of such experiences —
as described by the individuals who had them - is not disputed here.
The Religious Experience Research Unit in Oxford, founded in 1969
by the zoologist Sir Allster Hardy, has collected a wide variety of
specimens of such experiences, in anecdotes and accounts (Hardy 1979,
Hay 1990). Their conclusion is that 'religious or transcendent experi-
ence in contemporary Western society ... is widespread and that, in a
word, it is normal' (Hay 1990, vii). Anti-religionists who dismiss
religious experience as non-existent are not fair with respect to genuine
experiences of honest and able persons (see below, [20]).
Once their existence as experiences is granted, the question arises of
how the experiences should be evaluated, what they imply about God
or about human nature. In general, the most satisfactory interpretation
of widespread experiences need not be the one most obvious to
common sense. As an analogy from physics, we may recall that for
millennia it was considered natural that terrestrial objects sponta-
neously came to a halt; sustained motion required a persistent force.
This is still one of the many common-sense insights that a physics
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teacher needs to overcome. Physics since Newton has interpreted
sustained motion as natural; coming to a halt implies friction, a
resisting force. Without denying the experiences as experienced sub-
jectively, we need to consider whether we should take them credulously
as experiences of God.
Swinburne's Principle of Credulity
If it seems to me that there is a table there, I assume that there is a
table there. If it seems to a subject that an object is present, then
probably that object is present. Perception is prima facie evidence for
existence. The English philosopher of religion Swinburne considers
such a Principle of Credulity a fundamental principle of rationality.1
From this it would follow that, in the absence of special considerations, all
religious experiences ought to be taken by their subjects as genuine, and
hence as substantial grounds for belief in the existence of their apparent object
- God, or Mary, or Ultimate Reality, or Poseidon. (Swinburne 1979, 254;
1981, 186)
Swinburne holds that there is a specific reason to be credulous about
experiences of God, compared with credulity about experiences of
Poseidon or Mary: 'if there is a God, any experience which seems to be of
God, will be genuine - will be of God', as 'any causal processes at all which
bring about my experience will have God among their causes' (Swinburne
!979> 27°i takingup an argument from Wainwright 1973; 1981,7off.).
The claim that, if there is a God, any experience of God will be
genuine, is too generous; 'it would mean experiences such as the
Yorkshire Ripper's [who acted, allegedly, in response to a divine voice]
must be considered veridical perceptions of God' (Davis 1989, 226). It is
not sufficient to count as a perception of God that God is involved
somewhere, say in upholding the laws of nature. I do not, while looking
at a wooden chair, perceive the early history of the universe, nor even
the tree out of which the chair was made, even though both are
causally involved in the chair's existence. I will leave this problem aside
here, and focus on Swinburne's principle of credulity.
In my view, the principle of credulity is either uninformative or wrong.
If one stresses the prima facie which qualifies the principle, the principle
of credulity is uninformative, since all the work still has to be done.
Plantinga (1993, 33) traces this 'principle of credulity' back to the eighteenth-century
originator of Scottish common-sense philosophy, Thomas Reid.
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One still needs to understand when which experiences are to be
trusted. More relevant in the present context is the claim that percep-
tion of an object counts as evidence for its existence, a claim which, I
will argue, is wrong when it is applied without discrimination.
Swinburne opposes such credulity to scepticism. 'Initial scepticism
about perceptual claims - regarding them as guilty until proved
innocent - will give you no knowledge at all. Initial credulity is the only
attitude a rational man can take; there is no half-way house' (Swinburne
1981, 195). Swinburne opposes two extremes to be applied across the
board, denying any discrimination. However, credulity is developed as
an infant explores her world, and the child learns to apply credulity with
discrimination - not to jokes, not to dreams, not to promises made under
certain conditions, etc. We do not live by a general principle of credulity,
nor by a general principle of scepticism. Nor does science assume one of
these principles. Quite often one accepts a theory provisionally, thus
living in 'a half-way house' between credulity and scepticism; the precise
attitude often depends on the relation between a particular claim and
the background of explicit and implicit knowledge, including judge-
ments about the reliability of various sources.
The Principle of Credulity is not an ultimate principle of rationality,
but an inference justified on the basis of past experience. We do accept it
for tables, since almost each time when it seemed there was a table, we
were able to put things on it. We are less credulous about the content
of dreams or about the convergence of railroad tracks towards the
horizon, as our past experiences have not confirmed the reality of what
seemed to us to be the case. If the inference from 'what seems to me to
be the case' to 'what is the case' is based upon past success, it is dubious
whether such inferences can be made in the religious realm. Unlike our
past experiences with tables, corroboration of religious experience is
not as straightforward as putting plates on a table or knocking on it.
Earlier, we considered problems in the transfer of various strategies for
the defence of realism from science to theology, due to the fact that
they did not have a similar record of instrumental success [17]. The
same problems arise when we go from credulity with respect to sense
experience to credulity about religious experience.
An apparently more modest version of Swinburne's argument has been
developed by the philosopher Caroline Franks Davis (1989). Rather than
defending general credulity in all instances, she has argued that
Swinburne's principle of credulity is helpful if there are two competing
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explanations. On her interpretation of the Principle of Credulity, a
reductionist account must not just be shown to be plausible, 'but to be
more probable than an explanation which preserves the veridicality of
religious experiences' (Davis 1989, 228). If a naturalist and a religious
explanation fare equally well, then one should prefer the credulous, i.e.
religious one, because (by the principle of credulity) 'an explanation
which preserves a perceptual experience's veridicality is always prima facie
more probable than an explanation which does not' (Davis 1989, 228).
This interpretation of the principle of credulity is unfair. If the two
explanations are equally probable (if one could ever make such a
quantitative claim sufficiently specific) since they both account equally
well for the phenomena as they appear to the subjects, the naturalist
explanation already has had to account for the experiences of the
subjects (and not only for the phenomena 'out there'). If the naturalist
explanation accounts equally well for the experiences of the subjects,
there is nothing more that it should do, nor is there any further reason
to save the veridicality of the experiences.
Alston's defence of circularity
The philosopher William Alston does not seek to justify religious
experience as evidence acceptable to a non-believer. He defends the
view that people who already believe in God are not irrational when
they interpret religious experiences as experiences about God. The
circularity involved is not fatal; we accept a similar circularity with
respect to ordinary sense perception (Alston 1991, i43f). In emphasising
the rationality of whole practices, he is less 'atomistic' than Swinburne
in his use of credulity with respect to individual experiences (Alston
Alston's main arguments concentrate on non-sensory mystical
perception.2 He accepts the idea 'that every conscious experience is
A special problem with respect to sensory perception is that we are considering the perception
of an immaterial being as if it were material. We are used to perceptions which deviate with
respect to details from what an object is like: 'a square tower may look round from a distance;
a white object may look red under certain lighting; and so on. More fundamentally, there is a
long tradition that holds that secondary qualities like colors do not really characterize physical
substances. Thus it is not inconceivable that God should appear to us as looking bright or
sounding a certain way, even though He does not, in His own nature, possess any sensory
qualities' (Alston 1991, 19). The distinction between secondary qualities (as perceived) and
primary qualities (as true of the underlying reality) is a variant of the Aristotelian distinction
between form and essence. However, perceiving God as a material being while maintaining
that God is an immaterial being lacking all sensory qualities, seems to make significantly
more of the difference between primary and secondary qualities than is usual for ordinary
perception.
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proximately caused by neurophysiological happenings in the brain'
(Alston 1991, 231). Sense perception is none the less perception of
something else, as it is influenced by the light reaching the retina and
by sound waves entering the ears. Similarly, a tight link between
religious experiences and neurophysiological processes would not count
against the validity of the experiences as experiences about something
beyond us, since, as he argues in the same way as Swinburne (above), if
God exists, 'God figures somewhere among the causal conditions of
any occurrence whatsoever' (Alston 1991, 232). He accepts that God's
involvement is not a sufficient condition to make something into a
mystical perception of God, since that would imply that every experi-
ence was an experience of God. But if God were not involved it would
certainly be impossible to consider a religious experience to be an
experience of God.
With respect to God's involvement, Alston sees no contradictions
between established scientific results and central Christian doctrines.
Miracles would not be a problem either; 'the odd miracle would not
seem to violate anything of importance for science. It would be quite a
remarkable coincidence if a miracle should be among the minute
proportion of the cases of X that are examined for scientific purposes'
(Alston 1991, 244). The genuine conflict for Alston is a conflict with a
'naturalistic metaphysics'. However, both a naturalist and a theistic
understanding of mystical experiences have their place in the context of
world views. Thus, both are to some extent caught in a circularity with
respect to the question of whether they include or exclude any realm
beyond the material. If we accept sensory perception (with its circu-
larity), we cannot deny the legitimacy of mystical perception. ''Any
doxastic [belief-forming] practice that is not grossly internally incon-
sistent can be strongly supported if epistemic circularity is allowed. We
just use the practice to determine the facts reported by the practice;
since it will all agree with itself, it will turn out that it is inevitably
correct' (Alston 1991, 143). If we impose restrictions upon religious
practices which we do not impose upon science or common-sense
perception, we illegitimately use a 'double standard'.
I have already argued that an 'odd miracle' would violate something
'of importance for science' [13]. Later [22] I will consider the way
reductionistic explanations in the sciences challenge references to non-
natural, transcendent factors [22]. Here I will concentrate on the core
of Alston's argument, which seems to me to be the claim that mystical
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perceptions are dependent upon doxastic (belief-forming) practices
(such as the Christian Mystical Perceptual Doxastic Practice), which
cannot be defended in a non-circular way, but which none the less can
be considered rational and reliable, since we also accept such forms of
circularity for practices such as sense-perception and natural science
which we consider reliable.
Even though, on Alston's view, there is no non-circular justification
of practices, there may still be some justification for a practice, namely
'significant self-support'. Alston mentions two forms of self-support for
sense-perception [SP]. (i) The practice is fruitful; we can make
predictions, many of which turn out to be correct, and we can to some
extent control events. (2) 'By relying on SP and associated practices we
are able to establish facts about the operation of sense perception that
show both that it is a reliable source of knowledge and why it is reliable'
(Alston 1991, 173). Other practices may not have, and need not have
the same forms of self-support. Beliefs about God do not result in
predictive efficacy, but they provide 'effective guidance to spiritual
development' (174).
According to Alston, significant self-support is always circular. He
therefore refrains 'from taking it to be an independent reason for
supposing the doxastic practice in question to be reliable' (174). Rather,
Alston defends a holist stance towards justification of practices: 'a firmly
established doxastic practice is rationally engaged in provided it and its output cohere
sufficiently with other firmly established doxastic practices and their output' (175).
Apart from the coherence with other practices, there is no way to
evaluate a practice; 'there is no appeal beyond the doxastic practices to
which we find ourselves firmly committed' (177).
I agree with Alston that there is no appeal beyond the collection of
practices, but I consider his emphasis on practices as wholes mistaken.
In science we have differential epistemic justification, rather than
justification of a whole practice at once. Science can be understood as a
collection of a wide variety of interacting individual cognitive practices,
each consisting of various components such as concepts, theories,
techniques, questions (e.g., Kitcher 1993; see [27]). Justification is the
collective result of all the justificatory efforts directed at specific insights,
procedures, questions, concepts, etc. Piecemeal change makes it pos-
sible to justify the various elements of science, despite the presence of a
global circularity in justification, namely the dependence of any
justification of science on current science. Defending another practice
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despite circularity requires a detailed analysis of the justification of
piecemeal changes within such a practice, rather than a global
argument about the circularity of science and sense-perception. Such
an analysis would not provide a general justification of a practice, but
rather result in differential justification of its claims.
Differential justification arises when we study the sense organs, as
Alston notes when considering 'self-support' of our ordinary sense
perception practice (Alston 1991, 173, 250). We can study the ears, and
thereby learn about limitations to the sound frequencies accessible to
humans. Similarly, we can study the eyes, and learn that they may lead
us astray when images are flashed in front of us many times a second, a
phenomenon which allows us to make movies from sequences of static
images. We do not have to take the information provided by our sense
organs for granted, but can rather study the possibilities and limitations
of these organs. In the case of religious experience, we seem to lack
knowledge corresponding to the knowledge of the sense organs
(Donovan 1979, 51). It could be that the analogy between religious
experience and sense perception is mistaken. Another possible inter-
pretation of this dissimilarity between religious and scientific experi-
ences, may be that we are ignorant about these processes, an ignorance
which some might defend theologically. However, such ignorance
would inhibit one from building up confidence in the mystical
perceptual doxastic practice on the basis of increased knowledge about
the relevant ways the perceptual beliefs were generated.
2O. A NATURALIST VIEW OF RELIGION: RELIGION AND THE BRAIN
The heart has its reasons which reason does not know. (Biaise Pascal)
Religion is often seen as a matter of 'the heart', not of reason. The
heart symbolises love, desire, and passion. The heart is uncontrollable
and sometimes contradictory. One does not decide to fall in love; one
falls in love - it simply happens. At least, that is how falling in love is
often thought of. In the Christian tradition the heart has a similar
symbolic value, even though the mind is called upon as well in the
command to love God (Matthew 22: 37).
Since 1967, human hearts have been transplanted into other
humans. During surgery, machines may take over the functions of
heart and lungs. The associations attached to the 'heart' have no root
in the plain reality of this muscle which pumps the blood through the
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body. Even though the rhythm of the heart is affected by emotions, it is
not the seat of all that has been attached to the symbol. The passions of
'the heart' mainly have to do with the brain, and to a lesser extent also
with the spinal cord and the hormonal glands. The brain is not a cool
calculator; all the confusing and contradictory feelings of 'the heart'
originate there. We will briefly describe its complexity before turning
to some ideas about religious rituals (and non-conscious functions of
the brain) and about the neurophysiological basis for religious experi-
ences. Before developing along such lines the view that religious
experiences are rooted in our constitution, I will consider (and reject)
the suggestion that religious experiences should be understood as
pathological.
20. i. Pathological explanations
Only oedipal apes can have religion. (La Barre 1991, 146)
There is a variety of explanations of religious experiences as patholo-
gical phenomena. An otherwise healthy body and mind may have been
set off-track by drugs. Sensory deprivation, which occurs when people
are in deserts, on mountain peaks or in other isolated places, or by
sitting in a quiet and dimly-lit chapel, may act similarly in inducing
mystical experiences. It is thus not too amazing that a large proportion
of seers have been drawn from the shepherd class all over Europe and
Asia (Chadwick 1942, 59; Staal 1975, xii). Isolation, concentration,
fasting, monotonous recitation, dancing or singing to the point of
exhaustion, breathing exercises and other preparatory techniques have
physiological consequences. Such 'explanations' of religious experi-
ences are far from complete; they may explain why one person is more
susceptible than others, but they do not come near to explaining the
specific experience. Concepts and symbols, beliefs and traditions in a
culture may explain more of the specifics, but even then, the combina-
tion of cultural symbols and physiological consequences of preparations
do not thereby falsify the experience as an experience of something;
one might hold that the preparations induce greater receptivity rather
than 'cause' the experience.
Explanations may also refer to social factors, such as pressure from
peers or parents, or effects of upbringing and indoctrination. Without
entering into the debate on the status of psychoanalytical psychology in
general, we will briefly consider here one Freudian explanation of a
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religious phenomenon. A survey of appearances of the Virgin Mary
between iioo and 1896 found that they occurred in about 80 per cent
of the cases to sexually mature individuals without obvious sexual
partners (Carroll 1983, 210). They also occur significantly more often in
Italy than elsewhere.
The distribution of claimed appearances of Mary has been explained
on the basis of family structures. In Italy, adult males spend more time
away from their family than elsewhere, but the father regularly comes
home to the family. Hence, according to Carroll, the bond between a
son and his mother will be stronger than in Northern Europe (due to
the father's absence), but it will be equally strongly suppressed (due to
his regular presence). Therefore, Oedipal conflicts will be more
prominent among Italian males than among males elsewhere. A
religious sublimation oriented towards Mary, perpetually Virgin and
hence not associated with sexual intercourse, will not activate the fear
of the father (castration anxiety). Since the problem is more prominent
in Italy than elsewhere, the solution will be more common in Italy than
elsewhere. The argument for Marian apparitions to females resembles
this argument, with minor differences since patterns of identification
and sublimation are not the same in girls as in boys. Carroll concludes
that:
Marian apparitions derive from an especially strong sexual desire for the
opposite-sex parent forming during the Oedipal period, and that such
apparitions are most likely to occur when sexual outlets are blocked in later
life. (Carroll 1983, 216)
The conclusion is an overstatement; the appearances need not 'derive
from' the sexual desire, even though that may be one of the factors
which contribute to a greater propensity towards such experiences.
The explanation explains, at best, a greater frequency of such occur-
rences in Italy, not any actual occurrence.
The prospects for explaining all religious experiences as pathological
are weak. The phenomenon of religion in all its variety is so widespread
that more structural explanations seem to be called for, both evolu-
tionary explanations - it has to serve some function or to be linked with
something which was advantageous - and psychological explanations,
in the structure of humans, for instance in the prolonged infancy and
consequent dependency which distinguishes them from other animals
(La Barre 1991). I will not focus on developmental psychology, though
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this is an interesting angle worth exploring, nor on the role of
interaction with the environment, though that may be quite important
to the understanding of religion (e.g., Arbib and Hesse 1986). Here, the
attention is focused on the way spiritual life might be connected to the
constitution of the normal, adult human brain.
20.2. The complexity of the brain
The brain is the most complex organ we have; scientific understanding
of the brain is incomplete, though our knowledge has increased
enormously during the last few decades. Since the brain is complex, it
is hard to understand. However, if the brain were simpler, we would
probably be too simple to understand much of it. The following is a
little tour of this rich structure inside our skulls.
Nerve cells in the brain have many connections to each other.
Ordinary building-blocks have six sides, and hence mostly six to
fourteen neighbours. The hundred billion cells of the brain each have
connections with thousands of other cells. Furthermore, these connec-
tions are not permanent; they can develop or disappear. This flexibility
could be the basis for learning and memory.
Within the brain various subsystems can be distinguished. The oldest
structures, evolutionarily speaking, are located close to the spinal cord.
The medulla (brainstem) regulates involuntary functions such as
respiration, circulation, and digestion. The cerebellum regulates move-
ment and balance. The hypothalamus has to do with the production of
hormones. Hunger and satisfaction are regulated here; uncontrollable
eating disorders can be seen as a disturbance at this level. Even though
full-fledged emotions are more closely connected to the next level (the
limbic system), this deeper level regulates the expression of many
emotions, for example blushing (even if you do not want to), compul-
sive laughing or crying, and blind anger. These structures evolved
approximately 500 million years ago - long before the mammals
became prominent.
Approximately 200 million years ago the limbic system evolved in
our mammalian ancestors. Six structures located around the medulla
and part of the cortex have to do with long-term memory, olfaction,
and emotions. Many of these processes are not controlled by higher
levels in the brain; sometimes one feels sad or angry even when one
knows that this is not reasonable; you like someone even though you
know he might be cheating you. Sometimes the older part is referred to
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as the reptilian brain, while this level is called the mammalian brain:
the tears belong to the crocodile while the emotion itself is part of our
horse-like nature.3 The terminology should not be taken too seriously;
crocodiles and horses are not ancestors of humans, but modern stages
of other evolutionary lineages. And, more importantly for the under-
standing of humans, functions of lower parts of the human brain have
changed with the development of further structures.
A third layer of structures is the neocortex, well developed in
dolphins, apes, and especially in humans. Here various forms of
perception and action are integrated; here too is the neurological
correlate for our capacity to handle symbolic information such as
language. The cortex consists of a left and a right hemisphere, which
are connected at three places. The most prominent of these connec-
tions consists of hundreds of millions of links between cells on the two
sides. Although the cortex appears to be fairly symmetric, the two
hemispheres have different functions. The left hemisphere co-ordinates
movements of most of the right side of the body, and vice versa. In
most right-handed individuals, speech is located on the left side; spatial
orientation is mostly located in the right hemisphere. In some severe
cases of epilepsy, surgeons have cut some of the connections between
the two hemispheres. Most tasks are performed adequately by these
patients, but in some well-devised experiments remarkable examples of
independent functioning of the two hemispheres have been recorded.
For instance, a person was instructed to pick up with his hands pictures
related to images displayed to him. The left hemisphere was shown a
chicken's leg; the right hemisphere a snow scene. The right hand (left
hemisphere) picked an image of a chicken; the left hand a shovel (for
the snow). Both hemispheres properly identified the visual information,
and made adequate associations. But asked to tell what he had seen
and done, the subject reported that he had seen the chicken's leg, and
therefore pointed out the chicken, and that the shovel was needed to
clean the chicken-house. Apparently, the left hemisphere noticed that
the left hand picked the shovel, and without hesitation made up a story
to account for the actions (Kylstra 1983, 17; similar examples in Jaynes
1976, ii4f.).
Tight links of chemical and structural aspects to emotional and
mental aspects have been demonstrated in many ways. Remarkably
specific effects of various localised disorders have been documented.
The division into three structures became popular through Paul MacLean; I have taken
examples from Vroon (1989).
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Chemicals may have significant influences on our mental life. A classic
example is the treatment with L-Dopa of patients who had been
'frozen' in decades-long periods of absentmindedness as a consequence
of sleeping sickness (Sacks 1990).
In brief, the brain is a complex organ, which performs many
functions. It is the organ of most major aspects of personality, both
conscious and non-conscious.
20.3. Brains and religious rituals
Most religious rituals address our brains not only at the level of the
cortex. Burning incense or a candle, with its specific smell and light,
may well evoke memories of a 'world past'; smells reach into the
limbic system. The regular pattern of liturgy with the repetition of
well-known words may also appeal to deeper structures in our brains.
Preaching may also affect us there, especially when it evokes feelings
of guilt and sin, of powerlessness or acceptance. Stories are memor-
able; they are not dispensable vehicles for a cognitive argument, as
there is more than the neocortex. Silence, meditation, and prayer
affect the brain in different ways. When we close our eyes for a
moment of silence, while we are awake, certain dominant processes
are temporarily suspended, and other processes may become more
prominent. What these will be depends on the environment, on our
preparation, on our personal biography, and on our culture with its
symbols and concepts.
Some aspects of liturgy may also relate to the differences between
the dominant (mostly left) hemisphere and the less dominant one.
Music is dealt with mostly in the right hemisphere, whereas spoken and
written words speak to the left hemisphere. Songs may have an
emotional meaning which surpasses a cool (left hemisphere) analysis of
their words; upon analysis the words may well turn out to be outmoded
and unacceptable. That liturgy often takes place in a special place -
large, high, dimly lit - may well affect us also in less rational ways, and
thus elicit a different response than the same words would elicit in a
well-lit classroom.
Julian Jaynes has offered further speculations on potential connec-
tions between the left-right differentiation of the cortex and religion.
He has argued that the modern understanding of ourselves as a
conscious unity arose approximately three millennia ago in the period
between Homer's Iliad and the later Greek philosophers, between the
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patriarchs of Israel and the time of the prophets. In fact, before the
development of that unity of consciousness, 'the gods take the place of
consciousness' (Jaynes 1976, 72). Voices of the gods, both as described
in writings preceding the origin of a unitary consciousness and as heard
by epileptics and schizophrenics or by a Joan of Arc, are signals from
die right hemisphere received by the dominant, left one; they are
received as if they come from elsewhere, rather than from another part
of the same brain. Whatever the view of the religious implications,
Jaynes' questioning of the unity of consciousness is supported by
research on 'split-brain' patients (better, 'split-cortex', as other parts of
the brain are left intact) and by analysis of the philosophical implica-
tions of various personality disorders (Wilkes 1988, 100-67).
What I seek to argue for here is simple: we do not know precisely what
is happening inside our heads, for instance when participating in
religious practices, but it is clear that meditation, singing, silence,
burning candles or incense, and many other religious practices affect us
in ways which are not entirely under our control. Dismissing rituals as
useless and ineffective practices would be a mistake based upon too
narrow an understanding of ourselves.
This does not imply that all rituals are good; whatever has power has
potentials and risks. Horrible examples of mass psychology and of
individuals suffering from their religious upbringing make it clear that
a critical evaluation is also important. Nor does the reach of ritual into
deeper layers of our brains imply that all practices need to be kept
unchanged. Renewal is necessary in a changing culture, especially if
the messages of religious practices in the deeper layers of the brain are
to match with the information in the cortex. Otherwise they would not
contribute to integration but to disintegration. Renewal need not be a
reduction to cool argument and abstract ideal -- the richness of
traditions with stories and rituals and music correlates with the
complexity of the brain.
Not just ritual is psychologically effective; religion in general relates
to psychological needs, such as the need to cope with the challenges of
life, with contingencies. As one could say in German, religion is a
Kontingenzbewaltigungspraxis. For instance, the theologian and psycho-
therapist Dietrich Ritschl (1986, gf.) notes that the rise of the major
religions concurred more or less with the transition from humans living
as hunter-gatherers to a sedentary life-style, and the subsequent
development of villages and cities. In the demanding new style of life,
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religion was a way of shaping the lives of individuals and communities,
bridling aggression and stress. This is in a sense complementary to
Jaynes' claim about the origin of consciousness during a later stage of
human pre-history. On Ritschl's view, new demands on humans,
individually and socially, which arose when agriculture developed,
resulted in stress which was resolved in religion by introducing
'external', religious authorities (see also Jaynes 1976, 137), whereas,
upon Jaynes' view, with the subsequent rise of integrated consciousness
such an external authority was replaced by an increased sense of
autonomy.
We will come back to the origin and function of religion when we
consider evolutionary perspectives [24]. If one accepts that human
nature, including human religious experiences, is tightly linked with
the structure of our brains, how does this knowledge affect religion?
One option is to seek to articulate important aspects of theology such
as God's relation to us, in a way which is consistent with contem-
porary neuroscience. In the next section, we will consider one attempt
to do so.
20.4. Neuroscience and experiences of the Absolute
Earlier we considered ideas about divine action in the openness of
processes or as top-down causation [13]. A variant of such arguments is
the idea that divine action is to be found in the processes going on in
the brain. This idea has various attractive aspects. It will not be falsified
easily, as the system is complex. The system is very sensitive; different
outcomes of quantum processes may be amplified to macroscopically
different states of the brain, and thereby to different mental states. The
cosmologist and Quaker G. F. R. Ellis (1993, 396) uses the hiddenness
of quantum processes in the brain and the brain's sensitivity to minor
differences to argue that God may illuminate and guide us with an
inner light, while at the same time allowing for a free response. He
believes that such a view may be compatible both with human freedom
and responsibility and with a recognition of the autonomy of the world;
a view of divine action which would exclude human freedom would
exacerbate problems about God's acceptance of and responsibility for
evil. A problem with Ellis' view, apart from the questionable theolo-
gical use of the superposition in quantum physics, is, in my opinion,
that it seems indebted to the idea of an 'inner cinema' somewhere in
the brain where 'I' see images - generated elsewhere in the brain in a
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process which at the quantum level is influenced by God - and where I
freely respond, whereas I will argue in the next section that there is no
such centre.
More specific about the detailed structure of the brain in relation
to God has been Eugene d'Aquili, who seeks to understand 'the
neuroepistemological status of the experience of the Absolute'
(D'Aquili 1987, 375).4 D'Aquili speaks about the experience of
'absolute unitary being', in which reality is viewed as a whole. This
experience 'arises from the total functioning of the parietal lobe on
the non-dominant side (or at least certain parts ofthat area)' (D'Aquili
1987, 377). The dominant hemisphere deals primarily with our
perception of the external world in all its variety; the non-dominant
one delivers - occasionally, when the dominant one is not dominant -
'the perception of absolute, unitary, atemporal being' (D'Aquili 1987,
378). More specifically, D'Aquili and Newberg focus on 'tertiary
association areas', where we find 'the highest integration of sensory
information . . . We postulate that these areas, under certain condi-
tions, may be involved in the genesis of various mystical states, the
sense of the divine, and the subjective experience of God' (D'Aquili
and Newberg 1993, 179). Among the conditions is a 'de-afferentation',
which means that neural input into certain structures is 'cut off (185),
a situation which can be approached through meditation which
intends to clear the mind of thoughts and words. As a consequence, a
'reverberating circuit' may be formed in the right hemisphere,
increasing electrical activity until it spills over and stimulates certain
other systems, 'resulting in ecstatic and blissful feelings' (187). 'We
believe that this results in the subject's attainment of a state of
rapturous transcendence and absolute wholeness which carries such
overwhelming power and strength with it that the subject has the
sense of experiencing absolute reality' (189). As an integral part of this
process, including the de-afferentation, the role of the senses and also
that of words and concepts is diminished. One comes to 'an absolute
subjective sensation of pure space' (189) and obliteration of 'the self-
other dichotomy' (193).
I abstain from an evaluation of the specific neurological mechan-
isms these authors have proposed above and, other writings on
ritual, the shaman's journey, mature contemplation, and void
See also essays by Eugene d'Aquili, James Ashbrook, Roger W. Sperry, and Colwyn
Trevarthen in Ashbrook (1993), and the essays in tygpn 28 (2 June 1993) dedicated to
D'Aquili's contributions.
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consciousness.5 Which neurological processes in the brain are related
to which experiences seems to me, in principle, an issue for empirical
research, especially since the advent of non-invasive scanning techni-
ques. Whatever the details, some mechanisms which inhibit certain
pathways, and thereby inhibit certain forms of sensory input and of
conceptual analysis, may well turn out to correlate with mystical states
or other experiences considered religious. Of prime relevance in the
context of this study is a different issue: if we can describe such
neurological processes, does this support or undermine a naturalist
view of religious experiences?
D'Aquili and his co-workers argue that their analysis should not be
seen as reductionistic, as 'explaining away' either the phenomenon or
the external referent. Doing so would be 'equivalent to maintaining
that the person's experience of the "objective" reality of the sun, the
earth, and the air we breathe is reducible to neurochemical flux'
(D'Aquili, Newberg 1993, 197). We see two major modes of operation
of the brain; the 'ordinary' one of perception and linguistic cognition,
and the other one corresponding to some experience of absolute
unitary being; the first is ruled primarily by the dominant hemisphere,
the other by the non-dominant one. If we trust that we are in touch
with reality via the dominant hemisphere, why would we not trust, so
the argument goes, experiences governed by the other side? Hence:
it is possible to conclude that 'something out there' is being manifested in two
modes. One mode is the everyday world that all people experience; the other
is the world of ultimate wholeness often interpreted as God. I conclude further
that each mode has equal reality since neither mode can be systematically
reduced to the other. (D'Aquili 1987, 378)
The primacy of ordinary experience holds only from within that
perspective; from within the other perspective there is no question
about the reality of what is experienced thus.
The argument resembles defences of religious experience considered
above [19]: if we take sense perception by the dominant hemisphere
seriously as perception of the external world, then we should also take
religious experience by the non-dominant hemisphere seriously as
Perception of reality. The argument faces similar problems (see also
On ritual: D'Aquili, 1-aughlin, McManus (1979); on the shaman's journey, mature
contemplation, and void consciousness: I^aughlin, McManus, D'Aquili (1992). A criticism of
the neurological circuits referred to by D'Aquili et al. has been given by Rodney Holmes
('993)-
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[17.2, 22]). In this case, the two hemispheres have co-evolved, but there
is no need to say that they function in similar ways. In many respects,
they function in complementary ways; certain structures are more
involved in the perception of the world, others more in emotions or in
creating (rather than perceiving) an encompassing perspective which
allows for balanced action. It is not clear what external input this
second type of experience would have; it may well be seen as an
integration of earlier experiences of the individual and sense-experi-
ence (including the effects of position, smell, and the like). The more we
understand how the brain is able to make up stories (such as in the
example of the split-brain patient, explaining the acts of both his
hands), the less reason there seems to be to assume any additional
input.
The position of another neuroscientist illustrates this well. Roger
Sperry won a Nobel prize for his work on split-brain patients. He has
argued more recently that there is a new mentalist paradigm in
psychology, which considers subjective mental states as 'legitimate,
ineliminable explanatory constructs' (1988, 607). Since subjective phe-
nomena such as purpose, value, and morality 'are vital to religion', this
opens a way to overcome the contrast between science and religion as
mutually exclusive world views. No longer do we have 'a value-devoid,
physically driven cosmos, ultimately lacking in those humanistic attri-
butes with which religion is most concerned' (608). However, this new
understanding comes at a price: the new, mentalist approach in
psychology 'opens the way for a consistent naturalistic foundation for
both scientific and religious belief (607).
I agree with Sperry that an increased understanding of processes in
our brains has its 'price' (even though I do not therefore agree with
other elements of his position). The view that some mental notions
are 'ineliminable explanatory constructs' in no way supports a claim
to the effect that religious experiences require any non-natural input.
On the contrary, the more successful we are in understanding the
richness of behaviour and experience that can be generated on the
basis of natural processes, the less reason there is to invoke further
elements in our understanding of reality. In the terms of the definition
of naturalism presented in the beginning [2], conceptual and explana-
tory non-reductionism (CEN) does not conflict with ontological
naturalism (ON) and constitutive reductionism (CR). We will come
back on reduction below [22], but first, we will briefly consider
contemporary discussions on consciousness. I will conclude that this
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too might be an ineliminable construct which none the less can
perhaps be understood naturalistically.
21. A NATURALIST VIEW OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Humans are not only objects, whose behaviour can be described and
studied by others (a third-person approach). They are also subjects,
who have experiences and make decisions. In religious terms, they may
be seen as persons who relate to God as an 'I' to a 'thou'. Is it possible
to explain our sense of being a self-conscious person in a naturalist
perspective? Subjectivity seems to be a major challenge to a naturalist
view of reality. In this section, I point to philosophical literature which
attempts to answer that challenge. This is not directly relevant to the
understanding of religion, but it does away with one of the last ways of
conceiving an ontological dualism in reality, namely a distinction
between the mental and the material, just as earlier advances in
knowledge removed other dualist models, such as the one relying on
the distinction between heaven and earth. This supports the idea that a
theological dualism of God and the natural world either has to stand
on its own or is to be relinquished.
Who is the T that sees and hears, that listens and speaks? How am I to
think about the mind in relation to the brain? I first want to clear away
a potential misunderstanding, namely that we are dealing with a small
entity somewhere in our heads. This can be illustrated with a sketch of
human vision. One may be tempted to think of vision as a process
analogous to the way films are made. The eyes are the camera that
collects light from the external world; the pictures they make are
processed from the retina via the optical nerves to the brain, where I
look at it, and respond to it with certain feelings and decisions to act. In
my private cinema I am looking at the film of the outside world. But if
one distinguishes the seeing of my eyes (seeing,) from the seeing which
happens inside (seeinga), where T look at the film, what would this
second process of seeing be? Is there a minute T in there, with eyes to
seea? If so, what would this seeing,, of the T in my head mean? Is it
again processing of information until it is displayed somewhere to be
seen3? Such an understanding of vision results in an infinite regress, a
set of Russian dolls inside my head; each time the 'I' retreats further as
information is processed and displayed. The solution is that there is no
such inner cinema or 'Cartesian theater' (Dennett 1991). There is no
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single place within the brain where all the information of the senses
comes together, is evaluated by someone, and where the decisions for
future action are taken. Our mental life is distributed throughout the
brain. I am not somewhere inside the brain; in some way, I am my
brain - though I need not be identified equally with all parts of the
brain. There does not seem to be a subject of the experiences once one
looks at a scale smaller than an individual skull.6
In what way mental phenomena are related to the brain is highly
contested; an accurate account would have to do justice to our
subjective experiences, the physiological processes in the brain, and our
interactions with the environment. An extensive discussion of the
literature on consciousness and other aspects of our mental life is far
beyond the scope of this book. It is not the task of this study to make a
choice among various competing approaches, but rather to indicate
some of the ways in which a naturalist view of the mind might be
developed, and to contrast it to two other approaches, namely a dual
aspect view as advocated by Thomas Nagel (which is at odds with my
constitutive reductionism (CR), certainly when combined with the
emphasis on physics (PP)), and the view advocated by Paul Churchland
that constitutive reductionism with respect to the brain should result in
the replacement of mentalist language by a different vocabulary, and
thus in the elimination of mental notions (which is at odds with my
conceptual and explanatory non-reductionism (CEN)).7
According to Churchland, notions such as beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions are part of a folk-psychology which will be explained away and
There are individuals, such as the split-cortex patients mentioned above [20.2] or persons
suffering from a 'multiple personality' syndrome, who might be said to have more than one
centre of subjectivity. However, in all these cases there are links between the various
'persons'; the two hemispheres of 'split-brain' patients always share the various undivided
'lower' structures of the brain (Wilkes 1988, 100-67).
In the Scientific American 271 (i July 1994): 72-8, John Morgan offers an overview of various
schools on the prospects for a scientific explanation of consciousness. 1 will be brief about
approaches which emphasise the interaction of an organism with its environment. They
square well with an evolutionary view, which states that transmissible traits, organs, and
behavioural patterns which allow for a fruitful interaction with the environment are likely to
become more prominent in a population. Thus, I agree with Looren de Jong (1992, 7), that
'ecological psychology is a branch of naturalism, which takes organism-environment relations
as the central issue in psychology'. Arbib and Hesse (1986) also emphasise the interaction
between an organism and its environment. A move from reflection on 'mental life' to
interactions with the environment is also characteristic of 'connectionism' (Bechtel and
Abrahamsen 1991). I consider such environment-oriented approaches as being within the
range that fits the naturalism considered here, and will not discuss them any further here.
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replaced by neuroscience. Folk-psychology will disappear. 'Its inten-
tional categories stand magnificently alone, without visible prospect of
reduction to that larger corpus' of physics, chemistry, biology, and
neuroscience (Churchland 1981 (1991, 620)). If Churchland is right, we
will come to have a naturalist understanding of ourselves, and in due
time we will modify our language so as to reflect this view.
His expectation that the vocabulary of folk-psychology will be
eliminated in due course seems exaggerated to me. I think that folk-
psychology offers a vocabulary that might still be a useful vehicle for
expressing complex mental (and, upon this view, therefore neurophy-
siological) processes. And even more, the case for the explanatory
usefulness of notions from folk-psychology seems to me to be stronger
than Churchland allows. Hence, I would expect that a neuroscientific
understanding of the brain will retain notions such as 'beliefs' and
'desires' in a moderate revisionist reduction (see below, [22]), rather than that
such notions would be eliminated. However, whatever conclusion is
reached on the elimination of folk-psychology (and the implications for
religion of such an elimination), if the approach of Churchland is
successful, mental language is no challenge to a naturalist view of
reality.
Dennett seeks to respect folk-psychology and thus to maintain a place
for beliefs and intentions as part of our self-description. When I see the
cat sitting near the fridge, I report 'the cat wants food'. This is a first-
order belief about a cat. When I report 'I want food', this is a second-
order report, a belief about one of my beliefs, namely a belief about
myself, rather than a first-order report about some 'I'. However, since
'I want food' appears similar to the first-order report 'the cat wants
food', we take reports about our own mental states as if they are
reports having a clear referent (such as 'the cat'), and hence as if there
is an 'I' inside (Dennett 1991, ßosff.). A conscious state is distinct from a
non-conscious state due to the fact that it has 'a higher-order
accompanying thought that is about the state in question'; the higher-
order belief is reported, and the content of the report is taken as
referring to an inner unit, the 'I' about whom the report seems to be.
According to Dennett, there need not be a centre where everything
comes together. There is a pandemonium of events - Dennett speaks of
the Multiple Drafts model - in which coalitions form and other events
disappear without leaving many traces. Some coalitions may result in
the utterance of sentences in natural language, creating a text, which
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creates the benign illusion 'of there being an Author' (365). Dennett
sees the Self as an abstraction, but one which is none the less real, just
as the centre of gravity of an object is an abstraction (where we assume
all mass to be concentrated) but still a useful one, referring to a specific
place. The Self is the Center of Narrative Gravity (410). Once this view
of the self is in place, the 'higher order thoughts' need not be
understood as reports about beliefs preceding the report; rather, while
being reported they are constituted; 'The emergence of the expression
is precisely what creates or fixes the content of the higher-order
thought expressed' (315).
Experiences of colours (and tastes, etc.) are in the reports, the text
created by the brain, as ways of accounting for reflective properties of
surfaces out there. However, this is not a way of accounting for their
objective properties as uncovered by the natural sciences (wavelengths),
but rather for their significance. That we enjoy certain colours and
dislike others is part of the evolutionary context; warning and luring is
their life, not just informing. And similarly for taste. 'What we want
when we sip a great wine is not, indeed, the information about its
chemical contents; what we want is to be informed about its chemical
contents in our favorite way. And our preference is ultimately based on
the biases that are still wired into our nervous systems though their
ecological significance may have lapsed eons ago' (384).
Dennett acknowledges that his view is eliminative; 'there has to be
some "leaving out" otherwise we wouldn't have begun to explain' (454;
see [22]). Explaining life 'doesn't leave living things lifeless' (455), but
we tend to fail to understand this when it comes to explaining
consciousness. However, even though this view is eliminative at the
level of understanding, it is not (as Churchland's proposal is) elimina-
tive at the level of language; we still like or dislike the wine, and we will
continue to say that we drank water 'because we were thirsty'.
John Searle, another philosopher, also accepts that 'the mental state of
consciousness is just an ordinary biological, that is, physical, feature of the
brain' (Searle 1992, 13). However, he considers Dennett's work among
'several recent attacks on consciousness' (149). According to Searle,
Dennett is one of those who redefine consciousness in a way that denies
'the central feature of consciousness, namely, its subjective character'
(55). Searle's point is epistemological: consciousness or intelligence is not
exhausted by third-person descriptions and criteria (57).
On his view, consciousness is causally emergent. However, it differs
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from other causally emergent properties, such as heat or colour, in a
way which is relevant to the separate status of mental phenomena. We
can redefine the notion of heat, by defining temperature as mean
kinetic energy, and we can redefine red as light with a wavelength of
600 nanometres. Such a redefinition eliminates reference to the
subjective appearances, the way heat or colour appears to individuals.
'But where the phenomena that interest us most are the subjective
experiences themselves, there is no way to carve anything off (121).
Conscious states are always someone's; 'to be a pain, it must be
somebody's pain' (94). Thus, consciousness cannot be redefined in
physical, third-person terms.8 This irreducibility is merely a conse-
quence of the way we define terms. If one accepts the existence of
(subjective, qualitative) consciousness, 'there is nothing strange, won-
derful, or mysterious about its ineducibility. Given its existence, its
irreducibility is a trivial consequence of our definitional practices'
(Searle 1992, 124; contra Nagel 1986). But then, its (epistemological)
irreducibility is not an argument against its ontological naturalness, nor
does irreducibility imply that it is not biological, and beyond that
chemical and physical.
Thomas Nagel differs from Searle with respect to the physical and
biological basis of consciousness. He has argued that a unified concep-
tion of life and the world is impossible; we are left with the interplay of
an objective view of the world and the perspective of a particular
person inside the world. In physics 'we have achieved our greatest
detachment from a specifically human perspective on the world', but
we could only achieve this by leaving 'undescribed the irreducibly
subjective character of conscious mental processes, whatever may be
their intimate relation to the physical operation of the brain' (Nagel
'986, 7). Thus, unlike Searle and Dennett, Nagel challenges the
fundamental place given to physics: 'The subjectivity of consciousness
is an irreducible feature of reality - without which we couldn't do
physics or anything else - and it must occupy as fundamental a place in
Searle also has it that with respect to consciousness 'we cannot perform the ontological
reduction' (1992, 116), but this is a different, more epistemological notion of reduction than
the constitutive reductionism (CR) as used in this study [a]. However, as pointed out there,
my conceptual and explanatory non-reductionism (GEN) does allow for the possibility of
taking entities picked out by terms at 'higher' levels in an ontological sense, for example, a
belief as the cause of an action, or money as the means by which a person acquires goods.
With Searle, I take it that such notions need not ascribe to higher levels causal powers which
cannot be explained by causal interactions of the features of which it is composed, their
interactions, and their relations to the environment (Searle 1992, inf.).
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any credible world view as matter, energy, space, time, and numbers'
(1986, 7f.). Any 'correct theory of the relation between mind and body
would radically transform our overall conception of the world and
would require a new understanding of the phenomena now thought of
as physical. Even though the manifestations of mind evident to us are
local - they depend on our brains and similar organic structures - the
general basis of this aspect of reality is not local, but must be presumed
to inhere in the general constituents of the universe and the laws that
govern them' (1986, 8). A dualism of matter and non-physical mental
substances is unlikely, since the relation between the mental and the
physical is very intimate. Nagel opts for a 'dual-aspect theory'; the
same entities can have physical and mental properties. He argues for
more than epistemic non-reducibility. He rejects the combination of
constitutive reductionism (CR) and the belief that physics is the science
of the fundamental aspects of natural reality (PP).
I consider this position unlikely. The main motivation seems to be
negative, a rejection of the possibility of ever acquiring an objective
view; we cannot know the subjective experiences of others, and
especially not of other species. 'We will not know exactly how
scrambled eggs taste to a cockroach even if we develop a detailed
objective phenomenology of the cockroach sense of taste' (1986, 25).
Such an argument is very much dependent upon future theorising,
both about a physicalist or functionalist view and about the 'dual-
aspect' alternative, which, as Nagel admits, is currently 'largely hand
waving' (1986, 30). I will later criticise arguments which consider the
absence of evidence as evidence of absence [28] ; here we are in danger
of making a similar move from not knowing an objective view to its
impossibility. Furthermore, Nagel moves on from epistemological
impossibility to ontological claims, whereas the first person perspective
could also be salvaged by a form of epistemological non-reducibility, as
defended for instance by Searle.9
In a later section [30] we will consider the possibility of views of
reality which comply with ontological naturalism, but not with the
emphasis on physics and ontological reductionism; an understanding of
the ontology of mental life along the lines suggested by Nagel might be
an example. However, it is too early to give up. I consider it likely that
somewhere in the realm indicated by Churchland, Dennett, and Searle
- to which various other proposals could have been added - there is a
For other criticisms of Nagel's position, see, among others, Dennett (1991, 441-8, 457^-);
Searle (1991, loofT., 116-24).
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possibility for a future theory of mental life which is naturalist in my
sense (see [2]). There is a further reason why this is appropriate in the
context of a study of challenges to religion: such naturalist views are
more challenging to most religious positions than a dual-aspect theory
- and I have argued above for the intellectual virtues of a 'reverse
eclectic' rather than an 'eclectic' attitude towards competing scientific
approaches [16].
One of the concerns which have been raised against naturalist theories
of consciousness is that they explain by leaving essential characteristics
out of the picture. A similar issue has arisen with respect to the
understanding of religious experiences. It is to this more general issue
that we will now turn.
22. EXPLANATION AND ELIMINATION
If you want us to believe everything you say about your phenomenology, you
are asking not just to be taken seriously but to be granted papal infallibility,
and that is asking too much. You are not authoritative about what is
happening in you, but only about what seems to be happening in you. (Dennett
'99', 96)
Explanation and elimination have been recurrent notions throughout
these sections. Does the presence of naturalist explanations eliminate a
transcendental reference of religious experiences? And does a naturalist
view eliminate mental concepts? I will begin with an attempt to clarify
some central notions. I then argue that explanation does not imply
elimination as long as we operate within the natural world. In the final
part, I will argue that a non-eliminative view of our mental life cannot
be transferred to claims about non-natural, divine factors.
Describing, explaining, and explaining away
'I experienced a tree' can be said in two ways, descriptively and as a
judgement. It can be a description about how something seems to me,
without regard to the accuracy of that seeming. I may say 'I experi-
enced a tree, but then I realised I was mistaken.' But experience is also
used as an achievement word; 'I experienced a tree' if it not only
appeared to me that there was a tree, but that I was awake in the
presence of a real tree which I saw or felt. 'This second sense includes a
judgment on the part of the observer about the accuracy of the
subject's understanding of his or her experience' (Proudfoot 1985, 229).
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We cannot explain away experiences as they appear to the subjects.
The self-description should not be reduced or denied, unless one has
reason to believe that the description is intentionally dishonest.
However, it is a fair game of science to explain the experiences as they
appeared to the subject in a different way than the subject himself
does. 'Explanatory reduction consists in offering an explanation of an
experience in terms that are not those of the subject and that might not
meet with his approval. This is perfectly justifiable and is, in fact,
normal procedure' (Proudfoot 1985, 197). Accepting a subject's experi-
ence in the descriptive sense as authentic need not imply the judgement
that the self-description is correct.
This combination, of accepting the experience descriptively while
suspending judgement, is likely to irritate. It deviates from 'normal
interpersonal relations' (Dennett 1991, 83). The visiting anthropologist
accepts all the accounts of a tribe, but at the same time adopts an
attitude of distance and neutrality - whereas the natives do not just
want to be taken as sincere; they want to have their beliefs shared. It
may be a paternalism which irritates, just as when a father says he
understands how the child feels, while at the same time signalling to the
child that she will outgrow those feelings.
If one accepts first person accounts as genuine (in the first sense), is it
possible that science might explain religious experiences or other
important human experiences, and even explain them away?
After an explanation some experiences are gone. Once I know that
what seemed to me to be a snake in a dark corner was actually a rope,
the original experience with its emotional components, such as fear, is
gone. 'It is only ...' An explanation may liberate from unnecessary
fear. It may also be a loss of the innocence of childhood, which
diminishes joy and spontaneity, as in the explanation of Santa Glaus.
This kind of 'explaining away' is effective only if the explanation is
communicated to, and accepted by the subject.
'Explaining away' is sometimes taken in a more paternalist way: the
subject may still entertain her experiences, but the investigator knows
better. While we experience the Earth to be stable, the astronomer
knows that we are actually moving with a speed of a few hundred
meters per second around the Earth's axis. What needs explanation in
this case is also the delusion, why we do not feel the speed. Only a few
are bothered by the loss of the static Earth, but if an explanation is
offered for inner experiences, say of the fact that someone is prone to
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be irritated ('hormones; it is your period'), we are much more likely to
be offended. It seems as if the explanation takes away the genuine
character of the feelings by changing the terms.
Changing the terms is part of what it is to be an explanation. 'If your
model of how pain is a product of brain activity still has a box in it
labelled "pain", you haven't yet begun to explain what pain is'
(Dennett 1991, 455). Explaining why opium puts people to sleep by
saying that it has a virtus dormativa, a sleep inducing power - as happens
in Molière's play Le Malade Imaginaire is no explanation at all, nor is
calling someone 'photogenic' an explanation of the fact that she looks
good in pictures (Dennett 1991, 63). An explanation explains in other
terms, explains to some extent 'away'. However, this need not be
accompanied by the disappearance of the experience. Opium still puts
people to sleep, even if one does not consider the statement that opium
has a 'sleep-inducing power' an explanation.
When we deal with explanations of religion, part of the discussion
should be about the nature of the explanation. Does the explanation
undermine the experience, or does it offer an understanding without
undermining it? The same question can be posed about other explana-
tions, for instance of explanations of mental phenomena in terms of
physiological processes or of biological phenomena in terms of physics
and chemistry. We will consider the issue in that context before
returning to the specific issue of explanations of religious claims,
especially in as far as they purport to refer to something beyond the
natural realm.
Explanation need not be elimination
One of the worries that is evoked by reductionistic explanations is the
fear that successful reduction would eliminate the phenomena consid-
ered, or more accurately, that it would eliminate our common-sense
ideas about them. This is especially a worry expressed in relation to
reductionistic explanations of human mental capacities.
The opposite view of reductionistic explanations is also encountered
sometimes. A physiological basis for a trait can also be understood as
an affirmation of its reality. Genes are not less real for being under-
stood as strands of DNA, and pain is not less real if physiologically
understood. Rather the opposite: if the doctor can locate the physiolo-
gical process underlying my pain, my friends will take my complaints
with more seriousness.
'Reduction' is, of course, a notion which needs to be considered with
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some care. One view is that all empirical consequences of the first
theory, T,, can be derived from a more encompassing second theory,
Tj, which is at least equally specific in its predictions and explanations.
Hence, to explain the phenomena (which were understood as empirical
consequences of T,) one does not need T,. Thus, the phenomena can
be understood differently. For instance, the idea might be that 'reduc-
tion would eliminate psychology because it would be a dispensable
middleman between physical theory and observational statements
about behaviour (including neural behaviour)' (Schwartz 1991, 205).
Psychology and economics would still be useful disciplines and theories,
as we are, for all practical purposes, unable to replace them by applied
physics, but that would, on this view, only be a reflection of our
limitations. And classical mechanics would still be a useful theory for
many problems, but it would in principle be dispensable - as it does
not explain any observations which would not be explained by the
more fundamental theory.
If a theory is superfluous, it is not thereby wrong. Rather, if one
could derive the superfluous theory T, from the more fundamental
theory T2 the first theory would not be autonomous, but it would still
be a good theory for the domain with which it deals. Such a form of
reduction is conservative with respect to reference; it identifies entities,
properties, relations, and questions rather than eliminating them
(Schwartz 1991, 210).
Most scientific reductions do not reproduce the earlier theory but
some theory which resembles the original theory in certain aspects -
classical mechanics is not reproduced by relativistic mechanics; there is
no such thing as classical mass. The reduction is corrective, and so,
presumably, would be a reduction of psychology to, perhaps, neuro-
physiology. But a corrected psychology 'would be a psychology still.
Insofar as correction and improvement "threaten" our current folk
psychology, we should welcome such threats' (Schwartz 1991, 212).
Even in cases where there is no scientific reduction between
functional sciences such as biology and psychology and non-functional
sciences such as physics, there still may be a relevant form of co-
operation between different kinds of explanations, in which one science
results in modifications in another science. A. R. Mackor (1994, 555)
points to one such possibility when she writes: 'Functional explantions
tell disciplines that deal with the causal or computational explanation
what it is that they have to explain, but the findings of the latter might
lead to adjustments in the classification of the phenomena in question.'
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A worry may be that revisions are not ontologically conservative. If
there are inconsistencies between scientific chemistry (with the concept
H2O) and folk-chemistry (with the concept of water), the folk notion
>uld be dropped. Similarly, it has been argued by Paul Churchland
(1981, 67) that 'our commonsense conception of psychological phe-
nomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally
defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will
eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed
neuroscience'. It will disappear; we shall have to choose between our
naive views and a better view. If we have to choose, we are not dealing
with an example of reduction, but with competing theories. The
suggestion seems to be that we have to choose between a common-
sense view and a scientific one, which Sellars (1963, 5) called the
^manifest image' and the 'scientific image', as if they are incompatible.
Phihpse (1994, n) argues that such an 'incompatibility thesis' underlies
a wide variety of philosophical problems. However, the thesis that
common-sense ontology and ontologies as they are implicit in scientific
theories, are incompatible, can be disputed.
The compatibility of a common-sense ontology and a scientific one
can be defended in the case of 'Eddington's two tables'. The physicist
Sir Arthur Eddington distinguished between 'two' tables in his room,
the ordinary one, a substantial thing, and the 'scientific table', which is
'mostly emptiness'. The argument is that these 'two tables differ in
properties, indeed in essential properties, so they cannot be identical'
(Schwartz 1991, 213). The fallacy with the argument about the two
tables, according to Schwartz, is in the understanding of substance -
which is both a common-sense notion (I can lean on it, I cannot put my
hand through it, etc.) and a notion which carries various philosophical
commitments, for instance that the presence of substance excludes
empty space all the way down to the smallest microlevel. The
common-sense notion of substance, say solidity, is underwritten by,
explained by, and somewhat modified by the scientific account. We
might have to give up some, or perhaps even all philosophical notions
attached to substance, but we do not eliminate common-sense solids,
including Eddington's 'first' table. Any scientific description of the table
will have to incorporate the fact that I cannot put my hand through the
table (unless with considerable force and with major consequences for
the table and for my hand). 'If all we mean by commonsense solidity is
the functional notion, we have a reduction of solidity which preserves
the main features of the folk notion by identifying it with its physical
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microstructure, or showing how it is constituted' (Schwartz 1991, 217).
Both tables are equally real; they are the same table. Such a reduction
is moderately conservative rather than radically eliminative.
One can distinguish a range of cases of 'reductionism', ranging from
identification (water and H2O), where elimination would be incoherent;
constitutive, as when genes are discovered to consist of DNA, where the
reduction embeds the original notions more strongly in our under-
standing of reality; approximative, where the uncorrected science remains
useful and relevant; and moderately revisionist, where the effect is not so
much elimination as revision (of our ideas about solidity). 'In all these,
reduction is an alternative to, not a form of, elimination' (Schwartz
1991, 218). Just as quantum physics does not eliminate solid tables, but
leads us to a different conception of them, so too would a different
conception of mental states in some future psychological theory, for
instance in terms of neurology, not thereby eliminate the states. 'More
plausibly, reduction would be a way to vindicate psychology as part of
a unified science' (Schwartz 1991, 219).
Elimination of transcendent factors
The argument that reduction does not imply elimination works less well
for religious experience interpreted as an experience of God. The point
is that any identification or constitutive reduction is at odds with the
transcendence of God. Understanding the notion of 'God' as approxi-
mately valid, introduces the further question as to what it would
approximate. If there could be an explanation of religious experiences in
naturalist terms, as considered above [20], such an explanation would
eliminate any reference to a transcendent being, to God. Whereas the
table is there, though our description is revised, in this case the revision
would eliminate the need for a concept of God. The parallel is not
between the common-sense table and God, but between the table and
the religious experiences - they might still be there after a moderate
revisionist reduction, though perhaps understood somewhat differendy.
But God is one of the causes which was supposed to be behind the
religious experiences, just as the non-emptiness of substance was one of
the aspects of the philosophical notion of substance behind the common-
sense notion of solidity - and at that level, the revision hits most strongly.
The same problem arises with respect to a reduction of psychology to
physiology for someone who is interested not only in resisting the
elimination of mental states, but preserving a separate referent for
mental states, say the soul or the self.
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If the scientific understanding of the table is able to account for our
common-sense experiences with respect to the table (such as its
solidity), we may accept that we have one table described in different
vocabularies, rather than two tables. We may have to modify our
vocabularies to some extent, for instance our understanding of sub-
stance, but both accounts would refer to the same table. The situation
is somewhat different with respect to religious experiences that are
considered experiences of God. If the experiences are understood as
the consequence of complex physiological states, they would still be the
same experiences, but the two accounts would no longer refer to the
same entities. We would have to revise our view of the reality related to
the religious beliefs in a much more radical way.
B. EVOLVED TRADITIONS
The sensuous hues [of art] and dark tones [of religious experience] have been
produced by the genetic evolution of our nervous and sensory tissues; to treat
them as other than objects of biological inquiry is simply to aim too low.
(E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature, 1978, n)
One might attempt to treat human cultures, including human
morality, art, and religion as objects of biological inquiry, and seek to
understand them all in terms of reproductive advantages. The
opposite extreme is the claim that culture, morality and religion go
against or beyond the evolutionary developments in such a way as to
undermine a naturalist view which draws primarily upon evolutionary
biology. Below, I will defend the view that culture (etc.) arose as an
element in an evolutionary successful way of life, but that it is not
exhaustively understandable in terms of reproductive advantages.
Religion and morality fit into an evolutionary perspective, though
some crude variants of evolutionary views of ethics and religion need
to be rejected as inadequate in their understanding of human culture
and/or evolutionary processes [24].
Subsequently, I will reflect on the consequences of an evolutionary
view of morality and religion for morality and religion. It will be
argued that the consequences for morality are moderate, as a proce-
dural understanding of ethical justification avoids reference to non-
natural entities, whereas the same kind of explanation has more radical
implications for theology [25]. In the last section, we will consider how
one might incorporate an evolutionary perspective into a theological
view of reality which purports to be relevant for us today [26].
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Before coming to an evolutionary view of religion, and to reflections
on its consequences for theology, I locate the approaches considered
here in the wider field of discussions about religion and evolution. This
will also explain why some debates which have received much public
attention, such as the debates on 'scientific creationism', are left aside
[23]-
Another preliminary issue is methodological. If religions are seen as
cultural traditions, they function as a framework in the context of
which events are understood. Every understanding seems to be relative
to a particular framework of 'tacit knowledge' (Polanyi). Why should
one give one particular framework, that of the natural sciences, a
prominent role in understanding traditions? Does a scientific approach
to traditions not thereby elevate science to a position outside the
naturalist framework?
Before arriving at an answer, we should understand that the role of
science is restricted. Science is not elevated to the prime enterprise in
all respects. The assumption is that science as an epistemic enterprise
deserves more credit than earlier ways of acquiring knowledge about
reality, or than contemporary alternatives, including 'common sense'
or folk wisdom - even though there may be a great deal of practical
knowledge embodied in these. This does not make science into an a-
historical entity. Rather, it can be seen as the current level of an
iterative process in which knowledge, methods, and criteria 'have been
refined and improved over centuries' (Kitcher 1993, 390). In chapter 5
we will come back to the understanding of science and its legitimacy
[27]. In the following four sections, we will focus on the understanding
of religious and moral traditions within an evolutionary perspective.
23. SIX DEBATES ON EVOLUTION AND RELIGION
There are at least six different discussions concerning religion and
evolution. Three deal with the evolutionary perspective on the world;
the other three extend the evolutionary approach to religion itself. I
will not develop the first three discussions beyond the following brief
survey; the last three form the main focus of the next sections.
i. Most resounding has been the clash between Christians who claim
the literal truth of the Bible, in this case especially the first few chapters
of Genesis, and the teaching of evolution in American schools (see also
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[9]). One leading 'creationist' expressed the clash as follows in a tide:
'It is either "In the beginning, God ..." - or "... Hydrogen" ' (Gish
1982). 'Creationists' see two mutually exclusive positions: acceptance of
the Bible or acceptance of evolutionary theory. Disputes concern not
only the evidence for or against evolutionary dieory, but also the
nature of Biblical statements and the nature of theories. Most con-
temporary theologians distance themselves from creationists. Theolo-
gians have been very critical of the way the Bible is treated by
creationists, namely, as a source of prepositional and a-historical
truths. As theological opponents of creationism see it, Christians do not
believe in the Bible as such; they believe in God, the Creator of heaven
and earth - a belief to which the Bible testifies in the language of its
time. That modern science speaks of millions and billions of years
whereas the Bible counted in generations (adding up to a few thousand
years) is not necessarily a problem for such theologians.10
Among believers more open to scientific insights into evolution and a
less literalistic understanding of the Bible, two approaches may be
distinguished.
2. Natural order has been seen as evidence for design (see also [8, 11]).
Arguments in the British natural theology of the eighteendi and nine-
teenth century were mosdy based on the structure of organisms, either
by stressing functional adaptedness or coherence and unity of type
(Bowler 1977); more recent variants have taken up the argument at the
level of the universe as a whole (anthropic principles, see below [31]). A
classic exposition of of arguments from functional adaptedness is
William Paley's Natural Theology (1802), which was part of Darwin's
intellectual background. Before turning to a wealth of information on
the natural world, Paley considers a watch. If we should find a watch in
the fields, we would conclude that someone had designed this marvel-
lously complex and effective instrument. As organisms are endowed with
an even more intricate and effective structure, we should conclude to a
'cosmic watchmaker'. In his The Blind Watchmaker (1986), Richard
Dawkins agrees that natural complexity - and hence the appearance of
design - is impressive. Dawkins claims, however, that natural, effective
complexity can be fully explained as the product of a long evolutionary
There is an extensive literature written by scientists, philosophers, and theologians, which
analyses and responds to contemporary creationism (e.g., Frye 1983; Gilkey 1985; Kitcher
1982; Montagu 1984; Ruse 1982, 19823). For a history of the evolution of anti-evolutionism,
see Numbers (1992).
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process. The 'watchmaker' is blind, without purpose, foresight or
intention. As with the debate over creationism, the options are presented
as mutually exclusive: either order is the product of purposeful design or
of natural selection operating on variety due to random mutations.
3. Whereas the preceding two discussions tend to be formulated as
an opposition, other believers have been seeking a mediatory ap-
proach. Rather than looking for evidence of design, they have argued
that Christian beliefs were not necessarily inconsistent with the evolu-
tionary origin of species. Or, engaging more intensely with the sciences,
they have been looking for constructive opportunities, reformulating
convictions in so far as they are needed. Such reformulations concern
such questions as: If one accepts what the sciences tell us about our
world, how can we think of divine action (e.g., Russell et al. 1993, 1995)?
Is evolution God's way of creating the world? If so, what does this
imply for our ideas about God? There is a whole spectrum of
proposals. Some consider the possibility that specific divine action is
hidden in what in science is called chance (e.g. Polkinghorne, see
[13.1]). Others argue that chance might really be chance, also from
God's perspective; this would not preclude the possibility that God
achieves God's purposes through chance processes (e.g., Bartholomew
1984). Again others opt for a view of God as the 'Primary Cause' of the
evolutionary process, the laws of nature and the initial conditions,
while holding the evolutionary account to be complete in itself, without
requiring any special divine action within the realm of (secondary)
causality. In taking scientific insights about evolution into account in
theology, the issue is not just creation. Every theological topic,
including the doctrines of God, Christology, and eschatology, is up for
reconsideration in an evolving world (e.g., Peacocke 1979, 1993)-
Reformulation may be sought for various reasons, such as the wish to
defend the consistency of scientific knowledge and religious convictions,
or the desire to formulate an approximately adequate view of reality,
or the wish to develop images and metaphors which communicate the
religious message to persons whose views of reality and of methods
have been shaped by science (see above, [15]).
So far, we have considered three areas of discussion in relation to an
evolutionary understanding of the world; they oppose or combine a
theological and a scientific view of the world, including the apparent
design in organisms.
Humans, with their nature and culture, are part of the evolved
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world. Thus, rather than considering science and theology as com-
peting explanations, or at least as interacting with respect to insights
about the world (as above), one might also consider the possibility of a
scientific, evolutionary explanation of religion. This will be the issue
considered here. If one reflects upon evolutionary approaches to
religion and morality, three discussions may be distinguished.
4. One issue is the history and evolution of Christianity, and of other
religions. Discussions about this are prominent in the writings of
various great theologians of the nineteenth century such as F. C. Baur,
Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf von Harnack, and Ernst Troeltsch, and in
comparative studies on the histories of religions (e.g., Platvoet 1993).
5. Another approach 'seeks to identify just what significance Chris-
tian faith itself has for the evolutionary process' (Hefner 1989, 214; here
Hefner also distinguishes the options 3 and 4). In principle, this is a
project that is of interest not only to theologians or believers, but also
to scientists as such since it seeks to uncover the role of one factor,
religious faith, amongst others in the evolution of our species. We will
consider the evolutionary role of religion and morality in combination
with the possibility of an evolutionary explanation (discussion 4) in the
next section.
6. Theology is more than an analysis of the functions and histories of
religions. A proposal for a theological view of reality seeks to be
relevant, say as a true claim about important features of reality or as an
ideal guiding us in the manifold decisions we have to make individually
and socially. Thus, the challenge arises whether one can formulate
theological proposals which are relevant for us, as well as adequate
with respect to our knowledge about the evolved character of the
world, of morality, and of religion. Some proposals of this kind will be
considered [26].
24. THE EVOLUTION OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
In this section we will move from evolutionary approaches in biology to
evolutionary approaches to morality, culture, and religion. Along this
trajectory theories become more speculative; there is less consensus and
more diversity of opinion. For two reasons, morality and social
behaviour will be discussed before we turn to religion. Firstly, the
literature on morality is more extensive and of higher quality than that
on religion (e.g. Kitcher 1985, Alexander 1987, Irons 1991, Nitecki and
Nitecki 1993). Secondly, religion and morality have been, and on many
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occasions still are, closely intertwined and many of the problems for
evolutionary approaches to morality and religion appear to be similar.
However, despite similarities, I will argue in the next section [25], that
an evolutionary view of religion has more radical consequences for
religion than an evolutionary view of morality has for morality.
Evolutionary biology
Evolution is central to biology. Studies of anatomy and fossils, the
biogeographical distribution (such as Darwin's observations on the
finches of the Galapagos islands), and the biochemical structure of
organisms, viz. their proteins and DNA-molecules, all converge on a
single tree of descent of all living beings on Earth, a reconstruction of
the history of life. Evolutionary theory is more than such a reconstruc-
tion. Beginning with Darwin's Origin of Species (1859) and greatly
expanded in molecular biology, an increasingly detailed under-
standing of the causal mechanisms underlying the development of life
has arisen. Conditions for such a development by natural selection are
threefold.
(i) Traits are passed on to future generations (heredity). Thus, nature
builds upon achieved successes. The material basis for continuity is in
the genes," parts of the DNA-molecules which are mostly in the nuclei
of cells.
(ii) Small changes (mutations) may occur in complexes of genes
governing traits. In sexually reproducing species mixing of genes from
parents also contributes to variation. Thus, new traits may arise.
(iii) Not all individuals, as carriers of genes, are equally successful.
Some are more effective than others in finding food, escaping pre-
dators, attracting mates, conceiving offspring, and raising offspring so
as to become attractive partners (and thus more effective in producing
grand-offspring). Due to differences in reproductive success (differential
reproduction), some traits will be more common in later generations,
other traits less so.
Darwin's theory of evolution, and its later development, is not
merely a claim that these three principles are at work (as most
opponents in the nineteenth and twentieth century would have
Evolutionary explanations consider different variants of a gene - say of a gene for eye-colour
(if due to a single gene). There may be a variant resulting in blue eyes and another variant
resulting in brown eyes. Such variants are called 'alleles'. In the following I will stick to the
more popular usage of 'gene' as a word which refers both to alleles, i.e. variants which may
'compete' with each other, and to the locus where one of several variants may be found.
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accepted as well), nor that they, in the course of generations, result in a
higher prevalence, within a species, of characteristics which enable
their bearers to survive and reproduce. The claim is that these
principles provide a basis for explaining an extremely wide range of
biological phenomena (Kitcher 1993, igf).
Heredity, variation, and differential reproduction characterise the
general pattern of evolutionary explanations. However, differences in
success need to be determined in more detail in each situation -
whether they are due to resistance against drought or to an ability to
run at high speed in order to escape predators. Similarly, the sources of
variation and the mechanism of passing on traits have only been hinted
at; more detailed insights into these issues have been acquired during
what is almost a century and a half since the publication of Darwin's
book. Even with such more recent insights the theory is a scheme
which needs to be fleshed out in each particular context. Thus, if
empirical results seem to challenge the evolutionary scheme, the first
option is to reconsider the way the scheme is converted into a specific
theory for the particular circumstances to which the empirical results
apply. As most evolutionary explanations concern historical processes
rather than controlled experiments, this gives evolutionary explanations
the flavour of a 'just so' story, a story which explains how things could
have happened rather than an account of how things did happen.
Underdetermination (of histories in view of available evidence and the
general scheme) is quite common; the biochemical processes within the
organisms and the ecological and geophysical processes which shape
the environment are varied, complex, and not known in every detail.
Therefore, there may at a certain time be more than one
Darwinian history explaining a certain phenomenon, say the presence
of marsupials in Australia. Independent evidence acquired at some
later time, for instance from geology and palaeontology, may result in
choosing one in preference to the other. A conclusion might be that
marsupials came from Antarctica rather than from Indonesia, as
fossils were found in the Antarctic (Kitcher 1985, 65). A possible
Darwinian history is satisfactory (in the context of this study, and more
generally speaking in the context of arguments about the adequacy of
an evolutionary view of reality) if it explains a feature in way which is
consistent with currently available knowledge. The claim that one can
describe a possible course of evolution is less ambitious than the claim
to have the actual Darwinian history which resulted in the features of an
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organism; the latter requires a more elaborate process of investigation
(Kitcher 1985, 72, 74). The distinction between possible and actual
Darwinian histories is relevant with respect to more pretentious
expectations about sociobiology. Making predictions on the basis of
evolutionary models and giving advice on such a basis about indivi-
dual behaviour or social policies requires more than a possible
history; it assumes that one knows all the relevant factors in the actual
situation (and for the relevant future).
Not everything needs to be completely determined genetically. There is
a species of lice which develop wings if there are too many of them on
a single leaf, but not otherwise. Thus, they develop the capacity to
migrate to other plants if necessary, but avoid the investment when
wings are superfluous. Genes need not fix a single pattern of behaviour,
but can create the structure which allows for variability in behaviour,
depending on circumstances. In humans this plasticity has become very
pronounced.
One might even say that nothing is determined genetically. If a
seed does not fall in good soil, none of its potential traits will come
to expression. A proper environment is essential to the development of
all organisms - the genotype (as the collection of genes) is not
enough to generate a phenotype (an individual as it appears). The
cytoplasm of the initial cell is part of this environment, and for each
gene the other genes are as well, but the environment also extends
to the ecological system and climatic conditions. Though no traits
are genetically determined in an absolute sense, biologists may come
to the conclusion that, in a given environment, differences between
organisms are genetically determined if differences between organ-
isms are due to differences in genetic constitution (e.g., Van der
Steen 1993, 2f).
There are various complications in the evolutionary picture. For
instance, most genes have multiple effects and most effects are
consequences of more than one gene. The selection of mates in sexually
reproducing species affects the distribution of genes. Genes may be
linked to a greater or lesser extent by being more or less close to each
other on a chromosome. The frequency of genetic mutations due to
cut-and-paste work in genetic material may increase due to environ-
mental factors. Selection can be dependent on the frequency of a trait
in the population. An environment may change, perhaps also due to
the organisms themselves. The first organisms released oxygen, thus
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creating the conditions to which later organisms adapted. Humans live
in environments such as cities which are to a large extent shaped by
humans themselves.
Evolutionary success - denned as an increased frequency of certain
genes - is not to be identified with the largest number of offspring. One
needs offspring which produces further offspring. This can be achieved
by mass production or by intensive care of a few, as in birds and
mammals. Concentration of parental care on a few is attractive when
an environment is fairly reliable and the difference parents can make is
significant; the more unpredictable and unstable a situation is, or the
less power the parents have, the more attractive it becomes to have
more offspring and to invest less in each individually. That families
tend to be larger in poorer countries, and smaller in countries with
good medical care, is thus quite intelligible. This is also an example of
plasticity: there need not be a genetic basis for preferences about family
size. What may have evolved is an unconscious tendency to have the
size of one's family in accord with perceived risks and opportunities.
As far as genetics is concerned, nephews and nieces are also relevant;
they carry copies of some of one's own genes. Thus, instead of investing
in one's own offspring, it can be a good strategy to support nephews
and nieces. The inclusive fitness of an organism includes all contributions
to the continuation of one's genes, whether via one's own children and
grandchildren or via the extended family. The notion of inclusive
fitness has become important in the understanding of social insects.
Worker bees invest in the offspring of their queen (mother), and hence
in sisters rather than in their own offspring. This is evolutionarily
intelligible, since due to a peculiarity in the genetic constitution of
males, workers share 75 per cent of their genes with their sisters
(daughters of the queen), whereas they would share only 50 per cent of
their genes with their own offspring (Dawkins 1976, i86ff.).
We have our own view of the causes of our behaviour. Since heat is
painful, I withdraw my hand from a fire. I see a green tree, since the
retina of my eye receives light of certain wavelengths. Such currently
present causes are called proximate causes.
Why are we structured in such a way that these causes work the way
they do? Why has our nervous system developed in such a way that we
experience pain? How did the eye come to be? Evolutionary theories
consider more remote, so called 'ultimate' causes behind the proximate
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causes. Bodies, including nervous systems, and behavioural patterns
have evolved since they contributed to the survival and continuation of
the genes involved. Organisms with less adequate (proximate) mechan-
isms for interacting with their immediate environment did less well in
the long run ('ultimate' cause). To put it crudely, we owe our relatively
good sight to the fact that individuals in our ancestral population who
had inadequate eyes missed the branches they jumped for, and thus
dropped dead.
The preceding paragraphs have presented a brief sketch of evolu-
tionary theory, as it applies to yeasts, elephants, roses, and humans.
Most of it is uncontroversial, though its application is not, and a few
fundamental issues continue to be subjects of debate. For instance,
there are alternative views of the units of selection; some consider not
only the gene or the individual organism but also groups or species as
units of selection (see Ruse 1988, 32-4). And some have argued that the
evolutionary process is not so much one of gradual change as one of
periods of stasis and relatively swift changes (Ruse 1988, 35-9). The
appearance of discontinuity may arise when an area with a certain
population is invaded by individuals from another population which
had been geographically isolated for some time.
For the purposes of this study I assume that such controversies
among biologists do not generate challenges to the main fruit of
evolutionary theory: apparent design in organisms can be understood
as the outcome of a natural process of random change and selection
due to the interaction with the environment. We will now turn to the
idea of an evolutionary understanding of culture and morality.
Human culture and morality
Humans have arisen in the course of a long evolutionary process,
which we shared until a few million years ago with some of the great
apes. Thus, it seems a natural enterprise to understand our constitution
and behaviour in analogy with other species, especially other primates;
a popular example of such an attempt is the bestseller The Naked Ape by
Desmond Morris (1967). Going beyond arguments which rest upon
analogies, sociobiologists have developed arguments about social beha-
The terms 'proximate' and 'ultimate' are commonly used in evolutionary biology, and I will
use them thus in the chapters in this part. In other parts of this study, the quest for an
'ultimate' explanation is not focused on evolutionary origins, but on an explanation of
properties of natural reality as a whole.
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viour and social institutions; arguments which draw upon notions in
evolutionary theory, such as inclusive fitness, and upon reconstructions
of past environmental conditions. Such theorizing has led to various
claims about human nature and behaviour, such as claims about
differences between the roles of males and females, incest, aggression,
and racism.
Many of these arguments focus on behaviour with obvious reproduc-
tive consequences. For instance, Wilson (1978, 142-146) explains homo-
sexuality on the basis of kin-selection; a homosexual may support his
sister's children. Since it can be explained biologically, homosexuality
cannot be rejected as unnatural. Wilson remains cautious about this
kind of argument; it would be illogical and unfortunate 'to make past
genetic adaptedness a necessary criterion for current acceptance' (1978,
147). Wilson does not claim that we are completely determined by our
genetic heritage. However, the more we attempt to deviate from our
heritage, the greater the price in terms of human happiness.
Critics have pointed out that actual studies do not deliver the grand
claims made on behalf of human sociobiology. 'People have unpar-
alleled abilities for assessing both their own situation and the strategies
that are being pursued by those around them. Hence, we can hardly
expect to represent our own behaviour by restricting ourselves to the
simple, unconditional strategies often singled out in studies of animal
behaviour. Nor do we yet understand how to represent the interactions
between the behaviour of individuals and the surrounding culture'
(Kitcher 1985, 436). Two aspects of human behaviour complicate a
biological analysis: our cognitive capacities and the cultural traditions
in which we operate.
The position I will argue for is the following: the emergence of
human nature, including human cognitive abilities and human culture,
is intelligible in an evolutionary perspective, but explanations of human
behaviour which bypass or underestimate culture and cognitive capa-
cities, and the behavioural plasticity thus generated, are inadequate.
In The Biology of Moral Systems Richard Alexander (1987) presents a
modern evolutionary account of the origins and function of morality,
especially of altruistic behaviour. I will follow his arguments here. A first
step is to consider altruistic behaviour with respect to relatives. Parents
invest in their children and grandchildren; they 'sacrifice themselves'.
Though this is altruistic at the level of the individual person, it does not
constitute a problem at the level of genes, since the genes of the parents
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are also embodied in the children. If persons carry variants of genes
which contribute to active parental care, they will, on average, take good
care of their children, and thus these genes will be continued in the next
generation. Nepotism is evolutionarily intelligible.
Partners need not be close relatives. But partners combine their
genes in their children, and thus have shared interests, though only to
some extent; if the husband13 can have offspring elsewhere without
significant 'costs', for instance without being found out by his wife and
without taking away resources from his legitimate children, this might
be attractive, genetically speaking. But the value of mutual trust and
self-esteem is not to be underestimated; the potential costs of adultery
may be significant.
'Shared interests' can be relevant also at a larger scale, say that of a
village, a tribe, or a neighbourhood; one can promote one's interests by
promoting those of the larger group to which one belongs. Group cohesion
in the competition with other groups may well have been significant in
human evolution. In the evolutionary past of humans, other groups of
hominids were a major threat if not the major threat. Culture provides
characteristics which distinguish a group from other groups. Individuals
will serve the interests of the group to which they belong, as their own
interests and those of their descendants are tied up with the prospects
for the group as a whole, at least to some extent (see below, on
deception).
Among partners and neighbours there is, in addition to shared
interests, another mechanism which promotes co-operative behaviour:
reciprocity. It is advantageous to do something for another even if that
takes time (or money, or whatever), if you may expect the other to help
you on some other occasion. The return need not be immediate, nor
has it to be a benefit of the same kind. It is not even necessary that
there is an actual return: 'Whenever you might need help, please call
me' is (if it is a reliable promise) a valuable asset, whether you ever
need to appeal for help or not. The favour need not be returned to the
same person; it can also benefit your children or relatives rather than
yourself. Essential to such more or less direct forms of reciprocity is that
A woman can also be involved in adultery, but the perspective is different. The minimal
investment for a male is semen (and some courting); he could increase his number of offspring
by relating to various women in the same year. A woman's costs begins with at least a year of
physical investment (pregnancy); she is less likely to gain from adultery as far as the number of
children produced and raised during her lifetime. However, there may be benefits to a female
as well, for instance as a safeguard against the male's sterility (Williams 1989, 200, and
references therein).
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individuals see each other more than once - as is the case for people in
a village or neighbourhood, or among colleagues at work.
In some countries, people voluntarily donate blood, without re-
ceiving money for it. It is not specifically given to one's own family.
Nor need the recipient be someone who will return the favour
whenever necessary. Nor do donors receive a preferential treatment
whenever they need blood. Direct benefits or direct reciprocity are not
involved. Behaviour such as donating blood or risking one's life to save
an unknown person in danger of drowning, is evolutionary intelligible
if we take indirect reciprocity into account. A blood donation may induce
in others a positive view of the donor. Someone who is considered to
be a socially responsible person may be considered an attractive
partner for various transactions. Indirectly, this can be advantageous.
The return does not come from the person who benefitted in the first
place, but indirectly, via the culture in which one participates. War
heroes may be dead, but the social costs of opting out may have been
significant, whereas the honour of the dead hero may benefit the
relatives at home. And even if nobody notices one's altruistic actions, it
may contribute to one's own self-esteem. Indirect reciprocity is im-
portant for cultural beings who live in networks of relations, where
elements of status and solidarity are very important. These processes
need in no way be conscious, as if they were directly based on
calculation. Characters and codes of behaviour are mostly implicit, and
probably at least as much culturally as genetically determined, but
none the less real. In an evolutionary perspective one might view the
rise of moral systems as a way of promoting personal interests by means
of indirect reciprocity.
If a certain level of moral behaviour is considered customary, you
cannot fall far behind. Otherwise you might get excluded from the
community, and your children might have more difficulty in finding a
job or a partner. It is advantageous to have social status, to be a
respected person. Thus, moral codes may develop over time, even
without external pressure. A culture might become more demanding as
the expectations shift, for better or for worse. For example, when, in a
group of teenagers, the standard for boys is macho-behaviour towards
girls, or the possession of knives or guns, it will be attractive to have an
above average macho-status. Since all seek to be there, the average and
the unwritten code will change.
To summarise Alexander's proposal: the evolution of cultures with
moral codes may have been driven by two major factors: group cohesion
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(for the group as a whole, against other groups) and indirect reciprocity
(as a mechanism serving individual interests within a group).
Everybody has to be moral, for instance by paying taxes. In the
meantime, as long as it goes undetected, it is attractive for me to get
away with paying slightly less than my fair share. It is attractive to
appear to be nicer, more socially responsible than I am. For my social
investment will be lower, whereas the returns I get from the system
remain the same. It is also to my advantage if I can get others to do
more than their fair share, even if I do not live up to the norm myself.
It might also be attractive to appear to be more naive or dependent
than I am. The other will underestimate me, and thus be tempted to
think that there will be more to be gained by dealing with me than is
really the case. Deception, both consciously and unconsciously, is a
natural companion to morality. This does not only apply to serious
forms of deception; one could also think of make-up and fitness
exercises as attempts to disguise one's age.
Not only is it attractive for me to deceive others. It is also important
to be able to notice when others attempt to deceive me. However, if
others have the ability to spot attempts at deception, it becomes
attractive to hide one's deception even more. And thus it becomes
attractive to spot deception more accurately. This is a self-enhancing
process. One of the ways deceptive behaviour has become less notice-
able is by suppressing it, making it unknown even to oneself. Alexander
(1987, 114-26) holds that the evolution of the brain, with consciousness
and unconsciousness, is part of this arms race of covering up one's
weaker sides and spotting those of others. One's conscience is 'the still
small voice that tells us how far we can go without incurring intolerable
risks' (Alexander 1979; 1987, 253).
It may appear cynical to consider morality in such an evolutionary
perspective. It is understood as rooted in one's own interests (or those
of one's offspring and relatives, or even those of one's variants of the
genes, if genes may be said to have interests). For that matter, the
resistance against an evolutionary view is itself evolutionarily intelligible
too; acknowledging these origins seems to imply that one acknowledges
that one is selfish (in the genetic, offspring-including sense); this would
not be a good strategy in a culture which praises altruism, or at least
mutual solidarity (e.g., Ruse 1993, i52f; Alexander 1993, 187).
Although morality is rooted in our evolutionary past, it is not adequate
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to interpret all moral behaviour in terms of the consequences it has for
one's inclusive fitness. Rather, the evolutionary process has generated
the proximate mechanisms (our psychological constitution and our
cultural codes) which operate within the complexities and uncertainties
of cultures. Moral motives may well be genuine, as proximate mechan-
isms, even though culture and character have their roots in the
biological process described in evolutionary theory.
In the evolutionary perspective one could say that we are all 'selfish',
as far as the ultimate causes of culture are concerned. This does not
carry over to considerations about proximate causes, where the term
'selfish' has discriminative value. It is normally used to point out certain
forms of behaviour which are depreciated, while other forms are
appreciated by calling them altruistic, generous, or whatever. In that
context, the terms 'selfishness' and 'altruism' continue to mean what
they have always meant. 'Altruistic' is a label for behaviour which
promotes the well-being of others (or of the group as a whole); this is
not less altruistic for being an action in the context of a culture which
on average indirectly allows for one's own well-being or inclusive
fitness. In paying attention to motives, the discourse moves beyond the
evolutionary explanation (ultimate causes) of cultural mechanisms to an
evaluation within a certain cultural pattern (proximate causes). If
someone would say that pain is not pain because it serves organisms to
increase their inclusive fitness, he would mistakenly confuse the actual
mechanism (pain) and the evolutionary processes which created the
mechanism. Similarly, there is no reason to deny human culture in the
name of an evolutionary explanation. The genetic background is not
necessarily at odds with altruistic cultural codes. On the contrary, it has
made us into beings who may have altruistic motives:
Kin-selection ... can make it extremely adaptive to be nice to others ...
Because these tendencies do not spring from calculation, but from inherited
dispositions, they cannot be regularly switched off when someone less closely
related heaves in sight. They are not strictly proportioned to blood relation-
ship, but respond to many other cues, such as familiarity, admiration, liking,
and the special needs of others. And in human beings, the complexities of
culture can give them a much wider range of channels than is possible for
other species ... Virtue is as real a fact in the world as vice is, and the variety
of genuine human motives is also real. (Midgley 1985, 127)
To conclude this section: A move from 'selfish genes' (Dawkins 1976) to
selfish individuals neglects the way we are embedded in wider networks
of culture and ecology. We have evolved as moral and cultural beings,
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who can be altruistic or egoistic in character and behaviour. Edward
O. Wilson, author of Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), which
concluded with a controversial chapter on human social behaviour, a
few years later co-authored a book on the co-evolution of genes, mind
and culture, emphasizing the need to take the diversity of cultures and
the development of individual minds into account (Lumsden and
Wilson 1981).'4 Cultural and psychological factors are to be taken into
account in any attempt which seeks to understand any specific human
behaviour or make claims about the possibility for changing human
behaviour. We should be suspicious of short-cuts from genes or from
analogies with the behaviour of other animal species to recommenda-
tions about our behaviour. However, a critical stance towards a naive
sociobiological approach to self-understanding and social policy need
not result in the rejection of the ontological naturalist assumption
underlying sociobiology: humans, including human cognitive capacities
and cultural patterns, have come into being through a long evolu-
tionary process.
Religion in an evolutionary perspective
We now come to the role of religion in evolution, to the fifth of the six
approaches listed above [23].
In The Biology of Religion, Reynolds and Tanner focus on the question
'How does membership of a religious group, or belief in a religious
faith, affect individuals' chances of survival and their reproductive
success?' (1983, 2). Rules about marriage may close or open the gene
pool. Religious rules may allow or disallow premarital pregnancies.
Rules about divorce, widowhood, and remarriage affect reproduction,
as do rules about intercourse and contraception, nursing and infanti-
cide, male and female circumcision, legitimacy and illegitimacy of
children, food preparation and cleanliness, and child care. All of these
are relevant to the survival of children and thus to the inclusive fitness
of the parents concerned. Reynolds and Tanner link the differences
between religious traditions on these issues to differences in environ-
ments; as would be expected (see above, the paragraphs on 'offspring'),
Lumsden and Wilson (1981) shows that even persons coming from sociobiology as developed
for animals without elaborate cultures see the need to introduce culture and mind. I do not
by this illustration intend to endorse their vies of gene-culture co-evolution. The views of
mind and culture may be inadequate, especially too atomistic; for a critical discussion, see
Kitcher (1985, chapter 10), and references therein.
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religious rules promote more care in stable cultural circumstances,
while they promote a larger number of children in less stable ones.
Their view is not sociobiological in a restricted sense, viz., that all
behavioural patterns are genetically determined. It is sociobiological in
the wider sense in that they attempt 'to find a theory that can link up
the characteristics of human cultures with human evolution in the
organic sense (differential reproductive success of individuals, etc.)'
[Reynolds and Tanner 1983, 259); they aim at a theory of culture which
draws upon the explanatory schemes of evolutionary theory. It is in this
broad sense that I will use the term 'sociobiology' here.
Although Reynolds and Tanner widen their considerations beyond
reproductive mores by including care, they still restrict their scope too
much. The biology of moral and religious systems is intimately
intertwined with the whole creation of culture. Or, to express it
differently, sociobiological considerations do not only apply to sexual
morality, but to all spheres of life. To some extent, this liberates the
discussion from a too-narrowly conceived context, from proceeding as
f culture (including morality and religion) is to be understood as
immediately concerned with reproduction. However, it also enhances
the challenge, since religion and morality are not only considered in
relation to reproductive mores but in all other aspects.
Above, human altruism was linked with human culture as the context
for cooperation among unrelated individuals. Ralph Burhoe has
argued that it is in the creation of culture that religion plays an
important role. One of his essays carries the tide: 'Religion's role in
human evolution: The missing link between ape-man's selfish genes
and civilized altruism' (Burhoe 1979; see also Burhoe 1981; Breed 1992).
As Burhoe sees it, in humans genetic information is joined with non-
genetic, cultural information, which is transferred by language and
example. These two kinds of information are fairly independent: it is
°ur environment which determines our mother tongue, and it is our
genetic heritage which determines our eye-colour and our brain size (as
long as environmental conditions, such as food, are sufficient). Because
of their relative independence the two kinds of information can
strengthen each other in a co-evolutionary process.
The constitution of modern humans is different from the constitution
pf our ancestors a few million years ago; the underlying genetic
information has changed. What has most markedly evolved is the
brain, and thus the capacity to use, memorise, and transfer cultural
212 Theology and knowledge of human nature (B)
information. This fits well a co-evolution of culture and genes. To ask
what came first, the genetically determined capacities (brain, possibility
of speech) or the cultural information, such as language, is misguided;
they co-evolved. Humans would not be humans without culture and
culture would not be what it is without the human brain, though, of
course, less richly developed forms of transfer of information by
behavioural rather than genetic means can be found among animals as
well (Bonner 1980, 4).
Burhoe's point is that religions are systems which embody the
fundamental values of a culture. Through ritual and story, religions
mediate between the genetic and the cultural level, as they transfer
cultural information to the brains, the steering mechanisms of indivi-
duals. The first proto-religions may have evolved a million years ago.
Over time, religions have made larger societies possible, even when
genetic kinship was not sufficient to sustain cooperation. One way has
been to create a strong sense of (pseudo)-relatedness: we are all brothers
and sisters. In the Book of Genesis alone we already find three myths to
that effect, referring all humans back to a single ancestral pair, Adam
and Eve, all nations to the three sons of Noah, and relating more closely
the various tribes of Israel by linking them to the twelve sons ofjacob.
Three general claims about religion in an evolutionary perspective can
be made.
i. Possible Darwinian evolutionary histories can be sketched. There-
fore, humans and their cultures, languages, aesthetic and moral codes,
and their religious practices can be seen as results of a natural,
evolutionary process, as stated in the quote from E. O. Wilson with
which I began these chapters: 'The sensuous hues and dark tones [i.e.
art and religious experience, WBD] have been produced by the genetic
evolution of our nervous and sensory tissues', or at least our capacity to
experience these hues and tones in certain environments, under certain
cultural conditions has been produced by natural processes. However,
the complexity which was pointed out above, makes me disagree with
Wilson's next statement: 'to treat them as other than objects of
biological inquiry is simply to aim too low'. I agree that it would be too
modest for biology to exclude the study of humanity. However, due to
the complexity of the issues at hand, we rightly approach human
culture, including art and religion, also by various other means such as
the social sciences and the humanities, which are part of the richness of
our heritage.
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2. The actual history of morality and religions and their actual
functioning in the web of genes, mind, and culture are very complex,
and therefore not clear. The complexities of culture and mind and
the lack of complete knowledge of the variety of actual human
constitutions (and of the actual Darwinian history that produced that
variety) should not be glossed over in short-cuts from genes to
explanations of human behaviour and social institutions, and even less
m short-cuts from genes to recommendations regarding social policies
and individual behaviour.
3. Not only can religions be seen as the product of a natural,
evolutionary process, but it may well be the case that they have
contributed significantly to that process by fulfilling important func-
tions. However, that they were functional does not imply that they are
approximately true descriptions of reality. And what was functional in
the past need not be so now; our situation is in many ways different
from the environments in which these traditions may have been
adaptive. Thus, we come to the topics of the next sections: Can one
reach beyond an evolutionary view of religion to a religious view which
might be acceptable and relevant for us? How can one integrate an
evolutionary view of religion into religion? [26]. And what are the
implications of an evolutionary view for morality and for religion? [25].
25. CONSEQUENCES FOR M O R A L I T Y A N D FOR RELIGION
Before focusing on the implications of an evolutionary view of religion
for religion, I would like to consider the following question about
morality: How does an evolutionary view of the origins of morality
influence our morality? This has been debated ever since (and even
before) Darwin, and is one of the recurrent themes in the disputes
about sociobiology.
Morality and evolution
Thomas H. Huxley, who had the famous exchange with Bishop
Wilberforce (see above, [8]), clearly distinguished the question of
whether Darwinian evolution would be able to account for morality
from the question of whether it should be adopted as an ethical
principle. Huxley's answer concerning the evolutionary origin is
Positive, but he rejects an evolutionary ethics (Nitecki 1993, 24). In his
Romanes lecture (1893), Huxley seeks 'to remove that which seems to
have proved a stumbling-block to many - namely, the apparent
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paradox that ethical nature, while born of cosmic nature, is necessarily
at enmity with it' (Huxley 1894*:, viii). The difference between the
evolution of morality and taking evolution as a guide in morality is in
itself fairly obvious; no one would confuse an evolutionary account of
any physical structure, such as our hands or the wings of birds, with a
statement about evolution as such a physical structure. With respect to
evolution and ethics, at least three discussions have been distinguished:
(i) the evolution of ethics, (2) the ethics of evolution, that is the question
of 'whether trends or patterns can be seen in evolution that can be
assessed in terms of their ethical worth or merit', and (3) evolutionary
ethics, 'concerned with establishing an ethical or value system on the
basis of a scientific understanding of empirical evolutionary events'
(Caplan 1978, 312). Here, we will concentrate on implications of the
first kind of research, i.e. implications of the evolutionary origins of
morality, for our assessment of morality, and consider critically
proposals for an evolutionary ethics. Some of the theological proposals
which will be discussed in the next chapter evaluate the evolutionary
process, and are thereby examples of the second kind of discussion, the
ethics of evolution.
In debates on human sociobiology, one fear - apart from an
unwarranted elevation of evolution to the status of a moral principle -
seems to be that an evolutionary understanding of morality would
undermine the specific moral character of such behaviour. There are at
least four sources for such a fear (Kitcher 1985, 395-434). It can be seen
as (i) the fear that our moral language is a screen for hiding amoral
motives. It can be understood as (2) the fear that, given their humble
ultimate origins, moral considerations are not as worthy as we take them
to be. And the fear can be related to 'ontological' issues, such as (3) the
apparent denial of human freedom or (4) of objective values.
The first dispute concerns proximate mechanisms, such as the nature of
our motives. The suggestion is that we use moral language to serve,
and hide, our own interests. We may think that we are driven by moral
considerations, but we are mistaken about the mechanisms that drive
our behaviour. Instead, our actions are based on (unconscious) calcula-
tions about the consequences of the available options for our inclusive
fitness, rather than on, for instance, concern for the well-being of
others.
In order to evaluate this suggestion, let us briefly consider another
phenomenon: the feeling of pain. When I have my hand too close to a
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flame, I will quickly move my hand away. The proximate mechanism is
neurological, partly automatic (reflexes) and partly conscious (feeling
pain). An evolutionary account of the origin of these neurological
mechanisms does not in any way deny their reality, or the reality of the
sensation of pain. Nor is it reasonable to argue that the actions are
always in accord with maximising inclusive fitness. The reflex still
operates when the doctor comes to inject me, even if that is important
for me and my offspring. As has been argued by the philosopher of
biology Michael Ruse (1993, 147), the way we have become reasonably
good at co-operation (which serves our interests) has been to endow us
with a genuine desire to co-operate. Motives and feelings are not
covering up a supercomputer which calculates which behaviour is most
profitable, but they are the means by which we have come to co-
operate. Thus, as proximate mechanisms our motives and moral
pronouncements may well be sincere.
The second source of concern about the implications of the evolu-
tionary view for morality is the expectation that the recognition of the
evolutionary origins of our motives would undermine 'our normal
assessment of their worth' (Kitcher 1985, 404). Kitcher considers the
example of a childless couple spending time and energy caring for
children with birth defects. To point out that this behaviour derives
from the propensity to care for offspring, and thus arose to maximise
inclusive fitness, in no way diminishes the personal sacrifices made by
the couple and the moral worth of their actions. The remote action of
evolutionary forces 'is irrelevant to the assessment of moral worth'
(Kitcher 1985, 404).
The argument concerning the childless couple in the example brings us
to the third challenge to morality, the absence of freedom. Their care
of handicapped children is driven by the innate propensity to care for
children, a propensity which is 'merely the means that evolution has
employed in shaping humans to maximize their inclusive fitness'
(Kitcher 1985, 405). If their behaviour is the consequence of evolution,
they were externally or internally coerced to behave the way they did,
and thus their actions - though perhaps morally good if judged by the
results - are not really moral. Their behaviour is determined by the
evolutionary past and/or by the environment in which they live. Such
an objection can be raised with any explanation of behaviour, not only
an evolutionary one.
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There seem to be two ways of responding to the claim that freedom
in a morally relevant sense is threatened by an evolutionary view.
Firstly, one might object to the image of humans as puppets, unfree
because they are steered by others (the evolutionary past and environ-
ment), or of humans as robots or simple organisms, unfree as they do
not adapt their behaviour in a significant way to their actual environ-
ment, but rather move according to simple pre-programmed schemes
(e.g., Dennett 1984, nf.). Rather, in humans, with their highly devel-
oped central nervous systems, there is a sense of 'internal coercion'
which is not necessarily unreflective and without deliberation. This
brings us to the second response: freedom is not the opposite of
determination. Rather, freedom is self-determination, that is determi-
nation by my character and desires, controlled by my rational reflection
on my past actions and potential consequences of various options, by
my second order desires with respect to my life plan, and by my values.
It is not clear that such a notion of freedom conflicts with an
evolutionary understanding of ourselves (Kitcher 1985, 405-17).
However, it is at odds with a crude version of an evolutionary
understanding of human nature, which does not pay sufficient attention
to the complexity of culture and mind which generate the possibility
for self-reflection, deliberation, and acting on the results of delibera-
tions - conditions for behaviour being ethical (Williams 1993, 234).
Thus, though human morality is not independent of evolved biological
structures, human morality has further 'conditions that must be
explained and justified in ways that go beyond evolutionary ethics'
(Gewirth 1993, 255).
The fourth fear seems to be that sociobiology undermines the possibi-
lity of objective values with respect to which we evaluate moral
behaviour. It is at odds with an evolutionary perspective to consider
human values as revealed or imposed by religious authorities or as
entities residing in some timeless realm. Thus, we seem to be left with a
subjectivist view of values (rooted in the emotions of the individual) or
with an evolutionary view which grants the presence of values which
are shared by various organisms, but only in as far as these organisms
share a common evolutionary past or have similar interests in similar
situations. The sociobiologist E. O. Wilson has it that values are rooted
in deeper structures of the brain: 'ethical philosophers intuit the
deontological canons of morality by consulting the emotive centers of
their own hypothalamic-limbic system' (Wilson 1975, 563; see also
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Wilson 1975, 3; 1978, 6). A sociobiological understanding of those
emotive centres would, in his view, not so much undermine ethics as
offer an explanation and foundation for the values we need. Wilson
believes that we can thus understand that we need to support human
rights and protect biodiversity (Wilson 1978, ig8f; 1992).
There is something odd about the emphasis on the limbic system.
Why would a sociobiologist consider the higher structures of the brain,
including the capacity to reason about consequences and about
principles on the basis of which certain behaviour could be defended,
to be superfluous, not affecting the functioning of the limbic system,
nor affecting canons of morality? The 'oversight' of the role of higher
structures in the explanation of moral behaviour is, as I will argue here,
even more problematic when it comes to the justification of moral
behaviour.
Whether sociobiology offers an adequate explanation of the evolu-
tion of human moralities is not at issue here; it is assumed that it does
explain this evolution adequately if cultural phenomena and human
faculties, such as the habit of making moral judgements and the
capacity to make moral deliberations, are taken into account (see the
preceding section). Here we focus on issues of justification.
The claim that scientific insights, and especially insights from socio-
biology, deliver the values we need, has been disputed by various
philosophers, including philosophers who do not reject sociobiological
explanations of human behaviour (e.g., Singer 1981, Kitcher 1985). To
take an example, Singer considers a sociobiological explanation for
double standards with respect to extramarital sexual activity of
humans. The greater proclivity towards sexual promiscuity among
males and towards restraint among females is explained in a straight-
forward way: males may gain considerably in the number of offspring
by inseminating many females, whereas females do not, but rather gain
from male support with parenting, and thus from luring males into
more lasting relationships. However, Singer points out that even if we
accept a sociobiological explanation of these differences in behaviour
and of traditional moral attitudes with respect to such differences, we
still may consider such a double standard an example of sexism which
is morally unacceptable; there is room for a considered moral judge-
ment which differs from conventional moral sentiments. And even
more, according to Singer, since sociobiological explanations actually
allow us to distance ourselves from any innate tendencies: 'by
explaining the widespread acceptance of the double standard, we also
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remove any lingering idea that this standard is some sort of self-evident
moral truth. Instead it can be seen as the result of the blind
evolutionary process and, as such, something about which we should
make a more deliberate decision, now that we have understood it'
(Singer 1984, 154). I agree with this argument: a sociobiological
explanation does not offer a justification, but rather an opportunity to
reconsider the behaviour. But then the question arises by what
standards we evaluate our 'natural' moral sentiments.
The committed sociobiologist might say that we do not escape our
biology here; we only bring into play further values which are also part
of our biology, and we strive for coherence - a coherence which may
imply that we have to give in on the double standard referred to above.
In this process of evaluating our moral sentiments, we may reach
agreement with humans from different cultural backgrounds, since we
share a common biological history and structure; rape may be wrong
for all humans, and judged to be so by all reasonable ones, and human
rights may be universal for humans. However, rape would not
necessarily be wrong on Andromeda, in a species with a different
biology (Ruse 1989). We have to live with the resources we have: the
values which are handed down to us by cultural traditions (which,
upon a sociobiological view, are themselves fruits of a selective process)
and the capacities we owe to our constitution. The values are not
believed to be innate in a full-blown form; sociobiologists have argued
that there are 'epigenetic rules' which are innate, and which in the
course of a person's development in suitable cultural environments
result in certain values and behavioural patterns.
The view that all moral judgements are forged upon us by our past
and that they are in a fundamental way species-dependent (as in the
example about Andromeda), seems to me to be insufficient for
morality; it still identifies the moral justification with an explanation of
how we came to have the preferences which we do turn out to have;
there is no room for a contrast between 'what is' and 'what ought to
be'. However, upon a naturalist view as developed here, there seem to
be no other sources for substantial moral judgements than the heritage
of our biological and cultural past. There is no room for the justifica-
tion of ethical decisions in relation to entities in some Platonic realm, as
if we come to hold moral principles by intuiting an absolute moral
order.
However, there are proposals for ethical justification other than an
appeal to moral absolutes or to biologically based sentiments. A
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procedural view of moral justification such as offered by Rawls (1971)
may be compatible with an evolutionary view (Alexander 1993, iSoff).
It does not justify claims about categorical objective moral truth, but
such an absolute, 'rational intuitionist notion of objectivity is unneces-
sary for objectivity', and can be replaced by a social one (Rawls 1980,
570). It is, in my view, a valuable complement to and corrective of our
ethical intuitions as rooted in our biology. Ethical objectivity need not
be linked to a realm of ethereal entities, such as abstract values.
Rather, it 'involves the existence of a standard beyond personal wishes,
a standard in which the wishes of others are given their place' (Kitcher
I985> 432)- A procedural form of ethical justification may offer us ways
to cope with the conflicting interests of individuals.
This emphasis on procedures is not a separate way to morality, as if
ethical values could be deduced by thinking alone. The sociobiological
dimensions come into play in at least two ways: we owe our moral
intuitions (such as conceptions of persons, of suffering, and of a well-
ordered society) and our capacity for reflection to our evolutionary
past. We do not start as blank minds, who develop moral notions out of
nothing. Rather, we reflect upon our moral intuitions, and thus
consider whether they have certain general features which we consider
desirable. For instance, the 'golden rule' which states that one should
not do to someone else what one would not want to happen to oneself,
is a general ethical principle which could be brought to bear upon
many moral intuitions. In our reflection, we may test our moral
judgements by criteria such as generality and disinterestedness, coher-
ence, contribution to happiness and to the reduction of suffering, etc.
We owe our intuitions to the evolutionary past, but they can be
considered and corrected, since we have the ability to evaluate our
primary responses and to act upon such evaluations, though we do not
act easily upon them, as the apostle Paul observed (Romans 7: 19).
Such difficulties underline that genuine ethical behaviour does not
come to us 'by nature', but rather requires moral effort; ethics is not
prediction of what is most likely to happen.
The ability to engage in abstract forms of reflection, which allow us
to distance ourselves from our 'natural' inclinations, is itself a natural
capacity. It may have served other functions in our evolutionary past;
thinking allows for flexible responses to changing circumstances and
thinking ahead may considerably diminish risks. Whatever the origin of
the human capacity for reflection on one's own behaviour and the
behaviour of others, we now have this capacity and can use it for new
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purposes, such as a reconsideration of our moralities. This human
capacity for reasoning and the patterns of reasoning which we are able
to pursue are subject to change themselves. Thus it may seem as if
there is a higher norm by which we would adjudicate whether we can
improve our thinking. However, this need not be the case: in the
complex interplay of intuitions and sentiments, procedures and results
of reflections, and criteria used in such reflections, we may well come
to the conclusion that we could change some aspect in our proce-
dures. (A similar argument can be made with respect to scientific
methods, see [27]).
The criteria which we use in moral evaluations, such as the
requirement of disinterestedness, may also be seen as the product of
our evolutionary past. At some moment in the past one of our hominid
ancestors asked a fellow hominid the equivalent of the question 'Why
did you do that?' in the presence of a third party, and the answer was
couched not in terms of emotions (I like to do that) or in terms of self-
interest, but in terms which were sufficiently general to be recognisable
and acceptable to all bystanders, and thus, perhaps, brought the others
to similar behaviour (Singer 1981, 92ff.). Perhaps, as Singer grants,
before such explicit moral deliberations arose, customs were there as
embodiments of collective reason. The point is that we developed the
habit of evaluating and justifying behaviour in terms which were
sufficiently general to be acceptable to the whole group. As for the
ability to reason considered in the preceding paragraph, the criteria
delineating the relevant group are not necessarily beyond change.
Formal analysis, the application of criteria such as disinterestedness
and coherence, and the moral deliberation of many people together
are important for the credibility of morality, precisely because they
surpass and may correct the conclusions of our ordinary biological and
psychological mechanisms. One might include all these elements in a
sociobiological description, but then ethical considerations would not
so much have been eliminated, but they rather would have been
included in a modified sociobiology which includes consideration of the
mechanisms by which we override the psychological processes ex-
plained by traditional sociobiology. Or one could say that our moral
intuitions are explained by sociobiology, but that these intuitions need
not be our best ethical conclusions, since we can reconsider them. A
similar conclusion will be defended with respect to the status of
epistemology [27]: either we expand psychology by including scientific
procedures, such as double-blind experiments, etc., by which we
Consequences for morality and for religion 221
correct our ordinary belief-forming processes, or we acknowledge the
difference between psychology and epistemology: there is no need to
say that epistemology, or, in the present context, morality is eliminated
in a naturalist view.
Religion and evolution
So far, I have argued that an evolutionary view of moral behaviour
need not be in conflict with the 'moral character of morality'. Could
one make a similar claim for the consequences of an evolutionary view
of religion?
The philosopher of religion Vincent Brummer has argued that,
whatever understanding there would be of the way faith arose in me -
whether pathologically or naturally, as a psychological projection or as
an evolutionary strategy - a believer could always say something to the
effect: 'So that was how God brought me to faith?' In a similar vein,
in the midst of a discussion on ethics, Kitcher objects to the view that
an evolutionary scenario that accounts for the emergence of religious
ideas would undercut the view that religious doctrines are true. 'Even if
Wilson's scenario were correct, the devout could reasonably reply that,
like our arithmetical ideas and practices, our religious claims have
become more accurate as we have learned more about the world'
(Kitcher 1985, 419). An account of origins, how we have come to a
certain conviction, does not in itself decide on the truth of that
conviction. To argue otherwise, conflating issues of origins of beliefs
and of their justification, is to commit what is called the 'genetic
fallacy'.
However, there are relevant differences between the status of
mathematics and ethics, and the status of religious ideas. Mathematics
may be seen as a second-order activity, growing out of the analysis of
human practices such as counting and trading. Similarly, ethical
considerations involve a second-order reflection, upon procedures or
standards which may be fruitful in resolving conflicts of interests with
reference to an (unavailable) impartial perspective. As second-order
activities, they aim at norms of universal validity, but both may be
construed without reference to a realm of abstract objects apart from
'he natural realm with all its particulars. Moral intuitions and
judgements may be considered first-order phenomena, but they do
In a conversation during the symposium 'Physics and our view of the world' organised by the
Praemium Erasmianum Foundation, in May 1992 at Oosterbeek, the Netherlands; papers in
Hilgevoord (1994).
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not need a 'supernatural' realm for their explanation nor for their
justification.
In contrast, religions are first-order phenomena in which there is, in
most cases, some form of reference to transcendent realities, denizens of
another realm. Whereas such references in morality and mathematics
may be reconstructed in terms of procedures for justification (and of
some insights about human nature and the world in which we act),
religions are much more tied to an ontological view of those realities:
gods are either supernatural realities or they are unreal, non-existent. In
this sense, an account of the evolutionary origins and adaptive functions
of religion is a much stronger challenge to the truth of religious doctrines
than is a similar understanding of the origin and function of arithmetic
or morality, since mathematical and moral claims are not so much seen
here as truth claims about reality, say about causally efficacious entities,
whereas religious claims are often taken to be truth claims (though they
can also be seen differently, see [3.2]).'6
If a naturalist account of the way beliefs originated, both in our
culture and in individuals, is possible and satisfactory, there is no need
to assume that they offer an approximately true view of reality.
However, a naturalist explanation does not necessarily exclude their
truth: there might be a supernatural reality, God, who conforms to the
way people think about God in a particular tradition. Although this
solution is logically possible, it has to face various difficulties, such as
the fact that there is a wide and incompatible variety of religious
claims. More relevant to the arguments developed here is another
objection: it would be extremely unlikely that our ideas would
correspond to a reality if the origin of these ideas is not shaped by that
reality.17 Thus, in the example given above, Brummer had to claim
(emphasis added): 'that was how God brought me to faith'. Some causal
contribution of God in the temporal processes that brought someone to
faith is essential to the likelihood that claims concerning God's
existence may be true. But if there is such a divine causal role, the
naturalist account is incomplete, and therefore wrong.
Ruse (1993, '55f.) makes a similar case for a disanalogy between epistemology (the existence
of a train bearing down on me) and ethics. See also above, [22], on explaining and explaining
away.
Segal (1989, 79). This argument depends on a philosophical view of reference which gives
some place to our interactions with the world, but not necessarily on a causal theory of
reference which emphasises the initial dubbing and subsequent use which is supposed to
intend to preserve reference (Kripke 1980; emphasis on wider context in Evans 1973; see
A. W. Moore 1993, 18).
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Thus, there is at least this relevant difference between an evolu-
tionary view of morality and one of religion. Whereas an account of
ethics which avoids reference to a non-natural realm may be available,
a similar move in theology would have more radical consequences, as it
would undermine the referential character of statements which purport
to be about a non-natural God. In the next section, we will consider
two strategies which have been employed to respond to this challenge
for theology.
26. THEOLOGIES OF EVOLVED HUMAN RELIGION
Among those who are not willing to discard evolutionary theory or
diminish its scope, and who also seek to maintain an understanding of
religions as consisting not only of functional phenomena, but to some
extent of true claims about reality, at least two approaches can be
found. Some have argued that the evolutionary process itself has
certain qualities which make it revelatory of God, or perhaps even
represent God. Others, especially Lindon Eaves, have argued that the
religious metaphors should not be considered as claims about a non-
natural reality or about the process of evolution as a whole, but rather
as referring to phenomena within natural reality. We will return to this
approach, but first we will consider representatives of the first option
with its focus on particular qualitative features of the evolutionary
process.
Qualities of the evolutionary process
Various thinkers have emphasised different qualities of the evolutionary
process as theologically significant. Here I will consider the views of
Ralph Burhoe, Gerd Theissen, and Gordon Kaufman, who have
emphasised power, grace, and creativity as theologically relevant major
characteristics of the evolutionary process.
Ralph Burhoe has not only offered some ideas about the role religions
have played in our evolutionary past [24]. He has moved on from these
to a theological proposal about the most adequate view of God.
The scientific pictures join the religious myths in saying that the same system of
reality and power that created the earth and life upon it also created, sustains,
and judges human life, including our religions. It makes little difference
whether we name it natural selection or God, so long as we recognize it as that
to which we must bow our heads and adapt. (Burhoe 1981, 21)
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God is the Creator, the Lord of History - and that is the evolutionary
process. Burhoe sees God as that reality to which one has to bow; in
evolution that powerful reality shows itself as natural selection.
Humans are not autonomous, nor can they pretend to be the Lords of
History. Rather, our salvation lies in adaptation to the majestic reality
that created us, and in which we live, move, and have our being (with
reminiscences of the Acts of the Apostles 17: 28). Natural selection will
crush any individual or group which does not adapt. Thus, science
confirms what most traditional religions have always held: there is a
power which creates and judges, punishes what is evil and rewards
what is good.
Burhoe selects a particular aspect of reality to be regarded as God.
With many theologians, both contemporary ones and theologians of
previous ages, he emphasises divine power and human dependence;
the Lord of History creates and judges by natural selection. In choosing
- in company with many others - these elements to identify God,
Burhoe reflects, implicitly, his Baptist background (Breed 1992, i). Even
though his sense of the majesty of God expresses an antidote to human
anthropocentrism, it risks breathing fatalism - it is the process to which
we have to adapt, rather than a process in which we participate, and
within which we bear responsibility. It does not offer much guidance;
rather than a sense of direction it offers a sense of dependence.
There are other attempts at taking the evolutionary perspective
seriously which articulate other views of God. The German Lutheran
Gerd Theissen sees grace rather than power as the primary character-
istic of God. He argues that in the course of the evolutionary process
an enormous variety of organisms has developed. He argues that this
rise of variety reflects a major feature of reality: its tolerance for
variation. Ultimate reality is tolerant. Thus, whereas Burhoe identifies
God with natural selection, Theissen (1985, 72) is convinced that 'Belief
in the one God is a protest against the principle of selection.' One
reason is that Biblical monotheism gave certain human groups 'a
power to survive' which they would have lacked without such a faith.
His monotheism is not only rooted in biblical history, but also in a
wider view of reality:
where people arrive at the conviction that the decisive 'environment' for them
is God, whose resources can be shared among an infinite number of people
without losing their value, they have found the Archimedean point from
which they can shift the principle of selection which controls all life. They are
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still subject to this principle of selection, but they know that it does not
represent ultimate reality. (Theissen 1985, 73)
Fheissen's argument seems to be that evolution displays an increasing
tolerance for variation, a tolerance which has become more pro-
nounced with the emergence of culture; the ultimate limit corresponds
to a monotheistic view of the deepest reality as God who is inexhaus-
tible, and therefore able to tolerate all variations.
Theissen extrapolates from increasing tolerance for variation to
absolute tolerance for variation. If we were to know the central reality
completely, the central reality (the ultimate, God) would reveal itself as
a reality with unconditional tolerance for variation. If culture reduces
selective pressure, religion is the heart of culture. Theissen sees religion,
and certainly Biblical monotheism, as a rebellion against selection; it
opens humans to a larger reality in relation to which every individual
has infinite meaning.
Rather than the stern God of judgement (by selection) which Burhoe
envisages, Theissen offers a God who is primarily graceful, tolerant of
variation. However, given the historical record of Christianity and
Islam it is hard to maintain that monotheism is as closely tied to
tolerance as Theissen would like to have it - as he acknowledges
(Theissen 1985, 71). Besides, Theissen's emphasis on the inexhaustibility
of God as our ultimate environment, which thus takes away the need
for competition and striving, may well have adverse consequences for
our value-system. Does it help to build up the self-restraint needed in
the human use of natural resources?
Apart from such considerations on the historical and ethical ade-
quacy of Theissen's view, it is also disputable whether his view is
adequate with respect to evolutionary theory. Theissen moves from
observations about beliefs which were functional in specific contexts,
i.e. those of the historical situations of the Israelites, to an ontological
claim with universal scope about the tolerance for variation exhibited
by the ultimate, or central reality. However, evolutionary theory
always considers adaptation with respect to actual environments, local
realities. Some environments allow for a wide variety of organisms of
various species to coexist; other environments are more restrictive.
Claims about the central reality and unconditional tolerance have no
place in such a perspective; evolutionary tolerance is always conditional
on a specific environment. With the rise of culture, selection has
changed, but it has not disappeared, and one could even make a good
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case that it has not diminished. In ascribing tolerance to reality as such,
as an ontological claim, Theissen seems to me to be in danger of
presenting an unwarrantedly optimistic view of reality. A consequence
might be that the continuity between culture and non-cultural evolu-
tion is stressed too much, projecting back on reality the general
regulative ideals which have emerged especially in certain human
cultures.
The theologian Gordon Kaufman seems to combine a sense of
dependence (Burhoe), a sense of grace as central to Theissen's proposal,
and an ethical interest in regulative ideals which are not identified with
actual practices. God is a human symbol, which refers to the serendipi-
tous creativity of the biohistorical process (Kaufman 1993, 267), on
which we are dependent, and which refers also to regulative ideals
which shape human life.
On the one hand, thus, the word 'God' stands for something objectively there, a
reality over against us that exists whether we are aware of it or not: we did not
make it ourselves; we were created by cosmic evolutionary and historical
processes on which we depend absolutely for our being. On the other hand,
however, the word 'God' functions as a symbol within our minds, in our self-
consciousness as beings who are not entirely made from without but who
significantly contribute to our own creation, shaping and forming ourselves in
accordance with images and symbols to which we are devoted. (Kaufman
'993. 320)
As the symbol 'God' shapes human life, one is justified in evaluating
models of God by the functions they perform, especially their ecological
and geopolitical consequences in an era when we move towards a
history and culture which is global, even though it has many local
varieties.
Kaufman objects to 'postulating an "other side" or "other world" ',
though we need to keep in mind that all our knowledge 'always shades
off into ultimate mystery, into an ultimate unknowing' (Kaufman 1993,
3251). Dualism was functional, as it signalled that the normative was not
identified with the given. The normative is expressed in a non-dualist
way in the concept of 'God' as 'an ultimate point of reference'
(Kaufman 1993, 327). Notions such as creator and lord, with their
association of purpose, can be poetic expressions symbolising and
focusing the vast cosmic movement of which we are aware today; these
expressions need not and should not be reified (Kaufman 1993, 329).
I agree with Kaufman's emphasis on the human, constructed nature
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of all symbols of'God', and the importance of functional, moral criteria
in evaluating theological proposals. By emphasising the constructive
character of our ideas, he avoids inferring positive qualities from the
evolutionary process. However, this results in a certain ambivalence - a
problem which is mine as well. On the one hand, the symbol 'God' is a
human invention, a regulative idea beyond the evolutionary processes,
which calls humans to lead adequate and fulfilling lives. On the other
hand, it refers to the most fundamental character of reality. This
problem is not specific to Kaufman; it is an example of the general
problem that we create our ideas, as they are useful to us (functional,
regulative), and then commit ourselves to them (as if they have an
ontological status) - and as such this discussion is similar to the disputes
on scientific realism [17.1]. In Isaiah (44: \cjff.) we hear of a man who
cuts a tree, uses half of it to cook his food and the other half to carve a
statue of God - and then prays to it 'Deliver me, for thou art God.'
This is supposed to show the oddity of worshipping a human creation,
an idol.
Kaufman accepts that we can never reach beyond human ideas, but
none the less 'it will be understood that those who profess "faith in
God" in fact mean to be committing themselves not simply to their
own ideas of God but rather to that reality whatever it may be which
draws us on toward full and responsible humanness' (Kaufman 1993,
355f). Kaufman avoids reification of the dualism of perfection (ideal,
God) and reality on earth. Rather, he identifies the evolutionary
process with God - suggesting that it draws us toward humanness. If
the evolutionary process becomes God, the question becomes: 'how
can we fit our actions into God's overarching activity which is their
context?' (Kaufman 1993, 358).
Why should we fit into the process? The desire to 'fit' is justified
once we have already put a rubber stamp of approval upon the process
by identifying it with God. Such a view is in danger of undermining the
contrastive role of religion, as an inspiration to more than what is
given, and thus as articulations of criticism rather than affirmation.
Besides, an identification of the process and the normative ideals is
unhelpful. 'To say that God is involved in everything without exception
gives us no help at all in making the many quite particular choices of
which life is made up' (Kaufman 1993, 418).
The way out of the dilemma between committing oneself to the
process whatever it may be and the need for moral direction is for
Kaufman, and also for Theissen, Christology. That provides a specific
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content to the values after which one strives, and thereby a means for
distinguishing between whatever happens and what one values.
Kaufman thus seeks to construct our view of God on the basis of what
we know about Jesus and the new order of human relationships
surrounding him, as the events related to Jesus are considered to be a
revelation of the evolutionary process:
In and through Christ the serendipitous activity, which underlies the
evolutionary-historical trajectory that brought humanity into being, has
revealed the direction it is moving with humanity, and what this means for
human lif. (Kaufman 1993, 388f.)
Kaufman notes that tying the image of the truly human to specific,
particular events increases evocative power, but also increases the
potential for serious perversions.
Introducing Christology in this way in an evolutionary approach is
problematic, as the emphasis on the evolutionary process tends to treat
all stages as equally transient and relative to certain environments. By
opting for Christology to introduce particular normative content,
Kaufman returns to the particularity of a specific tradition. Any
theological view which seeks to avoid dualism by identifying certain
qualities of the evolutionary process with God (or ultimate values, or
regulative ideals) runs into the problem that such an identification does
not offer guidance for decisions to be made within the evolutionary
process. And vice versa: emphasising particular norms relates a view to
a particular perspective, which is related to a particular environment,
and thus lacks the universality which is achieved by the attempt to link
theology to the evolutionary process as a whole.
A further problem with such approaches, beyond their lack of
particular values which help discriminate within the process, is that the
process lacks the qualities assumed here, such as tolerance, concern for
humanity, or for Goodness or Beauty. The indifference of nature is to
some extent accepted by Kaufman when he points out the anthropo-
centric meaning of the word 'evil' (Kaufman 1993, soiff.), and thus the
problematic character of the concept 'natural evil' - such as the
earthquake that destroyed Lisbon in 1755 (my example; see above, [5]).
A positive valuation of the process is challenged even more once one
considers the far future, on a cosmological scale, when the Sun and the
Earth will be no more (see Peacocke 1979, 319-29; Drees 1990, 242-53).
Given the problems with approaches which emphasise the evolu-
tionary process, and then seek to justify particular values, one might
Theologies of evolved human religion 229
consider the reverse procedure: why not acknowledge that we are in
the middle of the process, in the middle of certain traditions as
embodied in myths and rituals. It is this point of departure which the
Lutheran theologian Philip Hefner seeks to combine with an evolu-
tionary understanding of reality.
Motivated by myths
Both Kaufman and Hefner are seriously concerned about our situa-
tion, our failure to deal with the global and ecological challenges.
Kaufman seeks to propose more adequate concepts of humanity,
nature, and God. However, can concepts motivate people? Hefner
does not focus on cognitively adequate concepts. He seeks to begin
with existing structures that motivate us.
I believe we will meet the challenge to our culture-formation from the bottom
up, rather than the top down. By that I mean we are more likely to move
through and with our existing myth-ritual traditions into new and more
adequate myth-ritual formations than to proceed from science-based concepts
into new channels. I term the latter a top-down approach, since it tends to
abandon the traditions of the last 40,000 years. (Hefner 1993, 214)
I see various advantages to Hefner's emphasis on existing human
traditions with their myths and rituals. Just as we do not have a
universal language, but only particular ones, so too do we only have
particular religious traditions. They provide orientation, whether for
better or for worse. In focusing on myth which provides orienting
images, and on ritual, which consists in symbolic actions, Hefner is
speaking at the level of particular traditions, rather than having to
introduce them as a kind of afterthought. His conception of theology is
more like a ship which is reconstructed in the open sea with the
materials available,18 whereas Kaufman seeks to take the ship apart in
a dock and reconstruct it out of the best available materials.
Emphasis on myth and ritual is also more congenial to the Biblical
material, for instance in its reflections on human responses to the life
and death of Jesus of Nazareth (e.g., Theissen 1987). It also seems to be
more adequate with respect to the role of religion in personal life,
which is not so much intellectual, but at a 'deeper' level of our personal
life. And the emphasis on myth and ritual is in line with anthropolo-
gical studies which approach myths and rituals as characteristic
Otto Neurath used this image in another context when he argued against the existence of
pure protocol sentences, in A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959
(original in Rrkmntnis in (
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elements of cultures. But we do not live by ritual and myth alone; we
need, or cannot avoid, systematic reflection. Intellectual culture is the
context for Kaufman's quest for clear and adequate concepts as well as
for Hefner's intense dialogue with anthropology and biology.
Hefner not only argues for the importance of myth; the theory which
he proposes has also some of the characteristics of a myth. To see
ourselves as created co-creators is a proposal within theoretical discourse,
within critical thinking, but also a proposal for a new rendering of our
self-understanding, and as such it is a reformulated myth. The notion
nicely captures both our dependence upon the processes that created
us and our responsibility as co-creators. This mixture of dependence
and responsibility is essential to his view of theology: the religious
symbols out of which theology works 'embrace within themselves both
the is and the ought and also an expression of how the two are unified'
(Hefner 1981, 58). Both aspects are united in the core of his proposal
for understanding human nature:
Human beings are God's created co-creators whose purpose is to be the
agency, acting in freedom, to birth the future that is most wholesome for the
nature that has birthed us. (Hefner 1993, 27)
The strength of the focus on myth and ritual - their hold on motivation
and imagination - is also its danger. The idea of an ultimate gracious-
ness in the evolutionary process, or any other academic alternative, is
pale in comparison with the forces evoked by the image of a personal
God up there. Myth and ritual may shape the attitude of masses and
individuals in disastrous ways. Thus, critical thinking is a valuable
counterpoint to any call for remythologising. However, critical thinking
needs to recognise the power and complexity of our genetic heritage
and of our brains. To reduce it all to well-articulated concepts, is to
miss important aspects of human life.
In relation to the importance of myth and ritual, the role of science
can be developed in various ways. Some attempt to develop a new
mythology, drawing upon the sciences. Examples of such a scientific
remythologising can be found abundantly, both among the popularisa-
tions of science and among the literature on the shelves labelled
'science and spirituality' or 'New Age' in many book stores (see also the
earlier discussion on models, [15]). To some extent, the emphasis on
power, tolerance, or serendipitous creativity as main characteristic of
evolutionary reality (as considered in this section), is similar. A problem
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with such approaches is that the achievements of science are not taken
for what they are, but that they are used as a springboard to reach far
beyond them in an insufficiently controlled flight of the imagination.
Hefner represents another perception of the task of relating science
and theology. He seeks to preserve the wisdom embodied in religious
traditions, while scrutinising and testing that wisdom in a critical
dialogue with the science at hand. He does not appeal to a mystery at
the limits of science. Rather, 'God-talk should be viewed as expressing
something about our experience of the world that is scientifically understood1 (Hefner
1993» 8l)-
However, Hefner's approach reaches beyond that which is scientifi-
cally understood in offering a revised mythical image ('we humans are
created co-creators') in the context of a positive view of reality. ' The
central reality that undergirds all of concrete experience and to which we continually
seek to adapt is disposed toward us in a way that we can interpret as graciousness
and beneficent support' (Hefner 1993, 194). Does religious myth, from
which the 'graciousness and beneficent support' are taken, portray 'the
way things really are', a term which Hefner uses in an attempt 'to
clarify what is meant by the terms God and ultimacy'? (Hefner 1993, 287)
Hefner needs a positive view of 'the way things really are', since he
identifies the normative proposal of a way of living with an hypothesis
about reality. 'The only persuasive ground for this commitment is the
possibility that the hypothesis is a true, declarative picture of the nature
of things' (Hefner 1993, 187).
I doubt whether this link between commitment and truth is as close
as Hefner has it. Myths and ritual address deeper layers of human
existence. To be effective at those deeper levels the explicit, consciously
communicated words need not match with the unconsciously received
message. Even within science, an adequate picture need not be true;
the Newtonian view of gravity as a force acting at a distance is not true,
but it has been and still is very adequate for almost all practical
purposes. It is obvious that effective moral behaviour requires proper
knowledge of our situation and of the possible ways to change it, but is
the moral input in the choice itself dependent upon cognitive insights
about the ontology of the world? I fail to see that the moral commands
are dependent upon the 'way things really are'. Hefner writes:
'Christian theology interprets this behaviour [altruism, love] as expres-
sion of basic cosmological and ontological principles' (1993, 197)- An
evolutionary view does not deliver such cosmological principles; love
and altruism are phenomena which have arisen in certain contexts.
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The command to love is not wrong if reality is indifferent rather than
loving; love would still exist as a real phenomenon within reality even if
one could not consider reality as a whole to be loving.
This brings me to the next author, Lindon Eaves. He does not seek
to discern certain qualities of the evolutionary process as a whole, but
rather considers the nature of religious language as a language used
within particular environments.
Nature and nature's God (Braves)
Lindon Eaves, geneticist and Episcopalian priest, agrees with the other
authors considered here in treating religion as speaking in and about
this reality, rather than about 'another world'. 'Reality shapes itself
(Eaves 1991, 501). None the less, it is useful to distinguish 'nature' from
'nature's God'. Why can there be such a distinction?
The glimmer of a biological answer to that question is that we cannot live
simply in a world of 'is'. The process of natural selection also produces an
'ought' within nature, in the form of the DNA-coded history of many past
experiments with nature. The capacity to 'dream', however fragmentary the
dreams, and to conceive of an alternative world, may also be DNA's solution
to potentially inhospitable environments. The 'ought' and the 'dream' are
experienced as 'nature's God', that is, as the existential pole of an evolutionary
adaptive 'is' embedded in nature. (Eaves 1991, 501)
In making a distinction between 'nature' and 'nature's God', Eaves
avoids the problem of affirming qualities of the evolutionary process
such as power, tolerance of variation, or creativity; our God-language
refers to a segment of our experiences with reality, especially some
which are unconscious and intractable for us:
At least part of the human consciousness of transcendence may stem from the
fact that we bear in our genes non-cognitive ways of functioning that have
been adaptive in the past . . . humans are puzzled by their awareness of the
divine and feel compelled to give a name and coherence to its basis in reality
beyond immediate experience. (Eaves and Gross 1992, 272)
The claim is not that specific myths are coded in the DNA, but rather
that 'the processes of encoding and ontogenetic decoding of adaptive
responses characteristic of the continuity of the germ line represent a
material foundation to the basic elements' of the idea that we grasp
transcendent Ideas by anamnesis, or that we have a 'collective uncon-
scious' which harbours archetypes (Eaves and Gross 1992, 272).
Eaves and the theologian Gross go on to consider the biological basis
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of religious notions such as grace and evil, community and diversity, sin
and death, transformation and fulfilment. However, developing new
ways of thinking about traditional religious concepts is only part of the
job. More challenging is another question:
How does a geneticist maintain his or her integrity while standing at the altar
on Sunday talking to (not merely about) God? (Eaves 1991, 495)
Why continue using personal language? Eaves considers the personal
language to be metaphorical. However, in metaphors it does speak
about important aspects of reality which would be less adequately
addressed in non-personal language.
Clearly, the 'thou' is metaphoric. But the puzzle for biology is accounting for
the power of the 'thou' compared with the 'it'. That is, even if the 'thou' is
metaphoric, something is lost when we attempt to translate the religious
reality to the language of'it', much as the joy of sex is not always enhanced by
understanding the neurobiology of orgasm. (Eaves 1991, 502)
I do not think that 'the puzzle for biology' is to account for the power
of personal over impersonal metaphors. In our evolutionary past (and
in our present), people, and to a large extent also animals, have always
evoked stronger responses of fear and affinity than inanimate objects.
Whenever inanimate processes were experienced as unpredictable, a
personal metaphor became quite prominent - spirits, demons, or gods
of winds and water, for instance. Animism is a 'natural' way of
experiencing the whims of nature, our 'manifest image'; many people
even speak in such a way about cars or computers.
The problem is not the power of personal metaphors, but whether
we can justify continuing to use such personal metaphors, even when
we have become aware of their metaphorical character. Eaves makes
the analogy with the joy of sex and the neurobiology of orgasm. There
we use both kinds of language, whenever appropriate. The personal
and affective dimensions can be there, and be communicated to the
other, and thus have genuine meaning and consequences, whatever
further analysis the neurobiologist offers. The demise of dualism
between matter and spirit, between the chemical basis of life and the
affective and cognitive features in humans and their cultures, may
undermine the last analogy for a dualism between God and the world.
However, it need not deprive us of a rich language which, in different
ways, makes sense of higher and lower levels of analysis - a language in
which the metaphor of a 'thou' to which we speak and sing may be
appropriate for certain purposes, especially in our responses to
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phenomena which we do not control or understand, for which we feel
grateful or which we are unwilling to accept. Eaves's approach avoids
an absolute ontological claim about 'the way things really are',
'ultimate reality', or the overall direction of the evolutionary process.
Concluding remarks: functional and immanent ontological religion
We have considered two tendencies in theological proposals which seek
to take an evolutionary view of everything very seriously. On the one
hand, there is the tendency to focus on the evolutionary process as a
whole, and to argue that it has certain features (power, tolerance,
creativity), which justify a religious view of evolutionary reality. On the
other hand, there is the proposal to consider different aspects within
reality, such as the wisdom from the past which is encoded in our genes
and articulated in religious metaphors, or the regulative ideals which
humans construct.
In my opinion, the second approach has two major advantages. It is
more in line with an evolutionary understanding of reality, which
focuses on particular contexts rather than on the whole and which does
not seem to justify an evaluation of the evolutionary process in positive
religious terms, such as grace. And it allows for a contrastive role of
religions, as systems which confront us with a sense of distance between
what is and what should be, a prophetic role for religion, whereas the
first approach aligns more with a mystical religious view which gives
primacy to the sense of belonging to a harmonious whole. I do agree
that there is a genuine role for reflections upon the whole, but they do
not so much support answers (such as 'ultimate reality is tolerant') as
provide an awareness of limitations, questions which remain open, as I
will argue in the next and final chapter of this study.
I see particular religious traditions, which propose answers or
responses to such limitations, as phenomena within reality, which have
a certain role and reflect certain features of natural reality in a
metaphorical way. As Eaves (1991, 499) formulated it, religions provide
'a symbolic and metaphorical framework for speaking (inadequately) of
an overwhelmingly powerful and mysterious prevenient biological
reality whose origins are lost in the mists of evolution and hidden from
language and logic in the genetic code' (Eaves 1991, 499). Hence,
religion is neither about a supernatural reality, transcending the
evolutionary process, nor is it purely functional, merely clothed with a
fictional aura of facticity (as in Geertz 1973, gof, see [3.1]). There is an
ontological aspect to the position articulated by Eaves and Gross:
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religious language reflects the rich reality of our genes and cultures
with all the adaptive wisdom thus encoded, wisdom which is not
exhaustively accessible to analysis.
To some extent this is a return to the God-of-the-gaps. We do not
use religious language to account for lightning, since we understand
lightning and are able to manipulate it by putting up lightning rods.
However, we do use religious metaphors in dealing with aspects of
reality which are 'hidden from language and logic in the genetic code'.
However, the discredited strategy of postulating a God-of-the-gaps has
tried to rill apparent holes in natural processes as described by the
sciences with the action of a supernatural being. Here, there is no
similar ontological claim, as if the absence of evidence (of a naturalist
explanation) is the evidence of absence (impossibility of a natural
process by which the aspects which are 'hidden from language and
logic' could have arisen).
The wisdom in our genes and our traditions stems from our tribal
past; it need not be the wisdom for today or tomorrow. Thus, whereas
we should not and cannot deny our evolutionary heritage, critical
analysis and normative reflection, as they arose in our heritage, remain
called for.
5
Science, religion, and naturalism
In the preceding two chapters we considered the impact of knowledge
of the world and of knowledge of humans on various arguments about
the relationship between religion and science. In this final part I move
on from discussions on particular issues to a general articulation of my
own position on science, reality, and religion. I also intend to present
arguments against the two alternatives which I consider most challen-
ging. Some dismiss all forms of religion by opting for a more radical
naturalism which conflicts with those elements in my naturalism that
provide minimal room for religion, i.e. conceptual and explanatory
non-reductionism (CEN) and limit questions (LQ). Others opt for a
richer naturalism which seeks to salvage religion in a realist way by
giving a less prominent place to the natural sciences, and in particular
to physics and functional, evolutionary explanations (thus contra CR,
PP, EEP; see also [2]). In addition to opposing other views, I will also
indicate how one can articulate some form of personal faith and
theology in the context of the naturalism defended here.
To achieve these ends, I will draw together the various elements of the
naturalist view in three sections dealing with science, reality, and
religion. Firstly, in the naturalist view developed here the natural
sciences play a major role. I will argue that the significance of science
for our view of the world does not elevate science to a position beyond
the naturalist view. The main contributor to a naturalist view can be
understood and justified naturalistically [27]. Secondly, we will consider
a naturalist understanding of reality and the consequences this has for
religious views [28]. Thirdly, we consider a naturalist understanding of
religion [29].
Then I will consider three major options for theology in relation to
such a naturalist perspective.
236
Science in a naturalist perspective 237
We begin with the possibility of a different naturalism, which accepts
science but seeks to offer another view of reality than the naturalist one
presented here [30].
Then we come to an understanding of God which emphasises God's
transcendence with respect to natural processes in such a way that
there can be no conflict with a naturalist view. Such a view interacts
with the sciences with respect to the understanding of time. It can also
be seen as a response to limit-questions as they arise in relation to a
naturalist view [31].
In the final section [32] I draw upon this non-temporal under-
standing of God's transcendence and upon theologies which build
upon an evolutionary understanding of religion, relating their
concept of God to 'the way things really are', as discussed above
[26]. However, such ideas are not so much affirmed as realist claims,
but rather accepted as speculations and regulative ideals. Religion
can be accepted as a particular human articulation of a way of life,
an articulation which is qualified and relativised by a sense of
transcendence which may be nourished by reflections on limit-
questions [32].
27. SCIENCE IN A NATURALIST PERSPECTIVE '
We need a view of science which avoids understatement as well as
overstatement. If we have a too modest view of science, it ceases to be
relevant. And if I have offered a too pretentious view of science,
science itself will become something supernatural -- which would
make naturalism self-contradictory, as it would be unable to accom-
modate its most important contributing source, the natural sciences.
The demise of the 'Legend' that science delivers truth in some a-
historical way (see [2]) saves us from such an inconsistency. However,
once one has avoided overstatement, one runs the risk of under-
statement. If science can be understood in naturalist terms as a
phenomenon which arose and developed through a natural process,
This section mainly follows Kitcher (1993), from whence the term 'Legend' has been taken.
Giere offers another example of a naturalist view of science as a cognitive practice, 'requiring
no special type of rationality beyond the effective use of available means to achieve desired
goals' (1988, xvii), an approach which fits well with a naturalist emphasis on evolution. A
label for such naturalist approaches to knowledge is also 'es'olutionary epistemology' or
'naturalist epistemology', as referring to approaches which link the study of how people
actually form beliefs, theories, etc., to ideas about the justification of beliefs, theories, etc.; see
essays in Kornblith, ed. (1994).
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and in which judgements arise through social interactions, interactions
with nature, and individual, natural, cognitive processes, without
reference to some absolute rational principles, we then need to argue
for its special status in comparison with other practices.
An analogy may be the development of precision tools. Can one
understand that one can make a precision tool for measuring lengths in
microns (a thousandth of a millimetre), even if one has to start with a
shed which contains only large and imprecise tools? The answer is: Yes.
We can trace the history of technology, and thus come to see how new
instruments have been made by means of a preceding generation of
instruments. One could not construct a precision instrument at the
level of microns in one step from scratch, say with only plain hammers
and screwdrivers. Our current generation of tools is the fruit of a long
chain of technological achievements. Rather than a jump from the
bottom to the present level, the history of technology resembles an
ascending spiral.
Similarly, the development of science is characterised by a long and
convoluted road of perpetual modification. However, there is one
relevant difference between science and technology: whereas tech-
nology may be judged by non-epistemic, namely practical goals,
science is, in the present context, defended for its epistemic success.
Thus, the norm for science is more abstract and elusive than the norm
for technology, though the norm for technology might turn out to be
hard to agree upon once one passes beyond the instrumental success to
its contribution to human flourishing.
A naturalist view of science can be challenged in various ways. For
instance, a naturalist view presents humans with all their capacities as
biological beings, with limited memories and limited capacities for
rational reflection. If humans are markedly limited in these ways, one
could argue, science as a successful rational enterprise cannot be
what it is. Hence, humans must be more than merely biological
beings; their capacities as they are evidenced in science, and perhaps
also in other activities, reach beyond what can be understood
naturalistically (see [18]). One might also focus not so much on
human capacities as on the norms by which science is evaluated.
How could one ever evaluate these norms, if not by reference to
some higher standard?
A naturalist answer can be envisaged with the help of an analogy.
Science may be the legal system in a science-based naturalist view, but
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judges (individual scientists) are fallible and laws are not always just.
Judges are not beyond judgement by their peers. And the laws can be
reconsidered and modified. Speaking loosely, one might say that the
legal system is evaluated and modified by the legal system. However,
behind such a general statement one can discern an intricate network
of persons and rules, parts of which are momentarily stable while other
parts may be in flux.
Similarly, a more adequate view of science would need to pay
attention to the variety of persons and procedures within science,
rather than sticking to a general statement that science is judged by
science, and is thus apparently caught in a circularity. Some scientists
evaluate claims of others via procedures that are currently part of
the accepted consensus, other scientists propose new instruments,
again others propose a modification of accepted procedures since
they do not account properly for results obtained and accepted as
part of the current consensus, etcetera. Science is an interplay of
various aspects, such as theories, concepts, and criteria of credibility,
instruments, sets of questions considered significant, and sets of
explanatory schemata. All these aspects have their place in practices
of individual scientists and in the (often not articulated) consensus of
the moment. When a theory is replaced by a different one, one can
ask by which standard we have evaluated them, and preferred the
one over the other. Apparently, the norm which is applied to both
theories is supposed to be stable during that evaluation. On some
other occasion, major concepts may change, or the division of
labour, or the set of questions deemed significant, or the norms for
credibility. Such processes occur at the level of individual scientists
with their individual practices. Such changes affect the consensus
practice of any given moment. The process, with all the variety of
work within individual practices, which shape a temporary consensus,
which shapes subsequent work in individual practices, which shape a
new consensus, is iterated again and again. All the work is done at
the level of individuals, interacting with each other and with nature.
There is no need to invoke an abstract notion of knowledge or
rationality beyond the knowledge and rationality as exhibited by
human individuals with a wide (and in many cases fruitful) variation
in cognitive styles. In such a way, science may be presented as a
thoroughly natural enterprise.
That science is understood as a natural enterprise does not imply
that epistemology can be eliminated in favour of psychology, as if we
240 Science, religion, and naturalism
could avoid discussing questions about 'how we should proceed' in
forming beliefs and theories about the world, and rather restrict
ourselves to the study of how humans actually proceed. We face a
variety of individual cognitive styles, and in discussing epistemological
issues, we assess this variety of different cognitive approaches. In doing
so, and in assessing beliefs formed in different ways, we also appeal to
criteria which surpass the criteria that humans are naturally inclined to
use. Logical and mathematical analysis, criteria such as universality
and coherence, and the variety of ways of experimenting and testing
claims, for instance by 'double-blind' experiments, are important for
the credibility of science, precisely because they surpass and correct the
conclusions of ordinary psychological mechanisms. One might include
all these elements in a psychological description of our belief-forming
mechanisms, but then epistemological considerations are not so much
eliminated, as incorporated in a modified psychology, which also takes
into account the mechanisms by which we override ordinary psycholo-
gical processes.
A philosophical view of science can be considered both as a
description of and as a prescription for science. Descriptive adequacy
should be tested by applying this naturalist view of science to the
historical development of various scientific disciplines over long
stretches of time. Not only is it worthwhile to see whether the
scheme can account for actual science, past and present, but also
whether it does so more adequately than other views of science, such
as those proposed by Thomas Kühn, in terms of paradigms, with a
more radical emphasis on social factors, and by Imre Lakatos, in
terms of research programmes, with greater emphasis on rationality.
In the following I will assume that some naturalist description of
science is possible, and that it has to combine social, empirical, and
rational aspects. As an indication of the lines along which such a
view might be developed I will adopt the understanding of science
proposed by Kitcher (1993), which was briefly sketched in this
section: science is understood as an interplay of various aspects
(theories, techniques, questions, etc.) in a variety of interacting
individual practices.
The prescriptive adequacy of such a naturalist view seems harder to
defend than its descriptive adequacy. Can this view, or any other
naturalist view, yield a good prescriptive model for science? If one does
not take human limitations and human variety into account, the answer
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is 'No!' Imagine a world in which scientists could entertain at each
moment an unlimited number of propositions, procedures, and goals in
their individual working memories and could all carry out the same
procedures equally well. In such a world, cognitive variety between
individuals would be much less pronounced, much less relevant, and
much less troublesome for the formation of temporary consensus.
However, we are limited in our cognitive capacities. And we are social
beings, who modify information when we incorporate information from
others and when we offer information to others. I think that for limited
social beings such as we are a naturalist view of science as a variety of
individual, interacting practices, forms the basis for a fruitful attitude:
respect the cognitive variety in individual practices and seek, again and
again, to articulate the current range of consensus.
This attitude with respect to cognitive variety and the quest for
consensus is not a rule which gives us explicit norms about questions
or theories to entertain, to accept, or to reject. In lacking such
discriminating norms, the proposal differs - and as a naturalist view
has to differ - from attempts which seek to formulate such norms in
formal or material terms, for instance in terms of greater falsifiability,
or as progress in or degeneration of a research programme. On a
naturalist view, the norms are themselves part of the changing variety
of practices, and of the consensus practices at each moment; there are
no specific criteria which could be delivered by philosophy. This does
not exclude an elusive, science-defining ideal beyond the flow of
practices, such as the pursuit of interesting truth (Kitcher 1993, 157-
60; against Laudan 1984). Such an elusive limiting ideal fits in well
with the recognition that all discriminatory judgements on the
feasibility and credibility of various projects are made in relation to
the current norms, which may themselves be modified in the course of
further individual work and consensus-formation. Since there are no
material or formal norms, there is no clear and final demarcation line
between science and non-science. One cannot prevent misguided
practices from being carried out, nor can one avoid the possibility
that practices which later will be considered good science are
currently excluded.
If science can be understood along such lines as a natural phenomenon,
based on the variety of cognitive practices of individual scientists and
the social interactions by which they modify the consensus about
claims, questions, procedures, criteria, instruments, assessments of
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authority, and the like, I may have overcome one potential problem,
namely an overly pretentious understanding of science, which would
surpass the naturalist framework. However, I then have to face another
problem: Why would such a human practice deserve preeminence over
other human practices, such as astrology, sport, politics, or art? Why
would science as a natural phenomenon deserve a unique place or
privileged status?
A preliminary element in the defence of the importance of science
should be to note the limited character of the claim. Health may be
improved more by physical exercises than by exercises in physics.
Emotional satisfaction may be a prime effect of music or of gastro-
nomy, rather than of science (though it is not absent from scientific
practices). Social relations require something different than knowledge,
and feelings may be expressed and recognised on many occasions in
non-discursive ways. Practices such as those in the arts are guided by a
different goal than the sciences, and thus are governed by different
notions of excellence or improvement, focusing for example on
technical and evocative aspects in the performance of music. Science is
not the sole practice in which we pursue some form of excellence. The
claim which I seek to defend here is that science deserves preeminence
as our major cognitive enterprise.
There are other human practices which result in cognitive claims.
An astrologer, for example, might claim the ability to inform us about
a person's character or about opportunities which will come up next
week with respect to finances or intimate relations. The claim is that
such cognitive enterprises do not deserve the same authority as the
natural sciences. Such a global dismissal needs to be spelled out in
more detail.
Some claims which are extraordinary and lie outside the current
consensus may well deserve further scrutiny. Let me take the example
of claims in parapsychology regarding telepathy across spatial or
temporal distances, apparently without a mediating physical process.
Such claims are at odds with the scientific consensus, but their rejection
is not beyond dispute. Whether one considers exploration worthwhile
will depend on one's assessment of the utility of pursuing such a
project, given what others have been doing so far, what other projects
one might engage in, and expectations about the feasibility and
fruitfulness of such research. I personally do not consider it sufficiently
promising to spend much time exploring parapsychology, since I
consider the likelihood of positive results very slim and the possibilities
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of developing my work within the consensus view of the natural
sciences more important. However, it is legitimate for some individuals
to study claims about parapsychological phenomena; this is part of the
cognitive variation which is encompassed in the naturalist view
espoused here. In this sense the view is liberal if not to say anarchistic;
there is, in principle, no external constraint on the projects to be
explored.
Such a liberal attitude in no way entails that all projects deserve
equal funding or equal status in curricula; many would-be scientific
ideas conflict with experiences and experiments, are inconsistent or
imprecise, stand in isolation from other knowledge or introduce ad
hoc elements which seem artificial or superfluous. Some cognitive
projects which aspire to be recognised as scientific fail not so much
due to the beliefs they advance, but due to their lack of proper
development; they do not respond adequately to new discoveries.
For example, creationists advance positions which were part of the
scientific consensus in geology and palaeontology some 200 years
ago. Hence, one cannot say that these beliefs as such could not be
part of science at some stage. However, research has moved on, and
scientists have abandoned such beliefs for good reasons. Mere
repetition of beliefs from the past without accommodating more
recent discoveries reveals an inflexibility of mind, and hence a
psychological shortcoming (e.g., Kitcher 1993, 195). Repeating pre-
viously held positions is not likely to promote epistemic goals, though
it might serve non-epistemic goals, such as the well-being of certain
religious groups.
There is no global criterion which delineates the proper sciences
and excludes all other practices which compete for cognitive cred-
ibility, but consistency, precision, fertility, avoidance of ad hoc-
elements, and coherence with other knowledge are among the
general criteria which we use to evaluate cognitive practices. The
adequacy of competing cognitive practices has to be analysed on a
case by case basis, with due consideration of the modifications that
ensue for other, partially unified accounts of the world. My expecta-
tion is that creation science, parapsychology, astrology, homeopathy
with its extreme dilutions, and the like would all fail in comparison
with mainstream science, and are not worth the effort needed to
study them, but that some folk-knowledge in medicine, for instance,
might be explored fruitfully, and that such an exploration might also
be worthwhile.
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In a piecemeal fashion we can assess claims about the relative merits
of scientific and non-scientific cognitive practices. A general defence of
science seems impossible, but this should not worry us too much. The
same holds for some forms of scepticism, which are unanswerable, just
as is a radical form of solipsism. If we abstract from everything we
know about nature, including our own cognitive capacities, we may
well be unable to demonstrate that certain procedures are bound to
yield epistemically valuable practices. However, one can refute more
specific forms of scepticism by carefully analysing the historical episodes
or psychological traits appealed to. In such an analysis, scepticism is
not only refuted but is also to some extent accommodated in a careful
scrutiny of our currently favoured methods of individual reasoning,
which might result in their modification.
The conclusion of these considerations is that science can be under-
stood naturalistically without thereby losing its significance. We now
will turn to the implications of a naturalist perspective for our views of
reality and of religion. In a later section [31], I will consider limits of a
science-oriented naturalism, and thereby bring to light another role for
religion.
28. REALITY IN A NATURALIST PERSPECTIVE
A naturalist approach may have consequences for religion due to its
view of reality, which may be at odds with a theological view of reality,
and due to the view of religion that arises in its context. We will begin
with the implications of a naturalist view of reality for theology.
A relatively minor issue is that any view of reality which differs from
the views of reality that were prevalent when a particular religion was
shaped, undermines the recognisability of the images and metaphors in
which that religion is expressed.
With respect to the naturalist view presented here there is a further
challenge to many religious images, due to its emphasis on the
coherence of reality. Matter and forces are the same in outer space as
on earth; organic chemistry is ordinary chemistry of a subset of all
molecules, viz. mostly large carbon-based ones; biology does not
assume a separate principle of life, humans arose in the course of a
long evolutionary process, and our cognitive capacities and experien-
tial life reside in our neurophysiological structure. Such a view of
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reality undermines various analogies, metaphors, and models which
flesh out many Christian views of the world. A duality of heaven and
earth can no longer be articulated in astronomical terms, and
distinctions between humans and animals, and between matter and
mind have become matters of degree rather than of principle. Even
the realm of personal experiences, including religious experiences and
consciousness, seems to be part and parcel of nature; the distinction
between personal and impersonal relations provides no basis for
distinguishing supernatural and natural phenomena. This does not
make such differences irrelevant or uninteresting; there is no need to
belittle quantitative differences and attach significance only to qualita-
tive ones. However, it makes such differences less adequate as
metaphors or models for God's transcendence. (Metaphors for trans-
cendence which regard the whole of natural reality are an exception,
since they do not assume a dichotomy in the natural world; see [31].)
A loss of analogies may not be too much of a problem for living
religions; adherents may propose new metaphors, or continue to
communicate with the help of the old ones which still function for a
large part of the audience.
A naturalist view of reality obviously has implications for those
theologies which understand themselves as, among other things,
explanatory of phenomena in the world. Theologies are more than
primitive or subtle attempts at explanation, but in so far as they are
understood as offering explanations for natural phenomena they
compete with other explanations, such as those delivered by the
sciences. In this respect, a comparison is appropriate. Such a
comparison does not favour a view of organisms or species as special
divine creations. For example, understanding organisms as the pro-
ducts of design offers no account for the many less-than-optimal
solutions which occur in nature, such as the Panda's thumb, which is
not a true thumb but an enlarged wrist-bone, modified to strip
bamboo (Gould 1980, 21-24), or tne human eye, with the nerve
leaving on the front side of the retina, thus saddling us with a blind
Of the vast literature on analogies, models, and metaphors a few (Harbour 1974, Gerhart and
Russell 1984, Soskice 1985) forus especially on science, religion, and their relations. In as far
as the differences are relevant, I will use the term 'analogy' where words are applied to a new
domain without a change of meaning or where meanings from two domains are brought into
a one-to-one correspondence; I will use 'metaphor' when meanings are modified. I use the
term 'model' when referring to a material or abstract partial representation or embodiment
of another material or abstract system (see also [15]).
246 Science, religion, and naturalism
spot. 'Remnants of the past that don't make sense in present terms -
the useless, the odd, the peculiar, the incongruous - are the signs of
history. They supply proof that the world was not made in its present
form' (Gould 1980, 28). An evolutionary approach is well suited to
understand less-than-optimal solutions as the outcome of nature's
tinkering, with existing mechanisms adapted to new purposes. The
point is not 'that special creation is in principle impossible, only that it
is in general unlikely, or unneeded in specific contexts' (McMullin
1993, 300; in a reflection on Plantinga's writings, see above [18]).
McMullin makes it clear that scientific claims about true beliefs do
not 'mean that the alternative can be logically excluded in a
completely conclusive way; nothing more than overwhelming like-
lihood is what scientists normally intend by this sort of usage'
(McMullin 1993, 306). And overwhelming likelihood they have
achieved, since the evolutionary view that all forms of life on earth
have a common ancestry is able to explain so many different
discoveries, both in the structure of different proteins, in the fossil
record, and in the study of homologies and of geographical distribu-
tions (e.g., McMullin 1993, 3i6ff.); special creation would leave such
discoveries unexplained, although 'it would have been possible for the
Creator to use similar structures' (McMullin 1993, 319). The conclu-
sion from the success of science must be that such cognitive theolo-
gical claims are unlikely.
With respect to physical processes in the non-living world, a similar
argument about the likelihood of special divine activity can be made.
Lightning has become dissociated from belief in the wrath of God and
most believers now accept lightning rods as protective devices (Ferré
1993, 27), even though it is not logically impossible that God acts in the
atmosphere so as to cause lightning to strike at one place rather than at
another place.
Even when theology is not understood as explanatory to some
extent, the view of reality we have may still be very relevant to
theological claims, for instance about divine action, at least when
such claims need certain assumptions about reality. The issue is not
that we are comparing natural and supernatural explanations (as in
the case of apparent design in organisms), but that believers propose,
for instance, that there is an openness in reality which offers a
possible locus for divine activity. Thus, the physical processes are not
supposed to confer any likelihood on the religious belief. Rather,
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given the belief, the physical processes are expected to have certain
characteristics which makes it possible to interpret them in a specific
way.
As argued earlier [13], claims about openness in complex processes
rely, in my view, in many cases on an unwarranted move from
epistemological considerations to ontological ones: unpredictability
does not imply indeterminacy or openness to non-natural influences,
either from humans or from God. Such an influence hidden in
unpredictable or unobserved but determinate processes would be at
odds with the integrity of science. An exception might be processes in
which there is, upon a naturalist view, a genuine element of chance.
Such processes would be less problematic as a locus for divine activity
within natural processes (as long as God would act so as to effect
outcomes within the range of naturally possible outcomes with their
frequencies). However, I do not consider this an attractive option for
theology. There is no need to supplement a non-natural cause when a
process is a genuine chance process; the occurrence of any of the
possible outcomes may be considered explained by being one of the
possible outcomes, whatever (non-zero) probability it has. An appeal
to chance as a locus of divine activity does not acquire likelihood as an
explanation of the outcomes; it derives its credibility solely from prior
beliefs about such divine activity.
Rather than focusing on a specific potential locus for divine
activity, one might also consider the incompleteness of any natur-
alist explanation. In my view, limitations in our knowledge are not
to be seized upon for religious apologetics; the absence of evidence
does not count as evidence of absence. If we do not know which
actual Darwinian history explains a certain feature, it does not
follow that there is no actual Darwinian history. It would only be
evidence of absence if we were quite sure that we had explored all
the possibilities in such a way that decisive pieces of evidence could
not have eluded us. Once I have turned the lights on in my room
and looked around, the absence of evidence for the presence of an
elephant in my room is, obviously, evidence of the absence of such
a large animal. However, a similar argument about a mouse would
not be valid. Similarly when we move from observations to
calculations: absence of tractability does not mean that the problem
Salmon (1990, 62), referring to Jeffrey (1969). According to Jeffrey (1969, 106), it 'is the famous
parallelism between explanation and prediction which I think breaks down for statistical
explanations that impart less than practical certainty to the phenomenon explained'.
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has no determinate mathematical solution, but only that this
solution eludes us.
This argument, that the 'absence of evidence' should not to be
confused with 'evidence of absence', may appear to be neutral with
respect to religion: the naturalist could apply it to the possibility of a
naturalist explanation where it has eluded us so far whereas a theist
might invoke it to defend her view with the argument that the
absence of evidence regarding divine intervention is not evidence of
the absence of such interventions. However, this symmetry is lost once
one develops examples in more detail. For instance, though looking
around and not observing a mouse would not be sufficient evidence
for its absence, I do have ideas about observations and tests (such as
putting out cheese) which would lead to further evidence and I also
have ideas about why I may have failed to observe a mouse that is
present (it is small and quick); similarly, we may be unable to predict
the weather two weeks in advance, but we can explain such a
limitation itself quite well. We may lack evidence which informs us
about the actual Darwinian history that led to contemporary homi-
nids, but we can propose various possible Darwinian histories,
develop these in detail, and check such specified possibilities against
independently acquired knowledge about conditions as they obtained
in the past. The challenge for a theist is to move beyond a general
claim about the absence of evidence not being evidence of absence to
more specific proposals about the things that might count as evidence
with respect to divine intervention in natural processes or to proposals
about why there cannot be any empirical evidence (see below, [31]).
The overwhelming likelihood seems to be on the side of the naturalist
view that natural processes are not occasionally interrupted or
suspended.
The coherence of reality is not only a challenge for theology. It may
well be seen as an understanding of reality which is consonant with a
theistic view. Given beliefs about God's wisdom and power, one
ought to expect a fundamental integrity in God's work (e.g.,
McMullin 1993, 323^). Whereas individual species are not the results
of distinct divine acts, the whole of natural reality may be seen in
these terms. The naturalist account presented here also articulates
how pervasive our limitations are. These too could be appropriated
theologically as indications of the significance of our myths about our
limitations, such as myths about the unavoidable (original) sin and
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problems of co-operation (tower of Babel), and the story of God's
answer to Job.
A naturalist view portrays the richness of matter. As in the quote
from Dewey at the beginning of the first chapter, mountain peaks
'are the earth in one of its manifest operations'. The propensities of
matter are revealed to go way beyond such a limited result as a pile
of sand, or even a mountain peak. In my view, the potentialities of
matter have reached their climax so far in humans; with this climax
have also come the deepest shadows so far. A naturalist view of
reality does not imply that we devalue humans, but that we upgrade
our view of reality. This seems to be lost sight of by opponents of a
naturalist view who fear that human dignity would be lost. It is also
neglected by some ardent supporters of a naturalist view, who claim
that the loss of human dignity is a fact. From the availability or
possibility of a naturalist explanation of humans it does not follow
that humans are insignificant or equal in significance to, for instance,
sponges, worms, or rocks. And whatever one's assessment of humans,
the richness of matter supports, in my view, a sense of gratitude
towards the reality which has given birth to us and to all these other
phenomena.
29. RELIGION IN A NATURALIST PERSPECTIVE
A naturalist view of reality not only has consequences for a theolo-
gical view of reality (see above), but also for the understanding of
religions. Religions are phenomena within reality. Thus, they can be
studied just like other human phenomena. The natural sciences in a
restricted sense do not have much to contribute to the study of
religions; this level of complexity and intractability requires ap-
proaches which may be less fine-grained and precise but are thereby
able to take some of the richness of social interactions into account.
However, even though the specific study of religions may be the
business of others, such as anthropologists, sociologists and psycholo-
gists, the perspective arising out of the natural sciences offers some
outlines for views of religions.
In earlier sections we have considered the implications of the
neurosciences, and thus the study of those aspects of our constitution
which give rise to our 'inner life', and the implications of the
evolutionary understanding of humans, including their cultures and
religions. Within an evolutionary perspective, one would primarily
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religions in human individuals and communities would not chal-
lenge the general view of religion as presented here.
3O. A RICHER NATURALISM?
In the last three sections I have presented the implications of my
naturalist view for our understanding of science, reality, and
religion. Now we come to consider how these explorations may be
taken up in a theological perspective which not only treats religion
as a phenomenon, but also as a view of, or an attitude to, reality
that calls for commitment, or 'faith'. In this section we will discuss
proposals which attempt to take science seriously without accepting
the naturalism presented here. The authors to be considered opt
for a richer view of reality, which has been called 'religious
naturalism' or 'religious empiricism'. They seek to stay clear from
approaches considered unattractive, such as 'reductionism', 'deter-
minism', 'materialism', 'selectionism', and 'mechanicism', to
mention just a few labels which are occasionally used pejoratively,
and to find value, self-organisation, meaning, consciousness, or
some other feature considered desirable, as fundamental aspects of
reality.
In an earlier section [21], we referred to Thomas Nagel as someone
who defends a richer view of reality when it comes to consciousness.
And when John Polkinghorne (1993, 439; see [13.1]) does not so much
claim room in relation to the laws of physics, but rather considers these
laws downward approximations 'to a more subtle (and supple) whole',
he too seems to seek a different understanding of reality in which a
continuous interaction between God and particular events in the world
does not disturb the coherence of processes as uncovered by the
natural sciences. However, Polkinghorne retains a stronger theological
dualism of God and the world than the 'religious naturalists' who will
be considered here.
An advantage of a richer naturalism seems to be that its religious
view of reality which emphasises notions such as meaning or value is in
tune with its interpretation of reality, without appealing to any
particular experiences or revelations in history (even though we may
have come to this view of reality through insights and experiences in
certain situations, due to certain persons). With respect to such richer
forms of naturalism which seek to accommodate religion, two kinds of
questions can be raised. Do they offer a plausible or at least reasonable
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interpretation of the sciences? And if so, do they deliver the theological
fruits desired? I will focus especially on the first question, the interpreta-
tion of the sciences. With respect to the theology that arises in such a
perspective, I wonder whether it is not too much a 'mystical' religiosity,
accepting reality as it is, lacking opportunities to articulate a 'prophetic'
sense of contrast between the way the world is and the way the world
should be (see [3.3, 17.3, 26]).
Religious naturalism
If the image of the Garden, in which humanity and nature interact with
balance and mutual benefit, becomes a fundamental image of our world,
it will of course be easier to see how the Machine can fit - as an
inorganic simplification and servant of the organic - than it is now to
understand how a Garden could come to grow in the cosmic Machine.
(Ferré 1993, 95)
'Religious empiricism', sometimes called 'religious naturalism' or
'empirical theology', seeks to draw on knowledge from the natural
and social sciences, including historical-critical studies of religions and
their sacred texts. It assumes that 'empirical data is always relational
and contextual' and 'that meaning, value, and significance are
immanent, that is, within the historical, temporal flux' (Rogers 1990,
3, 5). Experience is seen as 'a rich, complex phenomenon, containing
value-elements as well as sheer facts, often shading off into vague,
half-lighted zones where dreaming and waking are hard to distinguish'
(Ferré 1992, 223).
Among the founding philosophers one might count John Dewey,
William James, and Alfred North Whitehead. Their views were
propagated by many theologians teaching at me Divinity School
of the University of Chicago, such as Henry Nelson Wieman,
Bernard Meland, Charles Hartshorne, and Bernard Loomer
(Inbody 1992; Miller 1974; Peden 1987; Rogers 1990). This (mostly
American) religious naturalism has sought to relate positively to
science while developing a view of reality which is adequate to all
kinds of experience. Within this broader stream there are function-
alists (e.g., Dewey, Wieman, and the Jewish thinker Mordechai
Kaplan), who seek to understand 'God as that function or
instrument in human affairs that increases human good' (Rogers
'99°> 8). This is worked out in a practical and reforming spirit.
Rationalists, such as Charles Hartshorne, have built superstructures
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of logic and metaphysics. Those of a more mystical inclination
stress that life in its fullness goes beyond systématisation, remaining
'attentive to what William James has called the "More" in
existence' (Rogers 1990, 13).
In a wider sense, many authors writing on science and theology,
especially defenders of critical realism such as Ian Barbour and
Arthur Peacocke, could be considered to be doing empirical
theology, certainly when the contrast is with a theology which relies
on dogma or authority. However, the 'naturalist empirical theologies'
under consideration here differ from most other examples of
theologies elaborated in the light of science in their tendency to deny
transcendence beyond the natural; they also differ from some
approaches, including mine, in their tendency to hold that the
scientific view of the world itself is more spiritual, more humanistic
than is often thought.
One of the labels used is 'religious empiricism'. However, this may
be misleading. It is not an eliminative empiricism, i.e. the view that
nothing exists besides sense data and what can be operationally defined
on such a basis. Nor is it as agnostic as Van Fraassen's empiricism
(1980, 1994). Experiences are, upon this approach, the foundation from
which speculation is supposed to take off in order to develop a
metaphysical view. Quite a few authors in this tradition argue for a
Whiteheadian metaphysics. In searching for a metaphysical scheme
they encounter the same problems as other theological and metaphy-
sical realists who attempt to use the sciences while reaching beyond
them (see chapter 3, especially [17.3]).
Religious naturalism and science
Karl E. Peters, a long-time editor of the major journal on the relation-
ship between science and religion, tygon, holds that science and
empirical theology generally agree in their assumptions about the
nature of reality. Both assume a naturalist world view. 'Human
fulfilment and the ultimate source of fulfilment are to be found not
beyond the spatial-temporal world but within it. If there are realms of
being other than space-time nature and history (as in supernaturalism),
they are beyond our ken and have no relevance to life today' (Peters
1992, 63). Thus, empirical theology as he sees it does without a
traditional concept of transcendence. Here, we will focus on another
feature of their view, namely their understanding of science and of the
world.
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'A second feature of the naturalist worldview, which science and
empirical theology hold in common, is that reality is basically organic.
By this I mean it is both relational and historical' (Peters 1992, 63).
Similarly, Nancy Frankenberry claims that 'the fundamental image of
nature in terms of interpenetrating fields of forces and organically
integrated wholes has replaced that of self-contained, externally
related bits of particles of inert matter' (Frankenberry 1992, 39).
Ferré's reference, quoted above, to 'the Garden' as the fundamental
image of our world, rather than 'the Machine', evokes a similar
distinction between 'modern' and 'post-modern' science. Charles
Birch, a geneticist, discerns 'a purpose for everything', to paraphrase
the title of one of his books (Birch 1990), in a post-modern ecological
world view. And the process theologian David Griffin, who takes
seriously parapsychological evidence such as extrasensory perception
and psychokinesis (Griffin 1989, 6), entitles a book The Reenchantment of
Science (Griffin 1988).
The philosopher Frederick Ferré writes that one of the ideals of
modern science is to explain by reduction. 'To know what a thing
really is, in terms of this ideal, would be to know as much as possible
about the parts that make it up' (Ferré 1993, 88). The consequences
of the ideals of modern science are depressing: they leave no room for
the values of spontaneity, creativity, responsibility; they leave no place
for aesthetic values; and they alienate us 'from our own intuitions of
meaning and our own structures of purpose' (Ferré 1993, 90). We are
cut off both from nature and from the world of other people.
However, ' "modern science" is of course only one of many possible
approaches to the problems of "natural philosophy" ... and alter-
natives to it and its ideals have not been lacking' (Ferré 1993, 90). We
cannot dismiss empirical testability and the power of theories formu-
lated in mathematical concepts as mythology; we cannot go back to
pre-modern forms of science. However, there are 'postmodern
sciences', that 'have broken sharply with the ideals and assumptions
that have been identified with modern science for long centuries'
(Ferré 1993, 93). Ferré refers briefly to quantum physics, but his main
example is ecology; others refer also to the work of Prigogine (see
[14]). An ecologist needs analysis, but 'these analyses always become
means to a wider end, the end of conceptual synthesis that preserves
awareness of living systems in dynamic interaction' (Ferré 1993, 93).
To understand a tree one needs to understand its cells and tissues
as well as the forest of which it is a part. Ecology 'includes and
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transcends analysis in a holistic way that is essential to its conceptual
task' (94).
To what extent has science abandoned 'the mechanistic world
view', and accepted an 'organic' view of reality? I am not
convinced by the analysis of science offered by Ferré and other
religious naturalists.
Quantum physics excludes certain views of the universe. Perhaps
the universe is not like a clockwork with springs and cogs, always in
a well-defined state and, once started, for ever set on a unique
course. Quantum physics, on some interpretations, introduces non-
local correlations. But quantum physics does not thereby introduce
into our picture of the world holism in a sense related to subjectivity
or values. Something similar, it seems to me, holds for ecology.
Scientists have uncovered many subtle relations between various
species in a single environment. If modern science is exclusively
defined in terms of analysis in terms of constituent particles, it misses
such relations - and thus is passe. However, this is a straw man.
Relations between systems and their environment, or of various
systems with each other are within the domain of the natural
sciences as they developed over the last few centuries; there is no
need to mark such issues as signalling a shift from a world without
values, subjects, and colours to an organic world. The only point is,
perhaps, the place of the subject where Thomas Nagel took
exception to naturalist approaches [21].
In relation to Ferré's view of science, I consider as revealing his
statement, quoted at the beginning of this section, that it is of course
easier to understand how the Machine fits in the Garden than the
reverse. This betrays a resistance against mainstream theories of
evolution, which see more complex entities as products rather than
as initial states [24]. To take another example from the development
of science which is at odds with Ferré's holism: molecular processes
constituting complex processes in living organisms, ranging from
viruses to humans, are unveiled at an incredible rate, as testified by
almost any issue of journals such as Nature, Science, and, more
accessible to the general reader, Scientific American. This is not to deny
that there are important changes in scientific analysis. For instance,
one of the changes in chemistry has been the shift from analysis in
terms of constituent particles to analysis in terms of three-dimen-
sional shapes. However, analysis of amino-acids in terms of spatial
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structure is not less analytical and more holistic (in a sense related to
values) than analysis in terms of constituent particles. And the same
holds for physics formulated in terms of fields rather than in terms
of particles. The transition from modern to post-modern science in
the way discerned by Ferré and other religious empiricists, seems to
me to underestimate the success and the potential for further
development of modern science in the way it has progressed over
the last few centuries, or, to express it in terms of their distinction
between modern and post-modern science, to overestimate the
differences and underrate the continuity between successive stages of
science.
There are interesting changes in science, which have triggered
various debates in the philosophy of physics and elsewhere. Ideas on
space and time, substance, and determinism have acquired a new
shape. However, neither these changes in science nor these philoso-
phical discussions warrant the claim that there has been a 'réintégra-
tion of understanding with valuational intuition' (Ferré 1993, 95).
Science is not modified by our 'valuational intuitions', but contem-
porary science seems to offer the possibility of understanding the
constitutional basis and evolutionary origins of our 'valuational intui-
tions' [20, 24].
The order of disciplines
Can one offer an account of our world which is radically different from
the way it is viewed by contemporary physics? If the focus is on current
physics, the answer must be positive. Our physics is certainly not the
last word. Underlying the level of particle theory there might be a quite
different theory, formulated perhaps in terms of superstrings, twisters,
or quantised building blocks of space-time in a, yet unknown, theory of
quantum gravity. Such changes may well have consequences for our
concepts of object, space, time, substance, and force, and for ideas on
issues such as determinism and causality. However, such a change in
physics would respect the hierarchical structuring of phenomena, and
of the corresponding sciences, which is more or less the backbone of
the contemporary natural sciences, from quarks to nuclei to atoms and
molecules to macromolecules, and on to living organisms, followed by
consciousness and culture. We might change our understanding of the
foundation, ontologically speaking, but it would not affect the higher
parts of the building of our knowledge. In the order of knowledge
fundamental physics is not the basis for doing chemistry or biology, but
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rather a kind of pinnacle, pointed but uncertain and speculative. If it
were to be proved wrong, the building would not collapse, though it
might need some reorganising.
A more radical alternative — and this is what religious naturalists are
after - would be one which would in some way reject this overall
pattern of the natural sciences, and thereby modify general expecta-
tions about the fundamental levels of reality. In discussions about the
relationship between science and religion the most prominent example
of such an alternative is process philosophy, which draws on the
categorial scheme developed by Alfred N. Whitehead in his Process and
Reality (1929). On this view, 'values' and 'choices' are relevant at the
most fundamental level of reality. Physics is adequate for uninteresting
entities, such as electrons or stones, which have a rather limited
spectrum of choices. However, features of reality which show up most
clearly in human relations are characteristic of the most fundamental
structure of reality; the 'Garden' has priority over 'the Machine'.
The attempt to develop such an alternative view of the fundamental
structure is legitimate. It would be a remarkable change in the history
of ideas if such an alternative organisation of scientific knowledge
would replace the consensus view, but it is not to be rejected a priori.
However, there are some important constraints: such proposals will
have to be able to offer alternative accounts of all well-confirmed
phenomena, experiments and observations. Such accounts should be at
least of a degree of detail and precision comparable to those of the
currently dominant view. With respect to the proposal mentioned
above, process philosophy, I am not convinced that the categorial
scheme which gives a metaphysically basic role to values and choices
can be developed in sufficient quantitative detail, nor do I expect it to
be true or useful. I thus see no reason to abandon a materialist version
of naturalism. However, naturalism cannot, and should not, categori-
cally exclude the possibility of such a reversal of our ideas about the
most fundamental structure and the relative ordering of phenomena
and disciplines.
There is a dilemma for the religious naturalists. If they side with
empiricism as articulated in the philosophy of science, they should
abstain from erecting elaborate metaphysical schemes on the basis of
our experience, or rather, they should not take any of the manifold
schemes which could be constructed too seriously. If religious natural-
ists side with realists in philosophy of science, science enlarges our
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world beyond experience (McMullin 1994), but then, they will also
have to accept that science forces us to a critical reconsideration of our
experiences, coming up with counter-intuitive views of them; this was
expressed by the embryologist Wolpert in a book entitled The Unnatural
Nature of Science (1993). A challenge for a religious view which applies
notions such as value, meaning, purpose at the most basic level may
arise when science looks at the empirical material in another way than
the common-sense view, and thus offers an account which respects
experiences as experienced, but none the less gives an account of them
which differs - by employing fewer notions related to persons, values,
meaning, etc. - from the account given by the one who had the
experiences.
31. A MORE TRANSCENDENT GOD?
Recent philosophers and theologians tend to think that anything that could
count as God - as the living, loving person whom the Old and New Testaments
depict as in dialogue with the creatures of history - must be in time. Their
message is that the deity of the atemporalists is too remote and impersonal to
be God. Yet medieval philosophers and theologians tended to think that
anything that could count as God - as the transcendent, perfect source of all
that is other than Himself - could not be in time. The medievals would say
that the deity of the temporalists is too small or too creaturelike to be God.
(Leftow 1991, 3)
There is one traditional way to articulate theology in a way which
avoids a confrontation with the natural sciences, and that is to
emphasise the uniqueness of God's mode of being and activity. This is
articulated in the notion of creatio ex nMlo, which is not a notion that
applies only to an initial creative act 'in the beginning', but which
expresses that every event is created by, and wholly dependent upon
God. In the course of history, this view of God has been contrasted
with other views, such as that of God as a Demiurge, shaping the world
from existing materials, or of God as the one who started a world left
to itself thereafter - a 'deist' concept of God as a watchmaker. There is
in the idea of creation a tension between total dependence upon God
and the reality of creaturely - or, in the terms of this study, natural -
causal processes. If the dependence of everything upon God is
emphasised strongly, it may seem as if creaturely processes are not real,
since God creates the world anew every instant - a view which may be
called 'occasionalism'.
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One resolution of this tension has been to ascribe to God a unique
mode of action, by which God creates and sustains all things as their
primary cause; all natural causes are real, just as are all entities and
events, but they are so because they have been created by God. Such
real natural causes are called 'secondary causes'. This distinction
between primary and secondary causality was developed in the
European Middle Ages, for instance by Thomas Aquinas, but its roots
can be traced back at least to Augustine (4th/5th century). God creates
everything, both past, present, and future events, and God creates
them not as an amorphous bag of events but with their temporal,
spatial, and causal relations, and with their creaturely freedom. The
distinction between God and God's activity, on the one hand, and
creatures and creaturely activity, on the other, is articulated also as a
difference with respect to time: all creatures are temporal, whereas
God is, upon this view, conceived as not temporal. God's eternity is not
everlastingness (infinite temporal extension) but timelessness.4
Not all Christian thinkers accept divine timelessness. Some believe
that temporality is such a fundamental feature of reality that one
should not exclude even God from temporality; others hold that a
genuine relation between God and God's creatures requires some
temporality in God. It has also been argued that an atemporal under-
standing of creation conflicts with freedom, since it seems to imply that
future states of affairs are already real for God. The difference of
opinion is not only a difference about time; it correlates with differences
in the understanding of God, as was clearly expressed by Leftow in the
passage quoted above.
Conceiving of divine and creaturely action in terms of primary and
secondary causality results in various puzzles if not problems. A major
one is that both natural and divine action are considered to be sufficient
(at their own level of description). If God's creative activity is not
Kssays discussing the primary/secondary distinction can be found in books edited by Thomas
(1983) and by Hebblethwaite and Henderson (1990); another introduction is an essay by R. J.
Russell (1993) Historical aspects are considered by McMullin (19853, 1988) and Burrell
(1993). Among philosophical studies defending divine atemporality are a seminal essay by
Stump and Kretzman (1981) and books by Inflow (1991), Helm (1988), and Braine (1988); the
theologiaas Kaufman (1972) and Wiles (1986) lean in that direction with arguments for
understanding the world as a single 'master act' of God. In discussions on science and
theology, Heller and Stoeger are among those who consider such views favourably.
Among thinkers defending that God is temporal, one might think of Bergson, Teilhard de
Chardin, Whitehead, Pike, Lucas (1989), but also many contemporary authors writing on
science and theology, such as Barbour and Polkinghorne. A few also try to have both
temporality and atemporality in God, for instance in the context of a trinitarian view of God
(e.g., Russell 19933, Peters 1993).
A more transcendent God? 261
considered sufficient, one runs the risk of conceiving of God as a
demiurge who is dependent upon the co-operation of matter. However,
once one allows for two different sufficient causes causing a single event,
one of them seems superfluous. Thus, it is important that the kind of
sufficiency and the difference between these two kinds of activity is
clarified in order to avoid problems associated with 'double agency'.6
Accepting the whole natural world as the creation of a timeless
transcendent God avoids various potential problems in the relationship
between theology and the natural sciences, since it accepts the world as
understood by the natural sciences as God's creation. There is no need
for particular gaps within the world or for some particular form of top-
down causation [13]. However, even upon such an understanding of
God, theology and the natural sciences relate to each other with
respect to the concept of time [31.1] and the explanation of the natural
world as a whole (rather than the explanation of phenomena in the
natural world). With respect to limit questions of a naturalist view of
the world I will argue that science does not offer answers or evidence;
this will be illustrated with a discussion on 'the anthropic principles' in
cosmology [31.2]. I will conclude that a major emphasis on the
transcendence of God offers a good perspective for a theological view
which is consistent with science. However, it is hard to give reasons, at
least in the context of a dialogue with the sciences, why one would hold
such a theological position. If this is resolved through an appeal to
particular events or experiences in human history, one runs into
problems with respect to a naturalist understanding of human experi-
ence and history.
31. i. Divine timeUssness and the temporality of the world
One locus of interaction between such a conception of God and the
natural sciences concerns the understanding of time. Temporal pre-
dicates are, upon the theological view considered here, applicable to
creatures, but not to God. As Augustine wrote in reply to the question
of what God was doing before God created the world: 'before' assumes
Other problems considered by philosophers are the relation between divine and creaturely
freedom, between divine and human responsibility for evil, and the distinction between
redemptive and creative actions Burrell (1993, inff.) argues that resolution requires a way of
conceptualising possibilities which does not conceive of many determinate possible worlds of
which one is chosen
The following section is adapted from Drees (1993)
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that the creation took place in time, whereas time came into existence
with creation.8 Time is, upon such a view, not a pre-existing frame-
work, a container in which creation takes place, but rather a character-
istic of creation. How does this fare in the light of contemporary
scientific knowledge?
The temporal character of our natural world has become more
manifest in the last few centuries. Whereas biological species were
considered to be fixed, we now are aware of a long history of change.
And geology and cosmology have added their discoveries to the overall
view of the natural world as a world with a history of change. But the
fact that time is characteristic of the natural world does not bear upon
the question: can we conceive of God's relation to the world in a non-
temporal way? From within the natural world, and certainly from
within the discourse of the natural sciences, it may be impossible to
answer such a question about God, but we can at least take a closer
look at the concept of time as it functions in the sciences. And, I will
argue, such a closer look reveals limitations to the universal applic-
ability of time in the natural world in such ways that an understanding
of time as linked to the created order (rather than as a metaphysical
category applicable to everything, including God) is warranted. There
are at least three reasons for this view in relation to physics: (i) some
theories take whole histories rather than temporal processes as their
basic units of description, (2) in attempts to integrate quantum physics
and relativity theories, time is treated as an internal parameter, and
(3) in quantum cosmologies, 'time' becomes a notion of limited applic-
ability, even within the natural world. Thus, understanding time as a
feature of reality which is not applicable to God is consonant with the
natural sciences, where time is not universally applicable either.
(i) The presence in physics of timeless descriptions, for example in
terms of trajectories in phase space or in terms of spacetimes, where the
whole is a unit including all moments, suggests that it is possible to talk
about the relation of God to this whole - and not only of the relation
between God at one moment to die universe at that moment, which
implies differentiating moments in God. Let me consider the case of
descriptions in terms of'space-time'.
In the special theory of relativity the notion of simultaneity as having
a universal meaning with respect to a 'now' got lost. 'Past' and 'future'
(Ànfessiones, Book 11, xn,i4-xiv,i7.
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can be used as concepts relative to an observer located at some position
in space-time. The problem arises when a definite article is used,
speaking about 'the past' and 'the future', as if these are global
concepts. Thus, problems arise in theologies which insist that 'God's
future' is open, or make other claims which assume the existence of a
universal notion of time. As long as God lacks a specific location and
state of motion, it is difficult to understand the meaning of God
knowing 'the past' or influencing 'the future'.
At least three ways to get around the theological consequences of
this loss of a single universal time have been proposed. One is to allow
for the coexistence of more than one time in God.10 Another, defended
by Polkinghorne, is to invoke God's omnipresence. A third option is to
argue that there is a physical basis for a universal time by taking into
account the cosmological background radiation. I consider none of
these options viable.' A fourth way to attempt to have a universal
The description of the problem as one with the definite article has been taken from C. J.
Isham (Isham and Polkinghorne 1993, 142).
(Ward 1982, 166); analysed in Leftow (1991, 29).
Some have argued that one might consider the coexistence of our time with other time series.
However, if these time-series are taken to be unrelated except for their coexistence in God
(see preceding note), 'multiple time sequences' are of no help with the relativity problem; they
rather might refer to different universes. If one were to apply the idea of 'multiple times' to
the various times arising for different observers in one space-time, these time sequences
would be strongly correlated. To say that God is related to all these times would not
introduce a universal notion of time which would allow for statements about God's relation
to 'the future' or 'the present', but rather would be equivalent to saying that God is related -
in some non-temporal way to the whole of space-time.
Polkinghorne suggests that omnipresence provides a way out. He argues that an
omnipresent God is spatially coincident with every space-time point, and thus 'has no need to
use signalling to tell him what is happening and so he has instant access to every event as and
when it occurs. That totality of experience is presumably the mosC important thing to be able
to say about God's relation to world history' (Polkinghorne 1989, 82). Polkinghome's
description is ambivalent. 'When it occurs' may be read as a reference to a hidden
background of universal time, making possible a reading of 'the totality of experience' as a
three-dimensional present. Such a reading of Polkinghome's solution is not in line with
relativity theory, as it introduces a universal sense of now, correlated with that three-
dimensional 'totality of experience'. Another, perhaps better, reading of Polkinghome's
proposal takes it that 'when it occurs' means that God has equal access to events at all space-
time points whether deemed future, past or present from any space-time point. But then
God's temporality is lost; the 'totality of experience' covers four-dimensional space-time as a
whole.
One might suggest that Big Bang cosmology solves some problems with respect to God's
time, as there might be a way to define a global time in an expanding universe (for example,
by using as the frame of reference that frame in which the background radiation is
homogeneous). However, it is not clear that there is such a universal time when one moves
beyond the homogeneity and isotropy of the Friedman Robertson Walker models. Besides,
general relativity, on which the Big Bang theory is based, seems to make problems worse;
there are space-times which do not allow for a definition of time that covers the whole
manifold.
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notion of time is to abandon relativity theory which undermines
notions such as simultaneity. It might be the case that a notion of a
single, flowing, universal time is possible, once general relativity as the
framework for cosmology is succeeded by a quantum theory which
integrates space and time as well as matter. That such a further
development beyond the Big Bang theory is needed, has already been
discussed [16]. Running ahead of the argument, the conclusion of the
reflections on quantum cosmology will be that such a hope for a
recovery of universal time will not be fulfilled. Rather, things will
become worse (see below, 3).
(2) Origination of the material universe in a fixed background spacetime is
problematic. One of the major problems is the problem of choice;12
quantum theories which work with probabilities (e.g., per unit time)
tend to introduce a plurality of origination points. This would lead to
interacting 'universes', contrary to the available empirical evidence.
Hence, physicists have turned to the development of theories which
describe creation of time rather than creation in time. General relativity
theory offers a fundamental hint in that direction. Whereas in a fixed
background, time may be seen as external with respect to the system,
the situation in general relativity is different. Time may be understood
as an 'internal' variable. One might attempt to define time in relation
to the average distance between 'test-particles' such as galaxies. Or one
might use the temperature of the background radiation or features of
other material phenomena. The evolution of properties of the universe
in time is thus transferred to statements about the correlation between,
for example, the temperature and other properties of the universe.
Thus, time in the context of relativistic space-time theories not only
lacks uniqueness, but it is also a phenomenological, 'internal' construct.
One might well see this as a modern-day equivalent of Augustine's
view of creatio cum tempore, time being part of the created order. The
discovery of 'internal' time, as characteristic of the theory of general
relativity, has paved the way for a second discovery, the discovery of
the limited applicability of the concept of time, as is typical of quantum
cosmologies and quantum gravity.
(3) In traditional quantum theory, the fundamental equations describe
(Isham 1993). This objection to creation in time is not a new insight; for example, it was
considered by Augustine (Cmfesswnrs n, xii, 14; Dr antäte Da xi, 6) and, centuries earlier, by
an Epicurean, as told by Cicero in his Ar natura dmnim i, 9,21.
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the evolution of the wave function (or state vector) in time. The
properties of the system are thus described by a time dependent entity.
'Time' itself is part of the background. In some approaches to quantum
gravity there might be a background structure which is sufficiently rich
as to include some concept similar to classical time. However, these
approaches have the same problem as indicated above for creation in a
fixed background space-time. The main stream of research in quantum
gravity and quantum cosmology has taken a different approach,
drawing upon the possibility of understanding time as an 'internal'
parameter. " The background structure is a three-dimensional space
on which a wave function is defined which specifies configurations of
curvature and matter. A dynamical evolution might be recovered by
defining a time variable on the basis of a suitably behaving variable
either out of the curvature or out of the matter fields. However, such
evolutionary representations are slightly odd, compared with evolu-
tionary equations which arise in conventional quantum theory. This
deviation is an advantage in the context of the programme of quantum
cosmology, the attempt to construct a genuine theory of the origination
of the universe. It leads us to the idea of 'imaginary time', or, more
appropriately, of the limited applicability of the concept 'time'.
In contemporary proposals for quantum cosmologies the fundamental
ontology (background structure) assumes a three-dimensional manifold,
rather than a four-dimensional space-time. In addition the ontology
contains a collection of possible configurations of geometrical and
material configurations on this manifold: superspace. 'Time' is a deriva-
tive notion, well defined only for certain subsets of, or certain paths in this
superspace.'Time' is not universally applicable for two reasons: classical
space-time with the notion of time is recovered only as an approximate,
fuzzy, notion, and it is only recovered for parts of reality as described by
the wave function; other parts of reality do not lend themselves to an
interpretation in terms of time. Hence, time is unlike traditional time at
the most fundamental level of description, that of quantum gravity.
It is important to note that the relevance of these ideas cannot be
restricted to considerations regarding the quantum theory of the origin
of the universe. Rather, it purports to be the quantum view of the
universe or, even more significantly, the quantum theory of time (and
space, though in a restricted sense, since some features of space are still
assumed as part of the background structure). As the quantum theory
Beginning at least with B. S. DeWitt, Quantum Theory of Gravity: I, II, Physical Renew 160
(1967): 1113 1148 and 162 (1967): 1195 1239; see expositions by Isham (1988; 1993).
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of matter or radiation is different from classical theories of matter or
radiation, so is the quantum theory of space and time different from
classical theories of space and time.
Since in the most fundamental theories time is a parameter which is
closely tied to other physical parameters, and not applicable to all parts
of natural reality, it may be in accord with fundamental science to
attempt to understand God's transcendence with respect to space-time
as timelessness. Natural reality is, of course, dynamic and evolving,
especially when considered on an intermediate scale from a point of
view within an almost Newtonian epoch. However, questions arise
already when one considers larger scales, and thus has to take account
of the conceptuality of general relativity. The dynamic picture may be
extendable to the quantum level, the finer detail of photons and
electrons. However, further down in scale, to the quantum gravity
level, the conceptuality of dynamism breaks down. 'Deep down' the
ontology is different. The unusual features, from the perspective of
human experience, are not merely relevant to our understanding of the
far past (quantum cosmology), since they have to do with quantum
gravity, our speculations about the most fundamental structures of
reality, space and time. And they are not just details at some irrelevant
scale, because they affect, or should affect, the concepts of space and
time as they are used at all levels. At the almost Newtonian level of
description which is very adequate for human life on Earth, space and
time may seem to be universal, infinitely extendable continua. The
special theory of relativity has raised problems with respect to the
uniqueness of time. General relativity also calls into question the
extendability of time, as singularities may occur. And quantum gravity
takes away the fundamental concept of time. The still speculative ideas
at the frontier of cosmological research, and even the standard theory
of space-time (general relativity), thus suggest that temporal presenta-
tions (including evolutionary ones) may be of limited validity, and not
fundamental. Hence, a theological view which depicts the relation
between God and the temporal, evolving world as itself a timeless
relation, is consonant with contemporary cosmological insights.
31.2. Limit questions
Materialist naturalism is comprehensive: all phenomena are supposed
to be part and parcel of the same reality. However, a few questions
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escape treatment within this framework. These are questions regarding
the universe as a whole and regarding the most fundamental constitu-
ents of, or structures in reality. Earlier [2], I used an image of science
adapted from Charles Misner (1977, 97): the chemist delegates a
question regarding the origin of the chemical elements to an astro-
physicist in the next lab, and goes on with her own work. Whereas one
might be tempted to see the reductionist coherence of the sciences in
terms of explanations provided by 'lower' levels, one might also view
reductionism as the passing on of questions to such 'lower' levels.
Questions are partially answered at each level, but new questions are
generated. Some questions end on the desks of cosmologists and
physicists. These scientists cannot refer them to another lab. Some of
these questions are different from questions about phenomena within
reality; rather, they are questions about reality. We will explore the
shape of such questions, especially the question of existence ('Why is
there something rather than nothing?') and of structure ('Why this
structure rather than another one, or none at all?').
Why is there something rather than nothing?
In The Blind Watchmaker Richard Dawkins gives a lucid account of the
emergence of complex organisms through a long evolutionary process.
At a certain point Dawkins pauses to consider his starting-point, the
molecules and atoms he assumes. Their explanation is the task of the
physicists, and for that matter Dawkins refers to Peter Atkins' The
Creation (Dawkins 1986, 15). This reference illustrates the image evoked
by Misner: assumptions are passed on to the person in the next office,
until they end on the desk of the physicist and the cosmologist.
For his part, Atkins takes it that elephants and humans are a product
of chance given enough time and molecules. Elephants and humans
are not his business; in his argument, he is concerned with the first
beginnings and the basic elements. Molecules arise automatically, given
atoms. Atoms arise, given the original hot mix of elementary particles.
This mix of particles and radiation may have arisen by quantum
fluctuations from a vacuum. And that vacuum with three spatial
dimensions and one temporal one could have arisen by chance as
fluctuations in a pre-geometry. There is no design or creation: the
world arose by chance.
In my opinion, the appeal to quantum fluctuations does not offer a
final answer. Any such scheme rests upon certain assumptions. In the
case of the idea of origination by quantum fluctuations there is the
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assumption that some form of quantum laws hold for some form of
reality, such as the 'pre-geometry' in Atkins' account. By using a
language of probabilities one also assumes some measure. For instance,
the probability of a certain decay is 0.5 per day. Even the most extreme
'nothing' of a physicist is not an absolute Nothing devoid of any
properties and measures. Other proposals do not fare better. For
example, Stephen Hawking's proposal for a universe without bound-
aries avoids questions about a beginning in time, but it does not do so
without making any assumptions.
A more general argument is that all scientific theories about the
universe, however advanced and complete they might be, remain
theories. There is no way they can ever explain why there is a reality
which behaves in accordance with the theory. A mathematical theory
which would explain how one could get a universe from nothing would
not give a physical universe, but the idea of a physical universe. All
evidence ispostfactum.1^ Reality is assumed rather than explained. This
applies also to my naturalist account.
That natural reality is assumed rather than explained, is not proof
for the existence of a creator. Introducing a god as an explanatory
notion only shifts the locus of the question: why would such a god exist?
And it is possible that the universe just happens to exist, without
explanation. Perhaps the craving for explanations is not appropriate
here. The limit-question is there, but it does not point to a specific
answer.
Why this order?
Our (observable) universe has a certain structure. It could perhaps
have been different. Even if we had laws which accounted for all
observations and experiments, we could still ask why these laws (or
(Drees 1990, yjl ), Isham (1993, especially 77!!) offers a discussion of such issues in relation to
Vilenkin's proposal. The general point with respect to cosmology has been articulated by,
amongst others, Heller (1987, 421) and Barrow (1988, 231).
(Drees 1990, 98-101). Unless one assumes a Platonic conception of mathematics, taking it as
dealing with real entities; the universe being one of those entities. But then the assumption of
existence has already been made with respect to mathematical entities.
Another possibility is that the explanation is not to be looked for at some deeper level, but in
the requirement of self-consistency. After a story about a boy who extracts himself out of a
marsh by pulling his bootstraps, this is called a bootstrap view. It is at the moment not
actively pursued in physics, though it was once a serious alternative to the more common
quantum field theory of the strong interactions (Gale 1974; Gushing 1985 and 1990; Balashow
1992, 3661T). I doubt that self-consistency can ever imply existence; however, I do want to
allow for the possibility that there might be only one consistent fundamental theory in physics
(see the next few paragraphs in the main text).
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whatever ingredients that are essential to our explanations) have been
implemented in reality rather than any other laws. '7
It might be that there are no such alternative schemes. Mathematical
consistency and the finiteness (of all potential observables) have been
very restrictive in particle physics (Drees 1990, 8gf.). I abstain from an
opinion on the claim that physics might converge on a single theory,
and the subsequent claim that it might be able to show that this would
be the only one possible, not only as an account of our observations
and experiments but as a consistent recipe for reality. These are grand
claims, but I do not see any strong objections, especially to the first part
of the claim; convergence on a single theory has some credibility given
the history of theories in high energy physics. However, the defence of
these claims would at least assume that the laws (or symmetries, or
whatever explanatory schemata involved) are to be mathematically
expressible and consistent. Perhaps some other assumptions are also
taken for granted; the history of science reveals our tendency to
overlook the 'small print' which accompanies grand claims, small print
which contains non-trivial assumptions of which people became aware
only much later. The adoption of such assumptions might constitute an
a posteriori component in the articulation of the ultimate theory. If there
were to be such an ultimate theory which was not only unique a
posteriori but also a priori, there would be no independent limit
question about the order of the universe. Rather, the order would be
given with existence (together with logical or mathematical criteria
such as consistency).
Questions, not evidence: the anthropic coincidences10
The universe, or at least the observable universe, has characteristic
features, such as its size and age, a certain average density of matter/
energy, three spatial dimensions, and certain values of fundamental
The order of treatment, first that of existence and then that of order, is not intended to
suggest that existence comes fint and order is subsequently implemented. The questions of
what there is and which laws apply to it are connected. For instance, whereas Newtonian
mechanics allows for all imaginable angular momenta, quantum electrodynamics restricts
spin to multiples of a fixed unit of angular momentum.
Original articulations of the anthropic principles go back to Robert H. Dicke in 1969 and
Brandon Carter in 1974; good sources are the review article (Carr and Rees 1979) and the
multi-faceted Barrow and Tipler (1986). I have developed the position presented here in
greater detail in Drees (1990, 78 89); the definitions follow those of Barrow and Tipler (1986,
15 22), except for the category of 'anthropic coincidences', which I introduced myself;
Kirschenmann (1992) comes to a similar assessment of their limited significance, though with
slightly different definitions of the terms; he has, in line with Carter (1974), the WAP referring
to our location in the universe, without considering alternative universes.
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constants which determine the relative strengths of the various forces.
A few cosmologists and physicists have toyed with the idea that some of
these features could have been different, and have calculated the
consequences of such alternatives for the development of the universe.
The conclusion of such thought experiments has been that most
changes in such characteristic features of our universe would have led
to a quite different universe, and more specifically a universe in which
carbon-based forms of life, such as humans and worms, could not have
developed the way they did. The universe seems remarkably fine-tuned
for life. The observation that life as we know it would not have arisen if
the universe had been slightly different is not itself a principle; I prefer
to speak of 'anthropic coincidences' when referring to the primary
conclusion of such thought experiments.
The Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP) is one of the responses to the
anthropic coincidences. The Weak Anthropic Principle states that what
we observe must be compatible with our existence as observers. For
instance, we see a universe which has existed for billions of years,
because it took billions of years to develop beings capable of deter-
mining the age of their universe. This 'principle' does not draw grand
conclusions from the coincidences. Rather, it is a methodological
reminder of the truism that our observations are biased in favour of
situations in which we can exist. If I were to live in a train, I would
always observe railroad crossings that were closed. The WAP would
not explain why the crossings are closed, or why our planet has a
surface temperature which permits liquid water, or why gravity is so
much weaker than electromagnetic forces; it only reminds us that if the
situation had been different, we would not have been able to observe it.
Some authors have combined the WAP with a belief in many actual
worlds (or regions of the universe, with our observable universe being
only a tiny part of the larger universe). If one assumes that all possible
universes are realised somewhere somehow, then the bias expressed in
the WAP explains why we happen to be where we are. Given an
extremely large number of monkeys typing for an extremely long time,
one might expect a flawless copy of a play of Shakespeare, as well as
many more copies which are almost flawless. However, such an
explanation of the origin of this work would not explain the origin of
the typing monkeys (many worlds), nor the way we pick as the
significant result the play (us), nor the probability of the result. All the
(limited) explanatory force is carried by the assumption of many actual
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worlds, which is not a conclusion from the evidence, but an assumption
used in addition to the evidence. There are stronger 'anthropic
principles', such as the Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP), which states
that the universe must have the properties which allow life (or
intelligent and observing life) to develop, and the Participatory
Anthropic Principle (PAP), which states that the universe exists in a
definite state because it is observed by conscious beings. Thus, we
would not be mere creatures, but 'central participators in the great
cosmic drama' (Eccles 1979, 31). Like the assumption of plenitude
(many worlds), such principles are not conclusions from the evidence,
but metaphysical assumptions used in addition to it.
One more variant, in explicit opposition to the idea of many worlds,
might be called the Theistic Anthropic Principle (TAP), a cosmological
variant of the argument from design. As John Polkinghorne (1986, 80)
wrote:
A possible explanation of equal intellectual respectability - and to my mind
greater economy and elegance - would be that this one world is the way it is
because it is the creation of a Creator who purposes that it should be so.
Such an apologetic argument does not work. It assumes that the
anthropic coincidences are here to stay as inexplicable coincidences.
However, some of them, or perhaps even all, may be explained by
future scientific theories. This has happened to traditional design-
arguments based on intra-cosmic adaptedness, and it has to some
extent already happened to the cosmological variant with the develop-
ment of inflationary scenarios in cosmology.
My conclusion, which could also be argued for by an analysis of claims
about the beginning of the universe or its contingency (Drees 1990,
igofl), is that our knowledge of the universe and the limitations to our
knowledge do not support metaphysical or theological claims as
expressed in SAP, PAP, and TAP, or, for instance, a claim about an
absolute beginning. We may develop further scientific explanatory
schemes (as, I expect, will be the case for most if not all the anthropic
coincidences). And, beyond each further explanation, we are left with
further questions whose formulation at any moment depends on the
state of science at that time.
The persistence of questions, even if one accepts a naturalist view
informed by the natural sciences, may lead some to a sense of gratitude
and wonder about the existence of our world. This wonder or
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puzzlement about the contingency of existence, and perhaps also of
order and intelligibility, is something that receives an answer of some
sort from faith in a transcendent God who endows the world with
existence and order. However, the move is not from science to faith, as
if such a God was the conclusion of an inference to the best explanation
of the natural world.
31.3. No reasons for radical transcendence
So far, I have argued that a view of God which emphasises the unique,
non-temporal character of God's existence and activity can be com-
bined with a naturalist view of the natural world (see also [13.3]).
However, this consistency has a price, namely in the emphasis on the
otherness and uniqueness of God. It seems to leave one with empty
hands when one attempts to offer grounds for adopting such a view,
and the religious significance of such a view seems limited. We will
briefly consider these two disadvantages.
If one defends that there is, for instance, evidence of divine design in
the biological realm, or of purpose and value in natural processes [30],
then the reasons for adopting a certain religious view are built in as the
best explanation of certain phenomena or as an attractive reformula-
tion of our view of reality (though a mere reformulation identifying
religious and non-religious terms appears to make the religious terms
superfluous). In this respect, such approaches are attractive in that they
argue not merely for the possibility, but, at the same time, for the
plausibility of a religious view, or at least relate it to some puzzlement
in human existence. However, if- as in the non-temporalist theological
view - the created world can be accepted as being self-contained in a
naturalist sense - there seem to be hardly any grounds for adopting
belief in anything 'more'; 'since there are no real "gaps" to fill, we may
be left without an argument for God's existence of the kind that would
convince a science-minded generation' (McMullin 1988, 74).
Two kinds of grounds for adopting such a position may none the less
be considered. One has been referred to already: there is a puzzlement
articulated in limit-questions, and especially in the question 'why is
there something rather than nothing', which is to some extent answered
by introducing the concept of a creator. However, a similar question
with respect to the existence of that creator may be posed again, unless
one argues that such a creator necessarily exists - not only necessarily
given the world, but necessarily in a more radical, a priori way. This is
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what ontological arguments for the existence of God seek to achieve
when they attempt to deduce the existence of God from the concept of
God. In my view, the various variants of such an ontological argument
fail to deliver existence without presupposing existence.19 Hence,
arguing for belief in an atemporal, transcendent God on the basis of
limit-questions is not beyond dispute. One might as well hold, for
instance, that the world just happens to exist - there may be a question,
but without an answer.
Rather than turning to philosophical limit questions, one might also
adopt belief in a transcendent creator on the basis of particular
experiences or a particular tradition, such as the Christian one with its
testimonies about God's creative activity and God's love for us,
testimonies which are rooted in experiences in the history of Israel and
with Jesus of Nazareth. However, such a move assumes that there is a
basis in the historical realm where none was found in the physical and
biological realms. This split between the domain of the natural sciences
and history or anthropology neglects (or, more friendly, does not
accept) the coherence within a naturalist view of reality, since it now
seeks meaningful 'gaps' in the natural world, though not in the
processes described by physics and biology, but in historical and
psychological processes. Such an approach encounters the problems
which arise when humans with their experiences and traditions are
understood as part of the natural world [chapter 4].
There is one more option, and that is to abstain from giving any
grounds. This way of making a virtue out of necessity seems to be the
strategy of theologians who emphasise that they want to do without
'natural theology'. Coherence, or at least consistency, may be consid-
ered enough. However, this is a strategy which is at variance with
ordinary scientific practice, where we not only seek to eliminate
inconsistencies but also try to analyse how certain phenomena rest
upon the underlying processes. For instance, evolutionary epistemology
is an attempt not only to articulate an epistemology consistent with
evolution, but rather to explain why (and to what extent) we can know
the world by building upon our reconstruction of evolutionary
processes in our past.20
A careful defence of this conclusion, drawing on modal logic, can be found in Hubbeling
('987, 99f.)-
Gerhard Vollmer (1990, 6), in a foreword to a theological study of evolutionary epistemology
(Luke 1990), concludes that Luke's theological study does not explicate why one should take a
theological perspective; it is precisely on this issue of justification that he sees the most
significant difference between a theological and a naturalist approach.
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Even if one were to accept the mystery of existence as a ground for
belief in a transcendent non-temporal God, such a philosophical
concept of God is fairly empty. There is no ground to understand
faith in such a God as faith in a person; nor does it inspire devotion
to a way of life or a specific attitude towards the world and to other
persons in the world, except perhaps for a general sense of gratitude
and wonder, as mentioned above. The primary form of faith in this
philosophical approach is 'belief that', namely belief in the philoso-
phical proposition that there is a transcendent entity to which the
natural world owes its existence (see [3.2] for various concepts of
faith). A philosophical approach may result in a richer concept if
limit questions other than that about existence are analysed and
included, especially questions concerning moral and aesthetic values
and the intelligibility of the universe. However, such an approach
will not match the richness of patterns of worship, examples of
proper ways of life, and concepts of God and God's love for humans
which have arisen in religious traditions. Given such problems with
an approach which focuses on the most general aspects of a
naturalist view, I will in the next and final section present a view
which seeks to take the particularity of religious traditions into
account.
32. RELIGIONS FOR WANDERING AND WONDERING HUMANS
In the preceding section we considered a theological approach which
accepts the natural world as God's creation, while qualifying God's
unique mode of creative action in such a way that no problems due
to a naturalist view of the natural world can ensue. A disadvantage
of such an approach is that it bypasses particular religious traditions
with the orientation that they may offer for religious ways of life.
Earlier we considered theological views which take as primary data
the richness of particular religious traditions, which were understood
as evolved responses to reality [26]. A problem with these ap-
proaches is that they attempt to reach beyond an evolutionary
understanding of adaptations as adaptations to local environments in
order to make claims about some ultimate reality which is tolerant
(Theissen), or in which 'is' and 'ought' coincide, since altruism and
love express basic ontological principles (Hefner). Such claims seem
to me to expect a deeper ontological foundation for tolerance or
goodness in the natural world than is warranted. However, their
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emphasis on the value of particular religious traditions is important.
Humans live in parts of the actual world, at particular times and
places; their native tongue is not language, but a particular language;
they are immersed in some culture. They also relate to particular
religious traditions. Some people are totally immersed in a tradition;
others are confronted with a variety of traditions, and seek to
respond to that variety.
There are different ways of responding intellectually to the variety
of religious traditions. One might attempt to find common features
in underlying processes or common first principles, either through
analysis of actual religions or via a more formal, for example,
Kantian, approach. However, neither way of seeking common
features, and thereby a basis for claims which reach beyond the
particularities of traditions, seems to do sufficient justice to the
variety of religions. A more promising approach is to consider
religious practices in relation to their own contexts and their own
history, and to see how, for instance, cosmogonie beliefs, conceptions
of ethical order, and social circumstances interact (Lovin and
Reynolds 1985). Such an approach in the study of religion is an
obvious extension of an evolutionary approach, where organisms are
also studied in relation to the environments in which these organisms
function and in relation to the history of environments and organ-
isms that resulted in the situation considered. Such a study of
religions is something that surpasses the context of this book, but it
forms the background of the first part of this section, where I will
return to major characteristics of religious traditions, or at least
characteristics which are typical of the way we mostly use the notion
'religious tradition'. Then, I will propose criteria which may be
employed in selecting and modifying traditions, which are part of
our heritage as wandering humans.
However, humans are not only beings enmeshed in their particular
situations. They also speculate about the world beyond their local
environment. In the sciences, such speculations have reached remark-
able heights, resulting in the understanding of many phenomena and
the discovery of new phenomena. In the speculations of science, we
seem to reach beyond particularities, although the achievements of
science are acquired through the study of details and not through
reflections of a more general kind. In theological thinking there is a
drive towards universality and abstraction which resembles the move in
science from particular contexts to an understanding which covers
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different contexts. Wondering humans may receive answers from
science, but beyond the answers arise further questions which science
does not answer.
Wandering humans: a variety of particular traditions
Religious traditions are complex entities. Each one offers a particular
language, with certain metaphors and concepts. When in the preface I
suggested that when we stand before the divine throne on the day of
judgement, God will not ask about creation 'How did I do it?', but
rather 'What did you do with it?', I was using a particular religious
image, embedded in a tradition. When we consider this example, we
also may note another aspect of a religious tradition, namely that via its
metaphors, concepts, and images it evokes a conception of moral and
spiritual good life. A way of life may be suggested by parables, as for
instance that of the Good Samaritan helping a stranger from another
culture (Luke 10: 29—37), DY historical narratives (such as various
accounts of prophets protesting against injustice, or of Jesus forgiving
those who persecuted him) and it may be articulated in command-
ments, such as the Ten Commandments (Deuteronomy 5: 6-21). Such
a way of life need not always strengthen the conformity of the believer
to the expectations of the larger community; it may also emphasise
individual responsibility even where the individual goes counter to the
interests of others. Such a way of life is not only a practical matter. It is
oriented by an ultimate ideal which surpasses any actual achievable goal
or situation. Thus, religious traditions include elements such as 'the
Kingdom', 'Paradise', 'Heaven', 'Nirvana', immortality, emptiness,
openness, perfection, or unconditional love. Such notions function as
regulative ideals with which actual behaviour is contrasted in order to
evaluate it.
A tradition's way of life is affirmed and strengthened by the
particular forms of worship and devotion of that religious tradition.
Worship and other forms of ritual behaviour express and nourish the
individual and communal spirituality in relation to the joys, sorrows,
and challenges of life, and to the conceptions and ultimate ideals of
good life.
Religious traditions are not only ways of life; believers see their
religious way of life as rooted in certain claims about historical events,
ultimate destiny, or authoritative commandments. These claims are
supposed to justify the way of life espoused by a tradition as corre-
sponding to the way one should live one's life; justified because they
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derive from an authoritative source, because they deliver future
happiness, or because they correspond to the way reality is intended to
be or, deep down, really is.21
I assume that other languages may be equally adequate and beautiful -
until I find reason to conclude otherwise - but I still have a particular
native tongue, namely Dutch, which I consider very adequate and
beautiful. I intend to respect other people as all being, in principle,
worthy of my interest and engagement - until I find reason to think
otherwise - but I am involved in more intense personal bonds with
only a few friends and relatives. Similarly, I know that there is a variety
of religious traditions, and I intend to grant them all initial respect.
However, there is a particular tradition which I have encountered most
intensely, and that is the Christian one, in a liberal Protestant form
which was strongly influenced by the European Enlightenment. I have
found elements of value in this tradition - in most of its parables and in
some of its hymns, in a few of its representatives and in many
articulations of ideals of justice nourished by it.
Just as cognitive variety is not to be dismissed in the sciences [27], so
too may religious variety be acceptable, natural, and valuable in a
naturalist perspective. The variety of ways of life may well be a rich
resource and a colourful element in our own time. Variety is to be
expected, since we deal with human experiences (of various kinds in a
wide variety of contexts), and different forms of ritual behaviour and
different guiding ideals of human flourishing may be entertained.
However, no tradition is beyond dispute and beyond development.
There is no reason to dismiss at once such complex cultural entities as
religious traditions as being at odds with natural science, but neither do
we have to accept our own tradition, or any other, without critical
scrutiny nor as a yes-or-no package deal. Change is characteristic of
our history, and there is no need to exclude religious traditions from it
[chapter 2].
A particular tradition (or stage of, or element in, a tradition) may, of
Such characteristics may also apply to 'ideologies', such as belief in a classless society
(regulative ideal), in combination with indications about the proper way of life in the current
stage of history (class struggle); an ideology which may be supposed to rest in, and thus derive
its authority from, unavoidable historical processes; such political ideologies could be
considered as religions of some sort. Rather than the question of whether the word 'religion'
may be applied, the important issue is whether there are any criteria by which we can defend
a preference for one view over another.
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course, have to be rejected as outdated. One reason, which corre-
sponds well with an evolutionary view, is that the actual circumstances
have changed, and that therefore models of good life or forms of
worship may have to change. Such is certainly the case when we
consider the human condition today: we are vastly more numerous,
stand in a fundamentally different relation to nature (which is threa-
tened by us rather than that we are significantly threatened by wild
animals); we are more powerful than before, and we are confronted
with neighbours across the globe. In relation to such changes, tradi-
tional models and metaphors may be employed differently, or they
may be understood as they always were but this may now be
inappropriate to the circumstances (for example since they fuel the
exploitation of natural resources).
Not only have our circumstances changed, but so have our moral
and spiritual sensitivities, for example with respect to conflicts between
ethnic or religious groups, slavery, or cruelty to animals. To this
process of change have contributed religious traditions, changing
circumstances, a wider encounter with other cultures, and philoso-
phical insights. We evaluate traditions also by the moral and spiritual
life they support. These changes have not, in most instances, much to
do with science, though they reflect the general characteristic of a
naturalist approach of relating the behaviour of biological organisms to
the contexts in which they live.
One more reason, but not the most important one, is the cognitive
credibility of a tradition. If the images which support the way of life are
not recognisable, or if the claims by which the way of life is justified
have become incredible (and thus do no longer justify it), then that too
challenges the religious tradition, though more indirectly than chal-
lenges to the appropriateness of the circumstances of the way of life
and to its moral and spiritual adequacy.
Granted that we may have to discard some traditions or may have to
modify them, why would one keep alive any such tradition? The reason
is, in my opinion, that they are useful and powerful. They are useful
and powerful, not only for unreflective moments and persons, but also
for reflective and well informed persons. No human is only a rational
being who could entertain all his motives and desires consciously and
intentionally; the structure of our brains is such that much goes on
which is not dealt with consciously. This is the risk involved in religious
forms of behaviour (since so much cannot be scrutinised consciously)
and the reason for their importance: through religious metaphors and
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forms of behaviour we address reality especially in a way which
confronts us with ideals, with what ought to be, with a vision of a better
world, or with images of a paradisiacal past or an ultimate comforting
presence (for similar views, see Eaves (1991), and in [26]).
At this point, authors such as Hefner and Theissen (see [26]) propose
another argument: we entertain religious traditions because they are
true to the way things 'really are' or to the way reality ultimately is.
This seems to me to be a claim which goes - when understood in a
realist way - too far beyond, if not counter to, experience. And there is
also a theological reason for hesitation. If the religious ideals are
claimed to correspond to the way reality really is, the crucial function
of a tradition, namely in providing a guiding vision which shapes our
way of life, is undermined [3.3; 17.3]. However, the identification of an
ideal and ultimate reality also serves an important function. Talking
about aims and values in terms of 'the way things really are' is to use a
figure of speech which expresses basic trust, an appeal to a higher
authority than the local environment.
Wondering humans: Limit-questions
There is another aspect of religious traditions, where we also reach
beyond the local environment. Humans have, with the development of
consciousness and communication, contemplated questions about the
world in which they found themselves. Many of their speculative
answers may have been functional; anthropologists and other scholars
in comparative religious studies have found that creation myths and
other cosmogonies are not merely speculative attempts at explanation,
but ways of presenting and justifying moral imperatives and social
structures, or in some other way are 'indications of a very general
human effort to relate the changing requirements of action to a
permanent and unchanging order of things' (Lovin and Reynolds 1985,
i). However, some speculations may well be useless, toy with the
possibilities of thinking, or at least reach beyond what is sufficient for
the circumstances of the moment. In earlier ages, answers to specula-
tive questions may have been closely allied with the way the world was
experienced, which is still to a large extent reflected in our manifest
image of the world. In this manifest image, persons are the major
agents from which action proceeds. Hence, it is not very amazing that
animist ways of speaking about the world have become widespread;
experiences with many phenomena are modelled after expériences
with human agents. Sometimes, such agents are understood as residing
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in the phenomena, say as spirits, and sometimes, the agent is thought of
as a god who transcends the phenomena but acts through them.
Such models are still with us; animist ways of speaking about cars or
computers are common, and many persons discern intentions behind
bad luck such as being struck by a disease. I consider the belief in such
intentions a remnant of earlier times when manifest ways of speaking
were not yet corrected through the development of scientific images;
such ways of speaking and thinking are interesting as phenomena but
they are not credible given our knowledge of cars and cancers.
However, even though earlier answers have lost their credibility and
questions may have changed their appearance, humans can still be
wondering persons, contemplating questions that transcend our current
answers. Religious traditions offer answers to such questions, but -
more importantly, in my view - they are thereby also ways of posing
such questions, and thus ways of nourishing sensitivity to such ques-
tions. Earlier I quoted the physicist Misner (1977, 96) who said: 'Saying
that God created the Universe does not explain either God or the
Universe, but it keeps our consciousness alive to mysteries of awesome
majesty that we might otherwise ignore, and that deserve our respect.'
Maintaining this speculative openness is one role of limit-questions.
They also may serve another role, in relation to the particular religious
traditions, namely relativising them. I will come to this conclusion via a
discussion of views of the relations between the two ways, the
philosophical view of a radical transcendent God and the variety of
particular religious traditions.
I have introduced two approaches to religion; we have considered the
variety of particular traditions, each functional in its own way in
certain circumstances, though none is in a position to claim to be
adequate or true independent of circumstances, and we have consid-
ered religious speculations as they arise in relation to reflection on
philosophical questions. How do these two approaches relate to each
other?
One fairly direct claim would be that the two approaches,
independently, bring us to the same conclusions. For instance, in both
approaches there is a sense of mystery, of aspects of reality which
cannot be fully articulated in concepts. However, the 'ineffable' in the
view of Eaves reflects the fact that whatever is coded in our genes and
culture is only secondarily accessible through language; this is an
immanent understanding of 'mystery', whereas the openness of
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naturalism in its limit-questions might be linked to a mystery
transcending our reality. The two may resemble each other in spirit,
but they are not identical.
Another possible claim is that science offers evidence in support of a
theological view. Because, as argued above, reflections on ultimate
questions do not provide answers, the openness does not provide
evidence in support of any particular religious point of view. Nor could
the particular views of any religious tradition serve as evidence for
certain answers to the limit-questions of cosmology; they do not reach
that far. However, they could serve as proposals for answers to those
limit-questions. Religious traditions which propose answers to limit-
questions should avoid overstatement; religions should not propose
answers which are at odds with what is known, nor should they wish to
propose answers which upset the integrity of the world as discerned
through the natural sciences. One might also opt for a more rigorous
agnostic stance with respect to the limit-questions, with whatever
further attitudes are deemed appropriate.
In my view, the two approaches can complement each other. I do
not mean that they together result in a complete view, but I suggest
that we see them as independent contributions which can be brought
together in a larger world view. The openness expressed in the limit-
questions may induce a sense of wonder and gratitude about the reality
to which we belong. Such a cosmological approach might primarily be
at home with a mystical form of religion, a sense of unity and
belonging, as well as dependence upon something which surpasses our
world. The functional view of religion offers some opportunities for a
prophetic form of religion, with a contrast between what is the case
and what is believed ought to be the case. The contrast might be seen
as a consequence of our evolutionary past, which has endowed us with
wisdom that is encoded in our constitution and in our culture
(including religious traditions).
Not everything that is 'wisdom' of the past has the same character-
istics. On an evolutionary view, the structures of our eyes and of our
immune-system can be considered 'wisdom of the body' which provides
some useful capacities and defences. This 'wisdom of the body' is
experienced purely as a given; we could not choose to have a different
eye-colour. Religious traditions are phenomena which differ from
physical characteristics in that they embody an awareness of a reality
which is different from the reality of our daily lives. Furthermore, this
'other reality' is experienced in such a way that it reflects upon our
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individual and social behaviour, for instance by promoting a quietistic
acceptance or an activist rejection of social inequalities. That religions
embody a sense of transcendence with respect to our situation is not a
peculiar consequence of phenomena which already have the label
'religion'; rather, it is the kind of characteristic which makes us label
certain phenomena religious.
Such religious wisdom is to some extent independent from the actual
situation which we face. Hence, it may serve as an external reference,
an apparent Archimedean position outside the actual situation, in
reference to which one might judge human decisions in the actual
situation. However, such 'prophetic' wisdom transcends the current
situation, but is tied to an earlier one. Hence, it may not be adequate
in the new situation, where consequences may be different; blind
application is never justified.
Another way to articulate a prophetic element is to argue that
evolution has endowed us with the capacity for imagination, for
reconsidering our situation from a different perspective. This capacity
has as its limit the regulative ideal of an impartial view transcending all
our perspectival views. That such a point of view is inaccessible, is
beneficial since it protects us from fanaticism; if one were inclined to
believe that one's view could be the final one, one would not be incited
to self-questioning (Sutherland 1984, no). It is precisely in this role that
the speculative approach with a radical notion of divine transcendence
[31] may be of major significance in our dealings with particular
traditions; this role of transcendence and the possible reasons given
above for considering a tradition outdated or in need of modification
relative to the given variety of particular beliefs resembles the role of
the capacity for moral deliberation and for epistemologically more
advanced forms of testing beliefs in reconsidering our particular
psychologically constituted moral intuitions and belief-forming me-
chanisms [25, 27]. When considered in relation to the radical concept
of divine transcendence all regulative ideals as they arise in particular
religious traditions are relativised; they can never lay unrestricted claim
to our allegiance.
We know, collectively, a great deal about our world. I have only given
a bare outline of our knowledge, whereas its richness is in the details.
Our knowledge is also limited. Certain phenomena may be intractable,
even though they fit into the naturalist framework. And limit-questions
regarding the whole naturalist framework can be posed, but will not be
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answered. The novelist John Fowles has given a positive appreciation
of such limitations to our knowledge.
We are in the best possible situation because everywhere, below the surface,
we do not know; we shall never know why; we shall never know tomorrow; we
shall never know a god or if there is a god; we shall never even know ourselves.
This mysterious wall round our world and our perception of it is not there to
frustrate us but to train us back to the now, to life, to our time being. (Fowles
1980, 20)
I wonder how Fowles knows that we shall never know. He even knows
why we do not know: to train us back to life!
'To train us back to life': the notion of such a purpose of our
limitations is inadequate with respect to the evolutionary process which
has saddled us with these limitations; it has simply happened that we
are endowed with our capacities and our limitations. However, the
emphasis on the wider context of knowledge, our lives, fits well. Our
knowledge and our capacity for knowledge have arisen in the midst of
life, and if we are to use them anywhere at all, it will have to be there.
They allow us to wonder about that which transcends and sustains our
reality, but all the time we wander in the reality in which we live,
move, and have our being; to its future we contribute our lives.
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